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

The Ceremony of Preparing the Holy Oil

Photogravure. — From Drawing by Martin

Illustrated Library Edition

MY CONFESSION
DOGMATIC THEOLOGY
MY RELIGION
ON LIFE

By

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Translated from the Original Russian
and edited by

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MY CONFESSION

Introduction to the Critique of Dogmatic Theology and Investigation of the Christian Teaching

1879 – 1882

that information as something exceedingly interesting and quite probable.

I also remember how, when my eldest brother, Dmítri, who was a student at the university, suddenly with a passion which was characteristic of his nature abandoned himself to faith and began to attend all the services, to fast, and to lead a pure and moral life, all of us, even the grown persons, never stopped making him a butt of ridicule, and for some reason called him Noah. I remember how Músin-Púshkin, who at that time was the Curator of the Kazán University and who invited us to come to a dance at his house, tried in jest to persuade my brother, who declined to come, by telling him that even David had danced before the ark. At that time I sympathized with the jests of my elders and deduced the conclusion from it that the Catechism ought to be taught, that church ought to be attended, but that all that ought not to be taken too seriously. I also remember that I was very young when I read Voltaire, and that his ridicule not only did not provoke me, but even amused me very much.

My defection from faith took place in the same manner as it has taken place and still takes place in people of our cultivated class. In the majority of cases it happens like this, I think: people live as everybody else lives, and everybody else lives on the basis of principles that not only have nothing in common with the religious teaching, but generally run counter to it; the religious teaching does not enter into life, and in one's relation with other people one never has occasion to come across it, and in one's own life one never has occasion to refer to it; this religious teaching is professed somewhere there, far away from life and independently of it. If you come in contact with it, it is with its external phenomenon, which is not connected with life.

From a man's life, from his acts, it is impossible now,

as it was then, to find out whether he is a believer or not. If there is a difference between one who openly professes Orthodoxy and one who denies it, it is not in favour of the first. The open recognition and profession of Orthodoxy has generally been met with in dull, cruel, and self-important people, while intelligence, honesty, straightforwardness, good-heartedness, and morality are generally met with in people who profess to be unbelievers.

In the schools the pupils are taught the Catechism and are sent to church; officials have to show certificates of having received their communion. But a man of our circle, who is no longer studying and is not holding a government position, may nowadays pass dozens of years, — and formerly that was even more the case, — without thinking once that he is living among Christians and himself is professing the Christian Orthodox faith.

Thus, now as then, the religious teaching, which is accepted through confidence and is supported through external pressure, slowly melts under the influence of knowledge and the experiences of life, which are contrary to the religious teaching, and a man frequently goes on imagining that the religious teaching with which he has been imbued in childhood is in full force in him, whereas there is not even a trace left of it.

S——, an intelligent and truthful man, told me how he came to stop believing. When he was twenty-six years old he once at a night's rest during the chase followed his old habit, acquired in his childhood, and stood up to pray. His elder brother, who took part in the chase, was lying on the hay and looking at him. When S—— got through and was about to lie down, he said to him: "So you are still doing these things?"

That was all that was said. And S—— that very day quit praying and attending church. Thirty years have passed since he stopped praying, receiving the com-

munion, and going to church. Not that he knew the convictions of his brother and had joined them, not that he had decided on anything in his mind, but only because the sentence which his brother had uttered was like the pressure exerted with a finger against a wall which was ready to fall of its own weight; the sentence was merely an indication that where he thought there was faith there had long been a vacant spot, and that, therefore, the words which he spoke and the signs of the cross and the obeisances which he made during his praying were quite meaningless actions. Since he had come to recognize their meaninglessness, he could not keep them up any longer.

Thus it has always been with an enormous majority of people. I am speaking of people of our degree of culture, of people who are true to themselves, and not of those who use the very subject of faith as a means for obtaining any temporary ends. (These people are most confirmed unbelievers, for, if the faith is to them a means for obtaining any social advantages, it is no longer faith.) The people of our degree of education are in that condition when the light of knowledge and of life has melted the artificial structure, and they have either noticed it and have cleared the place, or have not yet noticed it.

The religious teaching which was imparted to me in my childhood disappeared in me just as in others, with this difference only that, since I began to read philosophical works at fifteen years of age, my apostasy very early became conscious. With my sixteenth year I quit praying and through my own initiative stopped attending church and preparing myself for communion. I did not believe in what I had been told in my childhood, but I believed in something. I should never have been able to say what it was I believed in. I believed in God, or, more correctly, I did not deny God, but what kind of a God, I should have been at a loss to say. Nor did I deny

Christ and his teaching, but what his teaching consisted in, I should also have been at a loss to say.

Now, as I recall that time, I see clearly that my faith, that something which, outside the animal instincts, moved my life, my only, real faith at that time was a belief in perfection. But what that perfection consisted in, or what its aims were, I should have been unable to say. I tried to perfect myself mentally, — I studied everything that I could and that life brought me in contact with ; I tried to perfect my will and formed rules which I tried to follow ; I perfected myself physically, prompting my strength and agility with all kinds of exercises, and practising endurance and patience in all kinds of privations. All that I regarded as perfection. At first it was, of course, moral perfection, but soon it was changed to perfection in general, that is, to a desire to be better, not before myself or before God, but before other people. And soon that tendency to be better before people gave place to a desire to be stronger than other people, that is, more famous, more influential, richer than others.

II.

Some day I will tell the history of my life, — it is both touching and instructive, — for those ten years of my youth. I think many, very many, have experienced the same. I wished with all my heart to be good ; but I was young, I had passions, and I was alone, completely alone, when I was trying to find the good. Every time I endeavoured to give utterance to what formed my most intimate wishes, namely, that I wished to be morally good, I met with contempt and ridicule ; and the moment I surrendered myself to the abominable passions, I was praised and encouraged.

Ambition, lust of power, selfishness, voluptuousness, pride, anger, revenge, — all that was respected. By abandoning myself to these passions I became like a grown person, and I felt that people were satisfied with me. A good aunt of mine, a pure soul, with whom I was living, kept telling me that there was nothing she wished so much for me as that I should have a liaison with a married woman : *" Rien ne forme un jeune homme, comme une liaison avec une femme comme il faut ;"* there was another piece of luck she wished for me, and that was that I should be an adjutant, preferably an adjutant to the emperor ; and the greatest piece of luck, that I might marry a very rich girl so that, in consequence of this marriage, I might have a very large number of slaves.

I cannot recall those years without dread, loathing, and anguish of heart. I killed people in war and challenged to duels to kill ; I lost money at cards, wasting the labour

of the peasants ; I punished them, fornicated, and cheated. Lying, stealing, acts of lust of every description, drunkenness, violence, murder — There was not a crime which I did not commit, and for all that I was praised, and my contemporaries have regarded me as a comparatively moral man.

Thus I lived for ten years.

At that time I began to write through vanity, avarice, and pride. In my writings I did the same as in life. In order to have glory and money, for which I wrote, I had to conceal what was good and speak what was bad. And so I did. How often I managed to conceal in my writings, under the aspect of indifference and even light ridicule, those strivings of mine after the good, which formed the meaning of my life. I was successful in that, and I was praised.

When I was twenty-six years old, I arrived in St. Petersburg after the war, and there came in contact with authors. I was received like one of their own, and was flattered. Before I had time to look around, the conventional literary views of life, which these persons whom I met held, were appropriated by me and completely wiped out all my former attempts to become better. These views furnished the looseness of my morals with a theory which justified it.

The view of life which these people, my literary fellows, held, consisted in stating that life was all the time developing, and that in this development the chief part was taken by us, the men of ideas, and that among these men of ideas the greatest influence was exerted by us, artists and poets. Our calling was to teach people. In order that the natural question, " What do I know, and what shall I teach ? " might not present itself to one, this theory explained that it was not necessary to know that, and that an artist and poet taught unconsciously. I was considered a marvellous artist and poet, and so it was quite

natural for me to make this theory my own. I, the artist and poet, wrote and taught, myself not knowing what. For this I was paid, and I had excellent food, quarters, women, society; I had fame. Consequently, what I taught was very good.

Faith in the meaning of poetry and in progress in life was a creed, and I was one of its priests. It was very agreeable and profitable to be its priest, and I lived for a long time in that belief, never doubting its truth. But in the second and, especially, in the third year of that life I began to have my doubts about the infallibility of that faith, and started to investigate it. What gave me the first impulse to these misgivings was the fact, which I noticed, that all those priests were not at one among themselves. Some said: "We are the best and most useful teachers; we teach what is necessary, but the others teach incorrectly." And others said: "No, we are the real ones, but you teach incorrectly." And they disputed, quarrelled, scolded, cheated, and deceived each other. Besides, there were many people among us who did not trouble themselves to find out who was right and who wrong, but who simply attained their selfish ends by means of that activity of ours. All that made me doubt the truth of our faith.

Besides, having lost faith in the truth of my literary creed, I began to observe the priests more closely, and I convinced myself that nearly all the priests of that faith, the authors, were immoral people and, for the most part, bad people, insignificant as to their character, who stood much lower than those men whom I used to meet in my former riotous and military life; but they were self-confident and self-satisfied, as only such men can be who either are great saints or who do not know what sanctity is. I got sick of those people, and I got sick of myself, and I understood that that faith was a deception.

But what is strange is that, although I soon compre-

hended all that lying faith and renounced it, I did not renounce the rank which I was given by those men, — that of artist, poet, teacher. I naïvely imagined that I was a poet, an artist, and that I could teach others, not knowing myself what I was teaching. That was what I did.

From my association with these people I carried away a new vice, — a morbidly developed pride and an insane conviction that I was called to teach people, myself not knowing what.

Now that I think of that time, of my mental state, and of the mental state of those men (however, there are thousands of such even nowadays), I feel pity, and terror, and amusement; there arises precisely the feeling that one experiences in a madhouse.

We were all convinced at that time that we must talk and talk, and write, and print, as fast as possible, and that that was necessary for the good of humanity. And thousands of us, denying and cursing one another, printed and wrote, teaching others. And, without noticing that we knew nothing, that to the simplest question of life, — what is good, and what bad, — we did not know what answer to give, we all spoke together, without listening to our neighbours, and now and then encouraged and praised each other, so that we, too, might be encouraged and praised, and now and then were irritated toward one another, precisely as in a madhouse.

Thousands of workmen day and night worked with all their strength, setting type and printing millions of words, and the post-office spread them all over Russia, and we proceeded to teach, and did not have time enough to teach everything, and kept growing angry because little attention was paid to us.

It is all very strange, but now it is easy to understand. Our real, intimate calculation was that we wanted to get as much money and praise as possible. In order to ob-

tain this end we had nothing to do but write books and newspaper articles. And that we did. But, in order to do such a useless piece of work and be confident that we were very important people, we needed a consideration which would justify our activity, and so we concocted the following: everything which exists is reasonable. Everything which exists develops; everything is developed by means of culture; culture is measured by the dissemination of books and newspapers. We are paid and respected for writing books and newspapers, consequently we are most useful and good men. This reflection would have been very nice, if all of us had been of one mind; but, since for every idea, expressed by one man, there always appeared another idea, diametrically opposed to the first, as expressed by another, that ought to have made us reflect. But we did not observe that; we received money, and the men belonging to our party praised us, consequently we every one of us considered ourselves in the right.

Now it is clear to me that there was no difference between that and a madhouse; but at that time I only dimly suspected that, and, like all insane persons, called everybody insane but myself.

III.

Thus I lived, abandoning myself to that insanity for six years longer, until my marriage. During that time I went abroad. My life in Europe and my associations with prominent men and scholars in Europe confirmed me even more in that faith of perfection in general, in which I was living, because I found the same faith in others. This faith assumed with me that customary form which it has with the majority of cultured people of our time. This faith was expressed by the word "progress." At that time I thought that that word expressed something. I did not yet understand then that, tormented, like any live man, by the questions as to how to live in the best manner possible, I, by saying that I ought to do so in conformity with progress, was giving the same kind of an answer that a man might give, who, being borne in a bark by the waves and by the wind, to the one important question of whither to keep his course, should not reply to the question, but should say: "We are being borne somewhere."

At that time I did not notice it. Only now and then, not my reason, but my feeling, revolted against that common superstition of our time, with which people veil from themselves the comprehension of life. Thus, during my stay in Paris, the sight of a capital punishment showed me the frailty of my superstition of progress. When I saw the head severed from the body, and both falling separately with a thud into a box, I understood, not with my reason, but with my whole being, that no

theories of the reasonableness of everything existing and of progress could justify that deed, and that if all men on earth, beginning with the creation, had some theory which made this necessary, — I knew that it was not necessary, that it was bad, and that, therefore, not what people said and did, and not progress, but I with my heart was the judge of what was good and necessary. Another occasion which made me conscious of the insufficiency for life of the superstition of progress was the death of my brother. An intelligent, good, serious man, he grew sick when he was young, suffered for more than a year, and died an agonizing death, without comprehending what he had lived for, and still less why he should die. No theories could give any answers either to me or to him, during his slow and painful death. But those were only rare cases of doubt; in reality I continued to live professing the faith of progress. "Everything develops, and I, too, am developing; why I am developing with the rest, will appear later." That is the way I ought to have then formulated my faith.

When I returned from abroad, I settled in the country and hit upon busying myself with the peasant schools. That occupation was particularly to my liking, because in it there was not that apparent lie which had appalled me in the activity of my literary teachership. Here also I worked in the name of progress, but this time I assumed a critical attitude toward progress. I said to myself that progress in some of its manifestations took place irregularly, and that it was necessary to treat the primitive men, the peasant children, in a free way, by letting them choose the path of progress which they wished. In reality, I was still gyrating around one and the same insoluble problem, which was that I should teach not knowing what. In the higher spheres of my literary activity I saw that it was not possible to teach not knowing what

to teach, because I observed that everybody was teaching in his own way, and that by disputing among themselves the men tried to conceal their ignorance; but here, with the peasant children, I thought that the difficulty might be obviated by leaving it to the children to learn what they pleased. Now it is ludicrous for me to think how I temporized in order to gratify my desire to teach, although in the depth of my soul I knew full well that I could not teach what was necessary, because I did not myself know what was necessary. After a year passed in occupations with the school, I went abroad again, in order to learn there how, without knowing anything myself, I might teach others.

I thought that I learned that abroad, and, armed with all that wisdom, I returned to Russia in the year of the liberation of the serfs and, accepting the position of a rural judge, I began to teach the uneducated masses in the schools and the educated people in the periodical which I published. Things apparently went well, but I felt that I was mentally not quite well and that it would not last long. I might have arrived even then at that despair at which I arrived fifteen years later, if I had not had another side of life, which I had not yet explored and which promised me salvation, — my domestic life.

For a year I acted as a rural judge and busied myself with my schools and my periodical, and I was so worn out, especially because I became so much involved, and my struggle in my capacity as rural judge was so oppressive to me, and my activity in the schools was so pale, and I grew so tired of wagging my tongue in my periodical, which still consisted in the same thing, — in the desire to teach others and conceal the fact that I did not know what to teach, — that I grew sick, mentally rather than physically, and gave up everything and went to live with the Bashkirs of the steppe, — to breathe the air, drink kumys, and live an animal life.

When I came back, I got married. The new conditions of my happy family life completely drew me away from all search for the general meaning of life. All my life during that time was centred in my family, my wife, my children, and, therefore, in cares for the increase of the means of existence. The striving after perfection, which before had given way to the striving after perfection in general, after progress, now gave way simply to the striving after making it as comfortable as possible for me and my family.

Thus another fifteen years passed.

Although I regarded authorship as a waste of time, I continued to write during those fifteen years. I had tasted of the seduction of authorship, of the seduction of enormous monetary remunerations and applauses for my insignificant labour, and so I submitted to it, as being a means for improving my material condition and for stifling in my soul all questions about the meaning of my life and life in general.

In my writings I advocated, what to me was the only truth, that it was necessary to live in such a way as to derive the greatest comfort for oneself and one's family.

Thus I proceeded to live, but five years ago something very strange began to happen with me: I was overcome by minutes at first of perplexity and then of an arrest of life, as though I did not know how to live or what to do, and I lost myself and was dejected. But that passed, and I continued to live as before. Then those minutes of perplexity were repeated oftener and oftener, and always in one and the same form. These arrests of life found their expression in ever the same questions: "Why? Well, and then?"

At first I thought that those were simply aimless, inappropriate questions. It seemed to me that that was all well known and that if I ever wanted to busy myself with their solution, it would not cost me much labour, —

that now I had no time to attend to them, but that if I wanted to I should find the proper answers. But the questions began to repeat themselves oftener and oftener, answers were demanded more and more persistently, and, like dots that fall on the same spot, these questions, without any answers, thickened into one black blotch.

There happened what happens with any person who falls ill with a mortal internal disease. At first there appear insignificant symptoms of indisposition, to which the patient pays no attention; then these symptoms are repeated more and more frequently and blend into one temporally indivisible suffering. The suffering keeps growing, and before the patient has had time to look around, he becomes conscious that what he took for an indisposition is the most significant thing in the world to him, — is death.

The same happened with me. I understood that it was not a passing indisposition, but something very important, and that, if the questions were going to repeat themselves, it would be necessary to find an answer for them. And I tried to answer them. The questions seemed to be so foolish, simple, and childish. But the moment I touched them and tried to solve them, I became convinced, in the first place, that they were not childish and foolish, but very important and profound questions in life, and, in the second, that, no matter how much I might try, I should not be able to answer them. Before attending to my Samára estate, to my son's education, or to the writing of a book, I ought to know why I should do that. So long as I did not know why, I could not do anything, I could not live. Amidst my thoughts of farming, which interested me very much during that time, there would suddenly pass through my head a question like this: "All right, you are going to have six thousand desyatínas of land in the Government of Samára, and three hundred horses, — and then?" And I completely lost my senses

and did not know what to think farther. Or, when I thought of the education of my children, I said to myself: "Why?" Or, reflecting on the manner in which the masses might obtain their welfare, I suddenly said to myself: "What is that to me?" Or, thinking of the fame which my works would get me, I said to myself: "All right, you will be more famous than Gógol, Púshkin, Shakespeare, Molière, and all the writers in the world, — what of it?" And I was absolutely unable to make any reply. The questions were not waiting, and I had to answer them at once; if I did not answer them, I could not live.

I felt that what I was standing on had given way, that I had no foundation to stand on, that that which I lived by no longer existed, and that I had nothing to live by.

IV.

My life came to a standstill. I could breathe, eat, drink, and sleep, and could not help breathing, eating, drinking, and sleeping; but there was no life, because there were no desires the gratification of which I might find reasonable. If I wished for anything, I knew in advance that, whether I gratified my desire or not, nothing would come of it. If a fairy had come and had offered to carry out my wish, I should not have known what to say. If in moments of intoxication I had, not wishes, but habits of former desires, I knew in sober moments that that was a deception, that there was nothing to wish for. I could not even wish to find out the truth, because I guessed what it consisted in. The truth was that life was meaningless. It was as though I had just been living and walking along, and had come to an abyss, where I saw clearly that there was nothing ahead but perdition. And it was impossible to stop and go back, and impossible to shut my eyes, in order that I might not see that there was nothing ahead but suffering and imminent death, — complete annihilation.

What happened to me was that I, a healthy, happy man, felt that I could not go on living, — an insurmountable force drew me on to find release from life. I cannot say that I *wanted* to kill myself.

The force which drew me away from life was stronger, fuller, more general than wishing. It was a force like the former striving after life, only in an inverse sense. I tended with all my strength away from life. The thought

of suicide came as naturally to me as had come before the ideas of improving life. That thought was so seductive that I had to use cunning against myself, lest I should rashly execute it. I did not want to be in a hurry, because I wanted to use every effort to disentangle myself: if I should not succeed in disentangling myself, there would always be time for that. And at such times I, a happy man, hid a rope from myself so that I should not hang myself on a cross-beam between two safes in my room, where I was by myself in the evening, while taking off my clothes, and did not go out hunting with a gun, in order not to be tempted by an easy way of doing away with myself. I did not know myself what it was I wanted: I was afraid of life, strove to get away from it, and, at the same time, expected something from it.

All that happened with me when I was on every side surrounded by what is considered to be complete happiness. I had a good, loving, and beloved wife, good children, and a large estate, which grew and increased without any labour on my part. I was respected by my neighbours and friends, more than ever before, was praised by strangers, and, without any self-deception, could consider my name famous. With all that, I was not deranged or mentally unsound, — on the contrary, I was in full command of my mental and physical powers, such as I had rarely met with in people of my age: physically I could work in a field, mowing, without falling behind a peasant; mentally I could work from eight to ten hours in succession, without experiencing any consequences from the strain. And while in such condition I arrived at the conclusion that I could not live, and, fearing death, I had to use cunning against myself, in order that I might not take my life.

This mental condition expressed itself to me in this form: my life is a stupid, mean trick played on me by somebody. Although I did not recognize that "some-

body" as having created me, the form of the conception that some one had played a mean, stupid trick on me by bringing me into the world was the most natural one that presented itself to me.

Involuntarily I imagined that there, somewhere, there was somebody who was now having fun as he looked down upon me and saw me, who had lived for thirty or forty years, learning, developing, growing in body and mind, now that I had become strengthened in mind and had reached that summit of life from which it lay all before me, standing as a complete fool on that summit and seeing clearly that there was nothing in life and never would be. And that was fun to him —

But whether there was or was not that somebody who made fun of me, did not make it easier for me. I could not ascribe any sensible meaning to a single act, or to my whole life. I was only surprised that I had not understood that from the start. All that had long ago been known to everybody. Sooner or later there would come diseases and death (they had come already) to my dear ones and to me, and there would be nothing left but stench and worms. All my affairs, no matter what they might be, would sooner or later be forgotten, and I myself should not exist. So why should I worry about all these things? How could a man fail to see that and live, — that was surprising! A person could live only so long as he was drunk; but the moment he sobered up, he could not help seeing that all that was only a deception, and a stupid deception at that! Really, there was nothing funny and ingenious about it, but only something cruel and stupid.

Long ago has been told the Eastern story about the traveller who in the steppe is overtaken by an infuriated beast. Trying to save himself from the animal, the traveller jumps into a waterless well, but at its bottom he sees a dragon who opens his jaws in order to swallow

him. And the unfortunate man does not dare climb out, lest he perish from the infuriated beast, and does not dare jump down to the bottom of the well, lest he be devoured by the dragon, and so clutches the twig of a wild bush growing in a cleft of the well and holds on to it. His hands grow weak and he feels that soon he shall have to surrender to the peril which awaits him at either side; but he still holds on and sees two mice, one white, the other black, in even measure making a circle around the main trunk of the bush to which he is clinging, and nibbling at it on all sides. Now, at any moment, the bush will break and tear off, and he will fall into the dragon's jaws. The traveller sees that and knows that he will inevitably perish; but while he is still clinging, he sees some drops of honey hanging on the leaves of the bush, and so reaches out for them with his tongue and licks the leaves. Just so I hold on to the branch of life, knowing that the dragon of death is waiting inevitably for me, ready to tear me to pieces, and I cannot understand why I have fallen on such suffering. And I try to lick that honey which used to give me pleasure; but now it no longer gives me joy, and the white and the black mouse day and night nibble at the branch to which I am holding on. I clearly see the dragon, and the honey is no longer sweet to me. I see only the inevitable dragon and the mice, and am unable to turn my glance away from them. That is not a fable, but a veritable, indisputable, comprehensible truth.

The former deception of the pleasures of life, which stifled the terror of the dragon, no longer deceives me. No matter how much one should say to me, "You cannot understand the meaning of life, do not think, live!" I am unable to do so, because I have been doing it too long before. Now I cannot help seeing day and night, which run and lead me up to death. I see that alone, because that alone is the truth. Everything else is a lie.

The two drops of honey that have longest turned my

eyes away from the cruel truth, the love of family and of authorship, which I have called an art, are no longer sweet to me.

"My family —" I said to myself, "but my family, my wife and children, they are also human beings. They are in precisely the same condition that I am in: they must either live in the lie or see the terrible truth. Why should they live? Why should I love them, why guard, raise, and watch them? Is it for the same despair which is in me, or for dulness of perception? Since I love them, I cannot conceal the truth from them, — every step in cognition leads them up to this truth. And the truth is death."

"Art, poetry?" For a long time, under the influence of the success of human praise, I tried to persuade myself that that was a thing which could be done, even though death should come and destroy everything, my deeds, as well as my memory of them; but soon I came to see that that, too, was a deception. It was clear to me that art was an adornment of life, a decoy of life. But life lost all its attractiveness for me. How, then, could I entrap others? So long as I did not live my own life, and a strange life bore me on its waves; so long as I believed that life had some sense, although I was not able to express it, — the reflections of life of every description in poetry and in the arts afforded me pleasure, and I was delighted to look at life through this little mirror of art; but when I began to look for the meaning of life, when I experienced the necessity of living myself, that little mirror became either useless, superfluous, and ridiculous, or painful to me. I could no longer console myself with what I saw in the mirror, namely, that my situation was stupid and desperate. It was all right for me to rejoice so long as I believed in the depth of my soul that life had some sense. At that time the play of lights — of the comical, the tragical, the touching, the beautiful, the terrible in life — afforded me amuse-

ment. But when I knew that life was meaningless and terrible, the play in the little mirror could no longer amuse me. No sweetness of honey could be sweet to me, when I saw the dragon and the mice that were nibbling down my support.

That was not all. If I had simply comprehended that life had no meaning, I might have known that calmly, — I might have known that that was my fate. But I could not be soothed by that. If I had been like a man living in a forest from which he knew there was no way out, I might have lived; but I was like a man who had lost his way in the forest, who was overcome by terror because he had lost his way, who kept tossing about in his desire to come out on the road, knowing that every step got him only more entangled, and who could not help tossing.

That was terrible. And, in order to free myself from that terror, I wanted to kill myself. I experienced terror before what was awaiting me, — I knew that that terror was more terrible than the situation itself, but I could not patiently wait for the end. No matter how convincing the reflection was that it was the same whether a vessel in the heart should break or something should burst, and all should be ended, I could not wait patiently for the end. The terror of the darkness was too great, and I wanted as quickly as possible to free myself from it by means of a noose or a bullet. It was this feeling that more than anything else drew me on toward suicide.

V.

"But, perhaps, I overlooked something, or did not understand something right?" I said to myself several times. "It is impossible that this condition of despair should be characteristic of men!" And I tried to find an explanation for these questions in all those branches of knowledge which men had acquired. I searched painfully and for a long time, and I searched not from idle curiosity, not in a limp manner, but painfully and stubbornly, day and night, — I searched as a perishing man searches for his salvation, — and I found nothing.

I searched in all the branches of knowledge, and not only failed to find anything, but even convinced myself that all those who, like myself, had been searching in the sciences, had failed just as much. They had not only not found anything, but had also clearly recognized the fact that that which had brought me to despair, — the meaninglessness of life, — was the only incontestable knowledge which was accessible to man.

I searched everywhere, and, thanks to a life passed in study, and also because through my connections with the learned world I had access to the most learned of men in every imaginable branch of knowledge, who did not refuse to disclose to me their knowledge, not only in books, but also in conversations, I learned everything which science replies to the question of life.

For a long time I could not believe that science had no answer to give to the questions of life, except what it gave. For a long time it seemed to me, as I looked at the im-

portance and seriousness of tone which science assumed, when it enunciated its principles which had nothing in common with the questions of human life, that there was something in it which I did not understand. For a long time I was intimidated by science, and it seemed to me that the inapplicability of the answers to my questions was not the fault of science, but of my own ignorance; but the matter was for me not a joke, a trifle, but an affair of my whole life, and I was against my will led to the conviction that my questions were the only legitimate questions, which served as a foundation of all knowledge, and that not I with my questions was to blame, but science, if it had the presumption to answer these questions.

My question, the one which led me, at fifty years, up to suicide, was the simplest kind of a question, and one which is lying in the soul of every man, from the silliest child to the wisest old man, — that question without which life is impossible, as I have experienced it, in fact. The question is: "What will come of what I am doing to-day and shall do to-morrow? What will come of my whole life?"

Differently expressed, the question would stand like this: "Why live, wish for anything, why do anything?" The question may be expressed still differently: "Is there in my life a meaning which would not be destroyed by my inevitable, imminent death?"

To this one, differently expressed, question I searched for an answer in human knowledge. I found that in relation to this question all human knowledge seemed to be divided into two opposite hemispheres, at the opposite ends of which there were two poles: one, a negative, the other, a positive pole; but that at neither pole was there an answer to the questions of life.

One series of the sciences does not seem to recognize the question, but clearly and definitely answers its own, independently put questions: that is the series of the

experimental sciences, and at their extreme point stands mathematics; the other series of knowledge recognizes the question, but gives no answer to it: that is the series of the speculative sciences, and at their extreme point stands metaphysics.

Ever since my early youth I had been interested in the speculative sciences, but later mathematics and the natural sciences attracted me, and so long as I did not clearly put my question, so long as the question did not of itself rise in me, insisting on an answer, I was satisfied with those fictitious answers which sciences give to the question.

In the sphere of the experimental sciences, I said to myself: "Everything develops, is differentiated, moves in the direction of complexity and perfection, and there are laws which govern this progress. You are a part of the whole. Having, in so far as it is possible, learned the whole, and having learned the law of evolution, you will learn your place in this whole, and all about yourself." I am ashamed to confess it, there was a time when I seemed to be satisfied with that. That was the time when I myself was growing more complex and was developing. My muscles grew and became stronger, my memory was being enriched, my ability to think and comprehend was increasing, I grew and developed, and, feeling within me that growth, it was natural for me to think that that was the law of the whole world, in which I should find a solution also to the questions of my life. But the time came when my growth stopped, — I felt that I was not developing, but drying up, that my muscles were growing weaker and my teeth falling out, — and I saw that that law not only explained nothing to me, but that there never was and never could have been such a law, and that I took for a law what I found within me at a certain period of life. I was more severe toward the definition of that law; and it became clear to me that there could be no law of endless development; it became clear to me that saying that

in endless space and time everything was developing, perfecting itself, becoming more complex, differentiating, was tantamount to saying nothing. All those are words without any meaning, for in the infinite there is nothing complex, nor simple, nor in front, nor behind, nor better, nor worse.

The main thing was that my personal question, "What am I with my desires?" remained entirely unanswered. And I understood that those sciences were very interesting, very attractive, but that the definiteness and clearness of those sciences were in inverse proportion to their applicability to the questions of life: the less applicable they are to the questions of life, the more definite and clear they are; the more they attempt to give answers to the questions of life, the more they become dim and unattractive. If you turn to that branch of those sciences which attempts to give answers to the questions of life, — to physiology, psychology, biology, sociology, — you come across an appalling scantiness of ideas, the greatest obscurity, an unjustified pretence at solving irrelevant questions, and constant contradictions of one thinker with others and even with himself. If you turn to the branch of knowledge which does not busy itself with the solution of the problems of life, but answers only its special, scientific questions, you are delighted at the power of the human mind, but know in advance that there will be no answers there to the questions of life. These sciences directly ignore the question of life. They say: "We have no answers to what you are and why you live, and we do not busy ourselves with that; but if you want to know the laws of light, of chemical combinations, the laws of the development of organisms, if you want to know the laws of the bodies, their forms, and the relation of numbers and quantities, if you want to know the laws of your mind, we shall give you clear, definite, incontrovertible answers to all that."

In general the relation of the experimental sciences to the question of life may be expressed thus: Question, "Why do I live?" Answer, "In the endlessly large space, in an endlessly long time, infinitely small particles are modified in infinite complexity, and when you understand the laws of these modifications, you will know why you live upon earth."

In the sphere of the speculative sciences I said to myself: "All humanity lives and develops on the basis of spiritual principles, ideals, which guide it. These ideals are expressed in the religions, in the sciences, in the arts, in the forms of political life. These ideals are all the time getting higher and higher, and humanity is moving toward a higher good. I am a part of humanity, and so my calling consists in coöperating in the consciousness and materialization of the ideals of humanity." During the period of my mental insipidity I was satisfied with that; but as soon as the question of life arose clearly within me, all that theory immediately went to pieces. Not to speak of that unscrupulous inexactness with which the sciences of this kind give out the deductions which are based on the study of a small part of humanity as general deductions; not to speak of the mutual contradictions of the different partisans of this conception as to what constitutes the ideals of humanity, — the strangeness, not to say stupidity, of this conception consists in this, that, in order to answer the question, which presents itself to every man, "What am I?" or, "Why do I live?" or, "What shall I do?" a man must first solve the problem, "What is the life of all humanity?" which is not familiar to him, and of which he knows only one tiny part at a tiny period of time. In order to understand what he is, a man must first know what all this mysterious humanity is, which consists of just such men as he himself is, who do not understand themselves.

I must confess, there was a time when I believed all

that. That was the time when I had my favourite ideals, which justified my lusts, and I tried to discover a theory which would allow me to look upon my lusts as a law of humanity. But as soon as the question of life arose in my soul in all its clearness, that answer at once was scattered to the winds, and I understood that, as in the experimental sciences there were real sciences and half-sciences, which attempted to give answers to questions which are not in their domain, so also in this sphere there was a whole series of wide-spread sciences which tried to answer to irrelevant questions. The half-sciences of this sphere, jurisprudence and the social sciences, try to solve the problems of man by apparently solving, each in its own way, the question of the life of all humanity.

But just as in the sphere of the experimental sciences a man who asks in all sincerity how to live cannot be satisfied with the answer, "Study in infinite space the modifications, infinite in time and complexity, of the infinite particles, and then you will understand all life," just so a sincere man cannot be satisfied with the answer, "Study the life of all humanity, whose beginning and end we cannot know, and then you will understand your own life." Just as in the experimental half-sciences, these half-sciences are the more filled with inexactness, obscurities, silliness, and contradictions, the farther they depart from the problems themselves. The problem of experimental science is a causal consecutiveness of material phenomena. Experimental science need only introduce the question of final cause, and nonsense is the result. The problem of speculative science is the consciousness of the causeless essence of life. It needs only introduce the investigation of causal phenomena, such as the social and historical phenomena, and the result is nonsense.

Experimental science gives positive knowledge and manifests the greatness of the human mind only when it does not introduce the final cause into its investigation.

And, on the other hand, speculative science is a science and manifests the greatness of the human mind only when it entirely sets aside the questions of the consecutiveness of causal phenomena and considers man only in relation to the final cause. Such in this sphere is the science which forms the pole of the sphere, metaphysics or philosophy. This science clearly puts the question: "What am I, and what is the whole world? and why am I, and why is the whole world?" And ever since it has been, it has answered in the same way. Whether the philosopher says that the idea, the substance, the spirit, or the will are the essence of life, which is within me and in everything existing, he keeps repeating that this essence exists and that I am that essence; but why it is, he does not know and does not answer, if he is an exact thinker. I ask, why should this essence be? What will result from the fact that it is and that it will be? And philosophy does not answer that, — it asks itself that question; and if it is a sincere philosophy, its whole labour will consist merely in clearly putting that question. And if it sticks firmly to its problem, it cannot do otherwise than answer to the question, "What am I, and what is the whole world?" by saying, "Everything and nothing;" and to the question, "Why?" by saying, "I do not know why."

Twist the speculative answers of philosophy as I may, I shall never get anything resembling an answer, not because, as in the clear, experimental sphere, the answer does not refer to my question, but because, though the whole mental labour is directed to my question, there is no answer, but instead of the answer there is received the same question, only in a complicated form.

VI.

In my search after the question of life I experienced the same feeling which a man who has lost his way in the forest may experience.

He comes to a clearing, climbs a tree, and clearly sees an unlimited space before him; at the same time he sees that there are no houses there, and that there can be none; he goes back to the forest, into the darkness, and he sees darkness, and again there are no houses.

Thus I blundered in this forest of human knowledge, between the clearings of the mathematical and experimental sciences, which disclosed to me clear horizons, but such in the direction of which there could be no house, and between the darkness of the speculative sciences, where I sunk into a deeper darkness, the farther I proceeded, and I convinced myself at last that there was no way out and could not be.

By abandoning myself to the bright side of knowledge I saw that I only turned my eyes away from the question. No matter how enticing and clear the horizons were that were disclosed to me, no matter how enticing it was to bury myself in the infinitude of this knowledge, I comprehended that these sciences were the more clear, the less I needed them, the less they answered my question.

"Well, I know," I said to myself, "all which science wants so persistently to know, but there is no answer to the question about the meaning of my life." But in the speculative sphere I saw that, in spite of the fact that

the aim of the knowledge was directed straight to the answer of my question, or because of that fact, there could be no other answer than what I was giving to myself: "What is the meaning of my life?" — "None." Or, "What will come of my life?" — "Nothing." Or, "Why does everything which exists exist, and why do I exist?" — "Because it exists."

Putting the question to the one side of human knowledge, I received an endless quantity of exact answers about what I did not ask: about the chemical composition of the stars, about the movement of the sun toward the constellation of Hercules, about the origin of species and of man, about the forms of infinitely small, imponderable particles of ether; but the answer in this sphere of knowledge to my question what the meaning of my life was, was always: "You are what you call your life; you are a temporal, accidental conglomeration of particles. The interrelation, the change of these particles, produces in you that which you call life. This congeries will last for some time; then the interaction of these particles will cease, and that which you call life and all your questions will come to an end. You are an accidentally cohering globule of something. The globule is fermenting. This fermentation the globule calls its life. The globule falls to pieces, and all fermentation and all questions will come to an end." Thus the clear side of knowledge answers, and it cannot say anything else, if only it strictly follows its principles.

With such an answer it appears that the answer is not a reply to the question. I want to know the meaning of my life, but the fact that it is a particle of the infinite not only gives it no meaning, but even destroys every possible meaning.

Those obscure transactions, which this side of the experimental, exact science has with speculation, when it says that the meaning of life consists in evolution and the

coöperation with this evolution, because of their obscurity and inexactness cannot be regarded as answers.

The other side of knowledge, the speculative, so long as it sticks strictly to its fundamental principles in giving a direct answer to the question, everywhere and at all times has answered one and the same : " The world is something infinite and incomprehensible. Human life is an incomprehensible part of this incomprehensible *all*." Again I exclude all those transactions between the speculative and the experimental sciences, which form the whole ballast of the half-sciences, the so-called science of jurisprudence and the political and historical sciences. Into these sciences are just as irregularly introduced the concepts of evolution and perfection, but with this difference, that there it is the evolution of everything, while here it is the evolution of the life of man. The irregularity is one and the same : evolution, perfection in the infinite, can have neither aim nor direction, and answers nothing in respect to my question.

Where speculative science is exact, namely, in real philosophy, — not in the one which Schopenhauer calls the professorial philosophy, which serves only for distributing all existing phenomena according to new philosophical rubrics and calling them by new names, — where the philosopher does not let out of sight the essential question, the answer is always one and the same, — the answer given by Socrates, Schopenhauer, Solomon, Buddha.

" We shall approach truth in proportion as we remove ourselves from life," says Socrates, preparing himself for death. " What are we, who love truth, striving after in life ? To free ourselves from the body and from all evil which results from the life of the body. If that is so, why should we not rejoice when death comes to us ? The wise man is seeking his death all the time, and therefore death is not terrible to him."

And this is what Schopenhauer says :

"Having learned the internal essence of the world as will, and in all the phenomena, from the unconscious striving of the dark forces of Nature to the full consciousness of the activity of man, having learned only the objectivity of this will, we shall by no means escape the consequence that with the free negation, the self-destruction of the will, there will disappear all those phenomena, that constant striving and tendency without aim or rest on all the stages of objectivity, in which and through which the world exists; there will disappear the diversity of consecutive forms, and with the form will disappear all its phenomena with their general forms, space and time, and, finally, its last fundamental form, subject and object. When there is no will, there is no concept, no world. Before us nothing only is left. But what opposes this transition to nothingness, our nature, is that very will to exist (*Wille zum Leben*), which forms ourselves as well as the world. That we are so afraid of nothingness, or, what is the same, that we desire to live, signifies that we ourselves are nothing but that desire to live and that we know nothing else. Therefore, what will be left after the complete annihilation of the will for us who are still full of that will is naturally nothing; and, on the other hand, for those in whom the will has turned away and renounced itself, this our so real world, with all its suns and milky ways, is nothing."

"Vanity of vanities," says Solomon, "vanity of vanities; all is vanity. What profit hath a man of all his labour which he taketh under the sun? One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth for ever. The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new? it hath been already of old time, which was before us. There is no remembrance of former things; neither

shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after. I the Preacher was king over Israel in Jerusalem. And I gave my heart to seek and search out by wisdom concerning all things that are done under heaven: this sore travail hath God given to the sons of man to be exercised therewith. I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit. I communed with mine own heart, saying, Lo, I am come to great estate, and have gotten more wisdom than all they that have been before me in Jerusalem: yea, my heart had great experience of wisdom and knowledge. And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly: I perceived that this also is vexation of spirit. For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.

"I said in mine heart, Go to now, I will prove thee with mirth; therefore enjoy pleasure: and behold, this also is vanity. I said of laughter, It is mad: and of mirth, What doeth it? I sought in mine heart to give myself unto wine, yet acquainting mine heart with wisdom; and to lay hold on folly, till I might see what was that good for the sons of men, which they should do under the heaven all the days of their life. I made me great works; I builded me houses; I planted me vineyards: I made me gardens and orchards, and I planted trees in them of all kind of fruits: I made me pools of water, to water therewith the wood that bringeth forth trees: I got me servants and maidens, and had servants born in my house; also I had great possessions of great and small cattle above all that were in Jerusalem before me; I gathered me also silver and gold, and the peculiar treasure of kings, and of the provinces: I gat me men-singers and women-singers, and the delights of the sons of men, as musical instruments, and that of all sorts. So I was great, and increased more than all that were before

me in Jerusalem: also my wisdom remained with me. And whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them, I withheld not my heart from any joy. Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do: and behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun. And I turned myself to behold wisdom, and madness, and folly. And I myself perceived also that one event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it happeneth to the fool, so it happeneth even to me; and why was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also is vanity. For there is no remembrance of the wise more than of the fool for ever; seeing that which now is in the days to come shall all be forgotten. And how dieth the wise man? as the fool. Therefore I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me: for all is vanity and vexation of spirit. Yea, I hated all my labour which I had taken under the sun: because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me.

"For what hath man of all his labour, and of the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath laboured under the sun? For all his days are sorrows, and his travail grief; yea, his heart taketh not rest in the night. This is also vanity. There is nothing better for a man, than that he should eat and drink, and that he should make his soul enjoy good in his labour.

"All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good, and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath. This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all: yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead.

For to him that is joined to all the living there is hope: for a living dog is better than a dead lion. For the living know that they shall die: but the dead know not any thing, neither have they any more a reward; for the memory of them is forgotten. Also their love, and their hatred, and their envy, is now perished, neither have they any more a portion for ever in any thing that is done under the sun."

And this is what the Indian wisdom says:

Sakya-Muni, a young, happy prince, from whom have been concealed diseases, old age, and death, drives out for pleasure, when he sees a terrible, toothless, slavering old man. The prince, from whom old age has heretofore been concealed, is surprised, and he asks the charioteer what that is, and why that man has come to such a wretched, loathsome state? And when he learns that that is the common fate of all men, that he, the youthful prince, has inevitably the same in store, he cannot proceed in his pleasure drive, but gives order to be driven home, in order to consider that. Evidently he finds some consolation, for he again drives out cheerful and happy. But this time he meets a sick man. He sees an emaciated, livid, shivering man, with blurred eyes. The prince, from whom diseases have been concealed, stops and asks what that is. And when he learns that that is sickness, to which all men are subject, and that he himself, a healthy and happy prince, may be as sick as that on the morrow, he again has no courage to amuse himself, orders himself driven home, and again looks for consolation, which he evidently finds, for he has himself driven out a third time; but this third time he sees again a new spectacle, — he sees that something is carried by. "What is that?" — A dead man. "What does a dead man mean?" asks the prince. He is told that to become dead means to become what that man is. The prince goes up to the corpse, and takes off the shroud and looks at him.

"What will be done with him?" asks the prince. He is told that he will be buried in the ground. "Why?" — Because he will certainly never be alive again, and there will be only stench and worms. "And is this the fate of all men? And will the same happen to me? Shall I be buried, and will a stench rise from me, and will worms eat me?" — Yes. "Back! I do not wish to go out for pleasure, and will never be driven out again."

And Sakya-Muni could not find any consolation in life, and he decided that life was the greatest evil, and used all the forces of his soul to free himself from it and to free others, and to do this in such a way that even after death it might not return in some manner, — to annihilate life with its root. Thus speaks the whole Indian wisdom.

So these are the direct answers which human wisdom gives when it answers the question of life.

"The life of the body is an evil and a lie, and so the destruction of this life of the body is a good, and we must wish it," says Socrates.

"Life is that which ought not to be, — an evil, — and the transition into nothingness is the only good of life," says Schopenhauer.

"Everything in the world, foolishness, and wisdom, and riches, and poverty, and merriment, and grief, everything is vanity and nonsense. Man will die, and nothing will be left. And that is foolish," says Solomon.

"It is impossible to live with the consciousness of inevitable suffering, debility, old age, and death, — it is necessary to free oneself from life, from every possibility of life," says Buddha.

And what these powerful minds have said, millions of millions of people have said, thought, and felt like them, and so think and feel I.

Thus, my wandering among the sciences not only did not take me out of my despair, but even increased it. One science gave no reply to the question of life, another

gave me a direct answer and only confirmed my despair and showed me that what I had arrived at was not the fruit of my aberration, of a morbid condition of my mind; on the contrary, it only confirmed me in my belief that my thoughts were correct and that I agreed with the deductions of the most powerful minds of humanity.

There is no cause for self-deception. Everything is vanity. Happy is he who is not born, — death is better than life: it is necessary to free oneself from it.

VII.

Having found no elucidation in science, I began to look for it in life, hoping to find it in the men who surrounded me. I began to observe the people such as I, to see how they lived about me and what attitude they assumed to the question that had brought me to the point of despair.

This is what I found in people who were in the same position as myself through their education and manner of life.

I found that for people of my circle there were four ways out from the terrible condition in which we all are.

The first way out is through ignorance. It consists in not knowing, not understanding that life is evil and meaningless. People of this category — mostly women or very young or very dull persons — have not yet come to understand that question of life which presented itself to Schopenhauer, Solomon, and Buddha. They see neither the dragon that awaits them, nor the mice that are nibbling at the roots of the bushes to which they are holding on, and continue to lick the honey. But they lick the honey only till a certain time: something will direct their attention to the dragon and the mice, and there will be an end to their licking. From them I can learn nothing, — it is impossible to stop knowing what you know.

The second way out is through Epicureanism. It consists in this, that, knowing the hopelessness of life, one

should in the meantime enjoy such good as there is, without looking either at the dragon or the mice, but licking the honey in the best manner possible, especially if there is a lot of it in one spot. Solomon expresses this way out like this:

"Go thy way, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine. Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest all the days of the life of thy vanity, which he hath given thee under the sun, all the days of thy vanity: for that is thy portion in this life, and in thy labour which thou takest under the sun. Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest."

Thus the majority of the people of our circle support the possibility of life in themselves. The conditions in which they are give them more good than evil, and their moral dulness makes it possible for them to forget that the advantage of their situation is a casual one; that not everybody can have a thousand wives and palaces, like Solomon; that to every man with a thousand wives there are a thousand men without wives, and for every palace there are a thousand people who built it in the sweat of their brows; and that the accident which has made me a Solomon to-day, will to-morrow make me a slave of Solomon. The dulness of the imagination of these people makes it possible for them to forget that which gave no rest to Buddha, — the inevitableness of sickness, old age, and death, which sooner or later will destroy all those pleasures.

Thus think and feel the majority of men of our time and our manner of life. The fact that some of these people assert that the dulness of their comprehension and imagination is philosophy, which they call positive, in my opinion does not take them out of the category of those who, in order not to see the question, lick the honey.

Such people I could not imitate: as I did not possess their dulness of comprehension, I could not artificially reproduce it in myself. Just like any live man, I could not tear my eyes away from the mice and the dragon, having once seen them.

The third way out is through force and energy. It consists in this, that, having comprehended that life is evil and meaningless, one should set out to destroy it. Thus now and then act strong, consistent people. Having comprehended all the stupidity of the joke which has been played upon them, and seeing that the good of the dead is better than that of the living, and that it is better not to be at all, they go and carry this out and at once put an end to that stupid joke, so long as there are means for it: a noose about the neck, the water, a knife to pierce the heart with, railway trains. The number of people of our circle who do so is growing larger and larger. These people commit the act generally at the best period of life, when the mental powers are in full bloom and few habits have been acquired that lower human reason.

I saw that that was the worthiest way out, and I wanted to act in that way.

The fourth way out is through weakness. It consists in this, that, comprehending the evil and the meaninglessness of life, one continues to drag it out, knowing in advance that nothing can come of it. People of this calibre know that death is better than life, but, not having the strength to act reasonably, to make an end to the deception, and to kill themselves, they seem to be waiting for something. This is the way of weakness, for if I know that which is better, which is in my power, why not abandon myself to that which is better? I belonged to that category.

Thus people of my calibre have four ways of saving themselves from the terrible contradiction. No matter how much I strained my mental attention, I saw no other

way out but those four. The one way out was not to understand that life was meaningless, vanity, and an evil, and that it was better not to live. I could not help knowing it and, having once learned it, I could not shut my eyes to it. The second way out was to make use of life such as it is, without thinking of the future. I could not do that either. Like Sakya-Muni, I could not go out hunting, when I knew that there was old age, suffering, death. My imagination was too vivid. Besides, I could not enjoy the accident of the moment, which for a twinkling threw enjoyment in my path. The third way out was, having come to see that life was an evil and a foolishness, to make an end of it and kill myself. I comprehended that, but for some reason did not kill myself. The fourth way out was to live in the condition of Solomon, of Schopenhauer, — to know that life was a stupid joke played on me, and yet to live, wash and dress myself, dine, speak, and even write books. That was repulsive and painful for me, but still I persisted in that situation.

Now I see that if I did not kill myself, the cause of it was a dim consciousness of the incorrectness of my ideas. No matter how convincing and incontestable seemed to me the train of my thoughts and of the thoughts of the wise men who had brought us to recognize the meaninglessness of life, there was left in me an obscure doubt of the correctness of my judgment.

It was like this: I, my reason, have discovered that life is unreasonable. If there is no higher reason (there is none, and nothing can prove it), reason is the creator of life for me. If there were no reason, there would be no life for me. How then does this reason negate life, since it is itself the creator of life? Life is everything. Reason is the fruit of life, and this reason denies life itself. I felt that something was wrong there.

Life is a meaningless evil, — that was incontestable, I said to myself. But I have lived, still live, and all hu-

manity has lived. How is that? Why does it live, since it can refuse to live? Is it possible Schopenhauer and I alone are so wise as to have comprehended the meaninglessness and evil of life?

The discussion of the vanity of life is not so cunning, and it has been brought forward long ago, even by the simplest kind of men, and yet they have lived and still live. Why do they continue living and never think of doubting the reasonableness of life?

My knowledge, confirmed by the wisdom of the sages, has disclosed to me that everything in the world, — everything organic and inorganic, — everything is constructed with surprising cleverness, only my own condition is stupid. And those fools, the enormous masses of people, know nothing about how everything organic and inorganic is constructed in the world, and yet live, and they think that their life is sensibly arranged!

And it occurred to me that there might be something I did not know, for ignorance acts in precisely that manner. Ignorance always says the same. When it does not know a thing, it says that what it does not know is stupid. In reality it turns out that there is a human entity which has lived as though understanding the meaning of its life, for, if it did not understand it, it could not live, and I say that the whole life is meaningless, and that I cannot live.

Nobody prevents our denying life by committing suicide. If so, kill yourself and stop discussing! You do not like life, very well, then kill yourself! If you live and cannot understand the meaning of life, make an end to it, and do not whirl about in this life, going into discussions about not understanding life. If you have come to a gay company, where all are very happy and know what they are doing, while you feel lonesome and disgusted, go away!

Indeed, what are we, who are convinced of the neces-

sity of suicide and who do not have the courage to commit it, if not the weakest, most inconsistent, and, to speak simply, the most foolish kind of men who carry about their foolishness as a fool carries around his painted wallet?

Our wisdom, however incontestable it may be, has not given us the knowledge of the meaning of our life; but all humanity which is carrying on life — the millions — does not doubt the meaning of life.

Indeed, ever since those most ancient, ancient times since when life has existed, of which I know anything, there have lived men who knew the reflection on the vanity of life, which has shown me the meaninglessness of life, and yet they lived, ascribing some kind of a meaning to it.

Ever since any life began with men, they had that meaning of life, and they have carried on the life that has reached me. Everything which is in me and about me, — everything carnal and non-carnal, — all that is the fruit of their knowledge of life. All the tools of thought, with which I judge this life and condemn it, — all that was done by them, and not by me. I was born, educated, and grew up, thanks to them. They mined the iron, taught how to cut down the forest, domesticated cows and horses, taught how to sow, how to live together, and arranged our life; they taught me to think and to speak. And I, their product, nurtured and fed by them, taught by them, thinking their thoughts, and speaking their words, — I have proved to them that they are meaningless! "There is something wrong there," I said to myself. "I must have made a mistake somewhere." But where the mistake was, I was unable to discover.

VIII.

All these doubts, which now I am able to express more or less coherently, I could not express then. Then I only felt that, no matter how logically inevitable and how confirmed by the greatest thinkers were my deductions about the vanity of life, there was something wrong in them. Whether it was in the reflection itself, in the way the question was put, I did not know, — I felt that the mental proof was complete, but that that was not enough. All these deductions did not convince me sufficiently to make me do that which resulted from my reflections, which was, that I should commit suicide. I should be telling an untruth if I said that I arrived through reason at what I did arrive at, and did not kill myself. Reason was at work, but there was also something else at work, which I cannot call otherwise than the consciousness of life. There was also at work that force which compelled me to direct my attention to this rather than to that, and this force brought me out of my desperate situation and directed my reason to something entirely different. This force made me observe that I, with a hundred people like me, did not constitute all humanity and that I did not yet know the life of humanity.

Surveying the narrow circle of my equals, I saw only people who did not understand the question, those who understood the question but stifled it in the intoxication of life, those who had understood life and had made an end of it, and those who understood, but in their weakness waited for the end of their desperate life. I saw no

others. It seemed to me that the narrow circle of learned, rich, leisured people, to which I belonged, formed all humanity, and that those billions of men who had lived and were living then were just a kind of animals, and not men.

No matter how strange, how incredibly incomprehensible it now seems to me that I, discussing life, should have been able to overlook all those who surrounded me on all sides, the life of humanity, that I should have been able to err in such a ridiculous manner as to think that my life, and the life of a Solomon and a Schopenhauer, was the real, the normal life, while the life of billions was a circumstance that did not deserve consideration, — no matter how strange that all appears to me now, it was nevertheless so. In the aberration of my pride of mind, it seemed to me so incontestable that Solomon, Schopenhauer, and I had put the question so correctly and so truly that there could be nothing else, — it seemed so incontestable to me that all those billions belonged to those who had not yet reached the whole depth of the question, — that in looking for the meaning of life I never thought: "What meaning have all those billions, who have lived in the world, ascribed to their life?"

I lived for a long time in this madness, which, not in words, but in deeds, is particularly characteristic of us, the most liberal and learned of men. But, thanks either to my strange, physical love for the real working class, which made me understand it and see that it is not so stupid as we suppose, or to the sincerity of my conviction, which was that I could know nothing and that the best that I could do was to hang myself, — I felt that if I wanted to live and understand the meaning of life, I ought naturally to look for it, not among those who had lost the meaning of life and wanted to kill themselves, but among those billions departed and living men who

had been carrying their own lives and ours upon their shoulders. And I looked around at the enormous masses of deceased and living men, — not learned and wealthy, but simple men, — and I saw something quite different. I saw that all these billions of men that lived or had lived, all, with rare exceptions, did not fit into my subdivisions, and that I could not recognize them as not understanding the question, because they themselves put it and answered it with surprising clearness. Nor could I recognize them as Epicureans, because their lives were composed rather of privations and suffering than of enjoyment. Still less could I recognize them as senselessly living out their meaningless lives, because every act of theirs and death itself was explained by them. They regarded it as the greatest evil to kill themselves. It appeared, then, that all humanity was in possession of a knowledge of the meaning of life, which I did not recognize and which I contemned. It turned out that rational knowledge did not give any meaning to life, excluded life, while the meaning which by billions of people, by all humanity, was ascribed to life was based on some despised, false knowledge.

The rational knowledge in the person of the learned and the wise denied the meaning of life, but the enormous masses of men, all humanity, recognized this meaning in an irrational knowledge. This irrational knowledge was faith, the same that I could not help but reject. That was God as one and three, the creation in six days, devils and angels, and all that which I could not accept so long as I had not lost my senses.

My situation was a terrible one. I knew that I should not find anything on the path of rational knowledge but the negation of life, and there, in faith, nothing but the negation of reason, which was still more impossible than the negation of life. From the rational knowledge it followed that life was an evil and men knew

it, — it depended on men whether they should cease living, and yet they lived and continued to live, and I myself lived, though I had known long ago that life was meaningless and an evil. From faith it followed that, in order to understand life, I must renounce reason, for which alone a meaning was needed.

IX.

There resulted a contradiction, from which there were two ways out: either what I called rational was not so rational as I had thought; or that which to me appeared irrational was not so irrational as I had thought. And I began to verify the train of thoughts of my rational knowledge.

In verifying the train of thoughts of my rational knowledge, I found that it was quite correct. The deduction that life was nothing was inevitable; but I saw a mistake. The mistake was that I had not reasoned in conformity with the question put by me. The question was, "Why should I live?" that is, "What real, indestructible essence will come from my phantasmal, destructible life? What meaning has my finite existence in this infinite world?" And in order to answer this question, I studied life.

The solutions of all possible questions of life apparently could not satisfy me, because my question, no matter how simple it appeared in the beginning, included the necessity of explaining the finite through the infinite, and vice versa.

I asked, "What is the extra-temporal, extra-causal, extra-spatial meaning of life?" But I gave an answer to the question, "What is the temporal, causal, spatial meaning of my life?" The result was that after a long labour of mind I answered, "None."

In my reflections I constantly equated, nor could I do otherwise, the finite with the finite, the infinite with the

infinite, and so from that resulted precisely what had to result: force was force, matter was matter, will was will, infinity was infinity, nothing was nothing, — and nothing else could come from it.

There happened something like what at times takes place in mathematics: you think you are solving an equation, when you have only an identity. The reasoning is correct, but you receive as a result the answer: $a = a$, or $x = x$, or $0 = 0$. The same happened with my reflection in respect to the question about the meaning of my life. The answers given by all science to that question are only identities.

Indeed, the strictly scientific knowledge, that knowledge which, as Descartes did, begins with a full doubt in everything, rejects all knowledge which has been taken on trust, and builds everything anew on the laws of reason and experience, cannot give any other answer to the question of life than what I received, — an indefinite answer. It only seemed to me at first that science gave me a positive answer, — Schopenhauer's answer: "Life has no meaning, it is an evil." But when I analyzed the matter, I saw that the answer was not a positive one, but that it was only my feeling which expressed it as such. The answer, strictly expressed, as it is expressed by the Brahmins, by Solomon, and by Schopenhauer, is only an indefinite answer, or an identity, $0 = 0$, life is nothing. Thus the philosophical knowledge does not negate anything, but only answers that the question cannot be solved by it, that for philosophy the solution remains insoluble.

When I saw that, I understood that it was not right for me to look for an answer to my question in rational knowledge, and that the answer given by rational knowledge was only an indication that the answer might be got if the question were differently put, but only when into the discussion of the question should be introduced the

question of the relation of the finite to the infinite. I also understood that, no matter how irrational and monstrous the answers might be that faith gave, they had this advantage that they introduced into each answer the relation of the finite to the infinite, without which there could be no answer.

No matter how I may put the question, "How must I live?" the answer is, "According to God's law." "What real result will there be from my life?" — "Eternal torment or eternal bliss." "What is the meaning which is not destroyed by death?" — "The union with infinite God, paradise."

Thus, outside the rational knowledge, which had to me appeared as the only one, I was inevitably led to recognize that all living humanity had a certain other irrational knowledge, faith, which made it possible to live.

All the irrationality of faith remained the same for me, but I could not help recognizing that it alone gave to humanity answers to the questions of life, and, in consequence of them, the possibility of living.

The rational knowledge brought me to the recognition that life was meaningless, — my life stopped, and I wanted to destroy myself. When I looked around at people, at all humanity, I saw that people lived and asserted that they knew the meaning of life. I looked back at myself: I lived so long as I knew the meaning of life. As to other people, so even to me, did faith give the meaning of life and the possibility of living.

Looking again at the people of other countries, contemporaries of mine and those passed away, I saw again the same. Where life had been, there faith, ever since humanity had existed, had given the possibility of living, and the chief features of faith were everywhere one and the same.

No matter what answers faith may give, its every answer gives to the finite existence of man the sense of

the infinite, — a sense which is not destroyed by suffering, privation, and death. Consequently in faith alone could we find the meaning and possibility of life. What, then, was faith? I understood that faith was not merely an evidence of things not seen, and so forth, not revelation (that is only the description of one of the symptoms of faith), not the relation of man to man (faith has to be defined, and then God, and not first God, and faith through him), not merely an agreement with what a man was told, as faith was generally understood, — that faith was the knowledge of the meaning of human life, in consequence of which man did not destroy himself, but lived. Faith is the power of life. If a man lives he believes in something. If he did not believe that he ought to live for some purpose, he would not live. If he does not see and understand the phantasm of the finite, he believes in that finite; if he understands the phantasm of the finite, he must believe in the infinite. Without faith one cannot live.

I recalled the whole course of my internal work, and I was frightened. Now it was clear to me that, in order that a man might live, he either must not see the infinite, or must have such an explanation of the meaning of life that the finite is equated to the infinite. I had such an explanation, but it was useless to me so long as I believed in the finite and tried to verify it by reason. Before the light of reason all the former explanation was scattered to the winds; but there came a time when I stopped believing in the finite. Then I began on a rational basis to build from what I knew an explanation which would give me the meaning of life; but nothing came of it. With the best minds of humanity I arrived at the result that $0 = 0$, and I was very much surprised when I received such a solution, whereas nothing else could have come from it.

What had I been doing when I had been looking for

an answer in the experimental sciences? I wanted to find out why I lived, and for this I studied everything which was outside of me. It is clear that I could have learned many things, but certainly nothing which I needed.

What had I been doing when I searched for an answer in the philosophical sciences? I had studied the thoughts of those beings who had been in the same condition that I was in, and who had no answer to the question of why I lived. It is clear that I could not have learned anything but what I already knew, that it was impossible to know anything.

What am I? A part of the infinite. In these few words lies the whole problem.

Is it possible humanity has begun only yesterday to put this question? And has no one before me put this question, which is so simple that it is on the tip of the tongue of every intelligent child?

This question has been put ever since men have existed; and ever since men have existed, it has been clear that for the solution of this question it is equally insufficient to equate the infinite to the infinite and the finite to the finite, and ever since men have existed the relations of the finite to the infinite have been found and expressed.

All these concepts, with which we equate the finite to the infinite and receive a meaning of life and a concept of God, freedom, goodness, we subject to logical investigation. And these concepts do not stand the critique of reason.

If it were not so terrible it would be ridiculous, with what pride and self-contentment we, like children, take a watch to pieces, pull out the spring, make a toy from it, and then wonder why the watch has stopped going.

What is necessary and precious is a solution of the contradiction of the finite and the infinite and an answer to the question of life, such as would make life possible.

And this one solution, which we find everywhere, at all times, and with all the nations, — a solution brought down from a time in which the life of humanity is lost for us, a solution which is so difficult that we can do nothing like it, we frivolously destroy in order to put once more the question which is inherent in every man, and for which we have no answer.

The conception of an infinite God, of the divineness of the soul, of the connection of human affairs with God, of the unity, the essence of the soul, of the human conception of moral good and evil, are concepts that have been worked out in the remote infinitude of human thought, concepts without which there would be no life and no I, and yet I, rejecting all that labour of all humanity, want to do everything anew and in my own way.

I did not think so at that time, but the germs of the thoughts were already within me. I saw, in the first place, that my position, with that of Schopenhauer and Solomon, in spite of our wisdom, was stupid: we understood life to be an evil, and yet we lived. It is stupid, because, if life is stupid, — and I am so fond of what is rational, — life ought to be destroyed, and there would not be any one to deny it. In the second place, I saw that all our reflections whirled about in a magic circle, like a wheel that does not catch in the cog. No matter how much and how well we might reflect upon the matter, we could not get an answer to the question, except that *0* was always equal to *0*, and so our path was evidently faulty. In the third place, I began to understand that in the answers which faith gave there was preserved the profoundest wisdom of humanity, and that I had no right to refute them on the basis of reason, and that these main answers were the only ones that gave an answer to the question of life.

X.

I UNDERSTOOD that, but that did not make it easier for me.

I was prepared now to accept any faith, so long as it did not demand from me a direct denial of reason, which would have been a lie. And so I studied Buddhism and Mohammedanism from books, and, more still, Christianity both from books and from living men who were about me.

Naturally I first of all turned to believing men of my own circle, to learned men, to Orthodox theologians, to old monks, to theologians of the new shade, and even to so-called new Christians, who professed salvation through faith in redemption. I clung to these believers and questioned them about their beliefs, and tried to find out in what they saw the meaning of life.

Although I made all possible concessions and avoided all kinds of disputes, I was unable to accept the faiths of those men, — I saw that what they gave out as faith was not an explanation, but an obfuscation of the meaning of life, and that they themselves affirmed their faith, not in order to answer that question of life which had brought me to faith, but for some other aims which were foreign to me.

I remember the agonizing feeling of terror lest I return to my former despair after hope, which I experienced many, many a time in my relations with these people.

The more they went into details in order to expound to me their doctrines, the more clearly did I see their

error and the loss of my hope of finding in their faith the explanation of the meaning of life.

It was not that in the exposition of their doctrine they mixed in with the Christian truths, which had always been near to me, many unnecessary and irrational things, — it was not that which repelled me; what repelled me was that the lives of these people were precisely what my own life was, with this difference only, that theirs did not correspond to those principles which they expounded in their doctrines. I saw clearly that they were deceiving themselves, and that, like myself, they had no other meaning of life than to live so long as life was possible, and to take everything that the hand could hold. I saw that because, if they possessed that meaning by which the terror of privations, suffering, and death is abolished, they would not be afraid of them. But they, the believers of our circle, just like myself, lived in plenty and abundance, tried to increase and preserve their possessions, were afraid of privations, suffering, and death, and, like myself and all of us unbelievers, lived gratifying their desires, and lived just as badly, if not worse, than the unbelievers.

No reflections could convince me of the truthfulness of their faith. Only such actions as would have shown me that they had such a meaning of life that poverty, sickness, death, so terrible to me, were not terrible to them, could have convinced me. But such actions I did not perceive among these varied believers of our circle. On the contrary, I saw such actions among the people of our circle who were the greatest unbelievers, but never among the so-called believers.

I saw that the faith of these men was not the faith I was in search of, and that their faith was not a faith, but one of the Epicurean solaces of life. I saw that this faith was, perhaps, good enough, if not as a consolation, as a certain distraction for a repentant Solomon on his

death-bed, but it was not good for the enormous majority of humanity, which is called not to live in solace, enjoying the labours of others, but to create life.

In order that all humanity may be able to live, in order that they may continue living, giving a meaning to life, they, those billions, must have another, a real knowledge of faith, for not the fact that I, with Solomon and Schopenhauer, did not kill myself convinced me of the existence of faith, but that these billions had lived and had borne us, me and Solomon, on the waves of life.

Then I began to cultivate the acquaintance of the believers from among the poor, the simple and unlettered folk, of pilgrims, monks, dissenters, peasants. The doctrine of these people from among the masses was also the Christian doctrine that the quasi-believers of our circle professed. With the Christian truths were also mixed in very many superstitions, but there was this difference: the superstitions of our circle were quite unnecessary to them, had no connection with their lives, were only a kind of an Epicurean amusement, while the superstitions of the believers from among the labouring classes were to such an extent blended with their life that it would have been impossible to imagine it without these superstitions, — it was a necessary condition of that life. I began to examine closely the lives and beliefs of these people, and the more I examined them, the more did I become convinced that they had the real faith, that their faith was necessary for them, and that it alone gave them a meaning and possibility of life. In contradistinction to what I saw in our circle, where life without faith was possible, and where hardly one in a thousand professed to be a believer, among them there was hardly one in a thousand who was not a believer. In contradistinction to what I saw in our circle, where all life passed in idleness, amusements, and tedium of life, I saw that the whole life of these people was passed in hard work, and that

they were satisfied with life. In contradistinction to the people of our circle, who struggled and murmured against fate because of their privations and their suffering, these people accepted diseases and sorrows without any perplexity or opposition, but with the calm and firm conviction that it was all for good. In contradistinction to the fact that the more intelligent we are, the less do we understand the meaning of life and the more do we see a kind of a bad joke in our suffering and death, these people live, suffer, and approach death, and suffer in peace and more often in joy. In contradistinction to the fact that a calm death, a death without terror or despair, is the greatest exception in our circle, a restless, insubmissive, joyless death is one of the greatest exceptions among the masses. And of such people, who are deprived of everything which for Solomon and for me constitutes the only good of life, and who withal experience the greatest happiness, there is an enormous number. I cast a broader glance about me. I examined the life of past and present vast masses of men, and I saw people who in like manner had understood the meaning of life, who had known how to live and die, not two, not three, not ten, but hundreds, thousands, millions. All of them, infinitely diversified as to habits, intellect, culture, situation, all equally and quite contrary to my ignorance knew the meaning of life and of death, worked calmly, bore privations and suffering, lived and died, seeing in that not vanity, but good.

I began to love those people. The more I penetrated into their life, the life of the men now living, and the life of men departed, of whom I had read and heard, the more did I love them, and the easier it became for me to live. Thus I lived for about two years, and within me took place a transformation, which had long been working within me, and the germ of which had always been in me. What happened with me was that the life of our circle, — of the rich and the learned, — not only

disgusted me, but even lost all its meaning. All our acts, reflections, sciences, arts, — all that appeared to me in a new light. I saw that all that was mere pampering of the appetites, and that no meaning could be found in it; but the life of all the working masses, of all humanity, which created life, presented itself to me in its real significance. I saw that that was life itself and that the meaning given to this life was truth, and I accepted it.

XI.

When I considered that this belief repelled me and seemed meaningless when it was professed by people who lived contrary to this belief, and that it attracted me and appeared rational when I saw that men lived by it, — I understood why I had rejected that belief and had found it meaningless, while now I accepted it and found it full of meaning. I saw that I had erred and how I had erred. I had erred not so much because I had reasoned incorrectly as because I had lived badly. I saw that the truth had been veiled from me not so much by the aberration of my mind as by my life itself in those exclusive conditions of Epicureanism, of the gratification of the appetites, in which I had passed it. I saw that the question of what my life was, and the answer to it, that it was an evil, were quite correct. What was incorrect was that the answer, which had reference to me only, had been transferred by me to life in general. I asked myself what my life was, and received as an answer: "An evil and an absurdity." And indeed, my life — that life of pampered appetites and whims — was meaningless and evil, and so the answer, "Life is evil and meaningless," had reference only to my life, and not to human life in general. I comprehended the truth, which I later found in the gospel, that men had come to love the darkness more than the light because their deeds were bad, for those who did bad deeds hated the light and did not go to it, lest their deeds be disclosed. I saw that in order to comprehend the meaning of life it was

necessary, first of all, that life should not be meaningless and evil, and then only was reason needed for the understanding of it. I comprehended why I had so long walked around such a manifest truth, and that if I were to think and speak of the life of humanity, I ought to think and speak of the life of humanity, and not of the life of a few parasites of life. This truth had always been a truth, just as two times two was four, but I had not recognized it because, if I recognized that two times two was four, I should have had to recognize that I was not good, whereas it was more important and obligatory for me to feel myself good than to feel that two times two was four. I came to love good people and to hate myself, and I recognized the truth. Now everything became clear to me.

What would happen if a hangman, who passes all his life in torturing and chopping off heads, or a desperate drunkard, or an insane man, who has passed all his life in a dark room which he has defiled, and who imagines that he will perish if he leaves that room, — if any of them should ask himself what life is, naturally he could get no other answer to this question than that life is the greatest evil, and the answer of the insane man would be quite correct, but for him alone. What if I was just such a madman? What if all of us, rich men of leisure, were such madmen? And I comprehended that we were indeed such madmen, — I certainly was.

Indeed, a bird lives for the purpose of flying, collecting its food, building its nest, and when I see the bird doing that, I rejoice at its joy. A goat, a hare, a wolf exists in such a way that they have to feed, multiply, and rear their young ones, and when they do so, I have the firm conviction that they are happy, and that their life is rational. What, then, ought man to do? He must procure his sustenance like the animals, but with this difference, that he will perish if he procures it by himself,

— he must procure it not for himself, but for everybody. When he does so, I have the firm consciousness that he is happy and that his life is rational. What had I been doing during my thirty years of conscious life? Not only had I procured no sustenance for everybody, but not even for myself. I had lived as a parasite and, upon asking myself why I lived, I had received the answer: "For no reason." If the meaning of life consisted in sustaining it, how could I, who for thirty years had busied myself not with sustaining life, but with ruining it in myself and in others, have received any other answer than that my life was an absurdity and an evil? It really was an absurdity and an evil.

The life of the world goes on by somebody's will, — somebody is doing some kind of work with the life of this world and with our lives. In order to have the hope of understanding the meaning of this will, it is first of all necessary to fulfil it, to do that which is wanted of us. If I am not going to do what is wanted of me, I shall never be able to understand what is wanted of me, and much less, what is wanted of all of us and of the whole world.

If a naked, starving beggar is picked up on a cross-road, is brought under the roof of a beautiful building, is given to eat and drink, and is made to move a certain stick up and down, it is evident that before the beggar is to discuss why he has been taken up, why he should move that stick, whether the arrangement of the whole building is sensible, he must first move the stick. When he does so, he will comprehend that the stick moves a pump, that the pump raises the water, and that the water flows down the garden beds. Then he will be taken out of the covered well and will be put to do some other work, and he will garner the fruit and will enter into the joy of his master, and, passing from the lower to the higher work, comprehending more and more the arrange-

ment of the whole building, and taking part in it, will never think of asking why he is there, and certainly will not rebuke the master.

Even thus the Master is not rebuked by those who do his will, — simple, working, illiterate people, — those whom we have regarded as beasts ; but we, the wiseacres, eat the Master's food and do not do any of the things that the Master wants us to do, but instead of doing them we sit down in a circle and discuss : " Why should we move the stick ? That is stupid." And we thought it out. We reasoned it out that the Master was stupid, or did not exist, and we were wise, only we felt that we were not good for anything and ought to free ourselves from our lives

XII.

The recognition of the error of the rational knowledge helped me to free myself from the seduction of idle speculation. The conviction that the knowledge of the truth could be found only through life incited me to doubt the correctness of my life; but what saved me was that I managed to tear myself away from exclusiveness and to see the real life of the working people and to understand that that alone was the real life. I saw that if I wanted to comprehend life and its meaning, I must live, not the life of a parasite, but the real life, and accept the meaning which real humanity has given to it and, blending with that life, verify it.

At that same time the following happened with me: during all the period of that year, when I asked myself nearly every minute whether I had not better make an end of myself by means of the noose or the bullet, my heart, side by side with the train of thoughts and of observations, of which I have spoken, was tormented by an agonizing feeling. This feeling I cannot name otherwise than the search after God.

I say that this search after God was not a reflection, but a feeling, because this search did not result from the train of my thoughts, — it was even diametrically opposed to it, — but from the heart. It was a feeling of terror, of orphanhood, of loneliness amidst everything foreign, and of a hope for somebody's succour.

Although I was fully convinced of the impossibility of

proving the existence of God (for Kant had proved it to me, and I fully comprehended his statement that it was not possible to prove it), I nevertheless tried to find God, hoped to find him, and, following my old habit, turned with prayers to him whom I was looking for and could not find. Now I tried to verify in my mind the proofs of Kant and of Schopenhauer about the impossibility of proving the existence of God, and now I refuted them. Cause, I said to myself, is not such a category of reasoning as space and time. If I am, there is a cause for it, and a first cause. And this first cause of all is what is called God. I stopped at this thought and tried with my whole being to recognize the presence of this cause. The moment I recognized that there was a force in the power of which I was, I felt the possibility of living. But I asked myself: "What is this cause, this force? How am I to think of it? In what relation shall I stand to that which I call God?" and nothing but familiar answers occurred to me: "He is the creator, the provider." These answers did not satisfy me, and I felt that what was necessary for life was being lost in me. I was horrified and began to pray to him whom I was searching after to help me, and the more I prayed, the more evident it became to me that he did not hear me and that there was nobody to turn to. With despair in my heart because there was no God, I said: "O Lord, have mercy on me! Save me! O Lord my God, teach me!" And nobody had mercy on me, and I felt that my life was stopping.

Again and again I arrived from various sides at the same recognition that I could not have appeared in the world without any cause or reason or meaning, that I could not be such a callow bird that has tumbled out of its nest, as I felt myself to be. Let me, fallen bird, lie on my back and pipe in the high grass, — I am piping because I know that my mother carried me in her womb, hatched and warmed me, fed and loved me. Where is she, that

mother of mine? If I have been abandoned, who has done it? I cannot conceal from myself that some one bore me loving me. Who is that some one? Again God.

He knows and sees my searching, my despair, my struggle. "He is," I said to myself. I needed but for a moment to recognize that, when life immediately rose in me, and I felt the possibility and joy of existence. But again I passed over from the recognition of the existence of God to the search after the relation to him, and again there presented himself to me that God, our creator in three persons, who sent his Son the Redeemer. Again that God, who was separate from the world, from me, melted like a piece of ice, melted under my very eyes, and again nothing was left, and again the source of life ran dry; I fell into despair and felt that there was nothing left for me to do but kill myself. What was worst of all, I felt that I could not do even that.

Not twice, or three times, but dozens, hundreds of times I arrived at these states, now of joy and animation, and now again of despair and the consciousness of the impossibility of life.

I remember, it was early in spring, I was by myself in the forest, listening to the sounds of the woods. I listened and thought all the time of one and the same thing that had formed the subject of my thoughts for the last three years. I was again searching after God.

"All right, there is no God," I said to myself, "there is not such a being as would be, not my concept, but reality, just like my whole life, — there is no such being. And nothing, no miracles, can prove him to me, because the miracles would be my concept, and an irrational one at that.

"But my idea about God, about the one I am searching after?" I asked myself. "Where did that idea come from?" And with this thought the joyous waves of life again rose in me. Everything about me revived, received

a meaning; but my joy did not last long, — the mind continued its work.

"The concept of God is not God," I said to myself. "A concept is what takes place within me; the concept of God is what I can evoke or can not evoke in myself. It is not that which I am searching after. I am trying to find that without which life could not be." And again everything began to die around me and within me, and I wanted again to kill myself.

Then I looked at myself, at what was going on within me, and I recalled those deaths and revivals which had taken place within me hundreds of times. I remembered that I lived only when I believed in God. As it had been before, so it was even now: I needed only to know about God, and I lived; I needed to forget and not believe in him, and I died.

What, then, are these revivals and deaths? Certainly I do not live when I lose my faith in the existence of God; I should have killed myself long ago, if I had not had the dim hope of finding him. "So what else am I looking for?" a voice called out within me. "Here he is. He is that without which one cannot live. To know God and live is one and the same thing. God is life."

"Live searching after God, and then there will be no life without God." And stronger than ever all was lighted up within me and about me, and that light no longer abandoned me.

Thus I was saved from suicide. When and how this transformation took place in me I could not say. Just as imperceptibly and by degrees as my force of life had waned, and I had arrived at the impossibility of living, at the arrest of life, at the necessity of suicide, just so by degrees and imperceptibly did that force of life return to me. Strange to say, the force of life which returned to me was not a new, but the same old force which had drawn me on in the first period of my life.

I returned in everything to the most remote, the childish and the youthful. I returned to the belief in that will which had produced me and which wanted something of me; I returned to this, that the chief and only purpose of my life was to be better, that is, to live more in accord with that will; I returned to this, that the expression of this will I could find in that which all humanity had worked out for its guidance in the vanishing past, that is, I returned to the faith in God, in moral perfection, and in the tradition which had handed down the meaning of life. There was only this difference, that formerly it had been assumed unconsciously, while now I knew that I could not live without it.

This is what seemed to have happened with me: I do not remember when I was put in a boat, was pushed off from some unknown shore, had pointed out to me the direction toward another shore, had a pair of oars given into my inexperienced hands, and was left alone. I plied my oars as well as I could, and moved on; but the farther I rowed toward the middle, the swifter did the current become which bore me away from my goal, and the more frequently did I come across oarsmen like myself, who were carried away by the current. There were lonely oarsmen, who continued to row; there were large boats, immense ships, full of people; some struggled against the current, others submitted to it. The farther I rowed, the more did I look down the current, whither all those boats were carried, and forget the direction which had been pointed out to me. In the middle of the current, in the crush of the boats and ships which bore me down, I lost my direction completely and threw down the oars. On every side of me sailing vessels and rowboats were borne down the current with merriment and rejoicing, and the people in them assured me and each other that there could not even be any other direction, and I believed them and went down the stream with them. I was carried far

away, so far away, that I heard the noise of the rapids where I should be wrecked, and saw boats that had already been wrecked there. I regained my senses. For a long time I could not understand what had happened with me. I saw before me nothing but ruin toward which I was rushing and of which I was afraid; nowhere did I see any salvation, and I did not know what to do; but, on looking back, I saw an endless number of boats that without cessation stubbornly crossed the current, and I thought of the shore, the oars, and the direction, and began to make my way back, up the current and toward the shore.

That shore was God, the direction was tradition, the oars were the freedom given me to row toward the shore, — to unite myself with God. Thus the force of life was renewed in me, and I began to live once more.

XIII.

I RENOUNCED the life of our circle, having come to recognize that that was not life, but only a likeness of life, that the conditions of superabundance in which we lived deprived us of the possibility of understanding life, and that, in order that I might understand life, I had to understand not the life of the exceptions, not of us, the parasites of life, but the life of the simple working classes, of those who produced life, and the meaning which they ascribed to it. The simple working classes about me were the Russian masses, and I turned to them and to the meaning which they ascribed to life. This meaning, if it can be expressed, was like this:

Every man has come into this world by the will of God. God has so created man that every man may either ruin his soul or save it. The problem of each man in life is to save his soul; in order to save his soul, he must live according to God's command, and to live according to God's command, he must renounce all the solaces of life, must work, be humble, suffer, and be merciful. The masses draw this meaning from the whole doctrine, transmitted to them by past and present pastors and by tradition, which lives among the masses.

This meaning was clear to me and near to my heart. But with this meaning of the popular faith, our non-dissenting masses, among whom I lived, inseparably connect much which repelled me and seemed inexplicable to me: the sacraments, the church service, the fasts, the worshipping of relics and images. The masses cannot separate

one from the other, nor could I. No matter how strange seemed to me much of what entered into the faith of the masses, I accepted everything, attended services, stood up in the morning and in the evening to pray, fasted, prepared myself for the communion, and at first my reason did not revolt against all that. What formerly had seemed impossible to me, now did not provoke any opposition in me.

My relations toward the faith now and then were quite different. Formerly life itself had appeared to me full of meaning, and faith had appeared to me as an arbitrary assertion of certain entirely unnecessary and irrational principles which were not connected with life. I had asked myself then what meaning these principles had, and, on convincing myself that they had none, I had rejected them. But now, on the contrary, I knew firmly that my life had no meaning and could have none, and the principles of faith not only did not appear to me as unnecessary, but I had been brought by incontestable experience to the conviction that only those principles of faith gave a meaning to life. Formerly I used to look upon them as upon an entirely useless, confused mass of writing, but now, though I did not understand them, I knew that there was a meaning in them, and I said to myself that I must learn to understand them.

I made the following reflection: I said to myself that the knowledge of faith flowed, like all humanity with its reason, from a mysterious beginning. This beginning is God, the beginning of the human body and of man's reason. Just as my body has devolved to me from God, thus my reason and my comprehension of life have reached me, and so all those stages of the development of the comprehension of life cannot be false. Everything which people believe sincerely must be the truth; it may be differently expressed, but it cannot be a lie, and so, if it presents itself to me as a lie, it means only that I do

not understand it. Besides, I said to myself: the essence of every faith consists in giving to life a meaning which is not destroyed by death. Naturally, in order that faith may answer the question of a king dying in luxury, of an old slave worn out by work, of an unthinking child, of a wise old man, of a half-witted old woman, of a happy young woman, of a youth swayed by passions, of all men under all the most varied conditions of life and education, — naturally, if there is one answer which replies to the eternal question of life, "Why do I live, and what will become of my life?" — this question, though one in its essence, must be endlessly diversified in its manifestations, and, the more this answer is one, the more sincere and profound it is, the stranger and the more contorted it must, naturally, appear in its attempts at expression, according to the education and position of each individual. But these reflections, which for me justified the strangeness of the ritualistic side of faith, were none the less insufficient to permit me in what for me was the only business of life, in faith, to commit acts of which I was doubtful. I wanted with all the forces of my soul to be able to become one with the masses, by executing the ritualistic side of their faith; but I was unable to do so. I felt that I should be lying to myself and making light of what for me was holy, if I did it. But here I was aided by the new Russian theological works.

These theologians show that the fundamental dogma of faith is the infallible church. From the recognition of this dogma follows, as its necessary consequence, the truth of everything professed by the church. The church as a collection of believers united in love and, therefore, in possession of the true knowledge, became the foundation of my faith. I said to myself that divine truth could not be accessible to one person, — that it was revealed only to a totality of men united in love. In order to attain truth, we must not divide; and in order not to divide, we

must love and make peace with what we disagree with. Truth will be revealed to love, and so, if you do not submit to the ritual of the church, you impair love; and if you impair love, you are deprived of the possibility of discovering the truth. At that time I did not see the sophism which was contained in that reflection. I did not see that the union in love could give the greatest love, but by no means divine truth as it is expressed in definite words in the Nicene Symbol; nor did I at all see that love could in any way make a certain expression of truth obligatory for union. At that time I did not see the mistakes of that reasoning and, thanks to it, I found it possible to receive and execute all the rites of the Orthodox Church, without understanding the greater part of them. I tried then with all the powers of my soul to avoid all reflections and contradictions, and tried to explain, as reasonably as possible, those church rules with which I came in contact.

In executing the rites of the church, I humbled reason and submitted myself to that tradition which all humanity had. I allied myself with my ancestors, with my beloved parents and grandparents. They and all those before them had believed and had procreated me. I allied myself also with millions of people from the masses, whom I respected. Besides, these acts had nothing bad in themselves (bad I called a pampering of the appetites). In getting up early for church service, I knew that I was doing well, if for no other reason, because in humbling the pride of my reason, and in allying myself with my ancestors and contemporaries, in the name of finding the meaning of life, I sacrificed my bodily rest. The same happened while I was preparing myself for communion, while I was saying the daily prayers and making the obeisances, while I was observing all the fasts. No matter how insignificant these sacrifices were, they were brought in the name of what was good. I prepared my-

self for communion, fasted, observed the proper prayers at home and at church. While listening to divine service, I tried to grasp every word of it and gave it a meaning every time I could. At mass the most important words for me were: "Let us love each other in unity of thought!" The following words, "In singleness of thought we profess the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost," I omitted, because I could not understand them.

XIV.

It was so necessary for me at that time to believe in order to exist that I unconsciously concealed from myself the contradictions and obscurities of the doctrine. But there was a limit to these attempts to elucidate the rites. If the responsory became clearer and clearer to me in its main words; if I managed to explain to myself in some way the words, "And having mentioned our Lady the Most Holy Mother of God and all the saints, we shall give ourselves, and one another, and our lives to Christ the God;" if I explained the frequent repetitions of the prayers for the Tsar and his relatives by assuming that they were more than others subject to temptation and so needed more praying for, — the prayers about vanquishing the enemy and foe, even though I explained them on the ground that an enemy was an evil, — these prayers and many others, like the Cherubical prayers and the whole sacrament of the offertory or "To the chosen leader," and so forth, almost two-thirds of the service, either had no explanation at all, or I felt that, finding explanations for them, I was lying and thus entirely destroyed my relation to God, and was losing every possibility of faith.

The same I experienced in celebrating the chief holidays. To remember the Sabbath, that is, devote one day to communion with God, was comprehensible to me. But this chief holiday was a celebration of the event of the resurrection, the reality of which I could not imagine or comprehend. And by this name of resurrection the

day which is celebrated each week is called in Russian, and on those days took place the sacrament of the eucharist, which was absolutely incomprehensible to me. All the other twelve holidays, except Christmas, were in commemoration of miracles, which I tried not to think of in order not to deny: Ascension Day, Pentecost, Epiphany, the feast of the Intercession of the Holy Virgin, and so forth. In celebrating these holidays and feeling that an importance was ascribed to what to me formed and were the opposite of important, I tried either to discover explanations which would soothe me, or I shut my eyes, in order not to see what was offensive to me.

This happened very strongly with me in the most usual sacraments which are regarded as most important, at christening and at communion. Here I came in contact, not with incomprehensible, but absolutely comprehensible actions: the actions seemed offensive to me, and I was placed in a dilemma, either to lie, or reject them.

I shall never forget the agonizing feeling which I experienced on the day when I went to communion for the first time after many years. The services, the confession, the rules, — all that was comprehensible to me and produced in me a pleasurable consciousness of having the meaning of life revealed to me. The communion itself I explained to myself as an action performed in commemoration of Christ and signifying the purification from sin and the full acceptance of the teaching of Christ. If this explanation was artificial, I did not perceive its artificiality. It was so pleasurable for me to humble and abase myself before the spiritual father, a simple, timid priest, and to turn out all the dirt of my soul to him, while repenting all my vices; so pleasurable to blend in thought with the humility of the Fathers who had written the prayers of the rules; so pleasurable to become one with all believers, past and present that I did not feel the artificiality of my explanation. But when I approached the

Royal Doors, and the priest made me repeat that I believed that what I was going to swallow was the real body and blood, I was cut to the quick; that was not merely a false note, it was a cruel demand made by one who apparently had never known what faith was.

It is only now that I permit myself to say that it was a cruel demand; at that time I did not even think of it, — then it merely pained me inexpressibly. I was no longer in that condition in which I had been in my youth, thinking that everything in life was clear; I had arrived at faith because outside of faith I had found nothing, absolutely nothing, but certain perdition, and so it was not possible to reject that faith, and I submitted to it. I found in my soul a feeling which helped me to bear it. That was the feeling of self-abasement and humility. I humbled myself and swallowed this blood and body without any blasphemous feeling, with the desire to believe, but the blow had been given to me. Knowing in advance what was awaiting me, I could not go there a second time.

I continued to do the rites of the church and still believed that in the faith which I was following there was the truth, and in me took place what now is clear to me, but then seemed strange to me.

When I listened to the conversation of an illiterate peasant, of a pilgrim, about God, about faith, about life, about salvation, the knowledge of the faith was revealed to me. When I came in contact with the masses and heard their opinions about life and about faith, I understood the truth more and more. The same was true during the reading of the menaions and of the prologues, for they became my favourite reading. Leaving out the miracles, upon which I looked as upon fables expressing an idea, this reading disclosed the meaning of life to me. There I found the lives of Macarius the Great, of Prince Ioasaph (the history of Buddha), there were the words of

John Chrysostom, the stories of the traveller in the well, of the monk who had found the gold, of Peter the Martyr; there was the history of the martyrs, all of whom proclaimed one and the same, that death did not exclude life; there was the history of those who were illiterate and foolish and ignorant of the doctrine of the church, and yet had been saved.

But I needed only to come in contact with learned believers, or to take their books, and a doubt of myself, dissatisfaction, a madness of quarrelling, arose in me, and I felt that the more I entered into their speeches, the more did I depart from the truth and walk toward the precipice

XV.

How often had I envied the peasants their illiteracy and ignorance! From those statements of the faith from which for me resulted apparent absurdities, there resulted nothing false to them; they could accept them and could believe the truth, that truth in which I myself believed. For me, unfortunate man, alone it was evident that the truth was bound up with the lie with thin threads, and that I could not accept it in such a form.

Thus I lived for three years, and at first, when I, like a catechumen, approached truth by degrees, guided only by feeling on my path toward the light, these conflicts did not startle me so much. Whenever I did not understand a thing, I said to myself, "I am guilty, I am bad." But the more I began to be permeated by the truths which I studied, the more did they become a basis of life, the more oppressive and striking did the conflicts grow, and the sharper did the line stand out between what I did not understand, because I could not understand it, and that which could not be understood otherwise than by lying to myself.

In spite of these doubts and sufferings, I still clung to Orthodoxy. But there appeared questions of life, which it became necessary to solve, and here the solution of these questions by the church — contrary to the very foundations of the faith in which I believed — made me definitely renounce all communion with Orthodoxy. These questions were, in the first place, the relation of the Orthodox Church to the other churches, to Catholi-

cism and to the so-called dissenters. During that time I, on account of my interest in religion, came in contact with believers of different creeds, with Catholics, Protestants, Old Ceremonialists, Milkers, and so forth, and among them I found a large number of morally elevated men and sincere believers. I wanted to be a brother to these people. What happened? The tenet which promised to me that it would unite all in one faith and love, the same tenet, in the person of its best representatives, told me that all these people were living in the lie, that what gave them the strength of life was the temptation of the devil, and that we alone were in possession of the only possible truth. I saw that the Orthodox people regarded all those who did not profess the same faith with them as heretics, precisely as the Catholics regarded Orthodoxy as a heresy; I saw that toward all who did not profess faith with external symbols and words, as Orthodoxy did, Orthodoxy, though trying to conceal it, assumed a hostile attitude, which could not be otherwise, for, in the first place, the assertion that you are living in a lie, while I have the truth, is the most cruel of words which one man can say to another, and, in the second place, because a man who loves his children and brothers cannot help assuming a hostile attitude toward people who wish to convert his children and brothers to a false faith. This hostility increases in proportion as the knowledge of the doctrine increases. And I, who had assumed the truth to be in the union of love, was involuntarily startled to find that that religious teaching destroyed precisely that which it ought to build up.

The offence is so manifest to us educated people, who have lived in countries where several religions are professed, and who have seen that contemptuous, self-confident, imperturbable negative attitude which a Catholic assumes toward an Orthodox or a Protestant and an Orthodox toward a Catholic or a Protestant, and a Protestant to-

ward both the others, and the same relation among the Old Ceremonialists, Pashkovians, Shakers, and members of all religions, that the very manifestedness of the offence at first seems perplexing. You say to yourself: "It cannot be so simple and yet that people should not see that when two statements mutually negate each other, neither the one nor the other can have the one truth which faith must have. There must be something wrong in it. There must be some explanation." I was sure there was, and I tried to find that explanation, and read everything I could in regard to this matter and took counsel with everybody I could. I received no explanation except the one which makes the Súmski hussars think that the first regiment in the world is that of the Súmski hussars, while the yellow hussars think that the first regiment in the world is that of the yellow hussars. The clerical persons of all different creeds, their best representatives, told me nothing but that they believed that they had the truth, while the others were in error, and that all they could do was to pray for the others. I went to see archimandrites, bishops, hermits, ascetics, and asked them, and not one of them made even an attempt at explaining that offensive state of affairs. Only one of them explained everything to me, but he explained it in such a way that I did not ask others after that.

I have said that for every unbeliever who turns toward religion (all our young generation is subject to making this search), this appears as the first question: Why is the truth not in Lutheranism, not in Catholicism, but in Orthodoxy? He is taught in the gymnasium, and he cannot help knowing — what the peasants do not know — that a Protestant or Catholic professes in the same way the one truth of his own religion. Historical proofs, which by each religion are bent in its favour, are insufficient. Is it not possible, I said, to look at the teaching from a more elevated point, so that from the height of the

teaching all differences may disappear, as they disappear for the true believer? Can we not proceed on the path on which we have started with the Old Ceremonialists? They assert that the cross, the hallelujah, and the procession around the altar as we practise them are wrong. We say: "You believe in the Nicene Symbol and the seven sacraments as we do, so let us stick to that, and in everything else do as you please." We have united with them by putting the essential in faith above the unessential. Now why can we not say to the Catholics, "You believe in this and that, which is the chief thing, but in relation to *Filioque* and the Pope do as you please"? Can we not say the same to the Protestants, by agreeing with them on the chief points? My interlocutor agreed with me, but he said that such concessions would produce a disaffection toward the spiritual power because of its departing from the ancestral faith, whereas it was the business of the spiritual power to preserve in all its purity the Græco-Russian Orthodox faith as transmitted to it from antiquity.

I understood it all. I was looking for faith, for the power of life, and they were looking for the best means of performing before people certain human obligations, and, in performing these human works, they performed them in a human manner. Let them say as much as they please about their compassion for their erring brothers, about praying for them before the throne of the Highest, — for the performance of human acts force is needed, and that has always been applied and always will be applied. If two creeds consider themselves right, they will preach their teachings, and if a lying doctrine is preached to the inexperienced sons of the church which is in the truth, the church cannot help burning the books and removing the man who is seducing her sons. What is to be done with that sectarian who, in the opinion of Orthodoxy, of religion, is burning with a false fire and in the most impor-

tant matter of life, in religion, is seducing the sons of the church? What else can be done with him but have his head chopped off or him imprisoned? In the time of Alexis Mikháylovich they burned him at the stake, that is, they applied the greatest punishment of that time; in our day they also apply the greatest punishment, by putting him in solitary confinement. I turned my attention to what was being done in the name of religion, and I was frightened and almost entirely renounced Orthodoxy.

The second relation of the church to vital questions was its relation to war and capital punishment.

Just then Russia had a war on its hands and Russians began to kill their brothers in the name of Christian love. It was impossible not to think of it. It was impossible not to see that murder was an evil which was contrary to the first foundations of any religion. And yet they prayed in the churches for the success of our arms, and the teachers of religion acknowledged this murder as a business which resulted from faith. And not only were there these murders in the war, but during all the disturbances, which followed after the war, I saw the orders of the church, her teachers, monks, and hermits, approve the murder of erring, helpless youths. I turned my attention to what was done by men who professed Christianity, and I was horrified.

XVI.

I STOPPED doubting: I was completely convinced that in that knowledge of faith which I had accepted not everything was true. Formerly I should have said that the whole doctrine was wrong, but now I could not say so. The whole nation had the knowledge of the truth, — so much was certain, — or else it could not live. Besides, this knowledge of the truth was now accessible to me, and I had lived with it and had felt all its truth; but in this knowledge there was also a lie. Of that I could have no doubt. Everything which before that had repelled me now stood vividly up before me. Although I saw that in the masses there was less of that alloy of the lie which repelled me than in the representatives of the church, — I nevertheless saw that in the beliefs of the masses the lie was mixed in with the truth.

Whence had come the lie, and whence the truth? Both the lie and the truth are to be found in tradition, in the so-called Holy Tradition and Scripture. The lie and the truth have been transmitted by what is called the church. Willy-nilly I was led to the study, the investigation, of this Scripture and Tradition, — an investigation of which heretofore I had been so much afraid.

I turned to the study of that theology which at one time I had rejected with such contempt, as something useless. At that time it had appeared to me as a series of useless absurdities; at that time I was on all sides surrounded by phenomena of life which had seemed clear to me and filled with meaning; now I should have been

glad to reject what would not go into my head, but there was no way out. On this doctrine is reared, — or with it, at least, is insolubly connected, — that one knowledge of the meaning of life which has been revealed to me. However strange this may be for my old, settled head, this is the one hope of salvation. I must carefully, attentively analyze it, in order that I may understand it, — not as I understand a statement of science, — that I am not looking for, nor can I look for it, knowing the peculiarity of the knowledge of faith. I am not going to look for an explanation of everything. I know that the explanation of everything must, like the beginning of everything, be lost in infinity. But I want to understand in such a way as to be brought to what is inevitably inexplicable; I want everything which is inexplicable to be such, not because the demands of my reason are incorrect (they are correct, and outside of them I cannot understand anything), but because I see the limitations of my mind. I want to comprehend in such a way that every inexplicable statement may present itself to me as a necessity of my reason and not as an obligation to believe.

That in the teaching there is truth, there can be no doubt for me; but it is equally certain to me that it also contains the lie, and I must find the truth and the lie and separate one from the other. And to this I proceed. What I have found in this teaching that is false, what truth I have found in it, and to what conclusions I have been drawn, forms the following parts of a work which, if it deserves it and anybody needs it, will no doubt be printed somewhere at some future time.

1879.

This was written by me three years ago. Those parts will be printed.

Now, the other day as I looked over and returned to that train of thought and to those feelings which were in me when I passed through all that, I had a dream. This dream expressed to me in concise form what I had lived through and described, and so I think that for those who have understood me the description of this dream will refresh and collect into one all that has been at such a length told in these pages. Here is the dream.

I see that I am lying on my bed. I feel neither well nor ill: I am lying on my back. But I begin to think whether it is right for me to lie down; my legs somehow do not feel comfortable: either I have not enough space to stretch them or the bed is not even, — in any case I feel uncomfortable; I move my legs and at the same time begin to consider how and on what I am lying, which has never occurred to me before. I examine my bed, and I see that I am lying on plaited rope strips that are attached to the side pieces of the bed. My feet are lying on one such strip, my thighs on another, — my legs are just uncomfortable. For some reason I know that these strips may be moved, and with the motion of my legs I push away the extreme strip under my feet, thinking that it will be more comfortable that way. But I have pushed it away too far, and I try to fetch it back with a motion of my legs, when the strip under my thighs slips away,

too, and my legs hang down. I move my whole body in order to get myself in a good position, quite sure that I will fix myself right; but with this motion other strips slip away and change their positions under me, and I see that the matter is only getting worse: the whole lower part of my body slips and hangs down, but my feet do not reach the ground. I hold on only with the upper part of my back, and I feel not only uncomfortable, but for some reason also nauseated. It is only then that I ask myself what before has not entered my head. I ask myself: "Where am I, and on what am I lying?" I look around and first of all glance beneath me, where my body hangs down, and whither, I feel, I must drop at once. I look down and do not believe my eyes. I am not only on a height, which is like the top of a very high tower or mountain, but on a height such as I could never have imagined.

I cannot make out whether I see anything down below, in that bottomless pit, over which I am hanging, and whither I am being drawn. My heart is compressed, and I experience terror. It is terrible to look there. If I look down, I feel that I shall at once slip from my last strip, and perish. I do not look. But not to look is even worse, for I think of what will happen to me if I slip down from the last strip. I feel that terror makes me lose my last hold, and slowly my back slips lower and lower. Another moment and I shall fall off. Just then the thought occurs to me that it cannot be the truth. It is a dream. Awaken! I try to awaken, but I cannot. What shall I do, what shall I do? I ask myself, and look up. Above there is also an abyss. I look into this abyss of the heaven, and try to forget the abyss below me, and indeed I am successful. The infinity below repels and frightens me; the infinity above me attracts and confirms me. I am still hanging over the pit on the last strips which have not yet slipped out from under me; I know that I

am hanging, but I look only up, and my terror disappears. As frequently happens in a dream, a voice says to me:

"Observe! It is it!"

And I look farther and farther into the infinity above me, and I feel that I am calming down; I remember everything which has happened, and I recall how it has all happened, — how I moved my legs, how I hung down, how I became frightened, and how I saved myself from terror by looking up. And I ask myself: "Well, am I now still hanging in the same way? I do not so much look around as feel with my whole body the point of support on which I am suspended. I see that I no longer hang or fall, but am firmly held. I ask myself how I am held; I feel around and look about me, and I see that beneath me, under the middle of my body, there is one strip, and that, looking up, I lie on it in the most stable equilibrium, and that it is that strip alone that has been holding me up all the while.

As happens in a dream, I now see the mechanism by means of which I am held, and I find it very natural, comprehensible, and incontestable, although in waking this mechanism has no meaning whatever. In my sleep I even wonder how it was that I could not understand it before. It turns out that at my head there is a pillar, and the stability of this pillar is subject to no doubt, although this slender pillar has nothing to stand on. Then there is a loop which is ingeniously and yet simply attached to the pillar, and if you lie with the middle of your body in this loop and look up, there cannot even be a question about falling. All that was clear to me, and I was happy and calm. It was as though some one were saying to me: "Remember! Do not forget!"

And I awoke.

1882.

CRITIQUE OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

1881–1882

CRITIQUE OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

PREFACE

I WAS inevitably led to the investigation of the doctrine of the faith of the Orthodox Church. In the communion with the Orthodox Church I had found salvation from despair. I was firmly convinced that in this doctrine lay the only truth, but many, very many, manifestations of this doctrine, which were contrary to those fundamental concepts which I had about God and his law, compelled me to turn to the study of the doctrine itself.

I did not then assume that the doctrine was false, — I was afraid of supposing that, — for one untruth in that doctrine destroyed the whole doctrine, and then I should lose the main support which I had found in the church as the carrier of truth, as the source of that knowledge of the meaning of life which I was trying to find in faith. So I began to study the books which expounded the Orthodox doctrine. In all those works the doctrine, in spite of the diversity of details and some difference in consecutiveness, is one and the same ; so, too, the connection between the parts and the fundamental principle is one and the same.

I read and studied those books, and here is the feeling

which I have carried away from that study. If I had not been led by life to the inevitable necessity of faith; if I had not seen that this faith formed the foundation of the life of all men; if this feeling, shattered by life, had not been strengthened anew in my heart; if the foundation of my faith had been only confidence; if there were within me only the faith of which theology speaks (taught to believe), I, after reading these books, not only would have turned an atheist, but should have become a most malignant enemy of every faith, because I found in these doctrines not only nonsense, but the conscious lie of men who had chosen the faith as a means for obtaining certain ends.

The reading of these books has cost me a terrible labour, not so much on account of the effort which I was making in order to understand the connection between the expressions, the one which the people who wrote them saw, as on account of the inner struggle which I had to carry on all the time with myself, in order, as I read these books, to abstain from indignation.

I used up a great deal of paper, analyzing word after word, at first the Symbol of Faith, then Filarét's Catechism, then the Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, then Makári's Introduction to Theology, and then his Dogmatic Theology. A serious, scientific tone, such as these books, particularly the new ones, like Makári's Theology, are written in, was impossible during the analysis of these books. It was impossible to condemn or reject the ideas expressed, because it was impossible to catch a single clearly expressed idea. The moment I got ready to take hold of an idea, in order to pass judgment upon it, it slipped away from me, because it was purposely expressed obscurely, and I involuntarily returned to the analysis of the expression of the idea itself, — when it appeared that there was no definite idea; the words had not the meaning which they generally have in language, but a special one,

the definition of which was not tangible. The definition or elucidation of a thought, if there was any, was always in a reverse sense; to define or clear up a difficult word use was made of a word or series of words entirely incomprehensible. For a long time I wavered in doubt, did not permit myself to deny what I did not understand, and with all the forces of mind and soul tried to understand that teaching in the same way as those understood it who said that they believed in it, and demanded that others, too, should believe in it. This was the more difficult for me, the more detailed and quasi-scientific the exposition was.

When I read the Symbol of Faith in church Slavic, in its word-for-word translation from the obscure Greek text, I managed somehow to combine my conceptions of faith, but when I read the Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, who express those dogmas more in detail, I was unable to combine my conceptions of faith, and was almost unable to make out what was meant by the words which I read. With the reading of the Catechism this disagreement and lack of comprehension increased. When I read the Theology, at first Damascene's and then Makári's, my lack of comprehension and my disagreement reached its farthest limits. But at last I began to understand the external connection which united those words, and that train of thoughts which had guided the writer, and the reason why I could not agree with them.

I worked over it for a long time and finally reached a point when I knew the Theology like a good seminarist, and I am able, following the trend of the thoughts which have guided the authors, to explain the foundation of everything, the connection between the separate dogmas, and the meaning in this connection of every dogma, and, above all, I am able to explain why such and not another connection, strange as it is, was chosen. When I attained to that, I was shocked. I saw that all that

doctrine was an artificial code (composed from the mere external, most inexact terms) of the expressions of the beliefs of a great variety of men, discordant among themselves and mutually contradictory. I saw that harmonization was of no use to anybody, that nobody could ever believe all that doctrine, and never did, and that, therefore, there must be some external purpose in the impossible combination of these various doctrines into one and in promulgating them as truth. I even comprehended that purpose. I also understood why this doctrine was sure to produce atheists in the seminaries, where it is taught, and I understood the strange feeling which I experienced while reading those books. I had read the so-called blasphemous works of Voltaire and Hume, but never had I experienced such an undoubted conviction of the full faithlessness of a man as what I experienced in reference to the composers of the Catechisms and the Theologies. When you read in these works the quotations from the apostles and the so-called fathers of the church, of which the Theology is composed, you see that those are expressions of believing men, you hear the voice of their heart, in spite of the awkwardness, crudity, and at times falseness of their expressions; but when you read the words of the compiler, it becomes clear to you that the compiler did not care at all for the sincere meaning of the expression quoted by him, — he does not even try to comprehend it. All he needs is a casual word, in order to attach by means of it an idea of the apostle to an expression of Moses or of a new father of the church. All he wants is to form such a code as will make it appear that everything which is written in the so-called Holy Scriptures and in the fathers of the church was written only in order to prove the Symbol of Faith. And so I came at last to see that all that doctrine, the one in which, I then thought, the faith of the masses was expressed, was not only a lie, but also a deception, which

The Metropolitan Filarêt.

had taken form through the ages and had a definite, base purpose.

Here is that doctrine. I expound it according to the Symbol of Faith, the Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, Filarét's Catechism, and, mainly, Makári's Dogmatic Theology, a book which the church regards as the best dogmatic theology.

FIRST PART OF THE DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

I.

The Introduction consists of the exposition of (1) the aim, (2) the subject, (3) the origin of the Orthodox Christian dogmas, (4) the division of the dogmas, (5) the character of the plan and method, (6) a sketch of the history of the science of dogmatic theology.

Though the Introduction does not speak of the subject, it cannot be omitted, because it defines in advance what will be expounded in the whole book and how it will be expounded.

"1. The Orthodox dogmatic theology, taken in the sense of a science, has to expound the Christian dogmas in a systematic order with the greatest fulness, clearness, and thoroughness possible, and, of course, only in the spirit of the Orthodox Church.

"2. Under the name of Christian dogmas are understood the revealed truths which are transmitted to men by the church as incontestable and invariable rules of the saving faith."

Farther on it explains that revealed truths are called the truths which are found in tradition and in the Scriptures. Tradition and the Scriptures are recognized as truths because the church recognizes them as such, and the church is recognized as a truth because it recognizes these, Tradition and the Scriptures.

"3. From the conception given about the Christian

dogmas it appears that they have all a divine origin. Consequently, no one has the right either to multiply or diminish their number, or to change and transform them in any manner whatsoever: as many as were revealed by God in the beginning, so many must there remain of them for all time, as long as Christianity shall exist."

Revealed in the very beginning. It does not say what is meant by "revealed in the very beginning." In the beginning of the world, or in the beginning of Christianity? In either case, when was that beginning? It says that the dogmas did not appear one after another, but all at once, in the beginning, but when that beginning was, it does not say, neither here, nor anywhere else in the whole book. It goes on:

"But, although they remain invariable in their revelation, both as to their number and their essence, the dogmas of the church have none the less to be disclosed, and are disclosed, in the church to the believers. Ever since men have begun to make these dogmas, which were handed down through revelation, their own, and to draw them into the circle of their ideas, these sacred truths began inevitably to be modified in the concepts of various entities (the same happens with any truth when it becomes the possession of man),— inevitably there had to appear, and did appear, various opinions, various misconceptions in regard to the dogmas, even various mutilations of the dogmas, or heresies, intentional and unintentional. In order to guard the believers against all that, to show them what and how they should believe on the basis of the revelation, the church has from the very beginning offered to them, by tradition from the holy apostles themselves, short models of faith, or symbols."

The dogmas are invariable in number and essence, and were revealed in the beginning, and, at the same time, they have to be disclosed. That is incomprehensible,

and still more incomprehensible is this, that before it said simply "in the beginning," and we assumed, with the Theology, that it was from the beginning of everything; but now the beginning is referred to the beginning of Christianity. Besides, these words give us the very meaning which the author has denied in the beginning. There it said, in the beginning everything was revealed, and here it says that the dogmas are disclosed by the church, and toward the end it says that the church *has* from the very beginning (of something) *offered*, not the church *offered* from the beginning, by tradition from the holy apostles, short models of faith, or symbols, that is, there appears an internal contradiction. It is evident that by the word "dogma" two mutually excluding ideas are understood. According to the definition of the Theology, a dogma is a truth as taught by the church. According to this definition dogmas may be disclosed, as the author, indeed, says they are, that is, they may appear, be modified, become more complicated, as has happened in reality. But the author, having evidently given an inexact definition to the word "dogma," by saying that it is a teaching of the truth, instead of saying a teaching of that which is regarded as the truth, or even by saying simply that the dogma is a truth of faith, has given to the dogma still another meaning which excludes the first, and so has been drawn into a contradiction. But the author needs this contradiction. He wants to understand by dogma the truth in itself, the absolute truth, and a truth as expressed by certain words. This contradiction is necessary in order that, teaching what the church regards as truth, it shall be possible to assert that what it teaches is the absolute truth. This false reasoning is important not only because it inevitably leads to contradiction and excludes all possibility of a rational exposition, but also because it involuntarily rouses suspicion in regard to the consequent exposition. According

to the definition of the church, a dogma is a revealed divine truth, taught by the church for the sake of the saving faith. I am a man of God. In revealing this truth, God has revealed it to me, too. I am in search of the saving faith, and what I say to myself, billions of people have said. Then, teach it to me! The truths are revealed by God (revealed to me as much as to you), so how can I help believing these truths and accepting them? This is all I want, and they are divine. So teach them to me! Don't be afraid that I will reject them. But the church seems to be afraid that I may reject what is necessary for my salvation and wants to compel me in advance to assert that all the dogmas which it may teach me are truths. There can be no doubt that what God has revealed to men who are in search of him is truth. Give me these truths! But here, instead of the truths, I receive a bit of intentionally incorrect reasoning, the purpose of which is to assure me in advance that everything which I am going to be told is the truth. Instead of vanquishing me in favour of the truth, this reasoning has the opposite effect upon me. It is evident to me that the reasoning is irregular, and that they want to assure themselves in advance of my confidence in what they are going to tell me. But how do I know that what I am to be taught as a truth is not a lie? I know that in the Dogmatic Theology, and in the Catechism, and in the Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, and even in the Symbol of Faith there is, among the number of dogmas, one about the holy, infallible church, which is guided by the Holy Ghost, and which is the keeper of the dogmas. If the dogmas cannot be expounded in themselves, but only by leaning on the dogma of the church, they ought to begin with the dogma of the church. If everything is based upon it, they ought to say so and begin with it, and not place, beginning with the 1st article, as is done here, the dogma of the church at the

foundation of everything, without mentioning it except in passing, as something well known, and not as is done in Filarét's Catechism, Chapter III., where it says that God's revelation is preserved in the church by means of tradition. The church is composed of all who are united by faith in tradition, and it is they who are united by tradition that keep the tradition.

Tradition is always preserved by those who believe in the tradition. That is always so. But is it right, — is it not a lie? And that care with which, without saying anything about the dogmas, they want to catch in advance my agreement to every dogma, compels me to be on guard. I do not say that I do not believe in the holiness and infallibility of the church. At the time when I began this investigation I fully believed in it, in it alone (it seemed to me that I believed). But it is necessary to know what is to be understood by the church and in any case, if everything is to be based on the dogma of the church, to begin with it, as Khomyakóv has done. But if they do not begin with the dogma of the church, but with the dogma of God, as is the case in the Symbol of Faith, in the Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, in the Catechism, and in all Dogmatic Theologies, they ought to expound the most essential dogmas, the truths revealed by God to men.

I am a man, — God has me, too, in view. I am searching after salvation, how then could I refuse to receive that one thing which I am searching after with all the powers of my soul! I cannot help accepting it, I certainly will accept it. If my union with the church will strengthen it, so much the better. Tell me the truths as you know them! Tell them to me at least as they are told in the Symbol of Faith which we have all learned by heart! If you are afraid that in the dimness and feebleness of my mind, in the corruption of my heart, I shall not understand them, help me (you know these

divine truths, — you, the church, are teaching us), help my feeble understanding, but do not forget that, no matter what you may say, you will be talking to the understanding. You will be speaking the divine truths as expressed in words, but the words must again be comprehended only through reason. Elucidate these truths to my understanding; show me the futility of my objections; soften my obdurate heart with the irresistible sympathy and striving after the good and the true, which I shall find in you; and do not catch me with words, with an intentional deception, which impairs the sacredness of the subject of which you speak. I am touched by the prayer of the three hermits, of which the popular legend speaks; they prayed to God: "There are three of you, three of us, have mercy on us!" I know that their conception of God is wrong, but I am attracted to them and want to imitate them, just as one feels like laughing, looking at those who laugh, and like yawning, looking at those who yawn, because I feel with all my heart that they are searching after God and do not see the falseness of their expression; but sophisms, intentional deception, in order to catch in their trap those who are not cautious or firm in reason, repels me.

Indeed, what is before us is the exposition of revealed truths about God, about man, about salvation. The men know that and, instead of expounding what they know, they make a series of false deductions, by which they want to convince us that everything which they are going to say about God, about man, about salvation, will be expressed in such a way that it cannot be expressed in any other way, and that it is impossible not to believe everything they are going to tell me.

Maybe you are going to expound to me a revealed truth, but the method which you use in making the exposition is the same that is applied in the exposition of an intentional lie. Let us zealously look at the truths themselves, — what they consist in, and how they are expressed.

II.

In the Symbol of Faith, in the Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, in Filarét's Catechism, in the Dogmatic Theology, the first dogma is the dogma about God. The general title of the first part is: "Of God in himself, and of his general relation to the world and to man (*θεολογία ἁπλῆ*, that is, simple theology)." That is the title of the first part. The second part will be: "About God the Saviour and about his special relation to the human race (*θεολογία οἰκονομική*, theology of house-management)."

If I know anything about God, if I have had any conception about him, these two titles of the two parts destroy all my knowledge of God. I cannot connect my conception about God with a conception about a God for whom there exist two different relations to man, — one, general, — the other, special. The concept "special" attached to God destroys my conception about God. If God is the God whom I have comprehended, he can have no special relation to man. But, perhaps, I do not understand the words right, or my conceptions are incorrect. Farther on I read about God: "Division I. Of God in himself." Now I am waiting for the expression of the truth about God, revealed by God to men for their salvation and known to the church. But, before getting an exposition of this revealed truth, I meet with Art. 9, which speaks of the degree of our cognition of God according to the doctrine of the church. This article, like the Introduction, does not speak of the subject itself, but in the same way prepares me to understand what is going to be expounded:

"The Orthodox Church begins all its doctrine about God in the Symbol of Faith with the words, 'I believe,' and the first dogma which it wishes to impart consists in the following: God is incomprehensible to the human intellect; men can know him only in part, — as much as he has been pleased to reveal himself for their faith and piety. An irrefutable truth." (p. 66.)

To those who are not used to this kind of an exposition I must explain (for I myself did not comprehend it for a long time) that by irrefutable truth is to be understood, not that God is incomprehensible, but that he is comprehensible, but comprehensible only in part. In that does the truth lie. This truth, it goes on to say:

"Is clearly expounded in Holy Scripture and is disclosed in detail in the writings of the holy fathers and teachers of the church, on the basis even of common sense. The Holy Books preach on the one hand that (*a*) God dwelleth in the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen nor can see (3 Tim. vi. 16); that (*b*) not only for men, but also for all his creatures his being is unknown, his judgments unsearchable, and his ways past finding out (Rom. xi. 33–34; John i. 18; 1 John iv. 12; Sirach xvii. 3–4), and that (*c*) God alone knows God: for what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the spirit of God (1 Cor. ii. 11), and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father, neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son (Matt. xi. 27)." (p. 67.)

On the other hand the Holy Books announce to us that the Invisible and Incomprehensible One was pleased to appear to men, and that God is inaccessible to reason, but that his existence is comprehensible. Here are the truths:

"(*a*) For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and God-

head (Rom. i. 20; Psalm xix. 1–4; Wis. of Sol. xiii. 1–5), and still more (*b*), in the supernatural revelation, when he at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son (Heb. i. 1–2; Wis. of Sol. ix. 16–19), and when this only-begotten Son of God, appearing on earth in the flesh (1. Tim. iii. 16), gave us light and understanding that we might know the true God (1 John v. 20), and then preached his teaching through the apostles, having sent down upon them the spirit of truth, which searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God (John xiv. 16–18, 1 Cor. ii. 10). Finally the Holy Books assert that although thus the Son of God, being in the bosom of the Father, hath declared to us God, no man hath seen him (John i. 18)." (p. 68.)

I beg the reader to observe the inexactness of the text. The actual text (John i. 18) runs like this: No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him, but nowhere does it say, "being in the bosom of the Father hath declared to us God."

"For now we see the Invisible One as with a glass in divining, and now we know the Incomprehensible One only in part (1 Cor. xiii. 12)."

I beg the reader to observe the incorrectness of this text, too. In the text cited it does not say: "Now we know the Incomprehensible One only in part." It does not say "in part," nor is there a word said about the "Incomprehensible One," and even nothing is said about knowing God, but about love and human knowledge in general. Look at the whole chapter! All this chapter speaks only of human knowledge, which is imperfect, and, evidently, there is no purpose even there of speaking about the knowledge of God.

"Now we walk by faith, not by sight (2 Cor. v. 7)." (p. 68.)

For we walk by faith, not by sight, that is, we live. Here again nothing is said about the knowledge of God in part, but about living by faith. All these texts are adduced in order to prove that God is incomprehensible and comprehensible only in part. Again we find here an intentional mixing up of ideas. The author purposely mixes up two ideas: the comprehensibility of the existence of God and the comprehensibility of God himself. When we speak of the beginning of everything, of God, we evidently recognize and comprehend his existence. But when we speak of God's essence, we obviously cannot comprehend that. Why then prove that he is comprehensible in part? If nothing in the world is completely comprehensible to us, then it is evident that God, the beginning of all beginnings, is absolutely incomprehensible. Why prove it? and why prove it in such a strange manner, by adducing incorrect words from John, which prove that no man has ever seen God, and inexact words from Paul, which refer to something quite different, to the proof of the comprehensibility of God in part?

These strange texts and the strange proofs arise from this, that the word "comprehensibility" is used here and elsewhere in a double sense: in its natural sense of understanding and in the sense of knowledge taken on trust. If the author had understood comprehensibility as comprehensibility, he would not have tried to prove that we comprehend God in part, but would have admitted at once that we cannot comprehend him; but he understands here by the word "comprehensibility" knowledge taken on faith, purposely mixing up this conception with the conception of the recognition of the existence of God. And so it turns out with him that we can comprehend God in part. When he adduces the text about our comprehending God through his creations, he has in mind the recognition of God's existence; but when he quotes the text that "God spoke to the fathers through

the prophets" and then "through the Son," he has in mind the knowledge which is taken on faith, as we shall see later on. For the same reason he quotes Paul's text, that "we walk by faith," as a proof of comprehensibility, by which he means the knowledge taken on faith. By comprehensibility the author does not understand a more or less firm conviction of the existence of God, but a greater or lesser quantity of knowledge about God, though entirely incomprehensible, taken on faith. Farther on he says:

"The holy fathers and the teachers of the church have disclosed this truth in detail, especially in reference to the heretical opinions which have arisen in regard to it."

The heretical opinions consist, in the author's opinion, in this, that God is entirely comprehensible and absolutely incomprehensible; but the truth, in the author's opinion, consists in this, that God is incomprehensible, and at the same time comprehensible in part. Although the word "in part" is not at all used in what the author is talking about, and has not even external authority; although the word, in the sense in which it is used here, is not even used in Holy Scripture, the author insists that God is comprehensible in part, meaning by it that he is known in part. How can something comprehensible be known fully or in part? There is an exposition of two opinions of what is supposed to be extreme heresy: of those who maintained that God was absolutely comprehensible, and of others who maintained that God was absolutely incomprehensible, and both opinions are rejected and an argument is adduced in favour of comprehensibility and incomprehensibility. In reality, it is clear that neither opinion, about the absolute comprehensibility and the absolute incomprehensibility, has ever been expressed, or ever could be expressed. In all these seeming arguments pro and con we find this expressed, that God, by the very fact that he is mentioned, that he is thought and spoken of,

is recognized as existing. But, at the same time, since the conception of God cannot be anything but a conception of the beginning of everything conceived by reason, it is evident that God, as the beginning of everything, cannot be comprehended by reason. Only by following along the path of rational thinking can God be found at the extreme limit of reason, but the moment this conception is reached, reason ceases to comprehend. It is this that is expressed in all the passages which are quoted from Holy Scripture and from the holy fathers, seemingly for and against the comprehensibility of God.

From the profound, sincere statements of the apostles and the fathers of the church, which prove only the incomprehensibility of God, is deduced, in a mere external manner, the comprehensibility of God. It is the dialectic problem of the Theology to prove that God cannot be comprehended altogether, but that he can be comprehended "in part." Not only is the reasoning purposely twisted, but in these pages I for the first time came across a direct mutilation, not only of the meaning, but also of the words of Holy Scripture. The real text of John i. 18: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him," is rendered by different words. From the famous 13th chapter of 1 Corinthians, which treats on love, one verse is quoted in a mutilated form in order to prove the thesis.

Then follow quotations from the holy fathers: "The Divinity will be limited if it is comprehended by reason, for conception is a form of limitation," says one of those whom the Theology counts among the advocates of incomprehensibility.

"What I call incomprehensible is not that God exists, but what he is. Do not use our sincerity as a cause for atheism," says Gregory the Divine, whom the Theology counts among the advocates of comprehensibility.

From all this the author concludes that God can be comprehended "in part," meaning by the word "comprehend" to receive the knowledge of him on faith, and proceeds to the exposition of the dogmas which will be a revelation of how God is to be comprehended in part. Like the Introduction, this Art. 9 does not expound the subject at all, but prepares us for the exposition of what follows. The purpose of this article consists apparently in preparing the reader to renounce his conception of God as God, as incomprehensible by his essence of the beginning of everything, and in preventing his daring to deny that information about God which will be imparted to him as truths based on tradition. This article concludes with a quotation from St. John Damascene, which expresses the idea of the whole:

"The Deity is unspeakable and incomprehensible, for no man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father (Matt. xi. 27). Even so the Spirit of God knoweth the things of God, just as the spirit of man knoweth the things of a man (1 Cor. ii. 11). Outside of the first blessed being no one has known God, unless God has revealed himself to him, — no one, not only of men, but even of the primordial forces, of the Cherubim and the Seraphim. However, God has not left us in complete ignorance of himself, for the knowledge of God's existence God himself has implanted in the nature of each. And creation itself, its keeping and management, proclaim the Deity (Wis. of Sol. xiii. 5). Besides, at first through the law and the prophets, then through his only-begotten Son, our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ, God has communicated to us the knowledge of himself, in so far as we are able to comprehend him." (p. 73.)

In this conclusion, which expresses the idea of the whole, the internal contradiction is very startling. In the first part it says that nobody can comprehend God, nobody knows

his ways and purposes, and here, in the second part, it says: "Still, God has not left us in ignorance, but through the prophets, his Son, and the apostles has let us know about himself, in so far as we are able to comprehend him." But we have just said that we cannot comprehend God, and here we suddenly assert that we know that he did not wish to leave us in ignorance, that we know the means which he has used for the purpose of attaining his end, that we know the real prophets and the real Son and the real apostles, whom he has sent to instruct us. It turns out that after we have recognized his incomprehensibility, we have suddenly discovered all the details of his purposes, his means. We judge of him as of a master who wants to inform his labourers of something. One or the other: either he is incomprehensible, and then we cannot know his purposes and actions, or he is entirely comprehensible, if we know his prophets and know that these prophets are not false, but real. And so it turns out:

"For this reason everything transmitted to us by the law, the prophets, the apostles, and the evangelists we accept, acknowledge, and respect, and we search after nothing else. Thus God, being omniscient and solicitous of the advantage of all men, has revealed everything which is useful for us to know, and has kept from us what we cannot grasp. Let us be satisfied with this and hold on to it, without removing the eternal landmarks or transgressing the divine Tradition (Prov. xxii. 28)." (p. 74.)

If so, we involuntarily ask ourselves: Why were these prophets and apostles true, and not those who are regarded as false? It turns out that God is incomprehensible and we are absolutely unable to know him, but that he has transmitted the knowledge of himself to men, not to all men, but to the prophets and the apostles, and this knowledge is kept in holy Tradition, and this alone we are to believe, because it alone, the church, is true, that is, those who believe in the Tradition, who observe the Tradition.

In the Introduction we had the same. After long discussions about what a dogma was, the whole business was brought down to this, that a dogma was a truth, because it was taught by the church, and the church were the men who were united by the faith in these dogmas.

We have the same thing here: God may be comprehended in part, a little bit, and how to know him "a little bit" the church alone knows, and everything which it will tell will be a sacred truth.

In the question of the dogma we had a double definition of the dogma, as an absolute truth and as a teaching, and so the contradiction consisted in this, that the dogma was now one unchangeable truth, revealed from the very beginning, and now a teaching of the church, which was evolved by degrees.

Here, in the question of comprehensibility, by which is understood knowledge on trust, as taught by the church, the author contradicts himself. To the word "comprehensibility" a double meaning is ascribed: the meaning of comprehensibility and of knowledge taken on trust. Neither St. John Damascene, nor Filarét, nor Makári can help seeing that for the greater comprehensibility we must have a greater clearness, and the affirmation that what I am told, I am told through people who by the church are called prophets, in no way can add any comprehensibility to the mind, and that we can only comprehend "in part" what is comprehensible, and so they substitute for the concept of comprehensibility the concept of knowledge, and then they say that this knowledge has been transmitted by the prophets, and the question of comprehensibility is entirely set aside; thus, if the knowledge transmitted through the prophets makes God more incomprehensible than he has been to me before, this knowledge is still true. But, in addition to this double definition, we have here also a contradiction between the expressions of the church Tradition itself.

Texts are quoted, and of these some deny the comprehensibility of God, and the others recognize it. It was necessary either to reject one or the other, or to harmonize them. Theology does neither the one, nor the other, nor the third, but simply enunciates that everything which is to follow on the attributes of the divisions of God according to his essence and his persons is the truth, because thus teaches the infallible church, that is, the Tradition. Thus, as in the first case, in discussing the Introduction, all the reasoning appears unnecessary, and all is brought down to this, that whatever is going to be expounded is the truth, because the church teaches it; even thus all the reasoning is unnecessary now, because the foundation of the whole doctrine is the infallible church.

But here, in addition to this repeated method, for the first time appears the teaching of the church itself, the code of that doctrine, and in it we find an absence of unity, — it contradicts itself.

In the Introduction, the foundation of everything was assumed to be the church, that is, the tradition of the men who were united through the tradition, but there I did not yet know how this tradition was expressed. Here appears the Tradition itself, that is, extracts from Holy Scripture, and these extracts contradict each other and are connected by nothing but words.

As I said in the beginning, I believed that the church was the carrier of truth. After having worked through the seventy-three pages of the Introduction and the exposition of how the church teaches about the dogmas and the incomprehensibility of God, I, to my sorrow, convinced myself that the exposition of the subject was inexact, and that into the exposition were accidentally or intentionally introduced irregular discussions about (1) the dogma being an absolute truth and at the same time the instruction in that which the church regards as truth, (2) that the announcement through the prophets, the apostles, and Jesus

Christ of what God is is the same as the comprehensibility of God. In the discussions of either point there is not only obscurity, but even unscrupulousness. No matter what subject I may wish to expound, no matter how convinced I may be of my incontestable knowledge of the whole truth in expounding the subject, I cannot act otherwise than say, "I am going to expound this and that, and this I consider the truth, and for this reason," but I will not say that everything which I am going to say is an incontestable truth. And no matter what subject I may be expounding, I cannot do otherwise than say, "The subject which I am going to expound is not fully comprehensible." My whole exposition will consist in making it more comprehensible, and the greater comprehensibility of the subject will be a sign of the correctness of my exposition. But if I say, "The subject which I am going to expound is comprehensible only in part and its comprehensibility is given to me by a certain tradition, and everything which this tradition says, even when it makes the subject more incomprehensible still, and only what this tradition says, is the truth," then it is evident that nobody will believe me.

But maybe the method of this Introduction was irregular, and the exposition of the revealed truths may still be regular. We shall listen to this revelation.

III.

"10. The essence of everything which it has pleased God to reveal to us about himself, outside his relation to other creatures, the Orthodox Church expresses in brief in the following words of Athanasius's Symbol: 'This is the Catholic creed: let us worship the one God in the Trinity, and the Trinity in the One, neither blending the hypostases, nor separating the substance.'" (p. 74.)

The fundamental truth which it has pleased God to reveal about himself to the church through the prophets and the apostles, and which the church reveals to us, is that God is one and three, three and one. The expression of this truth is such that I not merely cannot understand it, but indubitably understand that it cannot be understood. Man understands through reason. In the human mind there are no laws more definite than those which refer to numbers. And so the first thing which it has pleased God to reveal about himself to men is expressed in numbers: I myself = 3, and 3 = 1, and 1 = 3.

It is impossible that God should so answer the people whom he has himself created and to whom he has given reason in order to understand him; it is impossible for him to answer thus. A decent man, speaking to another, is not going to use to him strange, incomprehensible words. Where is there a man, however feeble in intellect, who to a child's question would not be able to reply in such a way that the child might understand him? How then will God, revealing himself to me, speak in such a way that I cannot understand him? Have not I, without

having any faith, given myself an explanation of life, just as every unbeliever has such an explanation? No matter how poor such an explanation may be, every explanation is at least an explanation. But this is not an explanation: it is merely a connection of words without any meaning and giving no idea of anything. I tried to find the meaning of life through rational knowledge, and found that life had no meaning. Then it seemed to me that faith gave that meaning and so I turned to the keeper of faith, to the church. And here, with its very first statement, the church affirms that there is no sense in the very concept of God. But, maybe, it only seems to me that it is senseless, because I do not understand the whole significance of it. Certainly that is not the invention of one person; it is that which billions have believed in. One and trine: what does that mean? I read farther:

"Chapter I. Of God, one in substance." (p. 74.) It is necessary, in the first place, to show that God is one in substance, and, in the second place, to disclose the idea of the very substance of God. Then there follows the doctrine about the unity of God in fourteen pages, divided into articles. ("The Doctrine of the Church, and a Short History of the Dogma about the Unity of God.")

There are proofs of the unity of God from Holy Scripture and from reason. The moral application of the dogma. An exposition of the proofs and explanations of the unity of God.

God is for me and for every believer, above all, the beginning of all beginnings, the cause of all causes, a being out of time and space, the extreme limit of reason. No matter how I may express this idea, I cannot say that God is one, for to that concept I cannot apply the conception of number, which results from time and space, and so I can say just as little that there are seventeen Gods, as that there is one. God is the beginning of everything, God is God. That is the way I formerly

comprehended God (and I am sure not I alone). But now I am taught that God is one. My perplexity before the expression that God is one and three is not only not cleared away, but my conception of God is almost lost when I read the fourteen pages which prove the unity of God. From the very first words, instead of elucidating that terrible statement about the unity and trinity of God, which has crushed out my idea of God, I am carried into the sphere of discussion about those Christian and pagan doctrines which have denied the unity of God.

It says there: "As opponents of the Christian doctrine about the unity of God have appeared (*a*) first of all, naturally, the pagans and polytheists who were to be converted to Christianity; (*b*) then, beginning with the second century, the Christian heretics, known under the general name of Gnostics, of whom some, under the influence of Eastern philosophy and theosophy, recognized the one supreme God, but at the same time admitted a multitude of lower gods, or æons, who emanated from him and created the existing world; and others, also carried away by the philosophy which, among other things, endeavoured to solve the origin of evil in the world, assumed the existence of two hostile, coeval principles, the principle of good and the principle of evil, as the prime causes of all good and evil in the world; (*c*) a little later, with the end of the third, and still more beginning with the middle of the fourth, century, the new Christian heretics, the Manicheans, who, with the same idea, assumed two gods, a good and an evil god, to the first of whom they subordinated the eternal kingdom of light, and to the second the eternal kingdom of darkness; (*d*) from the end of the sixth century, a small sect of tritheists, who, not understanding the Christian doctrine of the three persons in the one Divinity, assumed three distinct gods, who were as distinct as, for example, three persons or entities of the human race, although they all had the same substance,

and as distinct as are the entities of any kind or class of beings; (*c*) finally, beginning with the seventh and up to the twelfth century, the Diacletians, whom many regarded as a branch of the Manichean sect, and who, indeed, like the Manicheans, worshipped two gods, the god of good and the god of evil." (pp. 76 and 77.)

I am told that God is one and trine, and I am told this is a divine, revealed truth. I cannot understand it, and I look for an explanation. What use is there in telling me how incorrectly the pagans believed in assuming two or three gods? It is clear to me that they did not have the same conception about God which I have, — so what is the use of talking to me about them? I want to have the dogma explained to me, so why talk to me about these pagans and Christians who believed in two and in three gods? I am not a bitheist nor a tritheist. The refutal of these bitheists and tritheists does not clear up my question; and yet it is on this conception of the heretics that the whole exposition of the dogma about the unity of God is based, and not by accident. As before, when, in the question about the comprehensibility and incomprehensibility of God, the exposition of the church doctrine about it was connected with and even based on the refutal of the false doctrines, so even here, the doctrine is not expounded directly on the basis of traditions, reason, or mutual connection, but only on the basis of the contradictions of the other teachings, called heresies. In the doctrine about the Trinity, the divinity of the Son, the substance of the Son, there is everywhere one and the same method: it does not say there that the church teaches so and so for this or that reason, but it always says that some have taught that God is entirely comprehensible, others, that God is entirely incomprehensible, but that neither is correct, for the truth is so and so.

In the doctrine about the Son it does not say that the Son is this or that, but some have taught that he is en-

tirely God, and others, that he is entirely man, and so we teach that he is so and so.

In the doctrine about the church and grace, about the creation, about the redemption, there is everywhere one and the same method. Never does the doctrine result from itself, but always from a dispute, where it is proved that neither one opinion nor the other is correct, but both taken together.

Here, in the exposition of the dogma about the unity of God, this method is particularly striking, because the impossibility of polytheism, or rather arithmotheism, is so indubitable to us and to all men who believe in God that the disclosure of the dogma about this, where it says that God is trine, acts directly contrary to the aim which the author has in view. That low sphere of disputing with the polytheists, to which the author descends, and those false methods, which he uses in doing so, almost destroy the concept of God, which every believer in him has.

The author says that God is one, not in the sense in which any pagan god, taken separately from all the other gods, might be.

"But he is one in the sense of there being no other God, neither equal to him, nor higher, nor lower; but he alone is the only God." (p. 77.)

Farther on the words of some father of the church are adduced: "When we say that the Eastern churches believe in one God the Father, the Almighty, the one Lord, we must understand here that he is called one not in number, but in totality (*unum non numero dici, sed universitate*). Thus, if somebody speaks of one man, or one horse, one is in this case taken as a number; for there may be another man, and a third, and equally a horse. But where we speak of one in such a way that a second and third can no longer be added, there one is taken not as a number, but in its totality. If, for exam-

ple, we speak of the one sun, the word 'one' is used in such a sense that no second or third can be added to it. So much the more God, when he is called one, is to be understood not as one in number, but in his totality, one in the sense that there is no other God." (p. 77.)

However touching these words of the father of the church are by their dim striving to raise his conception to a higher level, it is evident that both that father of the church and the author are struggling only with polytheism and want the only God, but fail to understand that the words "one, only" are words expressing number and so cannot be applied to God, in whom we believe. His saying that God is "one or only not in number" is tantamount to saying: "The leaf is green or greenish not in colour." It is evident that here the idea of God as one sun by no means excludes the possibility of another sun. Thus this whole passage brings us only to the conclusion that for him who wants to follow the consequent discussions it is necessary to renounce the idea of God as the beginning of everything, and to lower this idea to the semi-pagan concept of a one and only God as he is conceived in the books of the Old Testament. In the chapter of the proofs from the Old Testament, texts are quoted which reduce the conception of God to the one, exclusive God of the Jews, and there is an exposition of a dispute this time no longer with the heretics, but with modern science. The opinion of modern science that the God of the Jews was conceived by them differently from what God is conceived now by believers and that they did not even know the one God, is called a bold, manifest calumny.

"After that it is a bold, manifest calumny to assert that in the Old Testament there are traces of the teaching of polytheism and that the God of the Jews, according to their Sacred Books, was only one of the gods,

a national god, like the gods of the other contemporary nations. In confirmation of the first thought they point to the passages in Holy Scripture where God is given the name of Elohim (gods, from 'Eloah,' god) in the plural number, and where he is made to speak: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness (Gen. i. 1 and 26); we will make him an help meet for him (Gen. ii. 18), and elsewhere. But when that same Moses, in whose books these passages are to be found, so often and so much in detail preaches monotheism as the chief part of the Sinaitic legislation; when he calls all the pagan gods vanities and idols, and in every way tries to guard the Jews from following them (Lev. xvii. 7; Deut. xxxii. 21, and elsewhere), there can be no doubt but that he did not, contrary to his opinion, openly express any belief in polytheism, and so we cannot but agree with the holy fathers of the church that here God is indeed represented in the plural, but that not the idea of the plurality of gods is expressed here, but of the divine persons in one and the same God, that is, that there is here an indication of the mystery of the Holy Trinity." (pp. 79 and 80.)

To any one reading the Old Testament it is clear that the conception of the God of the Old Testament is not at all the idea of a one God, but of a particular God, one only for the Jews. Why prove the contrary, when that is so unnecessary? What startles us here is not so much the intentional shutting of the eyes against what is manifest, but the unscrupulousness and incomprehensible boldness with which that is denied which is so evident to everybody who reads the Scripture, that which for hundreds of years has been worked out and made clear by all thinking men who busy themselves with these subjects.

It would be useless to quote passages from the Bible, from which it is clear that the Jews recognized their God as one only in comparison with other gods. The

whole Pentateuch is filled with such passages: Joshua xxiv. 2; Gen. xxxi. 19, 30; Psalm lxxxvi. 8; the first of Moses' commandments. We wonder for whom these discussions are written; but what is most remarkable is that all that is said to those who are seeking for an explanation of the God-revealed truths about God. In order to reveal to me the truth about God, which is in the keeping of the church, I am told unintelligible words, God is one and three, and, instead of explaining it, they begin to prove to me what I and every believer know and cannot help knowing, namely, that God has no number; and, in order to prove that to me, I am taken down to the sphere of low, savage conceptions about God, and, to fill the cup, they quote in proof of God's unity from the Old Testament what obviously proves the opposite to me; and, in order to confirm these blasphemous speeches about God, they tell me that the plurality of the expression is a hint at the Holy Trinity, that is, that the gods, as on Olympus, sat there, and said: "Let us make!" I feel like throwing it all away and freeing myself from this tormenting, blasphemous reading, but the matter is one of too much importance. It is that doctrine of the church which the masses believe in and which gives the meaning of life to them. I must proceed.

There follow confirmations of the unity of God from the New Testament. Again there is proved what cannot and ought not to be proved, and again with these proofs there is a debasing of the idea of God and again unscrupulous manipulations. In proof of the unity of God the following is quoted:

"The Saviour himself, in reply to the question of a certain scribe, Which is the first commandment of all? answered, The first of all the commandments is Hear, O Israel; The Lord your God is one Lord (Mark xii. 28–29)." (p. 81.)

The author does not see that this is only a repetition of an Old Testament sentence, and that it says, "Your God is one." But more remarkable still is the following:

"In other cases he expressed this truth not less clearly or even more clearly, when, for example, to a man, who called him blessed teacher, he remarked, 'No one is blessed except the one God.'" (p. 81.)

The author does not see that here the word "one" has not even a numerical meaning. Here "one" does not mean "the only God," but "only God." And all this in order to prove what is included in the conception of God, which no one who pronounces the word "God" can doubt. Why this blasphemy? One is involuntarily led to believe that all that is only in order intentionally to debase the conception of God. It is impossible to imagine any other purpose.

But that is not enough for the author. He considers it necessary to adduce more proofs of the unity (that is, of what cannot be connected with the idea of God) from reason. Here are the proofs of reason:

"The proofs of the unity of God, such as the holy fathers and the teachers of the church have used on the basis of common sense, are almost the same as those which are generally used at the present time for the same purpose. Some of them are borrowed from the testimony of history and the human soul (anthropological), others, from the examination of the universe (cosmological), others again, from the very conception of God (ontological)." (p. 83.)

In the first place, this is not correct, because such proofs have never been used to prove the unity of God. They have been adduced to prove the existence of God, and there they have their place and are analyzed in Kant. In the second place, it is proved that none of them are conclusive to reason. Here are the proofs as offered by the theologian:

"(1) All nations have preserved an idea of the one God."

That is not true. The author himself has just overthrown the polytheists.

"(2) On the agreement of the pagan authors."

This again is not true. It cannot be a proof, because it does not refer to all pagan writers.

"(3) On the innateness of the idea about one God."

This is again not true, because Tertullian's words, which are quoted in confirmation of this position, are said about the innateness of the idea about God, but not about the innateness of the idea about the unity of God.

"Listen," Tertullian says to the pagans, "to the testimony of your soul, which, in spite of the prison of the body, of prejudices, and bad bringing up, of the fury of the passions, of the enslavement to false gods, when it is roused as though from intoxication or from a deep profound sleep, when it feels, so to speak, a spark of health, involuntarily invokes the name of the one true God and cries: 'Great God! Good God! Whatever God may give!' Thus his name is to be found on the lips of all men. The soul also recognizes him as the Judge in the following words: 'God sees, I hope to God, God will recompense me.' And pronouncing these words, it turns its glances, not to the Capitol, but to heaven, knowing that there is the palace of the living God, that from there and from him it has its origin. On the testimony of the soul according to the Christian nature (*naturaliter Christiana*)." (p. 84.)

This exhausts the anthropological proofs. Here are the cosmological proofs:

"(1) The universe is one, consequently God is one."

But why there is one universe is not apparent.

"(2) In the life of the world there is order. If there existed several rulers of the universe, many gods, naturally divers among themselves, there could not be such an orderly flow and agreement in Nature; on the contrary,

everything would turn into disorder and become chaos; then each god would govern his own part, or the whole universe, according to his will, and there would be eternal conflicts and strife."

"(3) For the creation and government of the world one almighty, omniscient God is sufficient; what, then, are other gods for? It is obvious that they are superfluous."

Those are the cosmological proofs. What is this? A bad joke? Ridicule? No, it is a Theology, the disclosure of God-revealed truths. But that is not all. Here are the ontological proofs:

"(1) By the common consent of all men, God is a being than whom there can be nothing higher or more perfect. But the highest and most perfect of all beings can be only one, for, if there existed others, too, equal to it, then it would cease being the highest and most perfect of all, that is, it would cease being a god."

Here the sophism proves nothing, and only makes us doubt the strictness and exactness of the thoughts of the holy fathers, especially of St. John Damascene.

The first proof that there can be but one most perfect and highest being is the only correct reasoning on the attribute of him whom we call God, but is by no means a proof of the unity of God; it is only an expression of the fundamental concept of God, which by its very essence excludes the possibility of uniting this idea with the conception of number. For, if God is what is highest and most perfect, then all the previous proofs from the Old Testament and others about God being one only impair that idea. But, again, as in the discussion of comprehensibility and incomprehensibility, the author obviously needs here, not clearness and agreement of thought, but the mechanical connection with the tradition of the church; this connection is preserved to the detriment of the idea, and at all cost.

After these proofs follow special proofs of the unity of God in opposition to the bitheistic heretics, and these proofs have no connection with the subject. And after all that it is assumed that the first dogma about the unity of God has been disclosed, and the author proceeds with the teaching about the moral application of this first dogma.

The author has the idea that every dogma is necessary for the saving faith. One dogma about the "one God" has been revealed, and so it is necessary to show how this dogma is helpful in the salvation of men. It is like this:

"Three important lessons can we draw for ourselves from the dogma about the unity of God. Lesson the first: in respect to our relation to God. 'I believe in one God,' utters every Christian, beginning the words of the Symbol, — in one, and not in many, or two, or three, as the pagans and certain heretics used to believe: and so him alone shall we serve as God (Deut. vi. 13; Matt. iv. 10); and love him alone with all our heart, and with all our soul (Deut. vi. 4, 5); and put all our confidence in him alone (Psalm cxvii. 8, 9; 1 Peter i. 21); at the same time we must keep away from all kinds of polytheism and idolatry (Exod. xx. 3–5). The pagans, while believing in one supreme God, at the same time recognized many lower gods, and among this number included incorporeal spirits, good and bad (genii and demons), and deceased persons who had in some way been famous in life. We, too, worship good angels, and we worship holy men who in their lifetime have excelled in faith and piety; but we must not forget that we have to worship them, according to the teaching of the Orthodox Church, not as inferior gods, but as servants and ministers of God, as intercessors for us before God, and as promoters of our salvation, — we must worship them in such a way that the whole glory should refer mainly to him alone as won-

derful among his saints (Matt. x. 40). The pagans used to make sculptured figures of their gods and builded idols, and in their extreme blindness recognized these idols as gods, offering them divine worship: let not any of the Christians fall into similar idolatry! We, too, use and worship the representations of the true God and of his saints, and bend our knees before them; but we use and worship them only as holy and worshipful representations, and do not deify them, and, in making our obeisances to the holy images, we worship not the wood and paint, but God himself and his saints, such as are represented in the images: such ought to be the true worship of the holy images, and then it will not in the least resemble idolatry." (pp. 89 and 90.)

That is, according to this preceding discussion, we are given a lesson to do precisely as the idolaters are doing, but to remember certain dialectic distinctions, as here expounded.

"It is well known that the pagans personified all human passions and in this shape deified them; we do not personify the passions in order to deify them; we know how to value them, but, unfortunately, Christians frequently serve their passions as though they were gods, though they themselves do not notice that. One is so given to belly service and in general to the sensual pleasures that for him, according to the expression of the apostle, God is his belly (Phil. iii. 19); another is so zealously concerned about acquiring treasure and with such love guards it that his covetousness can, indeed, not be called otherwise than idolatry (Col. iii. 5); a third is so much occupied with his deserts and privileges, real and imaginary, and places them so high that he apparently makes an idol of them and worships them and makes others worship them (Dan. iii.). In short, every passion and attachment for anything, even though it be important and noble, if we abandon ourselves to it with zeal, so as to forget God

and act contrary to his will, becomes for us a new god, or idol, whom we serve; and a Christian must remember firmly that such an idolatry can never be coextensive with the service of the one God; according to the words of the Saviour: No man can serve two masters; ye cannot serve God and mammon (Matt. vi. 24)." (pp. 90 and 91.)

What is this? Where is this taken from? What a lot of things have been said and connected with the unity of God! How do they all result from it? There is absolutely no answer to that.

"Second lesson, in respect to our relation to our neighbours. Believing in the one God, from whom we all have our being, through whom we live and move and are (Acts xvii. 28), and who alone forms the aim of all of us, we are naturally incited toward union among ourselves."

And still more texts and still less connection with the preceding. If there is any connection, it is only a verbal one, like a play of words: "God is one, — we must strive after oneness."

"Finally, the third lesson, in respect to our relation to ourselves. Believing in God, one in substance, let us see to it that in our own being we may reëstablish the primitive union which has been impaired in us through sin. To-day we feel the cleaving of our being, the disunion of our forces, abilities, strivings; we delight in the law of God after the inward man: but we see another law in our members, warring against the law of our mind, and bringing us into captivity to the law of sin which is in our members (Rom. vii. 22–23), so that in each of us there are, not one, but two men, an inward and an outward, a spiritual and a carnal, man. Let us see to it that we put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and that we put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness (Ephes. iv. 22–24), and that we

thus may again appear just as one in our substance as when we came out of the hands of the Creator."

And so forth. Without the least connection with the dogmas about the unity of God, but with a play on the word "unity," there proceeds a discussion on the moral application of the dogma, but not a word is there for the solution of the question about the unity and trinity. I proceed to the next division of Chapter I.

IV.

I. Of the essence of God.

Of the essence of God? It was said that God is incomprehensible in his essence. Then it was said that he was a trinity. But I receive no reply to my answer, and get a new problem: God, who is incomprehensible in his essence, will be disclosed to me in his essence.

"The question of what God is in his essence (*οὐσία*, *φύσις*, *essentia*, *substantia*, *natura*), became, even in the first centuries of Christianity, a subject of especial attention for the teachers of the Church, on the one hand, as a question in itself of great importance and close to the mind and heart of each man, and, on the other hand, because at that time the question was taken up by the heretics, who naturally provoked against themselves the defenders of Orthodoxy."

Again, in order to disclose the truth to me, I am introduced to discussions and to the exposition of the opinion of this man and of that, and all of them are false, and:

"Avoiding all similar finesses, the Orthodox Church has always held only to what it has pleased God to communicate to her about himself in his revelation, and not having at all in mind the determination of the substance of God, which it recognizes to be incomprehensible and, therefore, strictly speaking, indeterminable, but wishing only to teach its children as precise, exact, and accessible an idea about God as is possible, it says about him as follows: 'God is a Spirit, eternal, all-good, omniscient, all-just, almighty, omnipresent, unchangeable, all-sufficing to

himself, all-blessed.' Here it points out to us, in the first place, the incomprehensible essence of God (or nature, or substance), as much as it can be comprehended now by our reason, and, in the second place, the essential attributes by which this essence, or more correctly, God himself, is distinguished from other essences." (pp. 94 and 95.)

The essence, nature, substance of God is pointed out to us, and so are the attributes by which God is distinguished from other essences. What are we talking about? About a limited being or about God? How can God be distinguished from others? How can we distinguish in him substance, nature, and attributes? Is he not incomprehensible? Is not he higher and more perfect than anything? Less and less do I understand the sense of what they are trying to tell me, and it is becoming clearer and clearer to me that for some reason they need inevitably, by rejecting sound reason, the laws of logic, conscience, for some secret purposes they need to do what they have been doing until now: to reduce my conception about God and the conception of all believers to a base, semi-pagan conception. Here is what is said about this nature and about the attributes of him who is here called God:

"17. The conception about the essence of God. God is a spirit. The word 'spirit,' indeed, more comprehensibly than anything else signifies for us the incomprehensible essence or substance of God. We know of only two kinds of substances: material, complex substances, which have no consciousness or reason, and immaterial, simple, spiritual substances, which are more or less endowed with consciousness and reason. We can nowise admit that God has in himself the substance of the first kind, since we see in all his acts, both of creation and of foresight, the traces of the greatest reason. On the other hand, we are of necessity forced to assume the substance

of the latter kind in God, through the constant contemplation of these traces." (p. 95.)

In confirmation of these unintelligible, perverse, intricate words there are quoted the words of St. John Damascene, which are almost as unintelligible and perverse.

"By knowing what is ascribed to God and from that ascending to the essence of God, we comprehend not the essence itself, but only what refers to the essence (*τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν,*) just as, knowing that the soul is incorporeal, inquantitative, and invisible, we do not yet comprehend its essence; just so we do not comprehend the essence of a body, if we know that it is white or black, but we comprehend only what refers to its essence. But the true word teaches us that the Deity is simple and has one action (*ἐνεργείαν,*) simple and doing good in everything." (p. 96.)

However painfully hard it is to analyze such expressions, in which every word is a blunder or a lie, every connection of a subject and predicate a tautology or a contradiction, every connection of one sentence with another a blunder or an intentional deception, it will have to be done. It says "spirit signifies substance."

Spirit is only the opposite of substance. Spirit is, above all, a word which is used only as an opposition to every substance, to everything visible, audible, tangible, perceptible by the senses. Essence, nature, substance is only a distinction of perceptive, sensual objects. By their nature, by their substance, by their essence, stones, trees, animals, men are distinguished.

But spirit is that which has not the essence of Nature. What, then, can the words, "Spirit signifies substance," mean? Further: "We know only two kinds of substances, complex material and simple spiritual substances." We do not know and cannot know any simple spiritual substances, because "spiritual substance" is a mere contradiction. The plural number used with simple spiritual

substance is another internal contradiction, because what is simple cannot be two or many; only with what is not simple do we get distinction and plurality. The addition to the word "substances" of "simple, spiritual, more or less endowed with consciousness and reason," introduces another internal contradiction, by suddenly joining to the simple concept that of consciousness and reason, according to the degree of which this something, which is called simple spiritual substances, is divided.

The words, "To admit that God has in himself the substance of the first kind," to be consistent, ought to have been, "To admit that the one God is complex, material substances," which is the merest absurdity, is an admission that the one God is a multiplicity of varied substances, of which it is impossible to speak. The words, "We are of necessity forced to assume the substance of the latter kind in God, through the contemplation of the works of his creation and foresight, in which traces of the highest reason are visible," signify not at all that God is a spirit, but that God is the highest reason. Thus, in examining these words, it turns out that, instead of saying that God is a spirit, they say that God is the highest intelligence, and in confirmation of these words are quoted the words of St. John Damascene, who says a third thing, namely, that the Deity is simple.

What is remarkable is that the conception of God as a spirit, in the sense of opposing it to everything material, is indubitable to me and to every believer, and has clearly been established in the first chapters about the comprehensibility of God, and that cannot be proved. But, for some reason, this proof is attempted, and blasphemous words about the investigation of the essence of God are pronounced, and the argument ends by proving that, instead of being a spirit, God is reason, or that the Deity is simple and has but one action. What is all that proved for? Why, in order, when the need for it shall

arise during an argument, to introduce the conception not of the one, simple spirit, but of spiritual essences, more or less endowed with consciousness and reason (men, demons, angels, who will be required later on), but more especially for that connection with the word "spirit," which later will play an important part in the exposition of the doctrine. We shall soon see for what purpose.

"And if, indeed, the revelation itself represents to us God as a spiritual being, our supposition must pass over to the stage of an indubitable truth. Now revelation teaches us, indeed, that God is purest spirit, not connected with any body, and that, consequently, his nature is entirely insubstantial, not partaking of the slightest complexity, simple." (pp. 95 and 96.)

From the words "purest spirit," not connected with any "body," it appears at once that the word "spirit" is no longer understood in the sense in which it is taken in all languages, not as it is understood in the gospel discourse with Nicodemus, "The spirit bloweth where it listeth," that is, as a complete opposite to everything material, but as something that can be defined, separated from something else. Then Holy Scripture is quoted to prove that God is spirit, but, as always, the texts prove the very opposite.

"Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord (Jer. xxiii. 24; Psalm cxxxix. 7–12); (*b*) everybody has a definite shape and so can be represented, but God has no sensual form, and so the Old Testament strictly prohibited his being represented: To whom then will you liken God? or what likeness will you compare unto him? (Is. xl. 18, 25); take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner of similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire: lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image, the similitude of

any figure, the likeness of male or female (Deut. iv. 15–16); (*c*) for the same reason everybody may be visible, but God is called the invisible God (Col. i. 15; 1 Tim. i. 17; Rom. i. 20), whom no man hath seen at any time (John i. 18 and vi. 46), and in particular, whom no man hath seen, nor can see (1 Tim. vi. 16; cf. Exod. xxx. 18–23); (*d*) everybody, being composed of parts, is destructible and perishable, but God is the immortal king of the ages (1 Tim. i. 17)." (pp. 96 and 97.)

Is it not clear that God who seeth everywhere, who has spoken from the midst of the fire on Mount Horeb, who has no similitude, that is, no form, who is immortal, is a spirit? It is evident that it is necessary to be able to speak of God as of a definite being, something like a man; but it is also necessary to speak of God as of an entirely simple, inaccessible spirit. It is the old catch; in all the chapters of this book, two different conceptions are purposely united into one, in order, in case of necessity, to exchange one for the other and, making use of that, mechanically to pick out all the texts of Scripture and so mix them up that it shall be possible to blend what is discordant.

After that follows a statement of the teaching of the church and, as always, not the exposition of the dogma, not an explanation, not a discussion, but a controversy. The controversy is against the anthropomorphists and pantheists. It is argued that it is not true that God is clothed in flesh and is in everything like man. If the Scripture speaks of his body, "we must by his eyes, eyelids, and vision understand his all-seeing power, his all-embracing knowledge, because through the sense of vision we obtain a fuller and more correct knowledge. By his ears and hearing we must understand his merciful attention and reception of our prayers; for even we, when we are asked, graciously incline our ear to the supplicants, showing them our favour by means of this sense. By his

mouth and speaking we must understand the manifestation of God's will, for we, too, manifest our intimate thoughts by means of our lips and through speech. By his food and drink — our agreement with the will of God, for by means of the sense of taste we satisfy the necessary demands of our being. By smelling — the acceptance of our thoughts as directed toward God, and of our hearty disposition, for by means of the sense of smell do we become aware of perfume. By his face we must understand his manifestation in his works, for our faces also manifest us. By his hands — his active force, for we, too, do everything useful and, especially, everything costly with our own hands. By his right hand — his succour in just works, for we, too, in performing more noble and important deeds, such as demand a greater force, most generally make use of the right hand. By his touch — an exact knowledge and investigation of the smallest and the hidden, because those who are touched by us cannot conceal anything upon their bodies. By his feet and walking — his coming and appearance, in order to aid the needy, or defend them against enemies, or to do some other act, even as we walk with our feet to some destination. By his oath — the inalterableness of his counsel, for between us, too, mutual agreements are confirmed by an oath. By his anger and fury — his loathing and hatred of evil, for we, too, become angry and hate what is contrary to our will. By his forgetfulness, sleep, and dreaming — his slowness in wreaking vengeance on his enemies, and his delaying his succour until the proper time." (pp. 99 and 100.)

These explanations and refutations of the anthropomorphists, independently of the arbitrariness and unintelligibility of the explanations (as, for example, why by food and drink is to be understood our agreement with the will of God), these explanations descend lower and lower into the sphere of petty, often stupid, dialectics, and farther

and farther does the hope recede of having the God-revealed truths explained.

After this, in the 2d division, there are adduced the proofs of the fathers of the church that God is an incorporeal, immaterial essence, and the same argument is continued. What is quoted is not the false, but the queer, reasoning of the fathers of the church, which shows that the fathers of the church were far from that conception of God which is common with every believer at the present time. They take pains to prove, for example, that God is not limited by anything, or is not subject to suffering, or not subject to destruction. No matter how worthy the labours of these fathers have been in the time of struggle against the pagans, the statement that God is not subject to suffering has involuntarily the same effect upon us as would have the statement that God does not need any raiment or food, and proves that to a man who argues the indestructibility of God the conception of the Deity is not clear and not settled. It does not explain anything to us and only offends our feeling. But, apparently, the compiler needs it: precisely what offends our feeling is what he needs, namely, the abasement of the idea of God.

In the 3d division the compiler quotes, in the shape of a proof, that invective which the fathers of the church uttered in defence of their opinion:

"In connection with this it is important for us to notice that the ancient pastors, rebuking the errors of the anthropomorphists, called their opinion a senseless, most stupid heresy, and accounted the anthropomorphists, who held this opinion, as heretics."

And as the last argument of the church the following is adduced:

"For this reason we hear, among other things, in the 'order of Orthodoxy,' which the Orthodox Church performs in the first week of the Great Lent, the following

words: 'Anathema on those who say that God is not spirit, but flesh!'"

That ends all we know about the substance of God, namely, that he is a spirit. What is the deduction from all that? That God is not an essence, but a spirit: all that results from the conception of God, and all believers cannot help thinking otherwise. This is partly confirmed by this article. But, in addition to that, we have the statement that this spirit is something special, separate, almost incomprehensible. In this verbal blending of the contradictions consists the subject matter of Art. 18. What the purpose is, appears clearly from the following 18th article.

"18. The idea of the essential properties of God, — their number and division. — The essential properties in God (τὰ οὐσιώδη ἰδιώματα, *proprietates essentiales*), or, in one word (ἀξιώματα, δόγματα, ἐπιτηδεύματα, *attributa*, *perfectiones*), are such as belong to the divine essence alone and distinguish him from all other beings, and so they are properties which are equally applicable to all the persons of the Holy Trinity, who form one in their essence, for which reason they are also called general divine properties (ἰδιώματα κοινά) in contradistinction to special or personal attributes (τὰ προσωπικὰ ἰδιώματα, *proprietates personales*), which belong to each person of the Deity taken separately and thus distinguish them among themselves." (p. 102.)

It turns out that God, a simple spirit, has properties which distinguish him from all other beings. More than that: in addition to the general, divine attributes, there are others, which distinguish the same God in the three persons, though nothing has as yet been said about what the Trinity, and what a person is.

"It is impossible to define the number of essential or common properties of God. Though the church, in giving us a sound idea about God, mentions some of these

('God is a Spirit, eternal, all-good, omniscient, all-just, almighty, omnipresent, unchangeable, all-sufficing to himself, all-blessed'), it at the same time remarks that God's general properties are endless, for everything which is said in revelation about God, one in essence, in a certain sense forms the properties of the divine being. Consequently we, following the example of the church, shall limit ourselves to the analysis of some of them, the chief ones, such as more than any others characterize the essence of God and embrace or explain the other, less perceptible properties, and such as are more clearly mentioned in the divine revelation." (p. 102.)

The attributes of God are numberless, and so we are going to speak of some of them. But, if they are numberless, a few of them are an infinitely small part, and so it is unnecessary and impossible to speak of them. But not so judges the Theology. Not only of some, but of the chief ones among them! How can there be a chief one in an endless number? All are equally infinitely small.

"We shall speak of such as more than any other characterize the Deity."

Characterize how? God has a character, that is, the distinction of one god from others. No, it is clear that we are talking about something else and not about God. But let us proceed.

"In order to have distinct ideas about the essential properties of God and to expound the teaching about them in a certain system, the theologians have since antiquity tried to divide them into classes, and of such divisions, especially in the mediæval and modern period, many have been invented, and all of them, though not in the same degree, have their virtues and their defects. The main reason for the latter is quite comprehensible: the attributes of the divine being, like the essence itself, are entirely incomprehensible to us. Therefore, without making a vain attempt to find any one most perfect divi-

sion of them, we shall select the one which to us appears most correct and most simple." (pp. 102 and 103.)

The properties of the essence of God, as well as the essence itself, are *quite incomprehensible* to us. Well? Let us not scoff and talk of the incomprehensible! No. "We shall select a division which to us will appear most correct."

"God, according to his essence, is a spirit; but in every spirit we distinguish, in particular, in addition to the spiritual nature proper (the substance), two main forces or faculties: mind and will."

How can there be the division into mind and will in a simple spirit? Where was that said? There was a general statement about the spirit, but there was nothing said about its having mind and will. Mind and will are words with which we, men, and only a few of us, distinguish in ourselves two activities. But why has God that?

"In conformity with this, the essential properties of God may be divided into three classes: (1) into properties of the divine essence in general, that is, into such as belong equally to the spiritual nature (substance) of God and to its two forces, to mind and will, and distinguish God, as a spirit in general, from all other beings; (2) into properties of the divine mind, that is, such as belong only to the divine mind; and finally (3) into properties of the divine will, that is, such as belong only to the divine will."

Had I not better throw it all up? For is that not the delirium of an insane man? No, I said to myself that I would analyze strictly and thoroughly the whole exposition of the Theology.

Then follow 60 pages on the properties of God. Here are the contents of these 60 pages:

"19. The properties of the divine essence in general. God, as a spirit, is distinguished from all other beings in

general, in that they are all limited in their existence and in their forces, consequently more or less imperfect, while he is an unlimited spirit, or limitless, hence all-perfect." (pp. 103 and 104.)

"God is distinguished from all other beings in general." This false conception of God as distinguished from all other beings is apparently needed because before and many times afterward and here it says that God is limitless, and therefore it is impossible to say that the limitless can be distinguished from anything.

"In particular, all other beings: (*a*) are limited in the beginning and during the continuation of their existence; all of them have received their existence through God and are in constant dependence on him, and partly on each other; God does not receive his existence from anybody, and in nothing is he dependent on anybody, — he is self-existing and independent; (*b*) they are limited in the manner or form of their existence, for they are inevitably subject to the conditions of space and time, and so are subject to changes; God is above all conditions of space, — he is immeasurable and omnipresent, — and above all conditions of time, — he is eternal and unchangeable; (*c*) finally they are limited in their strength, both in quality and in quantity; but for God there are no limits even in this respect, — he is all-powerful and almighty. Thus the chief qualities which belong to God in his essence in general are: (1) unlimitedness or all-perfection, (2) self-existence, (3) independence, (4) immeasurableness and omnipresence, (5) eternity, (6) unchangeableness, and (7) almightiness."

Then, God is distinguished from other beings in particular:

"(1) By his unlimitedness or all-perfection." Why unlimitedness is equal to all-perfection remains unexplained, both here and elsewhere.

"(2) By his self-existence and (3) independence." What

difference there is between self-existence and independence again remains unexplained. Self-existence is explained as follows:

"God is called self-existent because he does not owe his existence to any other being, but has his existence, and everything else which he has, from himself."

His independence is explained on p. 110 as follows:

"Under the name of independence in God we understand a quality by force of which he is in his essence and forces and actions determined only by himself and not by anything external, and he is self-satisfied (αὐτάρκης, ἀνενδεής), self-willed (αὐτεξούσιος), self-ruled (αὐτοκράτης), — this property of God results from the preceding. If God is a self-existent being and everything he has he has through himself, that means that he is not dependent on anybody, at least not in his existence and powers." (p. 110.)

Thus, in the first attribute of unlimitedness there is attached to it, for some reason, the idea of all-perfection (an unused and badly compounded word), which from its composition has an entirely different meaning from unlimitedness. But the words "self-existence" and "independence," which, according to the definition of the author himself, express the identical idea, are separated.

(4) Immeasurableness, which is only a synonym of unlimitedness, is suddenly combined into one with omnipresence, which has nothing in common with that idea. Then:

(5) Eternity and (6) unchangeableness are again separated, though they form one idea, for changeableness takes place only in time, and time is only the consequence of changeableness.

(7) Almightiness, which is defined by the concept of unlimited force, though neither before nor later will there be anything said about force. But that is far from being all. We must remember that after the disclosure of the essence of God in himself (Art. 17,

p. 95), we have had disclosed to us the essential properties of God (Art. 18, p. 102). Of the essential properties of God there have now been disclosed to us the essential properties of God in general (Art. 19, p. 103). We still are to get the disclosure of the properties, at first, of God's mind (Art. 20, p. 122), and then of the properties of God's will (Art. 21, p. 129).

"God's mind may be viewed from two sides: from the theoretical and from the practical side, that is, in itself and in relation to God's actions. In the first case we get the idea of one property of this mind, of omniscience; in the latter, of another, of the highest all-wisdom."

God knows everything in himself. What else does he know if he has all-wisdom? On p. 127 it says:

"All-wisdom consists in the completest knowledge of the best purposes and the best means, and at the same time in the fullest ability to apply the latter to the first."

The knowledge of the best purposes and means! But how can an unlimited, all-satisfied being have any purposes? And what concept of means can there be applied to an almighty being? But that is not enough:

"Holy Scripture defines in detail the subjects of the divine knowledge. It bears testimony in general to the fact that God knows everything, and in particular, that he knows himself and everything outside of himself: everything possible and actual, everything past, present, and future." (p. 122.)

Then, in parts, with quotations from Holy Scripture, the author proves that God knows (*a*) everything, (*b*) himself, (*c*) everything possible, (*d*) everything existing, (*e*) the past, (*f*) the present, (*g*) the future. But God is outside of time, according to the Theology, above time, — so what past and future is there for him? And God is outside of space, — he is an unlimited, limitless, omniscient being, — how can there be anything "outside of" him? "Outside of" means beyond the limits, beyond

the borders of something limited. I am not exaggerating, am not on purpose expressing myself in a strange manner, on the contrary, I am using every effort to soften the wildness of the expressions. Read pp. 123–125! What am I saying! Open those two volumes anywhere, and read them! It is all the time the same, and the farther you proceed, the more liberated from all laws of the connection of thoughts and words!

"21. The will of God may be viewed from two sides: in itself and in relation to creatures. In the first case it presents itself to us (*a*) in the highest degree free according to its essence, and (*b*) all-holy in its free activity. In the latter it appears, first of all, (*a*) all-good, — since goodness is the first and chief cause of all divine acts in relation to all creatures, rational and irrational; then, (*b*) in particular, in relation to rational creatures only, true and correct, for it is revealed to them in the form of a moral law for their wills, and in the form of promises or moral incitements toward the performance of this law; finally (*c*) all-just, in so far as it watches the moral actions of these creatures and repays them according to their deserts. Thus the chief properties of the will of God, or, more correctly, the chief divine properties according to his will, are (1) highest freedom, (2) completest holiness, (3) infinite goodness, (4) completest truth and correctness, and (5) infinite justice." (pp. 129 and 130.)

So it turns out that the limitless, unlimited God is free, and this is proved by texts. And, as always, the texts show that those who wrote and spoke those words did not understand God and only approached a comprehension of him and spoke of a strong, pagan god, but not of the God we believe in.

"I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power and by my out-stretched arm, and have given it unto

whom it seemed meet unto me (Jer. xxvii. 5). I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion (Rom ix. 15; cf. Exod. xxxii. 19). And he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou? (Dan. iv. 35; cf. Job xxiii. 13). The Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will (Dan. iv. 17, 25, 32). The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will (Prov. xxi. 1). Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father; but the very hairs of your head are all numbered (Matt. x. 29, 30). (*c*) In the redemption of man: Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will (Ephes. i. 5). Having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself (Ephes. i. 9). And Christ the Saviour gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from this present evil world, according to the will of God and our Father: to whom be glory for ever and ever (Gal. i. 4, 5). (*d*) For our regeneration and purification" (all this is an account of the manifestations of God's freedom): "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures (James i. 18). But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal; for to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another, the word of knowledge by the same Spirit. . . . But all these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will (1 Cor. xii. 7, 8, 11).

"The holy fathers and teachers of the church, who in

their writings mentioned the divine freedom in general, frequently expressed their ideas with peculiar clearness, in three cases, (*a*) when they armed themselves against the ancient philosophers, who affirmed that the universe was eternal and had sprung from God not by his will, but of necessity, as the shadow from the body, or the glow from the light, (*b*) when they refuted the errors of the pagans and certain heretics, who asserted that everything in the universe and God himself were subject to fate, and (*c*) when, wishing to define wherein the image of God consisted in us, they assumed it to be in man's free will. In all these cases they pointed out that God was not subject to any necessity and quite freely determined himself toward actions; that he had created in the beginning everything which he had wished and as he had wished, and continued to do everything in the world only by his will, and that he, in general, in his essence, was self-willed.

"Indeed, if God is a most perfect spirit, and an independent and almighty spirit, our reason, too, must be conscious of the fact that God is free in the highest degree according to his essence; freedom is a most essential property of a conscious spirit, and he who is all-powerful and holds everything in his power, himself not dependent on anything, cannot be subject to necessity or compulsion.

"(2) Completest holiness. Calling God holy (ἅγιος, *sanctus*), we profess that he is completely pure from all sin, that he cannot even sin, and in all his acts is entirely true to the moral law, and so he hates the evil and loves only the good in all his creatures." (pp. 130–132.)

The holiness consists in God's not sinning, and in his hating evil. And again a confirmation of this scoffing from Holy Scripture.

"(3) Infinite goodness. Goodness in God is a property by which he is always ready to confer, and actually does confer, as many benefits as each of the creatures is able to receive by its nature and condition."

And here is how this goodness is confirmed:

"Goodness is the chief cause of creation and providence; God has existed and continued in bliss since eternity, without having any need of any one; but only of his infinite goodness he wanted to make other beings the copartners of his bliss, and so he gave them existence, adorned them with various perfections, and did not stop lavishing upon them all benefits which are necessary for existence and bliss." (p. 138.)

From eternity, that is, an endless number of years, God lived in bliss by himself and with all his all-wisdom had not thought before of creating the world. Thus goodness, which is to be taken in the sense that the idea of evil cannot be connected with the idea of God, is mutilated in this conception and debased to the lowest, blasphemous representation.

"(4) Completest truth and verity. We profess God as being true and veracious (*ἀληθινός*, *πιστός*, *verax*, *fidelis*), because whatever he reveals to creatures he reveals correctly and exactly, and in particular, no matter what promises or threats he utters, he always carries out what he says."

True to whom? The idea of threat and punishment, the idea of evil, connected with God! And then texts which confirm the statement that God cannot lie!

"(5) Infinite justice. Under the name of justice, or truth (*δικαιοσύνη*, *justicia*), we here understand the property in God by which he metes out the due to all moral creatures, namely, he rewards the good and punishes the bad." (p. 140.)

The all-good God metes out eternal punishment to people for a sin committed in the temporal life. And that is confirmed by texts:

"And the unrighteous will hear the heavy doom of the unbiased judge: Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt. xxv.

41). Besides, holy Scripture (*b*) bears testimony to the fact that the curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked (Prov. iii. 33; cf. Prov. xv. 25), and he shall bring upon them their own iniquity, and shall cut them off in their own wickedness (Psalm xciv. 23); (*c*) calls God a consuming fire: For our God is a consuming fire (Heb. xii. 29; Deut. iv. 24), and (*d*) in human fashion ascribes to him anger and vengeance: For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness (Rom. i. 18; cf. Exod. xxxii. 10, Num. xi. 10, Psalms ii. 5 and lxxxviii. 5–7, 16, Ezek. vii. 14). Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord (Rom. xii. 19; Heb. x. 30; Deut. xxxii. 35). Lord God of vengeance, God hath not shewn himself (Psalm xciv. 1)." (p. 142.)

This apparent contradiction did not arrest the author, just as he had not been arrested by the contradictions in each division of the properties of God, but here he stopped, apparently because the contradiction had been observed long ago and there had been objections raised, and the holy fathers, on the basis of whom the whole book is written, had expressed themselves in regard to it. Here is what the holy fathers had said about it:

"The true God must of necessity be both good and just; his goodness is a just goodness, and his truth a just truth; he remains just even when he forgives us our sins and pardons us; he remains good when he punishes us for our sins, for he punishes us as a father, not in anger or revenge, but in order to mend us, for our own moral advantage, and so his very punishments are a greater proof of his paternal goodness toward us and his love than of his truth."

The question is how to solve the contradiction between goodness and justice. How can a good God punish with eternal fire for sins? Either he is not just, or not good.

The question seems to be both simple and legitimate. The author makes it appear that he is answering the question when he quotes the authorities of Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Chrysostom, Hilary, Augustine. There are plenty of authorities, but what have they said? They have said: "You ask whether God can be just if there is eternal torment for a temporal sin? And we answer that God must be both just and good. His goodness is just goodness, and his justice is good justice." But that is precisely what I am asking: How is this? How can a good and just God punish with eternal torment for a temporal sin? And you say that he punishes like a father for our moral good, and that his punishments are a proof of his goodness and love. What kind of correction and love is this, to burn for ever in fire for a temporal sin? But the author thinks he has explained everything, and he calmly finishes the chapter:

"Every sound mind must acknowledge the completest justice in God. Every injustice toward others can arise in us only from two causes, — from ignorance or from the error of our mind and from perversity of will. But in God these causes cannot take place: God is an omniscient and most holy being; he knows all the most hidden deeds of moral beings and is able worthily to appreciate them; he loves every good by his own nature, and hates every evil also by his nature. Let us add that God is at the same time an almighty being who, therefore, has all the means at hand in order to recompense others according to their deserts." (pp. 143 and 144.)

I have quoted this merely to show that I do not leave out a thing. That is all which is used to solve the contradiction. The disclosure of the essence of God in himself and in his essential properties is finished. What was there in it? It began by saying that God was incomprehensible, but the statement was added that at the same time he was comprehensible in part. This knowledge in

part is disclosed to us in such a way that God is one, and not two or three, that is, to the idea of God there is added an improper concept of number which, by the first definition, is not applicable to him.

Then it is disclosed to us that in the partly comprehensible God we none the less know the distinction between his essence and his properties. The definition of the essence of God consisted in saying that he was a spirit, that is, an immaterial, simple, uncomplicated being, which, therefore, excludes all subdivision. But immediately after that it is disclosed that we know the properties of this simple essence and are able to subdivide it. About the number of these properties it says that it is infinite, but from this infinite number of properties of the simple essence, the spirit, fourteen properties are disclosed to us. After that we are suddenly told that this simple essence, the spirit, differs from all other beings and, besides, has mind and will (nothing is said about what is to be understood by the words "mind" and "will" of a simple essence, the spirit), and on the basis of the fact that the simple essence is composed of mind and will, fourteen properties are divided into three classes: (*a*) essential properties in general. The essential properties of the divine essence in general (I change nothing and add nothing) are again subdivided (*aa*) into essential properties of the divine essence in general which distinguish it in general (*sic!*) from other beings, and (*bb*) into essential properties of the divine essence in general which distinguish it in particular from other beings, and thus we receive (*aaa*) unlimitedness, to which for some reason all-perfection is unexpectedly attached by a sign of equality, (*bbb*) self-existence, (*ccc*) independence, (*ddd*) immeasurableness and omnipresence (again unexpectedly patched on to it), (*eee*) eternity, (*fff*) unchangeableness, (*ggg*) almightiness. The properties of the divine mind are (*a*) omniscience, (*b*) the highest wisdom; and the properties

of the divine will are (*a*) freedom, (*b*) holiness, (*c*) goodness, (*d*) truth, (*e*) justice. The method of the exposition is the same as in the previous parts: obscurity of expressions, contradictions, clothed in words which elucidate nothing, an abasement of the subject, its reduction to the lowest sphere, a neglect of the demands of reason, and the eternally repeated tendency to connect in an external, verbal way the most diversified judgments about God, beginning with Abraham and going on to the fathers of the church, and on that tradition alone to base all the arguments. But in this part, which has so clearly deviated from the path of common sense (from the very first statements about God, where the determination of the divine properties begin), there is a new feature: there is a composition of words which apparently have absolutely no meaning for the author. Obviously the words have been detached entirely from the thought with which they were connected, and no longer evoke any ideas. For a long time I made terrible efforts to understand what is understood, for example, by the various spiritual essences, by the distinctions of the properties and by independence, by the divine mind and will, and could not understand it, and convinced myself that all the author wanted was in an external way to connect all the texts, but that even for the author there did not exist a rational connection in his own words.

22. This article speaks of the same thing that involuntarily presents itself to one when the properties of the incomprehensible God are counted out to him. Every person who believes in God cannot help feeling the blasphemy of these subdivisions. And here the words of the fathers of the church express precisely what each believer feels, namely, that God is incomprehensible to reason, and that all those words and epithets which we have applied to God have no clear meaning and blend into one, and that the conception of God as a beginning of everything

and incomprehensible to reason, is simply indivisible, and that to divide God according to his essence and properties is the same as destroying the idea of God.

The essence and the essential properties of God are not distinguished or divided among themselves in reality: on the contrary, they are one in God. This idea necessarily results from those passages of Holy Scripture where God is represented as the purest spirit and from him are removed all materiality, corporeality, and complexity. If the essential properties in God were indeed separate and distinct from his essence and from one another, he would not be simple, but complex, that is, he would be composed of his essence and of his properties which are distinct among themselves. Thus reasoned the fathers of the church: "The Deity is simple and uncompounded," says St. John Damascene, "for what is composed of many and various things is composite. If we shall thus take uncreatedness, uncommencedness, incorporeality, immortality, eternity, goodness, creative power, and similar properties as essential distinctions in God (*οὐσιωδειοφόρας ἐπὶ θεοῦ*), the Deity, being composed of so many properties, will not be simple, but composite; but it would be extreme infidelity to affirm that." (p. 145.)

Other extracts are quoted from the holy fathers in confirmation of this idea, so that one only wonders what all those former subdivisions and definitions were for. But these clear, incontestable arguments, which reëcho in the heart of each believer in God as full of truth, are preceded by just such an unexpected discussion as was given in the case of the comprehensibility and incomprehensibility of God, and such as those which precede the disclosure of each dogma. In the dogma about God the statement is made and proved that God is incomprehensible, and then there is a pretence at a proof that he is comprehensible. For the solution of this contradiction there is invented the doctrine about comprehensibility in

part. Here it says that the essence and the essential properties of God are not distinguished or divided, and immediately on p. 147 it says:

"The essence and the essential properties of God, without being distinguished or divided between themselves in fact, are, none the less, distinguished in our ratiocination, and not without foundation in God himself, so that the concept of any one property of his is not at the same time a concept of his essence, or a concept of any other property." (p. 147.)

This proposition, in the author's opinion, necessarily results from Holy Scripture, and there are quoted the words of Basil the Great that "our distinctions of the divine properties are not merely purely subjective, no, their foundation is in God himself, in his various manifestations, actions, relations to himself, such as the creation and providence, though in himself God is one, simple, uncompounded." (p. 149.)

Do you imagine that this palpable contradiction of the holy fathers is accidentally collated? Do you think that it is solved in any way? Not in the least. That is precisely what the author needs, and in that lies the meaning of this 22d article. It begins like this:

"This question has been raised in the church since antiquity, but especially during the Middle Ages, both in the West and the East, and in solving it men have frequently fallen into extremes. The first extreme assumes that between the essence and the essential properties of God, as well as between the properties themselves, there is a real difference (*τῷ πράγματι*, *realis*), so that the properties form in God something distinct from the essence and from each other; the other extreme, on the contrary, affirms that the essence and all the essential properties of God are absolutely identical among themselves, and that they are not separated, either in fact, or even in our ratiocination (*ἐπίνοια νοήσει*, *cogitatione*)." (p. 144.)

The Orthodox Church teaches that both propositions are equally remote from truth. Which, then, is nearer to the truth? Nothing is said about that. Two opposite opinions are put forth, and nothing is said for their solution. I carefully searched in all five pages, and there is not a word in them about how it is to be understood. Not a word. The conclusion of the article is as follows:

"Remarkable are also the words of St. Augustine that refer to the present case: 'It is one thing to be God, another to be Father. Though paternity and essence (in God) are one, it is impossible to say that the Father by his paternity is God, by his paternity all-wise. Such has always been the firm conviction of our fathers, and they rejected the Anomœans as having erred far beyond the limits of the faith, because these heretics destroyed all distinction between the essence and the divine properties.'" (p. 150.)

The end of the chapter. But are the Anomœans right, or why are the words of the blessed St. Augustine remarkable? that makes no difference. But how are we to understand it all? The words of St. John Damascene are true, as the author himself says. How are they to be made to agree with the contradictory words of St. Augustine? And are they true or not? The author does not even regard it as necessary to answer this, and concludes the chapter.

In the preceding article about the essence and the fourteen divine properties I was struck by the trait of the complete disassociation of ideas and the manifest play with mere contradictory or synonymous words in complete darkness; but here is another feature of an extraordinary neglect, offensive not only to my reason, but also to my feelings, which is shown to me and to the whole congregation which is listening to the teachings of the church.

In this article is directly expressed a contradiction, and it says: "This is white, and this black," and you can-

not say that this is white, nor that this is black, for the church teaches you to recognize both, that is, that the black is white, and the white black, so that here is expressed not only a demand that you should believe what the church says, but that you should repeat with your tongue what it says.

After that comes Article 23 : The moral application of the dogma. The moral application of the first dogma, of the dogma of the divine unity, had struck me only by its inconsistency. The moral rules which were taught on the basis of the unity of God were apparently not deduced from it, but were simply patched on the words, "God is one, we must live in oneness," and so forth. But when I met with the second application and, in looking through the whole work for all the moral rules which were inevitably applied to each dogma, recalled what had been said in the Introduction, that the dogmas of faith and the laws of morality (p. 36) had inseparably been revealed by God to men and were inseparably connected, I understood that these applications were not accidental, but very important, as showing the meaning of the dogmas for the saving life, and so I turned my close attention to them. Here is the application of the dogma about the essence and the properties of God :

"(1) God by his essence is a spirit, and, by the chief property of the essence which embraces all the others, he is an unlimited spirit, that is, most perfect, highest, all-glorious. From this (*a*) we learn, first of all, to honour and love God, for whom shall we honour and whom love, if not the most perfect, when every perfection naturally evokes these feelings in us ? The love of God, united with respect, forms the foundation of all our obligations toward him (Matt. xxii. 37) ; (*b*) we learn at the same time that our love of God and our honouring of God must be (*aa*) sincerest, spiritual : God is a Spirit : and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth, says the

Saviour (John iv. 24); every external worship can have a value only when it is an expression of something inward, otherwise it displeases God (Is. i. 11–15), and the sacrifices of God are a broken spirit, according to the words of the Prophet (Psalm li. 17); (*bb*) highest and fullest, because in his perfections God infinitely surpasses all other beings to whom we are able to feel respect and love; consequently, him above all else must we love with all our heart, and with all our soul, and with all our mind, and with all our strength (Mark xii. 30); (*cc*) most profoundly reverential: if even the seraphim, who in heaven surround the throne of God the All-holder, unable to endure the grandeur of his glory, cover their faces when they cry unto one another, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts (Is. vi. 3), then with what trepidation of awe ought we, the lowest and weakest of his spiritual creatures, to serve him (Psalm ii. 11)?

"(*c*) Let us learn to glorify God with our heart and our mouth, with our mind and all our life, remembering the words of the Psalmist: Give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name: bring an offering, and come into his courts (Psalm xcv. 8; cxliv. 3), and the words of the Saviour: Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven (Matt. v. 16).

"(*d*) Let us learn, at last, to turn to God as our highest good, and in him alone look for our fullest consolation, repeating with David: Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire beside thee. My flesh and my heart faileth: but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever (Psalm lxxiii. 25, 26). However profound the thirst of our mind may be in its search after truth, God is the highest truth; however fiery the striving of our will may be toward the good, God is the most perfect good; however insatiable the love of our heart may be for happiness and bliss, God is the

highest and interminable bliss. Where, then, if not in him, shall we be able to find a full gratification for all the high needs of our spirit?

"(2) Reflecting, in particular, on the separate properties of the divine essence, which distinguish God from his creatures, we can draw from them new lessons for ourselves. And (*a*) if God alone is self-existent, that is, is in no way under any obligations to any one, while all the other beings, consequently we, too, are under obligations to him, we must (*aa*) constantly humble ourselves before him, according to the words of Scripture, What hast thou that thou didst not receive? now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it? (1 Cor. iv. 7); and (*bb*) constantly thank him: for in him we live and move and have our being (Acts xvii. 28). (*b*) If he alone is independent and all-satisfied, and so does not demand our goodness (Psalm xvi. 2), but, on the contrary, gives to all life and breath, and all things (Acts xvii. 25), we must (*aa*) experience within us a feeling of the fullest dependence on him and of the most complete submission to him, and (*bb*) in bringing him gifts or sacrifices not imagine that we are obliging the all-satisfied God in this manner, since all which we have is his property. (*c*) The confidence that we are always before the face of the omnipresent God, no matter where we may be, (*aa*) naturally inclines us to act before him with the greatest circumspection and reverence; (*bb*) can keep us from sins, as it once kept Joseph from sinning (Gen. xxxix. 9); (*cc*) can encourage and console us in all perils, as it consoled David, who said about himself: I have set the Lord always before me; because he is at my right hand, I shall not be moved (Psalm xvi. 8); (*dd*) can incite us to invoke, glorify, and thank the Lord in every place (John iv. 21–24).

"(*d*) Keeping in mind that God alone is eternal, while everything else which surrounds us on earth is temporal

and vanishing, we learn (*aa*) not to cleave with the soul to perishable possessions, but to seek the one, imperishable possession in God (Matt. vi. 19, 20); (*bb*) not to put our trust in princes, nor in the sons of man, who may die any moment and leave us without a support (Psalm cxlvi. 3–5), but to put our trust in him who alone has immortality (1 Tim. vi. 16) and will never abandon us.

"(*e*) The thought of God's complete unchangeability (*aa*) can still more incite us to put this exclusive trust in God, for men in general are fickle, the favour of the great and mighty of the earth is easily shaken and passes, the very love of our relatives and friends frequently betrays us, whereas God alone is always the same and unchangeable; (*bb*) can at the same time incite us to imitate the unchangeableness of God in a moral sense, that is, to be as firm and constant as possible in all the honourable pursuits of our spirit, and in our unwavering march along the path of virtue and salvation.

"(*f*) The live faith in almighty God teaches us (*aa*) to implore his aid and blessing in all our undertakings: except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain (Psalm cxxvii. 1); (*bb*) not to be afraid of anything and not to lose courage amidst the greatest dangers, so long as we are doing what pleases him and thus attract his good-will: if God be for us, who can be against us? (Rom. viii. 31); but (*cc*) to fear him and tremble before him, if we do what displeases him: he is able to destroy not only our body, but also our soul in hell (Matt. x. 28).

"(3) If we turn our attention to the properties of the divine mind, we shall find even here many edifying things for ourselves. (*a*) God is omniscient: what consolation and encouragement for the righteous man! Let people who do not know his intentions and are not able to appreciate his actions, insult, and even persecute him, he is rewarded by the knowledge that God himself clearly sees his soul with all its thoughts and wishes, knows all

his deeds in the bloody battle with the enemies of salvation, knows his intentional privations and innocent suffering, knows every sigh and every tear of his amidst heavy temptation! No matter how hypocritical he may be before men, how much he may try to conceal his criminal intentions, in what darkness he may be committing his lawlessness, he cannot help confessing that there is a being from whom it is impossible to conceal himself, before whom everything is naked and open (Heb. iv. 13), and that it is possible to deceive men, but never God. (*b*) God is infinitely wise; and thus (*aa*) let not our mind and soul be dejected if in social life or in Nature we shall see any phenomena which seem to threaten a universal ruin and destruction, for all that is done or omitted by the unsearchable fate of the highest wisdom; (*bb*) let us not be faint of heart or murmur against God if we ourselves have occasion to be in straitened circumstances, but let us rather give ourselves altogether to his holy will, believing that he knows better than we what is useful and what harmful to us; (*cc*) let us learn according to our strength to imitate his highest wisdom, tending all the time toward that supreme aim, which he has set for us, and selecting for ourselves those most reliable means, which he himself has outlined for us in his revelation.

"(4) Finally, each of the properties of the divine will either only offers us a model for imitation, or at the same time also imparts certain other moral lessons. (*a*) God is called supremely free, because he always selects only what is good, and this he does without any external pressure or incitement; it is in this, then, that our true freedom ought to consist! In the possibility and freely acquired habit of doing only what is good, only because it is good, and not in the arbitrary will of doing good and evil, as people generally think, and still less in the arbitrary will of doing only what is bad: for whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin, says our Saviour (John

viii. 34), and, committing evil, we every time lose part of our freedom, more and more submitting to our passions and impure strivings, over which we ought to rule. (*b*) God is supremely holy and has commanded to us: ye shall sanctify yourselves, and ye shall be holy; for I am holy, the Lord your God (Lev. xi. 44). Without this condition we can never become worthy of the most blissful union with the Lord: for what communion hath light with darkness? (2 Cor. vi. 14); nor shall we ever be worthy of seeing God: for only the pure in heart shall see God (Matt. v. 8). (*c*) God is infinitely good to all his creatures and to us in particular; this (*aa*) teaches us to thank him for all his benefits, and for his paternal love to repay him with filial love: we love him, because he first loved us (1 John iv. 19)."

Not only is there no sense in all that, but there is not even any connection except what the French call *à propos*. Indeed, what moral application can there be from the fact that God is one and immeasurable, and a spirit, and trine? What is remarkable is not that the exposition of this moral application of the dogma is written disconnectedly and badly, but that an application has been invented for a dogma that can have no applications at all. Involuntarily it occurs to me: why should I know these incomprehensible, most contradictory dogmas, since from their knowledge absolutely nothing can result?

V.

Chapter II. Of God trine in persons.

Before proceeding to the disclosure of the dogma itself, I involuntarily stop at the words "in persons," "God's person." I have read and studied the exposition of the dogmas about the essence of God. There was no definition there of the word person, or hypostasis, which was used in the definition of the Trinity. Only in the passage where the anthropomorphists were refuted it said that under the divine person we must understand "the manifestation of God in his works." But that apparently has no reference to the Trinity. Maybe the definition of this word, so necessary for the comprehension of the Trinity, will become clear from the exposition itself. I proceed to read. Here is the introduction:

"The truths about God, one in essence, and about his essential attributes, so far expounded by us, do not embrace the whole Christian teaching about God. In acknowledging God to be one, we have not yet the right to call ourselves Christians: the one God is professed also by the Jews, who did not accept Christ the Saviour as the Messiah, and who reject Christianity; he is also professed by the Mohammedans and has been admitted by many old and new heretics in the lap of Christianity itself. The full teaching about God, which it is necessary to keep in the heart and profess with the lips, in order worthily to bear the name of Christian, consists in this, that God is one and trine, one in substance, trine in persons." (p. 156.)

What does that mean? All the attributes of God, as given in the division about the essence of God, such as unlimitedness, immeasurableness, and the others, exclude the concept of person. The fact that God is a spirit is still less in agreement with persons. What, then, does "in persons" mean? There is no answer to this, and the exposition goes on.

"This doctrine forms the radical, essentially Christian dogma: directly upon it are based, and, consequently, with its refutal are inevitably refuted, the dogmas about our Redeemer the Lord Jesus, about our Sanctifier the All-holy Ghost, and after that, more or less all the dogmas which refer to the house-management of our salvation. And in professing God as one in essence and trine in persons —" (p. 168.)

In essence God is one, and God, it was said in the preceding, is a spirit. In spite of the essence, it was said that God had fourteen attributes. All the attributes exclude the concept of person. What then is "in persons"? There must, then, be still a third division. First it was (1) according to the essence and (2) according to the attributes. Now a third division is added: according to persons. On what is this division based? There is no answer, and the exposition goes on:

"By professing in this manner we differ not only from the pagans and certain heretics, who assumed many or two gods, but also from the Jews, and from the Mohammedans, and from all heretics, who have recognized the one God only."

What do I care from whom I differ? The less I differ from other people, the better it is for me. What is a person? There is no answer, and the exposition is continued:

"But being the most important of all the Christian dogmas, the dogma about the Most Holy Trinity is at the same time the most incomprehensible."

That is the very reason why I thirst so much, if not for an explanation, at least for an expression which would be comprehensible. If it is entirely incomprehensible, there can be no answer.

"We saw a number of incomprehensible things when we expounded the doctrine about God one in essence and about his essential attributes, especially about his self-existence, eternity, omnipresence." (p. 167.)

There was nothing incomprehensible about that. All those were expressions from various sides of the first concept about the existence of God, — a concept which is familiar to every believer in God. These expressions were for the most part incorrectly used, but there was nothing incomprehensible in them.

"Many incomprehensible things shall we also see later on, in disclosing the dogma of the incarnation and person of our Saviour, about his death on the cross, about the ever-virginity of the Mother of God, about the action of grace upon us, and so on. But the mystery of Christian mysteries is indisputably the dogma about the Most Holy Trinity: just as there are three persons in one God, so the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, however not three Gods, but one God, — all this surpasses all understanding." (p. 157.)

That is precisely what I want to know. A father of the church says:

"What manner of reasoning, what power and might of the intellect, what vivacity of the mind and perspicacity of imagination will show me — 'How does the Trinity exist?' And in another place: 'However, what it is, is unspeakable; no tongue of the angels, much less of men, can explain it.'" (p. 157.)

The Trinity is God. What is God and how does he exist? that surpasses my imagination. But if the essence of God surpasses my understanding, I can know nothing about the essence of God. But if we know that

he is the Trinity, it is necessary to say what we understand by this appellation. What do these words mean in relation to God? So far there have been no explanations of these words, and the exposition is continued:

"So this is the reason why the heretics who have tried to explain the truths of religion with their own intellect have stumbled over the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity more than over any other dogma. So, if at all anywhere, we must here more especially stick closely to the positive doctrine of the church, which has guarded and defended this dogma against all heretical opinions, and which has expounded it for the guidance of the Orthodox with the greatest possible precision." (pp. 157 and 158.)

It is precisely this exposition that I am in search of, that is, I want to know what is meant by God one and three. For, if I say that I believe, without understanding, and if any one else says that he believes that God is one and three, we are lying, for it is impossible to believe what we do not understand. It is possible to repeat with the tongue, but it is not possible to believe words which not merely have no meaning, but directly violate sound reason. Here is the way the Orthodox Church expounds this doctrine with precision:

"(1) In the symbol of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, the Bishop of Neocæsaria: 'There is one God, Father of the living Word, of wisdom and self-existing force, and of the eternal form: the perfect progenitor of the perfect, Father of the only-begotten Son. There is one God, one from one, God from God, form and expression of the Deity, active word, wisdom, containing the composition of all, and force building the whole creation; true Son of the true Father, the unseen of the unseen, the incorruptible of the incorruptible, the immortal of the immortal, the eternal of the eternal. And there is one Holy Ghost, issuing from God, having appeared through the Son, that is, to men; life, in which is the cause of the living; holy

source; holiness offering sanctification. To him appears God the Father, who is above all and in all, and God the Son, who is through all. Trinity, perfect in glory and eternity, indivisible and inseparable in dominion. And so there is in the Trinity neither created, nor ancillary, nor additive, which has not been before, or which will come later. The Father has never been without the Son, nor the Son without the Holy Ghost; but the Trinity is invariable, unchangeable, and always one and the same.'

"(2) In the Nicæo-Constantinopolitan symbol: 'I believe in one God the Father — and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only-begotten, born from the Father before all ages, light of light, true God of true God, born, uncreated, of one substance with the Father — and in the Holy Ghost, the life-creating Lord, who proceedeth from the Father; who with the Father and the Son is worshipped and glorified.'

"(3) In the symbol which is known under the name of that of St. Athanasius of Alexandria: 'This is the Catholic creed: Let us worship the one God in the Trinity and the Trinity in the One, neither blending the hypostases, nor separating the essence. For different is the hypostasis of the Father, different that of the Son, and different that of the Holy Ghost. But that of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is one Deity, an equal glory, a coeval grandeur. As the Father, so is the Son, and so is the Holy Ghost — Thus: God is the Father, God is the Son, and God is the Holy Ghost; and yet not three Gods, but one God — God is not created by any one, nor born. The Son was not created by the Father himself, nor made, nor born, nor issued from him — And in this Trinity nothing is first or last; nothing more or less; but the three hypostases are complete, coeval with each other and equal.'" (pp. 158 and 159.)

That is the exposition with the greatest possible precision! I read farther down:

"Examining more closely this doctrine of the Orthodox Church about the Most Holy Trinity, we cannot help observing that it is composed of three propositions: one general and two particular, which directly result from the general and disclose it through themselves.

"The general proposition is in God, one in substance, three persons or hypostases: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The particular propositions: the first, — as it is one in essence, so three persons in God are equal to each other and uni-existent; and the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, not three gods, but one God. The second: however, as three persons they are different among themselves by their personal attributes: the Father is not born from any one; the Son is born from the Father; the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father." (p. 159.)

I have not left out anything, hoping all the time to find an explanation, and what? The author not only does not find it necessary to explain what is said here, but, looking attentively at it, he finds here, too, subdivisions, and he proceeds. (p. 161.)

As I get no definition not only of the persons of the Trinity, but even of the word "person," though there is an unnecessarily detailed statement about the essence and the attributes of God, I involuntarily begin to suspect that the author and the church have no definition of this word, and so speak themselves not knowing what. My suspicion is confirmed by the following article. As always, after the exposition of an unintelligible dogma there follows the exposition of the dispute, which has led to this exposition. And here it says:

"That God is one in substance and trine in persons, has unchangeably been professed by the holy church

from the very beginning, as is witnessed by its symbols and other incontrovertible proofs."

From what beginning remains unknown. But from common sense, from the historical data, even from the exposition given here and in Art. 28 of the different opposing opinions, it is evident that there was no such beginning, and that the dogma was formed by degrees. Then follows a confirmation of the fact that the dogma was not formed in an indefinite "very beginning," but at a very definite historical period of church history.

"But the manner of expression of this truth in the first centuries was unequal even among the Orthodox teachers of the faith. Some used the words οὐσία, φύσις, *substantia*, *natura*, in order to signify the essence or substance of God; others, however only few of them and rarely, used these words to designate the divine persons. Similarly, certain words, ὑπόστασις, ὕπαρξις, or τρόπος ὑπάρξεως, designated the persons in God; others, on the contrary, designated by these words the essence of God, and for the designation of the persons used the words πρόσωπος, *persona*. The different use of the word 'hypostasis' has even led to considerable disputes in the East, especially at Antioch, and for some time created discord between the Eastern and the Western churches, of which the first taught that it was necessary to profess three hypostases in God, fearing a reproach of Sabellianism, while the others affirmed that there was but one hypostasis in God, fearing a reproach of Arianism. To solve the misunderstanding a council was called in Alexandria (in the year 362), where, together with St. Athanasius the Great, there were present bishops from Italy, Arabia, Egypt, and Libya. At the council, the representatives of both parties were heard, and it turned out that both sides believed precisely alike, differing only in words, both the Orthodox and those who said, 'In God there is one essence and three hypostases,' and the others who said, 'In God is one hypostasis

and three persons,' for the first used the word 'hypostasis' instead of πρόσωπος, *persona*, while the latter used it instead of οὐσία, *substantia*, essence." (pp. 160 and 161.)

Farther on it says that if at first the words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις were used differently, or rather, indifferently, in the sixth, seventh, and the following centuries the concept appears as generally accepted, that is hypostasis was used in reference to three, οὐσία to one. Thus, if I had the slightest hope of getting an explanation of what is to be understood by the word "person," of that on the basis of which 1=3, I, after reading this exposition about the use of the words by the fathers, came to understand that such a definition (which is inevitably necessary for the comprehension of the Trinity) does not exist and cannot be; the fathers used words without ascribing any meaning to them, and so used them indiscriminately, now in one, and now in a contrary sense, and finally agreed not on the ideas, but on the words. The same is confirmed by what follows:

"But while the Orthodox teachers of the faith differed only in words, invariably professing one God in the Trinity and the Trinity in One, the heretics perverted —" (p. 162.)

That is, now without any farther explanation, One is equal to the Trinity, and the Trinity is equal to One. But the holy fathers professed:

"The heretics perverted the very idea of the dogma, some of them denying the trinity of persons in God, while others admitted three Gods."

Again some say black, and others say white. Both are wrong, but we say, "Black is white, and white is black." Why is it so? Why, because the church said so, that is, the tradition of those men who believe in that tradition. Here is the idea of the heretics who denied the Trinity:

"(*a*) Even during the life of the apostles: Simon the

Magician taught that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost were only manifestations and forms of the self-same person, and that the one God, in the capacity of Father, had revealed himself to the Samaritans; in the capacity of the Son, as Christ, to the Jews; in the capacity of the Holy Ghost, to the pagans; (*b*) in the second century, Praxeas affirmed that one and the same God, as concealed in himself, was the Father, but as having appeared in the work of creation and later, in the redemption, was the Son Christ; (*c*) in the third century, Noetus, who also recognized the Father and Son as one person, one God, who had become incarnate and had suffered torment and death; Sabellius, who had taught that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost were only three names, three actions (ἐνέργεια) of one and the same person, God, who had been incarnate and had suffered death for us; and Paul of Samosata, according to whose words the Son and the Holy Ghost were in God, as mind and strength were in man; (*d*) in the fourth century, Marcellus of Ancyra and his disciple Photinus: they preached, after Sabellius, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost were only names of the selfsame person in God, and after Paul of Samosata, that the Son, or the Word, was the mind of God, and the Holy Spirit, the power of God." (pp. 162 and 163.)

Here is the conception of other heretics:

"The common idea of all these was that although the divine persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, were of one substance, they were not one in substance, and that they had one nature, but had it each separately, as, for the example, three persons of the human race, and so were three Gods, and not one God." (p. 163.)

Without having the question answered whether the teaching of the heretics was true or false, I am unable to say that I understand what they have been saying. Similarly, without entering into a discussion as to whether

it is right that God should be one and three, I am unable to say that I understand what it means, although the dogma is expounded in all its fulness, as the author avers. In all its fulness the dogma is expounded as follows:

"'Let us worship the one God in the Trinity and the Trinity in the One, neither blending the hypostases, nor separating the essence.' Neither blending the essence, that is, recognizing the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost not merely as three names, or forms, or manifestations of the selfsame God, as the heretics have represented him, nor as three attributes, or forces, or actions, but as three independent persons of the Deity, since each of them, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, possessing a divine mind and the other divine attributes, has his own, personal properties, 'for one is the hypostasis of the Father, another, of the Son, and still another, of the Holy Ghost.' Nor separating the essence, that is, affirming that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one in essence, exist inseparably one in the other, and, differing from each other only in their personal attributes, have an identity of mind, will, and all the other divine attributes, — not at all as there exist three entities of any class of beings among the creatures, entities that have one nature. 'Among the creatures,' let us speak with the words of St. John Damascene, 'the common nature of the entities is perceived only by the mind, for the entities do not exist one in the other, but each separate and distinct, that is, in itself, and each has much to distinguish it from the others. They differ in place and time, in disposition of the will, in firmness, in external appearance or form, in habits, in temperament, in worth, in the manner of life, and in the other distinctive properties, but most of all, because they do not exist one in the other, but each exists separately. For this reason we say: two, three, many men. But in the holy, transubstantial, all-surpassing, incomprehensible Trinity we see something different. Here the universality

and unity are viewed in fact according to the coeternality of the persons, according to the identity of the essentiality, activity, and will, according to the concord of definitions, according to the identity — I do not say similitude, but identity — of power, almightiness, and goodness, and according to the one tendency of motion — Each of the hypostases has a unity with the other, not less than with itself; that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one in all respects but ungeneratedness, birth, and derivation, and are divided only in our ratiocination (ἐπίνοια). For we know only one God, and only in the properties of fatherhood, sonhood, and derivation do we present a difference — In the unlimited Deity we cannot assume, as in us, spatial distance, because the hypostases exist one in the other, but in such a way that they are not blended, but united, according to the words of the Lord: I am the Father, and the Father in me (John xiv. 11); nor distinction of will, definitions, activities, power, or anything else, which in us produce a real and complete division. Therefore we recognize the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost not as three Gods, but as one God in the Holy Trinity.' The whole incomprehensibility of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity consists precisely in this, that the three independent persons of the Deity are one in essence and entirely inseparable; if they existed separately one from the other, like three entities among the creatures, there would be nothing incomprehensible in that. 'The Deity is one and three: oh, most glorious transformation!' What is united in essence is divided according to the persons: the indivisible is divided, what is one is trebled: that is the Father, the Son, and the living Spirit, preserving all." (pp. 164 and 165.)

So here it is, all the doctrine, all the God-revealed truth, revealed to me in all its fulness for the sake of my salvation. "The Deity is one and three. Oh, most glorious transformation!" The exposition and explana-

tion are ended, and there will be nothing else. And this through the mouth of his church says God the Father to me, his son, who with all my power am looking for truth and salvation! To my entreaty and tears of despair he replies to me: "The indivisible is divided, what is one is trebled: that is the Father, the Son, and the living Spirit, preserving all." And to the demands of my reason, which has been given me for the comprehension of God, there is no other answer. I cannot say, nor can any one else say, that I have comprehended it, and so I cannot say that I believe. With my tongue I can say that I believe that "what is one is trebled. Oh, most glorious transformation!" But when I say that, I am a liar and an atheist, and it is precisely this that the church demands of me, that is, those people who assert that they believe in it. But that is not true: they do not believe and nobody has ever believed it. What a marvellous phenomenon! Christianity will soon have existed for a thousand years in Russia. For a thousand years the pastors have been teaching their flocks the foundations of the faith. The foundation of the faith is the dogma of the Trinity. Ask a peasant, a country woman, what the Trinity is. Out of ten hardly one will answer you. It cannot be said that that is due to ignorance. Ask them what the teaching of Christ consists in. Everybody will tell you. And yet the dogma of the Trinity is not complicated or long. Why, then, does no one know it? Because it is impossible to know what makes no sense.

Then there follow proofs that these truths, that is, that God is a Trinity, have been revealed by God to all men. The proofs are divided into proofs from the Old and the New Testament. In the Old Testament, which forms the teaching of the Jews, of those Jews who regard the Trinity as the greatest blasphemy, in this Old Testament do they look for proofs that God has revealed his threefold nature to men. Here are these proofs from the Old

Testament: (1) Because God said, "Let us make," and not "Let me make:" that was so because he spoke with his Son and the Holy Ghost. (pp. 165, 166.)

(2) Because he said, "Adam, one of us." By "us" are meant the three: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. (3) The Bible says: "Let us confound their language," and not, "Let me confound;" consequently the three Gods wanted to confound it. (4) Because three angels came to Abraham, — those were the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, who came to see Abraham. (pp. 169, 170.)

(5) Because in the Book of Numbers it is commanded that the word "Lord" should be repeated three times. (6) Because in David's Psalter it says, "Their whole host." "Their" proves the Trinity. (7) A proof of the Trinity is found in the fact that Isaiah said three times, "Holy, holy, holy." (8) Proofs are found in all those passages of the Old Testament where the words "son and spirit" are used (Psalm ii. 7; Is. xlviii. 16, xi. 2, lxi. 1; Job xxxiii. 4). "The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee. The Lord God, and his Spirit, hath sent me, and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him," and so forth. Those are all the proofs from the Old Testament. I have not omitted a single one. The author sees himself that the proofs are poor, and that it is possible to find as many or even more proofs in any book you please, and so he thinks it necessary to give explanations. Later on he says:

"And why they are not entirely clear, why it has pleased God to disclose in the Old Testament the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity only to a certain degree, — that is concealed in the plans of his infinite wisdom. The godly teachers assumed for this two main causes: (*a*) one lay in general in the property of human nature, which was limited and impaired, and had to be led to the knowledge of the highest mysteries of revelation only by

degrees, in proportion to its unfolding and strengthening, and receptivity. 'It was not without danger,' reasons St. Gregory the Divine, 'before professing the Divinity to preach clearly the Son, and before the Son had been called (I shall express myself rather boldly) to weigh us down with the sermon about the Holy Ghost, and to subject us to danger and make us lose our last strength, as is the case with people who are burdened with food which is not taken in measure, or who direct their feeble vision to the sun's light; it was necessary for the treble light to shine on the illuminated by progressive additions, as David says, by ascensions (Psalm lxxxiv. 5), progressions from glory to glory, and advancements.' (*b*) Another cause lay in the quality and weaknesses of the Jewish nation, to whom the Old Testament revelation was made: 'God, in his infinite wisdom,' says the blessed Theodoret, 'was not pleased to communicate to the Jews any clear idea of the Holy Trinity, in order that they might not find in this a good cause for worshipping many gods, — since they had been so prone to follow the Egyptian abomination; this is the reason why, after the Babylonian captivity, when the Jews felt such a distinct loathing for polytheism, we meet in their sacred and even profane books many more passages than before in which the divine persons are mentioned.' We must observe, at last, that, in picking out the places from the Old Testament, which contain references to the Most Holy Trinity, we had in view mainly to prove that the teaching about this mystery is by no means so new in the New Testament, as the later Jews say, and that the pious men of the Old Testament believed in the same tri-hypostatic God, in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, in whom we believe — But the foundations of this most important of all the Christian dogmas is, beyond doubt, contained in the Books (Art. 27— *b*) of the New Testament." (pp. 173 and 174.)

Here are the proofs from the New Testament. The first proof the Theology finds in Christ's conversation with his disciples: Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me (John xiv. 11); and whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son (John xiv. 13). From the fact that Jesus Christ calls himself the Son of the Father, God, just as he taught all men to call themselves the sons of God, it is argued that Jesus Christ is a second person of God. The author says: "Here evidently two persons of the Holy Trinity, the Father and the Son, are distinguished." (p. 175).

The second proof is taken from the passage where Jesus Christ says to his disciples, If ye love me, keep my commandments. And I will pray the Father, he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever; even the Spirit of truth; whom the world cannot receive (John xiv. 15–17). The last verse is not written out, but instead of it the continuation is taken from verse 26 of the same chapter: but the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you. (p. 175.)

From this it is concluded:

"Here all three persons of the Most Holy Trinity are distinguished, namely, as persons: the Son, who speaks of himself: I will pray, — the Father: I will pray the Father, — the Holy Ghost, who is called another Comforter, consequently distinct from the Father; and he will be sent to take the place of the Son with the apostles and to teach them everything; consequently, he is just such a person as the Son." (p. 175.)

Because the paraclete, that is, the comforter, whom Christ promises his disciples after his death, is once during that conversation called the Holy Ghost, it is taken as a proof that Christ in this conversation revealed

the mystery of the Holy Trinity. No attention at all is paid to the meaning which this word has in the whole conversation, for even there the comforter is called the spirit of truth, precisely what Christ calls his teaching. I go away, and come again unto you (John xiv. 28); and I in you, and ye in me (*ib.* 20); if a man love me, he will keep my words: and my father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him (*ib.* 23); I will not leave you comfortless: I will come to you (*ib.* 18); for he shall receive the Spirit of truth, and shall shew it unto you (John xvi. 14).

These passages, which explain the whole meaning of the conversation, are not quoted, but the word "holy," which is attached as an epithet to the spirit, is taken as a proof that here Christ spoke of the third person of the Trinity.

Third proof: But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me (John xv. 26). These words, which quite clearly and simply say that when I shall no longer be alive, and you shall be permeated by the spirit of truth, by that truth which I have taught you, and which proceeds from God, you will convince yourself of the truth of my teaching, — these words are taken as a new proof that here are clearly distinguished, as in the previous texts, all three persons of the Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and at the same time they prove the consubstantiality of the Holy Ghost with God: the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father.

Fourth proof: The words of John (xvi. 15), Therefore said I, that the Spirit of truth shall take of mine, and shall shew it unto you, — the words which clearly speak of the spirit of the teaching as given by Jesus Christ serve as a proof that here mention is made of the consubstantiality with the Son.

Fifth: The words, I came out from God, I came forth from the Father (John xvi. 27, 28), which cannot signify anything but the filial relation of any man to God, precisely what Jesus Christ has preached, are taken as a proof that "here with new force is expressed the idea of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father."

In the second series of proofs from the New Testament there appear first the concluding words of St. Matthew: Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matt. xxviii. 19), which Jesus Christ said, when he appeared to his disciples after the resurrection.

Without saying anything about the meaning and the especial character in general of the whole Gospel after the resurrection, of which mention will be made later, these words serve only as a proof, — as which even the church understands it, — that in accepting Christianity it was necessary to acknowledge the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as the foundations of the teaching. But from this does not follow by any means that God consists of three persons, and so the demands that the words "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost" be used can by no means have anything in common with the arguments about the existence of God in three persons.

The Theology itself admits that the customary formula of baptism can by no means be regarded as a proof of the Trinity of God, and so, on pp. 177 and 178, it explains why it is necessary to understand God in three persons by this. The explanations are as follows:

"The Saviour had before explained to the apostles more than once that under the appellation of the Father was to be understood God the Father who had sent him into the world (John vi. 38–40; vii. 16, 18, 28; xi. 42, and elsewhere) and who is another that beareth witness of him (John v. 32); under the name of the Son he understood himself, whom the apostles indeed professed as the Son of

God who came from the Father (Matt. xvi. 16 ; John xvi. 30) ; finally, under the name of the Holy Ghost he understood another Comforter whom he had promised to send to them in his place from the Father (John xiv. 16 ; xv. 26)." (p. 177.)

No proof is needed that Christ understood God by the Father, for that is admitted by everybody, but there is no proof, and there can be none, that under the Son he meant himself, and under the Holy Ghost a new person of the Trinity. As a proof that he is the second person they adduce the passage (Matt. xvi. 16), where Peter says to Christ what Christ has always said about all other people, that is, that they are sons of God ; and John xvi. 30, where his disciples say to him what he teaches all other men. In proof of the separate existence of the third person there are repeated the same verses (John xiv. 14 and xv. 26), which mean something different.

Under the name of the Comforter Jesus Christ understands the spirit of truth, but cannot understand any third person. The clearest proof of it is that in the gospels there are no proofs ; outside of these passages, which prove nothing, it is impossible to find anything else. But the Theology, not at all embarrassed by this, regards its proposition as proved, and says :

" Consequently, since the Saviour did not consider it necessary to add a new explanation of the above mentioned words (Matt. xxviii. 19), he in the present case understood, and the apostles understood with him, nobody else but the three divine persons by the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost."

In the third series there is one last and chief proof from the New Testament ; those are the words of John in his first Epistle, v. 7 : For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost : and these three are one. The Theology says :

" In this passage there is expressed, even more clearly

than before, the Trinity of the persons in God and the unity of the essence. The Trinity of the persons: for the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost are called three witnesses; consequently they are distinct from each other and the Word and the Holy Ghost, mentioned as witnesses with the Father, are not merely two of his attributes, or forces, or actions, but just such persons as the Father. The unity of the essence: for if the Word or the Holy Ghost did not have the selfsame divine nature and substance with the Father, but a lower, created nature, there would be an endless distance between them and the Father, and it would not be possible to say: and these three are one."

But unfortunately, although this passage, no matter how weak it is, may serve, if not as proof, at least as an incentive to the assertion that God is one and three, unfortunately not all agree with the theologians. It says:

"Unjust are those who wish to weaken the power of this passage, by asserting that the three celestial witnesses, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, are represented as one, not in relation to their essence, but only in relation to their unanimous testimony, just like the three terrestrial witnesses, who are mentioned in the following verse: There are three that bear witness in earth, the spirit, and the water, and the blood: and these three agree in one (1 John v. 8), form unquestionably one, not by their essence, but only in relation to the testimony. It must be remarked that (*a*) the apostle himself distinguishes the unity of the celestial and the unity of the terrestrial witnesses; of the latter, which are indeed different among themselves or different in their essence, he expresses himself only by saying: and these three agree in one (καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσιν), that is, in one, in relation to the testimony; but of the first he says: And these three are one (καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἕν εἰσιν), and not, agree in one; consequently 'are one' is a great deal more than what the

terrestrial witnesses are, — they are one, not only in relation to the testimony, but also in their essence. This is the more certain since (*b*) the holy apostle himself in the next verse calls the testimony of the celestial witnesses, without any distinction, the witness of God: If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater; consequently he assumes that the three witnesses of heaven are one, namely in their Divinity, or are three persons of God. It is the more certain since (*c*) the same holy apostle even before, in his Gospel, mentions each of the three witnesses of heaven, the Father, the Son or Word, and the Holy Ghost, and mentions them as three persons of God, consubstantial among themselves, when expounding the words of the Saviour: Though I bear record of myself, yet my record is true: for I know whence I came, and whither I go. I am one that bears witness of myself, and the Father that sent me beareth witness of me (John viii. 14, 18; cf. John v. 32, 37); but when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me (John xv. 26); he shall glorify me: for he shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you. All things that the Father hath are mine: therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, and shall shew it unto you (John xvi. 14, 15)." (pp. 179 and 180.)

Still more unfortunate it is that this solitary passage, which, however weak it is, at least in some way confirms the words of the three Gods and of one, that this same passage turns out, according to the testimony of the Theology, to be debatable, and, according to the unanimous testimony of all learned criticism, spurious:

"Unfair is the attempt which is made to doubt the authenticity of the passage under discussion, by pointing out that it does not exist in certain Greek texts of the New Testament and in certain translations, especially in

the East, and by showing that it was not used by the ancient fathers of the church, such as St. Gregory the Divine, Ambrose, Hilary, nor by the Councils of Nice and Sardis and others, which were against the Arians, though this verse might have served as an important tool against the heretics, and though some of the fathers have made use of verses 6 and 8 of the same chapter, which are much less strong and decisive. All these proofs of the assumed spuriousness of the verse under discussion are quite insufficient for their purpose and, besides, are refuted by positive proofs: (*a*) if in some Greek texts of the New Testament, which have been preserved until the present, this verse does not exist, it has been and still is in many others. Why then, arises the question, should we give preference to the first over the latter and conclude that it was added to the latter, and not omitted in the first? On the contrary, justice demands that preference be given to the latter." (pp. 180, 181.)

Those are all the proofs from Holy Scripture of the Old and the New Testament. The only passage from the whole Scripture which presents a similitude of that assertion that God is one and three is spurious, and its reality is confirmed by the polemics of the composer of the Theology.

But there are also proofs from Holy Tradition:

"(28) Confirmation of the same truth from Holy Tradition. No matter how clear and numerous the passages are from Holy Scripture, especially from the New Testament, which contain the doctrine of the Trinity of the persons in one God, it is necessary for us here to turn to Holy Tradition which has been preserved in the church from its very beginning. It is necessary to do so because all these passages from Scripture have been subject to all kinds of interpretations and controversies, which cannot be permanently settled, at least not for a believer, but by the voice of the apostolic tradition and the ancient

church. It is necessary also in order to defend the church itself against the unjust rebuke of the freethinkers that the church began to offer the doctrine about the three hypostases in God only with the fourth century, or with the First Œcumenical Council, but that before that time it was entirely unknown to the church, or was presented in an entirely different form. Consequently it is sufficient to take the thread of the tradition to the fourth century, or to the First Œcumenical Council, and to show whether and how the ancient Christian church taught about the Holy Trinity in the first three centuries."

So we have learned from the Theology, that there are absolutely no proofs in Scripture in confirmation of the Trinity, except the polemics of the composer of the Theology; we have also learned that it is not even possible to assert that the church has always adhered to this tradition and that the only foundation of this assertion is left in the polemical art of the composer of the Theology. I have read all the proofs of Art. 28, which show in fifteen pages that the church has always professed the Trinity, but these arguments have not convinced me, not because I have read more exact and convincing proofs against it, but because my feeling revolts and I cannot believe that God, who has revealed himself to me in such a senseless, wild expression as that "I am one and three, and I am the Father and the Son, and I am the Spirit," should not have given me in his Scripture, or in his Tradition, or in my soul, any means to understand what it signifies, but has condemned me, for the solution of the question about God and my salvation, to have recourse to no other means than believing the argument of the Orthodox Theology against the rationalists, and repeating, without comprehension of what I am saying, the words which the Orthodox Theology will dictate to me.

I was on the point of making my last conclusion about

this dogma, when, immediately after the article about the Tradition, there was revealed to me Art. 29, and as the crown of the whole: The relation of the dogma about the Trinity of the persons in one God to common sense, —"we shall now take the liberty to say a few words about its relation to common sense, in order, on the one hand, to overthrow the false opinions in respect to this subject, and, on the other, to point out and elucidate to ourselves the true opinion. Since antiquity there have existed two false opinions in respect to this matter. Some have asserted that the teaching of the triune God is contrary to common sense, because it is contradictory in itself, but they assert so without any foundation: (*a*) Christianity teaches that God is one and trine not in the selfsame relation, but in different relations, that he is one in essence, but trine in person, and gives us one conception about the divine essence, and another about the divine persons, so that these concepts in no way exclude each other: where then is the contradiction?"

Christianity gives us one conception about the essence, and another about the divine persons. That is precisely what I have been looking for, namely, what these different conceptions about the persons and the essence are, but that is not to be found anywhere. Not only is it absent, but there can be no answer, because the words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις now mean something different, and now mean one and the same, and are used indiscriminately.

"If Christianity taught that God is one in essence and trine in essence, or that there are in him three persons and one, or again, that person and essence in God are identical, then there would indeed be a contradiction. But, we repeat, Christianity does not teach that, and he who does not intentionally mix the Christian conceptions of the essence and the persons in God will never think of looking for an internal contradiction in the teaching about the Holy Trinity." (p. 204.)

Does not intentionally mix. Have I not strained all the powers of my mind in order to find in the teaching the slightest difference in the conceptions about the essence and the persons, without finding any? And the author knows that there is none.

"(*b*) In order to call a certain idea contradictory to common sense and to itself, it is necessary first of all completely to grasp this idea, to comprehend the meaning of its subject and predicate, and to see their incongruity. But in relation to the mystery of the Holy Trinity no one can boast of that; all we know is what nature or essence or person among creatures is, but we do not fully comprehend the essence, or the persons in God, who infinitely surpasses all his creations. Consequently we are not able to judge whether the idea of God one in essence and trine in persons is congruous or not; we have not the right to assert that the idea that God one in essence and three in persons includes an internal contradiction. Is it sensible to judge of what is not comprehensible?" (p. 204.)

In division *a* it was said that the conception of the essence was one, and of the persons another, and that Christianity taught it, but this teaching did not appear anywhere; but let us suppose that we have not read what precedes, have not studied the whole book, and have not convinced ourselves that such a distinction exists, and that we believe it. How then is it said in division *b*: that we cannot and have not the right to call an idea "contradictory to common sense without having comprehended the meaning of its subject and predicate"? The subject is 1, the predicate 3, — that is comprehensible. But if the subject is one God and the predicate three Gods, the contradiction is by the laws of reason the same. If, according to the Introduction of the concept of God, one may become equal to three, we shall insensibly be talking about what we do not comprehend, before we

insensibly judge of what we do not understand. And it is there where it begins. And these senseless words, according to the confession of the Theology, the highest reason and the highest goodness speaks in reply to the entreaties of his children searching after truth.

"(*c*) On the contrary, common sense cannot help recognizing this idea as completely true and devoid of any contradiction. It does not comprehend its internal meaning; but on the basis of external testimony it knows conclusively that this idea has clearly been communicated by God himself in the Christian revelation: God is the God of truth." (p. 205.)

What is said cannot be understood, but it is so "on the basis of external, conclusive testimony," so that it is possible, without understanding them, to repeat the words which the Theology speaks; but in this case, as we see, there are none of those external proofs, not only no conclusive proofs, but no proofs at all. Nowhere in Holy Scripture does it say that the Spirit of God is a third person. What Moses wrote about God saying to himself, "Let us make," cannot be called a reliable proof. And the fact that in Jesus Christ's conversation in St. John there is once used the word Holy Ghost when speaking of the truth, is not a conclusive evidence. The fact that in baptizing into Christianity the words, "In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost," are used is also not an evidence. The spurious verse from the Epistle of John not only does not argue in favour of the Trinity, but is a clear proof of there not being, and never having been, any proof, and that those who wanted to prove it felt so themselves.

From the external evidences there is left only the polemic of the author against those who reject the verse from St. John and against the rationalists who assert that the church did not accept the doctrine of the Trinity until the fourth century. Let us assume that I am so little in-

telligent and so illiterate that I believe the polemic of the author and agree with him that the dogma of the Trinity is recognized by the One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Infallible Church, and that I want to believe in it. I cannot believe it, because I cannot form any concept about what is meant by the triune God. Neither I nor any one else can recognize this dogma, if for no other reason, because the words, as they were expressed at first, have remained, after long speeches, quasi-explanations and proofs, nothing but words which can have no meaning whatever for a man with an unimpaired reason.

On the basis of the sacred church tradition you may assert anything you please, and if the tradition is imperturbable, it is impossible not to recognize as true what is transmitted by tradition; in any case, it is necessary to assert something, but here nothing is asserted, — these are words without any inner connection. Let us assume that it is asserted that God lives on Olympus, that God is made of gold, that there is no god, that there are fourteen gods, that God has children, or a son. All those are strange, wild assumptions, but with each of them some idea is connected; but no idea is connected with the assertion that God is one and three. So, no matter what authority may assert it, even if it be all the living and dead patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, and no matter what uninterrupted voice from heaven may call out to me, saying, "I am one and three," I shall remain in the same condition, not of unbelief (there is nothing here to believe in), but of perplexity about what these words mean, and in what language and by what law they may receive a meaning. For me, a man educated in the spirit of the Christian faith, who after all the erring of his life has retained a dim consciousness of what there is true in it; for me, who by the blunders of life and the seduction of reason have reached the negation of life and most terrible despair; for me, who have found salvation in uniting

with it the spirit of religion, which I recognized as the only divine force which moved humanity, and who have been in search of the highest expression of this religion, which would be accessible to me; for me, who above all believe in God my Father, through whose will I exist, suffer, and agonizingly search after his revelation; for me to admit that these senseless, blasphemous words are the only answer which I can receive from my Father in response to my entreaty as to how to understand and love him, for me this is impossible.

It is impossible to believe that God, my good Father (according to the teaching of the church), knowing that my salvation or perdition depends on my comprehension of him, should have expressed the most essential knowledge about himself in such a way that my reason, which he has given me, should not be able to comprehend his expressions, and (according to the teaching of the church) should have concealed all that truth, so important to men, under indications in the plural number of verbs and, in any case, in an ambiguous, obscure interpretation of words, such as the Spirit and the Son, in Jesus' farewell conversation in St. John, and in the spurious verse in the Epistle, and that my knowledge of God and my salvation and that of billions of men should depend on a greater or lesser verbal glibness of all the Renans and Makáris. I shall believe him who has the best arguments.

No! If it were so, God would have given me such an intellect that 1=3 would be as comprehensible as it is impossible now, and such a heart that it would be a joy to admit three gods, whereas now my heart revolts against them, or, at least, he would have given all that to me in a definite and simple manner, and not in debatable and ambiguous words. God cannot have commanded me to believe. The very reason why I do not believe is because I love, worship, and fear God. I am afraid to believe the lie which surrounds us and to lose God. That is

impossible, and not only impossible, but it is quite clear that it is not the truth, that I was mistaken in thinking that I could find an answer and a solution of my doubts in the church. I had intended to go to God, and I found my way into a stinking bog, which evokes in me only those feelings of which I am most afraid: disgust, malice, and indignation. God, that incomprehensible, but still existing one, by the will of whom I live! Thou hast implanted in me this striving after the knowledge of thee and of myself. I have erred, I have searched after the truth in the wrong place. I knew that I erred. I have pampered my evil passions, and I knew that they were bad, but I have never forgotten thee; I have always felt thee, even in moments of erring. I came very near perishing, when I lost thee, but thou gavest me thy hand, and I grasped it, and life was illuminated for me. Thou hast saved me, and I am searching after this alone: to come near unto thee, and to understand thee as much as is possible. Help me, teach me! I know that I am good, that I love and want to love all, and want to love truth. Thou art the God of love and truth, take me nearer unto thee, disclose everything to me, so that I may be able to understand about myself and about thee!

And the good God, the God of truth, replies to me through the mouth of the church: "The Deity is one and trine. Oh, most glorious transformation!"

Go yourselves to your father, the devil, you who have taken the keys of the kingdom of heaven and have not yourselves entered it and have closed it against others! You are not speaking of God, but of something else.

VI.

Such is the doctrine about the Trinity in the radical Christian dogma, as expounded in fifty pages. On this dogma are based, and with its refutal are refuted, the dogmas about the Redeemer and Sanctifier, and every one of the dogmas which refer to the house-management of our salvation. I reject this dogma. I cannot help rejecting it, because, by accepting it, I should be renouncing the consciousness of my rational soul and the cognition of God. But, while rejecting this dogma, which is so contrary to human reason, and which has no foundation either in Scripture, or in Tradition, I still find inexplicable the cause which has led the church to profess this senseless dogma and so carefully pick out the imaginary proofs to confirm it. That is the more surprising to me since that terrible, blasphemous dogma, as expounded here, can apparently be of no use to any one or in anything, and since it is impossible to deduce any moral rule from it, as indeed is evident from the moral application of the dogma, — a collection of meaningless words, which are not connected in any way. Here is the application of the dogma:

"(1) All the persons of the Most Holy Trinity, except the common attributes, which belong to them according to their essence, have still other, especial attributes, by which they differ from each other, so that the Father is indeed the Father and occupies the first place in the order of divine persons, the Son is the Son and occupies

the second place, and the Holy Ghost is the Holy Ghost and occupies the third place, although by their divinity they are entirely equal among themselves. To each of us the Creator has given, in addition to the properties which we all have in common by our human nature, special properties, special talents, by which our special calling and place is defined in the circle of our friends. To know these faculties and talents in ourselves, and to use them for our own benefit and for the benefit of our friends and for the glory of God, so as to justify our calling in this way, is the unquestionable duty of each man. (2) Differing from each other in their personal properties, all the persons of the Most Holy Trinity are, none the less, in a constant mutual communion: the Father is in the Son and in the Holy Ghost; the Son is in the Father and in the Holy Ghost; the Holy Ghost is in the Father and in the Son (John xiv. 10). Even thus we, with all our differences according to our personal qualities, must observe the greatest possible communion and moral union among ourselves, being bound by the unity of essence and the bond of brotherly love. (3) In particular, let the fathers among ourselves keep in mind whose great name they bear, even as the sons, and all those who are begotten from the fathers, — and, keeping this in mind, let them see to it that they sanctify the names of father or son which they bear, through an exact performance of all the obligations imposed upon them by these names — (4) Finally, keeping in mind, to what disastrous results the Eastern Christians have been led through their arbitrary reasoning on the personal essence of God the Holy Ghost, let us learn to cling as fast as possible to the dogmas of faith of the teaching of the word of God and the Orthodox Church, and not to cross the eternal boundaries which our fathers in faith have set."

Thus it remains incomprehensible why this dogma is

confirmed. Not only is it senseless and not based on Scripture or on Tradition, and nothing comes of it; in reality, according to my immediate observation of the believers, and according to my own personal recollection of the time when I myself was a believer, it turns out that I never believed in the Trinity and never saw a man who believed in the dogma of the Trinity. Out of a hundred men and women among the people not more than three will be able to name the persons of the Trinity, and not more than thirty will be able to say what the Trinity is, and will not be able to name the persons, but will include among them St. Nicholas the Miracle-worker and the Mother of God. The others do not even know anything about the Trinity. Among the masses I have not come across any conception about the Trinity. Christ is called the God-man, as it were, the eldest of the saints. The Holy Ghost is entirely unknown, and God remains the incomprehensible, almighty God, the beginning of everything. Nobody ever prays to the Holy Ghost, no one ever invokes him. In the more cultured circles I have also not found any belief in the Holy Ghost. I have met very many who very fervently believed in Christ, but never have I heard the Holy Ghost mentioned except for the purpose of theological discussion. The same was true of me: during all those years when I was an Orthodox believer the idea of the Holy Ghost never entered my mind. The belief in and definition of the Trinity I have found only in the schools, and thus it turns out that the dogma of the Trinity is not rational, not based on anything, is good for nothing, and no one believes in it, while the church professes it.

In order to comprehend why the church does that, it is necessary to investigate the further exposition of the church, and I proceed to do this. It would be a useless labour in the consequent investigation to point out all the errors, contradictions, senseless statements, and lies, for

the investigation of the first two chapters about the most important dogmas has sufficiently demonstrated to the reader what the methods of reasoning and the expressions of the author are. I will now give a short exposition of all the dogmas, in their general interrelation, giving the pages and pointing out the chief propositions which are adduced in confirmation of the dogmas. I do this in order from the general connection of the whole teaching to elucidate the meaning which may not become evident from the separate passages.

I repeat what was in the beginning, so as to proceed consistently.

There is a God, and he is one (Art. 13). He is a spirit (Art. 17). He has an infinite number of attributes; his attributes, as revealed to us, are as follows (Art. 19). His attributes in general: unlimitedness, self-existence, independence, unchangeableness, omnipresence, eternity, almightiness. The attributes of his mind (Art. 20): omniscience and all-wisdom. The attributes of his will (Art. 21): goodness, freedom, holiness, truth, justice. God, in addition to that, has persons. He is one and three persons. The persons are independent and inseparable (proofs from Holy Scripture, Arts. 26, 27, and 28). All three persons are equal to each other, though some have thought that one is more important than the others. But that is not true; they are all equal: the Father is God, the Son is God and consubstantial with the Father; there are adduced disputes which prove the opposite, and proofs from Holy Scripture which prove the opposite, and discussions about one God not being subject to another, but that both have equal power. The same is true of the divinity of the Holy Ghost. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost have personal properties. Art. 32. Many controversies are cited about the personal attributes, and finally there is an exposition of the dogma that the personal attribute of the Father consists in this, that he is

not generated, but begets the Son, and produces the Holy Ghost. (p. 263.)

"(*a*) Entirely in a spiritual manner and consequently without any suffering, without any sensuous secretion: because the essence of God is immaterial and simple; (*b*) he begets and produces since eternity and for eternity: for there has been no time when the Father has not been the Father of the Son and the producer of the Holy Ghost, just as there was no time when he was not God, and what has never begun cannot be said ever to end; (*c*) he begets and produces in such a way as only he alone knows and he who is born from him and proceeds from him, but of the creatures none can comprehend it; (*d*) finally, beginninglessness and causelessness are exclusively appropriated by God the Father only in relation to the other persons of the Holy Trinity, but by their divinity the Son and the Spirit are also beginningless and causeless, or, rather, the whole Trinity is co-beginningless and co-causeless." (pp. 263 and 264.)

"41. The personal attribute of God, the Holy Ghost." (p. 267.)

A controversy of over fifty pages about the question from whom the Holy Ghost proceeds, whether from the Father and the Son, or from the Father alone. The dispute is settled by an analysis of external proofs. The proofs are as follows:

"Who, putting his hand on his heart, will have the courage to affirm that we, who believe that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, have deviated from the truth? Who will dare, in all conscience, to rebuke us for observing a heresy? If we are rebuked for an error or a heresy, it would be just as right to rebuke for it all the holy fathers and teachers of the church; the same as to rebuke the Œcumenical Councils, not only locally, but altogether the whole ancient church; the same as to rebuke the Word of God itself for error and heresy.

Who, we repeat, will be bold enough to utter such blasphemy?"

Then follows a moral exposition of the dogma of the Trinity, which was quoted before. One cannot help but come to the conclusion that the simplest, clearest application of all the preceding controversies is that one must not speak any foolishness; above all, one must not teach what nobody can understand, and, more important still, one must not impair the chief foundations of faith, love, and charity to your neighbour.

Then follows "Division II. Of God in his general relation to the world and to man. Chapter I. Of God as the Creator." God has created the world.

Here is the way the church teaches about it:

"Unquestionably God is the creator of all visible and invisible creations. First he produced through thought all the celestial powers, as exalted psalmists of his glory, and created all that mental world which, through the grace given to it, knows God and is always and in everything devoted to his will. After that he created out of nothing this visible and material world. At last God created man, who is composed of the immaterial rational soul and the material body, so that from this one man, thus composed, it might be seen that he is the creator of both the worlds, the immaterial and the material." (p. 351.)

After that, as always, follows a controversy:

"Some assumed that the world was eternal; others admitted its emanation from God; others again taught that the world was created by itself, by accident, from the eternal chaos or from atoms; others taught that God has formed it from coeternal matter; but no one could rise to the concept of the production of the world out of nothing by the almighty power of God." (p. 352.)

All these opinions are refuted in Art. 55:

"God created the world out of nothing." 56. "God

created the world not from eternity, but in time, or together with time." (p. 360.)

The farther one reads the book, the more one has to marvel. It looks as though the problem and purpose of the book consisted in keeping out rational comprehension, not the comprehension of the divine mysteries, but simply the comprehension of what is being said. I can imagine a man who admits that God created the world. Well, what more do you want? He does not care to inquire any farther into the teaching. No, they demand of him that he should recognize that the world is created not from something, but from nothing, not from eternity, but in time. On this point there is a controversy, and it is proved to him that the world was created in time or, more correctly, with time. "Prescience or predetermination were in God before existence." It says, "At one time the world did not exist," that is, it says, if God's prescience be admitted, that when there was no time, God knew the future. And when it says, "At one time the world did not exist," and time did not exist, it says that there was time (for "at one time" means time) when there was no time. And when it says that "God created time," it says (since the verb is used in the past tense), there was a time when God created time.

57. The world was created by all three persons. This is proved by Holy Scripture, and is expressed thus:

"The Father created the world through the Son in the Holy Ghost;" or "everything is from the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost;" however, not in the sense that the Son and the Holy Ghost performed some instrumental and slavish service at the creation, but that constructively they performed the Father's will. (p. 365.)

58. The manner of the creation. The world was created (1) through reason, (2) through willing, and (3) through the word:

"God created the world according to his eternal ideas

about it, quite freely, by the mere beck of his will. The plan of the world creation had been predetermined since eternity in his ideas; the free will determined to materialize this plan; the beck of his will actually materialized it."

Particularly fine is here the word "ideas."

59. The incitement toward the creation, and its purpose. God created the world for this reason:

"We must believe that God, being good and all-good, though all-perfect and all-glorious in himself, created the world out of nothing for the purpose that other beings, glorifying him, might partake of his grace." (p. 370.)

The purpose of God is glory. Proofs from Holy Scripture and then:

60. The perfection of the creation and whence evil comes into the world. The question is, Whence comes the evil? and the answer is that there is no evil. And the proof for this is as follows:

"God is a supremely all-wise and omnipotent being, consequently he could not have created the world imperfect, could not have created a single thing in it which would be insufficient for its purpose and would not serve for the perfection of the whole. God is a most holy and all-good being, consequently he could not be the cause of evil, either physical or moral, and if he had created an imperfect world, it would have been so, because he was unable to create a more perfect one, or because he did not want to. But both assumptions are equally incongruous with the true concept of the highest being." End of the article. (p. 376.)

There is no evil, because God is good. But how about our suffering from the evil? What sense was there in asking? How can there be any evil, when there is none?

61. The moral application of the dogma is that it is necessary to glorify God, and so forth.

62. About the spiritual world. "Angels are incorporeal spirits, endowed with reason, will, and power. They were created before the visible world and before man — ; are divided into nine forms — ; and the evil angels themselves were created by God as good, but became evil by their own will." (p. 377.)

And again, as always, there comes a controversy with those who spoke differently of the angels and the demons. Then proofs from Holy Scripture that there are angels of various orders.

"65. By their natures the angels are incorporeal spirits, more perfect than the human soul, but limited."

They were created after the likeness of God, and have mind and will. Proofs from Holy Scripture.

66. Number and degrees of angels. The celestial hierarchy.

The number of angels is legion, that is, very large. There are various classes of celestial powers. (p. 396.)

There follows a controversy with Origen about the orders of the angels, and it is proved that there are nine classes of them. (p. 397.)

"The angels are divided into nine classes, and these nine into three orders. In the first order are those who are nearer to God, such as thrones, cherubim, and seraphim; in the second order are dominions, principalities, and powers; in the third order are angels, archangels, and beginnings. This division is based partly (*a*) on Holy Scripture, at least in this respect that in Holy Scripture we meet with the names of all the orders of the angels, as given here — but mainly (*b*) on Holy Tradition." (pp. 198 and 199.)

"Of the private opinions the most noteworthy is this, that the division of the angels into nine orders embraces only the names and orders of those that were revealed in the Word of God, but does not embrace many other names and classes of angels which have not been revealed to us

in this life, but will become known to us in the life to come."

67. Various appellations of evil spirits and the authenticity of their existence. In addition to the angels there are the devil and his angels.

"That this devil and his angels are accepted in Holy Scripture as personal and actual beings, and not as imaginary beings, is to be seen (1) from the books of the Old Testament, (2) still more from the books of the New Testament." Then follow proofs.

68. The evil spirits were created good, but they themselves became bad. How the good could have become bad is not explained, but there are many proofs from Scriptures. The devils became bad, some fathers of the church say, immediately before the creation of the world, while others say that the devils remained for a considerable time in the state of grace. (p. 406.) The devils became bad not all at once:

"At first one only fell, the chief of them, then he drew after him all the rest. This chief devil, according to some opinions, had been, previous to his fall, the very first and most perfect of all created spirits, who excelled before all the hosts of the angels; but according to the opinion of others, he belonged to the order of the supreme spirits (ταξιάρχων), to the leadership of which the lower orders of the angels were subject, — indeed he was among the number of those among whom the Lord apportioned the government of the parts of the world. The others, whom the fallen morning star drew after him, were the angels who were subject to him, who therefore could easily be carried away by his example, or suasion, or deception." (pp. 406 and 407.)

What sin caused the devils to fall? Some say, because they mingled with the daughters of man, others say through envy, and others again say through pride.

"There have been various opinions as to what the pride

of the fallen spirit, which formed his first sin, consisted in. Some, on the basis of the words of Isaiah (xiv. 13, 14), have supposed that the devil took it into his head to be equal with God in essence and to sit on the same throne with him, or even dreamed of being higher than God, for which reason he became God's antagonist who exalted himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped (2 Thes. ii. 4). Others supposed that the fallen morning star did not wish to bow before the Son of God, having been envious of his privileges, or because he saw from the revelation that this Son of God would suffer some day, and so doubted his divinity and did not wish to acknowledge him as God."

How deep the devils fell, and whether God gave them time for repentance, is also determined (p. 410); it is declared that previous to the creation of the world the devils had a chance to repent, but after that they could no longer do so.

69. The nature of the evil spirits, their number, and degrees. The nature of the devils is the same as that of the angels; the number of the devils is very great, and it is assumed that there are orders among them too. From this is made (Art. 70) a moral application of the dogma. The application of the dogma is here more startling than in the previous cases, but here for the first time this application has a definite purpose:

"(3) The angels of God are all equal among themselves in their nature, but are distinguished according to their powers and perfections, and, consequently, there are among them higher and lower angels; there are those who rule, and those who are subject; there is an invariable hierarchy, established by God. Even thus it ought to be with us: in all the unity of our natures, we differ from each other, by the will of the Creator, through our different faculties and distinctions; consequently among us, too, there ought to be higher and lower, rulers and sub-

jects, and in our societies God himself arranges the order and hierarchy, enthrones his anointed ones (Prov. viii. 15), gives all the lower powers (Rom. xiii. 1), and ordains for each man his service and place." (p. 415.)

For the first time a definite rule is patched on a dogma.

71. Soon after the creation of the angels and the devils, God created the material world in this fashion:

"In the beginning God created from nothing the heaven and the earth. The earth was without form and void. Then God successively produced: on the first day of the world, light; on the second, the firmament or visible heaven; on the third, the gathering of the waters on the earth, the dry land, and the plants; on the fourth, the sun, moon, and stars; on the fifth, fishes and birds; on the sixth, four-footed animals living on the dry land." (p. 416.)

72. Moses' account of the origin of the material world is history. A proof is given that history began when there was no time.

73. The meaning of Moses' account of the creation is six days. It is argued that all of Moses' words have to be taken in their literal sense.

74. A refutal of the objections made against Moses' account. In refutal of the false opinion of the rationalists that there could not be any day and night when there was no sun, the following is said:

"Nowadays, indeed, there could be no day without the sun, but at that time it was possible. For that only two conditions were needed: (*a*) that the earth should turn around its own axis, and (*b*) that the light-bearing matter, which existed even then, should be brought into a quivering motion. But it cannot be denied that the earth began to turn around its own axis with the very first day of creation; nor that the Creator could in the first three days by his immediate power bring the light-bearing

matter into a quivering motion, just as now, beginning with the fourth day, it is brought into motion by the celestial luminaries, which have received this power from God." (p. 423.)

It is necessary to repeat word for word and quickly to admit that God brings the light-bearing matter into motion by his immediate power, as though his problem did not consist in creating the world, but that the manner of the creation should agree with the Bible, rather than admit any departure from the words of Moses, which might harmonize his account with our concepts and knowledge of zoology, physics, and astronomy. The whole history of the creation in six days has to be understood word for word; thus the church commands. This is a dogma.

75. The moral application of the dogma. This application consists in the necessity of attending mass on Sunday and sanctifying the seventh day.

"76. The Lord our God, at the end of the creation, produced man, who belongs equally to the spiritual world, by his soul, and to the material world, by his body, and so he is, as it were, an abbreviation of the two worlds and has since antiquity justly been called the little world." (p. 427.)

"God in the Holy Trinity said: Let us make man in our image, and after our likeness (Gen. i. 26). And God made the body of the first man, Adam, from the earth; breathed into his face the breath of life; brought Adam into Paradise; gave him for food, besides the other fruits of Paradise, the fruits of the tree of life; finally he took a rib from Adam during his sleep, and from it created the first woman, Eve — " (p. 427.)

77. The essence and meaning of Moses' account of the origin of the first men, Adam and Eve. This account of Moses is to be taken in the sense of history, and not in the sense of an invention or myth, because Moses and the holy fathers understood it in a historical sense. On

the other hand it says (p. 429): "It is to be understood in the sense of history, but not in a literal sense."

The question as to what is meant by understanding in a historical but not a literal sense remains unanswered.

78. The origin of Adam and Eve and of the whole human race. According to the established order, there follows a controversy. Here are those with whom the controversy is carried on:

"This truth has two kinds of enemies: in the first place those who affirm that there existed men on earth before Adam (Preadamites), and that, therefore, Adam is not the first ancestor of the human race; in the second place, those who admit that with Adam there were several progenitors of the human race (Postadamites), and that, consequently, men did not originate from one root."

As in many other passages of the book, it is evident that the point is not in the refutal, for there is no refutal, but only in giving utterance to a dogma. A dogma is only the product of a controversy. Consequently it is necessary to put forward that against which an argument is adduced, in order to be able to say wherein the teaching of the church consists. Here, of course, are victoriously refuted the proofs of the first on the basis of Holy Scripture, and the proofs of the second from physiology, linguistics, and geography, — on the basis of those same sciences which are interpreted to suit its own purposes. These proofs of the unity of the human race are remarkable only for this, that here, almost under our eyes, takes place the formation of what is called a dogma, and what, in reality, is nothing but the expression of one particular opinion in any controversy. Some prove that men could not have had one progenitor, others prove that they could. Neither can adduce anything conclusive in their defence. And this dispute is not interesting and has nothing in common with the question of faith, with the question as to what constitutes the meaning of my life. Not one

of the disputants is disputing for the sake of solving the scientific question, but each because a certain solution is needed by him. This confirms their tradition.

The Theology adduces proofs that God could have counted days, when there was no sun, by saying that he shook the matter; but to prove that all men originated in one man, we read on p. 437:

"Nowadays the best linguists, after prolonged labours, have come to the conclusion that all languages and all dialects of man are to be referred to three chief classes, the Indo-European, the Semitic, and the Malay, and come down from one root, which they find in the Hebrew language, while others do not define it." (p. 437.)

The Theology says that it knows all about it in this matter. And these ignorant words pass unnoticed in the world of science; but let us imagine that the composer of the Theology, which is quite possible, will turn out to be a father of the church in three hundred years; then his words will serve as a confirmation of the dogma. In another five hundred years God himself who shakes matter may become a dogma. Only such reflection gives an explanation to those strange, wild utterances, which now are taken as dogmas.

79. The origin of each man and, in particular, the origin of the soul. All men originated from Adam, "still, none the less, God is the Creator of each man. The difference is this, that Adam and Eve he created directly, while all their descendants he creates indirectly, by the power of his blessing, which he gave to our first fathers soon after the creation of the world, saying: Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth." (p. 439.)

Then follow texts of Holy Scripture, and then a minute determination by the church when the soul of man is created:

"The holy church, believing in the divine Scripture, teaches that the soul is created with the body, but not

together with the seed from which the body is formed does it receive its existence, but, by the will of the Creator, it appears in the body soon after its formation." (p. 440.)

When this formation of the body takes place it does not say. For the purpose of elucidation the following is said:

"At the time when the body is formed it becomes capable of receiving the soul."

If that does not explain the matter, what follows explains whence and from what the soul is created by God. Here we again have a controversy. Some have said that the soul originated by itself from the souls of the parents, while others have said that it came from nothing, directly from the seed. All are wrong:

"God creates the human souls, just as he creates the bodies, by force of the same blessing, to be fruitful and multiply, which he gave to our forefathers in the beginning, — he creates them not out of nothing, but out of the souls of the parents. For, according to the teaching of the church, although the souls of men receive their existence through creation, the stigma of the ancestral sin passes to them from the parents, — and this could not be, if God created them from nothing." (pp. 441 and 442.)

80. The composition of man. Man consists of two parts, of the soul and the body, and not of three parts. As usual, there comes after that a dispute and confirmations from Holy Scripture. The dispute is directed against those who assert that man consists of three parts, of body, soul, and spirit. That is not so, — he consists only of body and soul.

81. The properties of the human soul are the following: "(1) It is an independent essence, separate from the body, (2) immaterial, simple (spirit), (3) free, and (4) immortal." (pp. 449–453.)

There follow proofs from Holy Scripture. But what is

this soul of mine? What connection is there between it and the body? Where are the limits of the soul and the body? From the definition of the properties of the soul directly result these questions. But there are no answers for them. What is so provoking in this teaching is that it compels you to put questions to which there can be no answers. As the definition of the attributes of God have abased and destroyed in me the conception of God, even so the definitions of the properties of the soul and its origin abase and lower in me the conception of the soul. God and the soul I know as well as I know infinity, not by means of definitions, but in an entirely different way. The definitions destroy this knowledge in me. Just as I know beyond any doubt that there is an infinity in number, so I know that there is a God and that I have a soul. But this knowledge is unquestionable for me only because I was inevitably brought to it. To the certainty of the infinity in number I was brought by addition. To the certainty of the knowledge of God I was brought by the question, "Whence am I?" To the certainty of the soul I was brought by the question, "What am I?" And I know beyond any doubt that there is an infinity in number, and that God exists, and that my soul exists, when I am led to this knowledge by means of the simplest questions.

To two I add one, and still one, and again and again, or I break a stick into two, and again into two, and again and again, and I cannot help recognizing infinity. I was born from my mother, and she from my grandmother, and she from my great-grandmother, and the last from whom? And I inevitably come to God. My hands are not I; my feet are not I; my head — not I, my feelings — not I, even my thoughts — not I; what, then, am I? I = I, I = my soul. But when I am told that an infinite number is first or not first, even or odd, I no longer comprehend a thing, and even renounce my conception of

infinity. The same do I experience when I am told about God, his essence, his attributes, his person; I no longer understand God. I do not believe in God. The same, when I am told about my soul and its properties. I no longer understand about it, and do not believe in my soul. No matter from what side I may approach God, it will be the same: the beginning of my thought, of my reason, is God; the beginning of my love is he again; the beginning of materiality is he again. But when I am told that God has fourteen attributes, mind and will, persons, or that God is good and just, or that God created the world in six days, I no longer believe in God. The same is true of the conception of the soul. When I turn to my striving after truth, I know that this striving after truth is the immaterial foundation of myself, my soul; when I turn to the feeling of my love of the good, I know that it is my soul which loves. But the moment I am told that this soul was placed in me by God from the souls of my parents, when I was in the womb of my mother, and my body was able to receive it, I do not believe in the soul and ask, as ask the materialists: "Show me that of which you speak! Where is it?"

VII.

82. The image and likeness of God in man. The image and likeness of God, the purest spirit. According to the teaching of the church, the Theology says, as it said before, that this purest spirit has mind and will, and so the image and likeness of God means mind and will. But mind and will, as we have seen, were ascribed quite arbitrarily to God. In the whole book there is not the slightest hint why we should assume mind and will in God. So it turns out that in the division about God the division of the pure spirit into mind and will was introduced, not because there were any causes for that in the concept of God itself, but because man, comprehending himself as mind and will, has arbitrarily transferred this division to God.

Now, in the division about man, in explaining the word "he was made in the image and after the likeness of God," it says that since the attributes of God are divided into mind and will, the word image means mind, while likeness means will. But the concepts of mind and will have been transferred to God only because we find them in man! Let not the reader think that I have anywhere omitted the definition of God's mind and will. It does not exist. It is introduced as something known in the definition of the attributes of God, and now the attributes of man are deduced from it. In this article we have the following exposition:

"To be in the image of God is natural for us according to our creation; but to become after the likeness of God

depends on our will. This dependence on our will exists in us only potentially; it is acquired by us in fact only through our activity. If God, intending to create us, had not said beforehand, 'We will make' and 'after our likeness,' and if he had not given us the power to be after his likeness, we could not by our own force be after the likeness of God. But as it is we received at creation the power to be like God. But, having given us this possibility, God has left it to us to be the actors of our own likeness with God, in order to be worthy of an acceptable reward for our activity, and that we may not be like soulless representations made by artists." (p. 458.)

83. Man's destination is as follows:

"(1) In relation to God this destination of man consists in this, that he shall unalterably remain true to that high bond or union with God (religion), to which the All-good has called him at the very creation, while stamping upon him his image; in order that, in consequence of this calling, he may constantly strive after his Prototype with all the forces of his rational, free soul, that is, in order that he may know his Creator, and glorify him, and live in moral union with him. (p. 459.) (2) In man's relation to himself, his destination is that he, being created in the image of God with moral powers, shall constantly try to develop and perfect these powers by exercising them in good deeds, and, in this manner, shall more and more become like his Prototype. For this reason the Lord has more than once commanded in the Old Testament: Ye shall be holy; for I am holy, the Lord your God (Lev. xi. 44; xix. 2; xx. 7), and now we hear in the New Testament from our Saviour: Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect (Matt. v. 48). However, this purpose of man is essentially not to be distinguished from the first; on the contrary, it is included in it and serves as a necessary condition for its attainment." (pp. 460 and 461.)

Consequently it is the same.

"(3) Finally, the destination of man, in relation to the whole Nature which surrounds him, is clearly determined in the words of the tri-personal Creator himself: Let us make man in our image and after our likeness: and let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the beasts, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth."

The third is evidently not a destination, but a convenience; but here it is included as a destination. There turns out to be one destination: to remain true to the union with God.

84. The ability of the first-born man for his destination, or perfection. "In predestining man for such a high purpose, the Lord God created him fully capable of attaining this aim, that is, perfect."

85. The special coöperation of God with the first-born man in the attainment of his destination.

In order to attain this high purpose, the preservation of the union with God, God considered it necessary to coöperate with the man. The first coöperation consisted in this:

"God himself planted a garden eastward in Eden as a habitation for man; and there he put the man whom he had formed (Gen. ii. 8). This was, according to the words of St. John Damascene, as it were, a royal house, where man, living, might have passed a happy and blissful life — it was the abiding-place of all joys and pleasures: for Eden denotes enjoyment. The air in it was perfectly pure. It was surrounded by bright air, the thinnest and the purest; it was adorned with blooming plants, filled with perfume and light, and surpassed every representation of sensual beauty and goodness. It was truly a divine country, a worthy habitation, created in the image of God." (p. 467.)

Here it is proved that Paradise is to be understood directly as a garden, as described, and we may only presume that Adam, besides the body, enjoyed also his soul. The second coöperation with Adam was this, that God visited him in Paradise (p. 468). The third coöperation consisted in this, that God gave Adam his grace. What grace is, is not explained here. The fourth coöperation consisted in this, that God planted in the garden the tree of life; and here we suddenly get the explanation that this tree of life was that very grace. The tree of life was the cause why Adam did not die. The fifth coöperation was this, that for the "exercise and development of the physical forces God commanded Adam to make and keep the Paradise (Gen. ii. 15); for the exercise and development of his mental powers and the powers of speech, he himself brought to Adam all the beasts to see what he would call them (Gen. ii. 19); for the exercise and strengthening of his moral powers in what was good, he gave a certain command to Adam, not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, ye shall not eat of it: for in the day that ye eat thereof, ye shall surely die." (pp. 472 and 473.)

If anybody imagines that anything essential is added or omitted here, or in any way transformed, let him read the book itself! I am trying to cite the most essential and intelligible passages. The Theology represents the question of Adam's fall in the most remarkable manner and insists that it is not possible and not allowable to understand it in any other way. According to the church teaching God has created man for a certain destination, and has created him quite capable of attaining his destination; it says that he has created him perfect and has shown him every kind of coöperation for the purpose of

attaining his ends. The command about not eating the fruit was also a coöperation.

86. The command given by God to the first man, — its necessity and meaning. Of the command about not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil the Theology says (1) that this command was very necessary, (2) that in this command the whole law is contained, (3) that the command was an easy one and that it was guarded by a terrible threat. And, in spite of it all, man fell and did not reach his destination. One would think that it would be necessary to clear up this contradiction, and one involuntarily waits for some interpretation of this whole remarkable event. But, on the contrary, the Theology bars the way to all interpretation and carefully preserves it in all its coarseness. It proves that it is not possible and not allowable to understand the meaning of the second chapter of Genesis, about the Paradise and the trees planted in it, in any explanatory way, but that it is necessary to understand it as Theodoret understood it:

"'The Divine Scripture says,' asserts the blessed Theodoret, 'that the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil grew out from the ground; consequently they are by their natures like any other plants. Just as the rood is a common tree, but receives the name of a saving cross on account of the salvation which we receive through faith in him who was crucified upon it; even thus these trees are common plants that grew out from the ground, but, by God's determination, one of them is called the tree of life, and the other, — since it has served as a tool for the knowledge of sin, — the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The latter was proposed to Adam as an opportunity for an exploit, and the tree of life as a certain reward for the keeping of the command.' (*b*) This tree is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, not because it had the power of imparting to our first parents the knowledge of good and

evil, which they did not have before, but because, by their eating from the forbidden tree they were to find out experimentally, and did find out, all the distinction between good and evil, 'between the good,' as the blessed St. Augustine remarks, 'from which they fell, and the evil into which they fell,' a thought which is unanimously taught by all the teachers of the church. (*c*) This tree, according to the opinion of some of the teachers of the church, was by no means destructive and venomous in its nature; on the contrary, it was good, like all the other divine knowledge, but it was chosen by God only as a tool for trying man, and was forbidden, perhaps, because it was too early yet for the new-born man to eat of its fruits.

"'The tree of knowledge,' says St. Gregory the Divine, 'was planted in the beginning without any evil purpose and was not forbidden through envy (let not the wrestlers against God open their lips and imitate the serpent!); on the contrary, it was good for those who used it in proper time (for this tree, according to my opinion, was the contemplation to which only those may proceed who are perfected by experience), but it was not good for simple people and for those who were immoderate in their desire, even as perfect food is not useful for feeble people who need milk.'—'The tree is good,' blessed St. Augustine, who understands the forbidden tree in a sensuous sense, says to Adam, in the person of God, 'but do not touch it! Why? Because I am the Lord, and you are a slave: that is the whole reason. If you consider this insufficient, it means that you do not wish to be a slave. What is there more useful for you than to be under the power of the Lord? How will you be under the power of the Lord, if you are not under his command?'"

Thus the church understands it, and thus it commands you to understand it. The fact that the tree is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; the fact that

the serpent says to the woman: You will know good and evil; the fact that God himself says (Gen. iii. 22), that, having eaten of the fruit of the tree, Adam is become as one of us, to know good and evil, — all that we must forget and we must think about the profound account in the Book of Genesis in a most inexact and absurd manner; and all that, not in order to explain anything in this account, but that there should not be left any sense in it except the most apparent and coarse contradiction that God was doing everything for the purpose of attaining one end, while something different resulted.

87. According to the doctrine of the church, the first man lived in the garden and was blessed. This is told as follows: Adam and Eve lived in bliss in the garden, "and there is no doubt that this bliss of the first men would not only not have diminished in time, but would have increased more and more in proportion with their greater perfection, if they had kept the command which the Lord had given them in the beginning. Unfortunately for our progenitors themselves as well as for their descendants, they violated this command and thus destroyed their bliss."

88. The manner and causes of the fall of our first parents. But the serpent came (the serpent is the devil, — that is proved by Holy Scripture) and Adam was tempted and fell, and lost his bliss.

89. The importance of the sin of our first parents. This sin is important because (*a*) it is disobedience; (*b*) the command is easy; (*c*) God had benefited them and only demanded obedience; (*d*) they had the grace, and needed only to wish; (*e*) in that one sin there were many other sins, and (*f*) the consequences of this sin were very great for Adam and for all posterity.

90. The consequences of the fall of our first parents were in the soul: (1) the disruption of the union with God, the loss of grace, and spiritual death.

All this is proved by Holy Scripture, but nothing is said about what disruption of the union with God is, what grace is, what spiritual death is. It would be particularly desirable to know what is meant by spiritual death, as distinguished from corporeal death, since above it was said that the soul was immortal. Other consequences of the fall: (2) dimming of the intellect, (3) proclivity toward evil rather than toward good. But what difference there was between Adam before and after the fall in relation to the proclivity toward evil it does not say. Before the fall there was also a greater proclivity toward evil than toward good, if Adam, as we are told in Art. 89, committed an evil act when everything drew him on to the good. (4) The mutilation of the image of God. Mutilation means:

"If a coin, which has upon itself the image of a king, is spoiled, the gold loses its value and the image is of no service: the same happened with Adam."

For the body the consequences were: (1) diseases, (2) bodily death. For Adam it was: (1) expulsion from Paradise, (2) the loss of his dominion over the animals, (3) the curse of the serpent, that is, man had to work to earn his sustenance.

We are all used to this story, which we have briefly learned in our childhood, and are all accustomed not to think of it, not to analyze it, and to connect with it an indistinct, poetical representation, and therefore the detailed repetition of this story with the confirmation of its coarse meaning and seeming proofs of its correctness, as expounded in the Theology, involuntarily strikes us as something new and unexpectedly coarse.

The representation of God and of the garden and of the fruits makes us doubt the truth of the whole, and for him who assumes justice there arises involuntarily the simple childish question as to why the omniscient, almighty, and all-good God did everything in such a way

that the man who was created by him should perish, and why all his posterity should perish. And every person who will stop to think of this contradiction, will obviously wish to read the passage in Holy Scripture, on which it is based. And he who will do so will be terribly surprised at that striking unceremoniousness with which the church commentators treat the texts. It is enough to read carefully the first chapters of Genesis and the church exposition of the fall of man, in order to become convinced that two different stories are told by the Bible and by the Theology.

According to the church interpretation it turns out that Adam was permitted to eat from the tree of life and that the first pair was immortal, but not only is this not said in the Bible, but the very opposite is mentioned in verse 22 of Chapter III., where it says: lest Adam put forth his hand, and eat of the tree of life, and live for ever. According to the church interpretation the serpent is the devil, but nothing of the kind is said in the Bible, nor could anything be said, because no idea about the devil is given in the Book of Genesis, but it says there: the serpent was more subtile than any beast. According to the church interpretation it turns out that the eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a calamity for men; but according to the Bible it was a benefit for men, and thus the whole history of the fall of Adam is an invention of the theologians and nothing like it is mentioned in the Bible.

From the story of the Bible it does not follow that the men ate from the tree of life and were immortal, but the opposite is said in verse 22, nor does it say there that the evil devil tempted man; on the contrary, what is said is that the most subtile of beasts taught him that. Thus the two chief foundations of the whole story about the sinful fall, namely, the immortality of Adam in Paradise and the devil, are invented by the theologians in direct opposition to the text.

The only connected sense of the whole story according to the Book of Genesis, which is exactly the opposite of the church account, is this: God made man, but wished to leave him such as the animals were, who do not know the difference between good and evil, and so prohibited them from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. At the same time, to frighten man, God deceived him, saying that he would die as soon as he ate of it. But man, aided by wisdom (the serpent), discovered the deception of God, found out the good and the evil, and did not die. But God was frightened by it and barred his way from the tree of life, to which, to judge from the same fear of God lest man should eat of that fruit, we must assume, according to the sense of the story, man will find his way, as he has found his way to the knowledge of good and evil.

Whether this story is good or bad is another matter, but thus it is told in the Bible. God, in relation to man in this story, is the same God as Zeus in relation to Prometheus. Prometheus steals the fire, Adam the knowledge of good and evil. The God of these first chapters is not the Christian God, not even the God of the Prophets and of Moses, the God who loves men, but a God who is jealous of his power, a God who is afraid of men. And it is the story about this God that the Theology had to harmonize with the dogma of the redemption, and so a jealous and evil God is combined with God the Father, of whom Christ taught. Only this reflection gives a key to the blasphemy of the chapter. If we do not know what it is all needed for, we cannot understand why it was necessary to misinterpret, contort (directly departing from the text) the simplest, most naïve, and profound story, and to make of it a conglomeration of contradictions and absurdities. But let us suppose that the story is correct as told by the Theology: what follows from it?

VIII.

91. The descent of the sin of the first parents to the whole human race: prefatory remarks. Adam's fall was the cause of the original sin. The exposition of the original sin is preceded by two different opinions. Some, the rationalists, regard original sin as nonsense and assume that diseases, sorrows, and death are the properties of human nature, and that man is born innocent. "Others, the Reformers, fall into the opposite extreme by exaggerating too much the consequences of the original sin in us: according to this teaching, the sin of our first parents entirely abolished freedom in man, and his divine image, and all his spiritual powers, so that the nature of man became tainted by sin: everything which he may wish, everything which he may do, is a sin; his very virtues are sins, and he is positively unfit for any good. The first false teaching indicated above, the Orthodox Church rejects by its doctrine of the actuality in us of the original sin with all its consequences (that is, original sin taken in its broad sense); the latter it rejects by its doctrine about these consequences."

As always, there is an exposition in the form of a heretical teaching which cannot be understood otherwise by any man in his senses. The fact that all men are by their natures subject to diseases and death, and that babes are innocent, is represented in the form of a heresy, and an extreme heresy at that. Another extreme is the teaching of the Reformers. The church teaches the middle way, and this middle way is supposed to be this, that by

original sin is to be understood "that transgression of God's command, that departure of human nature from the law of God, and consequently from its aims, which was committed by our first parents in Paradise and which from them passed over to us. 'Original sin,' we read in the Orthodox profession of the Catholic and Apostolic Eastern Church, 'is a transgression of the law of God, given in Paradise to our forefather Adam. This original sin passed from Adam to the whole human race, for we then were all in Adam, and thus through the one Adam the sin has spread to all of us. For this reason we are begotten and born with this sin.' The only difference is that in Adam this departure from the law of God, and consequently from its destination, was free and arbitrary, but in us it is inherited and necessary: we are born with a nature which has departed from the law of God; in Adam it was a personal sin, a sin in the strict sense of the word, — in us it is not a personal sin, not really a sin, but only a sinfulness of our nature as derived from our parents; Adam sinned, that is, he freely violated the law of God and thus became a sinner, that is, caused his whole nature to deviate from the law of God, and consequently became personally guilty toward God, — but we have not sinned personally with Adam, but have become sinners with him and through him: By one man's disobedience many were made sinners (Rom. v. 19); receiving from him our sinful nature we appear in the world as children of the wrath of God (Eph. ii. 3).

"Under the consequences of the original sin the church understands those consequences which the sin of our first parents produced immediately upon them, and which pass over from them to us, such as the dimming of the intellect, the abasement of the will, and the proclivity to do evil, diseases of the body, death, and so forth. (pp. 493 and 494.)

"This distinction of the original sin and of its conse-

quences must be firmly borne in mind, especially in certain cases, in order that the doctrine of the Orthodox Church may be properly understood." (p. 494.)

92. The actuality of the original sin, its universality and manner of dissemination. "The sin of our first parents, the Orthodox Church teaches, with its consequences, spread from Adam and Eve to all their posterity by means of natural birth and, consequently, exists unquestionably." (p. 496.)

All that is proved by Holy Scripture, for example like this: "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one, even though he hath lived but one day upon earth (Job xiv. 4, 5). Here, evidently, an unclean thing is meant, from which no man is free, and that, too, from his birth. What is this unclean thing? Since, according to Job's description, it appears as the cause of the calamities of human life (verses 1, 2) and subjects man to the judgment of God (verse 3), we must assume that a moral uncleanness is meant and not a physical one, which is the consequence of the moral uncleanness and cannot in itself make man subject to the judgment before God, — what is meant is the sinfulness of our nature, which passes over to all of us from our first parents. To the passages of the second kind belong: (1) the words of the Saviour in his conversation with Nicodemus: Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit (John iii. 5, 6)." (p. 498.)

It is also confirmed by Tradition:

"For according to this rule of faith the babes, who have not yet committed any sin, are baptized indeed for the remission of sins, that through the new birth there may be purified in them what they have received from their old birth. Utterances of the individual teachers of

the church, who lived before the appearance of the Pelagian heresy, such as (*a*) Justin: 'It has pleased Christ to be born and to suffer death, not because he himself had any need of it, but on account of the human race, which through Adam (ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδάμ) was subject to death and the temptation of the serpent.' (*b*) Irenæus: 'In the first Adam we offended God, by not fulfilling his command; in the second Adam we made peace with him, becoming submissive even unto death; we were under obligation not to any one else, but to him whose command we had violated from the beginning.' (*c*) Tertullian: 'Man was from the start seduced by the devil to violate the command of God, and so is subject to death; after that the whole human race was made by him a participant (*traducem*) in his judgment,'" and so forth. (p. 500.)

"We do not quote similar utterances of many other teachers of the church, who lived at that period, as what we have adduced is sufficient to show the whole senselessness of the Pelagians, both the ancient and the modern, who assert that St. Augustine invented the doctrine of original sin, and, on the other hand, to cause the recognition of the whole justice of the words of the blessed St. Augustine to one of the Pelagians: 'I have not invented original sin, in which the Catholic Church has believed since olden times; but you, who reject this dogma, are no doubt a new heretic.' Finally, of the actuality of original sin, which has come down to us from our first ancestors, we may convince ourselves in the light of sound reason, on the basis of incontestable experience." (p. 502.)

What convinces us of it is the fact "(*a*) that within us there exists a constant struggle between the spirit and the flesh, between the reason and the passions, between the striving after the good and the attraction of the evil; (*b*) in this struggle the victory is nearly always on the

side of the latter: the flesh vanquishes in us the spirit, the passions rule over our reason, the attractions of evil overpower the striving after the good; we love the good according to our nature, wish for it, and rejoice in it, but find no strength in us to do good; we do not love the evil according to our nature, and yet are irresistibly drawn to it; (*c*) the habit of what is good and holy is acquired by us after much effort and very slowly; but the habit of doing wrong is acquired without the least effort and exceedingly fast, and vice versa; (*d*) it is exceedingly difficult for us to discard a vice, to vanquish in us a passion, no matter how insignificant; but in order to change a virtue which we have acquired after many exploits, the smallest temptation is frequently sufficient. The same predominance of evil over good in the human race, that we observe now, has been observed by others at all times."

Evidences from the Old Testament and the Epistles that the world is merged in evil. And farther: "Whence comes this discord in human nature? Whence this unnatural struggle of the forces in it and that striving, that unnatural predominance of the flesh over the spirit, of the passions over reason, that unnatural inclination toward evil, which outweighs the natural inclination toward the good? All the explanations which men have thought of for this are inconclusive, or even irrational; the only explanation which fully satisfies us is the one revelation offers us in its teaching about the original, ancestral sin."

Then follows an analysis of these supposed explanations which men have invented. On the question of the original sin, of the sources of evil in the world, and of those explanations which the church offers, we must dwell at a greater length.

Among the number of the dogmas of the church, which have already been analyzed in the preceding parts and which will be analyzed farther on, we meet with dogmas

about the most fundamental questions of humanity, about God, about the beginning of the world, about man, by the side of perfectly useless, perfectly senseless propositions, such as the dogma about the angels and the devils, and so forth, and so we will omit what is useless and will necessarily dwell on the important ones.

The dogma about the original sin, that is, about the beginning of evil, touches a fundamental question, and so we must attentively analyze what the church has to say about it. According to the teaching of the church, the struggle which man feels in himself between the evil and the good, and the proclivity to do evil, which the church asserts as an adjudged case, are explained by the fall of Adam and, we must add, by the fall of the devil, for the devil was the inciter of the crime and, having been created good, must have fallen before. But, in order that Adam's fall may explain our proclivity to do evil, it is necessary to explain the fall of Adam and of the devil who tempted him. If in the story of the fall of the devil and of Adam there should be any explanation of that fundamental contradiction between the consciousness of good and the propensity to do wrong, as the church says, then the recognition of the fact that this contradiction, which I am conscious of, is an inheritance from Adam, would be an explanation for me; but here I am told that Adam had just such freedom as I feel in myself and that, having this freedom, he fell, and so I have the same freedom. What, then, does the story of Adam explain to me?

We are all ourselves occupied with that struggle, and we feel and know by internal experience what, as we are told, took place with the devil and later with Adam. Precisely the same takes place in us each day and each minute that must have taken place in the soul of the devil and in that of Adam. If in the story of the freedom of the devil and of Adam, of how they, the creatures

of the Good, created for bliss and glory, fell, there were given the slightest explanation of how they could have become evil, since they had been created good, I should understand that my propensity to do evil is the consequence of their special relation to good and evil; but I am told that in them took place precisely what is taking place in me, with the only difference that in them all that happened with less reason than in me: I have a mass of temptations which did not exist for them, and I am deprived of those special coöperations of God which they enjoyed. Thus the story about them not only explains nothing, but even obscures the whole matter; if it comes to analyzing this question of freedom and to explaining it, would it not have been better to analyze it and explain it in myself, rather than in some fantastic beings, like the devil and Adam, whom I am not even able to imagine? After some quasi-refutals of those who are supposed to say that evil is due to the limitation of Nature, to the flesh, to bad education, the author says:

"The most satisfactory solution of all these questions, as far as reason is concerned, the correctest explanation of the evil which exists in the human race, is offered by the divine revelation, when it says that the first man was actually created good and innocent, but that he sinned before God and thus injured his whole nature, and that thereupon all men, who come from him, are naturally born with the original sin, with an impaired nature, and with a propensity to do evil."

There are many errors and many consequences of these errors in this reflection. The first error is this, that if the first man, who was in such unusually favourable conditions for innocence, impaired his nature and did so only because he was free, there is no need for explaining why I impair my own nature. There cannot even be such a question. Whether I am his descendant or not, I am

just such a man and have just such freedom, and just such, or even greater, temptations. What is there here to explain? To say that my proclivity to do evil is due to the inheritance from Adam, means only to roll the guilt from an ailing head on one that is sound, and to judge by traditions, which, to say the least, are queer, about what I already know through inward experience. Another error it is to assert that the propensity to sin is due to Adam, for that means to transfer the question from the sphere of faith to that of reasoning. A strange *quid pro quo* takes place here. The church, which reveals to us the truths of religion, recedes from the foundation of faith, that recognition of a mysterious, incomprehensible struggle which takes place in the soul of each man, and, instead of giving by the revelation of the divine truths the means for the successful struggle of the good against the evil in the soul of each man, the church takes up a stand on the field of reasoning and of history. It abandons the sphere of religion and tells the story about Paradise, Adam, and the apple, and firmly and stubbornly sticks to the barren Tradition, which does not even explain anything or give anything to those who seek the knowledge of faith. The only result of this transference of the question from the chief foundation of any religion, — from the tendency to know good and evil, which lies in the soul of each man, — to the fantastic sphere of history is above all to deprive the whole religion of that only foundation on which it can stand firmly. The questions of faith have always been and always will be as to what my life is with that eternal struggle between good and evil, which each man experiences. How am I to wage that war? How shall I live? But the teaching of the church, in place of the question as to how I should live, presents the question as to why I am bad, and replies to this question by saying that I am bad because I became so through Adam's sin, that I am all in sin, that I am

born in sin, that I always live in sin, and that I cannot live otherwise than in sin.

93. The consequences of the original sin. This article expounds, with proofs from Holy Scripture, that the original sin is in all men, that all are filled with uncleanness, that the reason of all men is dimmed, and that the will of all men is more prone to do evil, and that the image of God is blurred.

How would workmen work if it were known to them that they are all bad workmen, if they were impressed with the thought that they cannot work well, that such is their nature, and that, to accomplish their work, there are other means than their labour? It is precisely this that the church does. You are all filled with sin and your bent to do evil is not due to your will, but to your inheritance. Man cannot save himself by his own strength. There is one means: prayer, sacraments, and grace. Can a more immoral doctrine be invented?

Then follows the moral application of the dogma.

Only one moral application of this dogma is possible, and that is, to look for salvation outside the striving after what is good. But the author, as always, not feeling himself bound by any logical train of thoughts, throws into the article of the moral application everything which happens to occur to him and which has some verbal, external connection with what precedes.

94. The moral application of the dogma. There are ten such applications: (1) to thank God for having made us to perish; (2) the wife should submit to her husband; (3) to love our neighbour since we are all related through Adam; (4) to thank God for creating us in the womb of our mothers; (5) to praise God because we have a soul and a body; (6) to care more for our soul; (7) to preserve in us the image of God; (8) to please God —

"May the high purpose toward which we are obliged to strive always be before our eyes, and may it, like a

guiding star, illuminate our whole murky path of life!" (p. 514.)

(9) Not to violate the will of God, because "it is terrible to fall into the hands of the living, just God." (p. 514.) "(10) The original sin, with all its consequences, has passed over to the whole human race, so that we are all begotten and born in iniquity, impotent in soul and body, and guilty toward God. May that serve us as a living, uninterrupted lesson of humility and in the recognition of our own weaknesses and defects, and may it teach us —" you expect to hear "to be better," but no: "may it teach us to ask the Lord God for his succour of grace, and thankfully to make use of the means for salvation which Christianity offers to us!" (p. 514.)

With the moral application of the dogma of the voluntary fall ends the chapter about God in himself, and the following chapter of the Theology speaks of God in his general relation to man and to the world. It is impossible to understand the meaning of this whole chapter, if we do not keep in mind those controversies which must have been evoked by the strange doctrine about the fall of man and the consequent doctrine about grace and the sacraments. In this chapter the Theology tries to remove the contradiction in which it has placed itself by the history of Adam and of redemption: a good God created men for their good, but men are evil and unhappy.

IX.

Chapter II. Of God as the Provider.

The Theology says of Adam that God aided him, leading him toward the good, but Adam, endowed with freedom, did not wish that good and so became unhappy. After the fall and after the redemption, God has not ceased coöperating with the good in all creatures; but the creatures, through the freedom which has been given to them, do not want that good, and commit evil.

Why has God created men who commit evil and so are unhappy? Why, if God coöperates with the good in the creatures, does he coöperate so feebly that men, in spite of this coöperation, become unhappy? Why does this condition, which leads man to misfortune, persist after the redemption, which was to free him from it, and why do men, in spite of the coöperation of God the Provider, again do evil and perish? To all these simple questions there is no answer. The only answer is the word "allow." God allows the evil. But why does he allow the evil, since he is good and almighty? To this the Theology does not reply, but carefully prepares in this chapter the way for the teaching about grace, about prayer, and, strange to say, about submission to the worldly powers.

Here is the exposition of the dogma:

"Section I. Of divine providence in general.

"96. Under the name of divine providence has since antiquity been understood that care which God has for all the beings of the world, or, as this idea is more circumstantially expressed in the Larger Christian Catechism:

'Divine providence is the constant action of the almightiness, wisdom, and goodness of God, by which he preserves the being and powers of the creatures, directs them to good ends, assists all that is good; but the evil that springs up by departure from good he cuts off, or corrects and turns to good consequences.' In this way three particular actions are distinguished in the general concept of the divine providence: the preservation of the creatures, the coöperation, or assistance, given to them, and the direction of them.

"The preservation of the creatures is a divine action by which the Almighty preserves the being of both the whole world, and also the separate creatures who are contained in it, with their powers, laws, and activities. The coöperation, or assistance, given to the creatures is a divine action by which the All-good, permitting them to make use of their own powers and laws, at the same time offers them his aid and succour during their activities. This is especially palpable in relation to the rational and free creatures, who are all the time in need of the grace of God in order to progress in the spiritual life. However, in relation to the moral beings the actual coöperation of God takes place only when they freely choose and do the good; but in all those cases when they according to their own will choose and do the evil, there takes place only the permission, but not the coöperation, of God, for God cannot do evil, and does not wish to deprive the moral beings of the freedom which he has granted to them.

"Finally, the direction of the creatures is a divine action, by which the infinitely All-wise directs them with all their lives and activities toward their predestined ends, correcting and turning, as far as possible, their very worst deeds toward good results. From this it can be seen that all the above mentioned actions of the divine providence differ among themselves. The preservation embraces also the existence of the creatures, and their powers and activi-

ties; the coöperation refers mainly to the powers; the direction, to the powers and actions of the creatures. God preserves all the creatures of the world; he coöperates with the good only, and allows the evil ones to perform their evil activities; he also directs all. Not one of these actions is contained in the other: it is possible to preserve a being, without assisting and without directing it; it is possible to assist a being, without preserving and without directing it; it is possible to direct a being without preserving and without assisting it. But, on the other hand, it must be remarked that all three actions of the divine providence are distinguished and divided only by us, according to their different manifestations in the limited and diversified beings of the world and in consequence of the limitation of our mind, but in themselves they are not separable and form one unlimited action of God, because God, who 'at the same time sees everything together and each in particular,' performs everything by one simple, uncomplicated action. He inseparably preserves all his creations, and assists and directs them.

"Divine providence is generally divided into two kinds: into general providence and into particular providence. General providence is the one which embraces the whole world in general, and also the species and genera of beings; particular providence is the one which is extended over the particular beings of the world and over each of the entities, no matter how small they may appear. The Orthodox Church, believing that God 'from the smallest to the largest knows everything precisely, and in particular provides for each creation,' apparently admits both these kinds of providence.

"The ideas of divine providence, as expounded above, exclude: (*a*) the false doctrine of the Gnostics, Manicheans, and other heretics, who, submitting everything to fate, or recognizing the world as a product of an evil principle, or recognizing divine providence as superfluous for

the world, entirely rejected divine providence with all its actions; (*b*) the false teaching of the Pelagians, who rejected in particular the coöperation with rational and irrational beings, regarding this as incongruous with their perfection and freedom, and also (*c*) the contrary teaching of various sectarians, who, believing in unconditional divine predestination, to such an extent exaggerate the divine coöperation with the rational creatures that they almost destroy their freedom, and regard God as the true cause of all their good and bad actions; finally (*d*) the false teaching of certain sophists, both ancient and modern, who admit only the general providence and reject the particular, considering it unworthy of God." (pp. 515–517.)

97. The actuality of divine providence.

98. The actuality of each of the actions of the divine providence. This actuality is proved by texts from the Book of Job, from the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon, from the Psalms, and from elsewhere. These texts prove nothing except that all men who recognized God recognized his almightiness.

99. The actuality of the two kinds of divine providence. Besides the general providence there is described the particular providence about each being taken separately.

100. The participation of all the persons of the Holy Trinity in the act of providence. All the persons take part in providence. This is proved from Holy Scripture; then, in conclusion, the explanation:

"It is not difficult for a believer to explain why all three persons of the Deity take part in the act of providence. That is due to the fact that the providence of the world is an action of divine omniscience, omnipresence, all-wisdom, almightiness, and goodness, — of such attributes as belong equally to all three persons of the Holy Trinity." (p. 532.)

Then follows what pretends to be a solution of the

question which naturally arises with the assertion of the existence of the providence of a good God: whence comes the moral and physical evil?

101. The relation of divine providence to the freedom of the moral beings and to the evil which exists in the world.

"(1) Divine providence does not impair the freedom of the moral beings. Of this we are assured both by the Word of God and by our own conscience and reason, which also assert that we are all the time under the influence of divine providence (cf. Arts. 81, 93), and that we are all free in our moral actions (Arts. 97, 99). In what manner divine providence, with all its effects in the moral world, does not violate the freedom of the spiritual beings, we are not able fully to explain, but we can to a certain extent approach its comprehension."

This is the way God with all his effects does not violate the freedom:

"(*a*) God is an unchangeable, omniscient, all-wise being. Being unchangeable, he, having deigned to endow the rational creatures with freedom, cannot change his determination so as to oppress or entirely abolish it. Being omniscient, he knows in advance all the desires, intentions, and actions of the free beings. And being infinitely all-wise, he will always find means to arrange his actions in such a way as — "

What you expect is: "not to impair the action of his providence," but that is far from the mark:

"As to leave inviolable the freedom of the actors." (p. 532.)

In a book which treats of God and of faith in him, suddenly enter the basest tricks!

God is unchangeable, and so he cannot change his determination about the freedom of man. But, in the first place, unchangeableness means something quite different. Unchangeableness means that he remains always

one and the same. If in the determination of the attributes of God it is added that he does not change his determinations, this false definition is evidently given in order later to fall back on it. But let us admit the impossible, for we know from the Theology about the changing of his own determinations, that the unchangeableness of God means the unchangeableness of his determinations; still, we have no proof of it, and all that is left is a miserable rascally deal.

Among the number of God's attributes, according to the Theology, there are almightiness, completest freedom, endless goodness. The admission by God of moral evil and the punishment for it, due to the freedom of man, contradicts his goodness; and the necessity in which God is placed to arrange things in such a way as to leave the freedom of the actors inviolable contradicts his freedom and almightiness.

The theologians have themselves tied the knot which it is impossible to untie. An almighty, good God, a Creator and Provider of man, and an unfortunate, evil, and free man, such as the theologians acknowledge him to be, are two concepts which exclude each other.

"(*b*) Divine providence in respect to the creatures is expressed in this, that God preserves them, coöperates with them or allows them to do as they please, and directs them. When God preserves the moral beings, he preserves their existence and their powers; then he, no doubt, does not embarrass their freedom: that is self-evident. When he coöperates with them in the good, he also does not embarrass them in their freedom, because they are still left as the actors, that is, to choose and perform a certain action, and God only coöperates with them, or assists them. When he allows them to commit an evil act, he still less embarrasses their freedom, and permits this freedom to act without his aid, according to its will. Finally, in directing moral beings, divine providence prop-

erly directs them toward the aim for which they are created; and the regular use of their freedom consists in striving for the last aim of their being." (p. 533.)

What? Was it not said that he allows them to commit evil acts? How, then, does he direct them toward their aim for which they are created, when their aim, as was said before, was their good?

"Consequently the divine direction does not in the least embarrass the moral freedom and only assists it in its striving toward its aim.

"(*c*) We know from experience that quite frequently we are able with our words and motions, and in various other ways, to turn our neighbours to this or that act and to direct them without embarrassing their freedom; how much more easily the infinitely All-wise and Almighty is able to find means for directing the moral beings in such a way that their freedom shall not suffer by it?..."

The periods are in the book. This whole chapter is striking in that, apparently without any visible necessity, it raises again the question of Adam's fall, transferring it now from the sphere of history to that of actuality. One would think that the question as to whence the evil, both the moral and the physical, came, was decided in the Theology by the dogma of the fall of man. Adam was given freedom, and he fell into sin, and so all his posterity fell into sin. One would think that all was ended, and that there could be no place left for the question of freedom. But suddenly it turns out that after the fall man remains in the same condition that Adam was in, that is, capable of doing either good or evil, even after the redemption, so that again man, the creation of the good God, who is eternally providing for him, may be bad and unhappy; as it was with Adam, just so it remains in relation to men after the fall and after their redemption. Apparently the Theology needs this contradiction of the good God and the bad, unhappy and free Adam and man.

Indeed it needs it. The necessity of this contradiction will be made clear in the teaching about grace. After this follows:

102. The moral application of the dogma. It consists in (1) singing praises to God, (2) hoping in him, (3) praying, (4) complying with God's providence, and (5) doing good to others, even as God does it. With this properly ends the teaching about divine providence. The next section is only a justification of the coarsest superstitions which are connected with this teaching.

Here is what the Theology deduces from divine providence. About divine providence in relation to the spiritual world.

103. The connection with what precedes.

104. God coöperates with the good angels. Proved by Holy Scripture. The angels serve the all-satisfied, all-perfect God.

105. God directs the good angels: (*a*) their serving God.

106. (*b*) Angels in the service of men: (*aa*) in general "they are given for the preservation of cities, kingdoms, districts, monasteries, churches, and men, both clerical and lay —"

107. (*bb*) Angels as guardians of human societies. There are angels of kingdoms, nations, and churches.

108. (*cc*) Angels as guardians of private individuals.

109. God merely allows the activity of evil angels. God only permits the devils to act.

110. God has limited and still limits the activity of the evil spirits, directing it, withal, toward good results. In this chapter there is an account, confirmed by Scripture, of all kinds of devils, of how to protect oneself against them with the cross and with prayers, and what the devils are good for: they humble us, and so forth.

111. The moral application of the dogma about the angels and devils is this, that it is necessary to worship the angels and fear the devil:

"And if we fall in the struggle, if we sin, let us not be frightened before the evil, let us not give ourselves over to despair: we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous (1 John ii. 1). Let us call him, with sincere repentance for our fall and with sincere faith, and he will raise us up, and will again clothe us with all the weapons, that we may be able to oppose our eternal foe." (p. 575.)

112, 113, 114 impress upon us, with confirmations from Holy Scripture, the idea that God rules the material world, and that therefore the moral application of the dogma is, to pray God for rain, good weather, and healing, and not to risk our healths too much.

116. God's especial care of men.

117. God provides for kingdoms and nations. The essence of this article, confirmed by Holy Scripture, is as follows:

"The health of kings causes our peace — For God has established the powers for the common good. And would it not be unjust, if they bore arms and waged war that we might live in peace, while we did not send up prayers for those who were subjecting themselves to dangers and waging war? Thus this matter (the prayer for the kings) is not merely a graceful act, but is performed by the law of justice." (p. 585.)

And in another place: "Destroy the places of justice, and you will destroy all order in our life; remove the helmsman from the ship, and you will send it to the bottom; take the leader away from the army, and you will give the soldiers into captivity to the enemy. Thus, if you deprive the cities of their chiefs, we shall act more senselessly than the animals which cannot speak, — we shall bite and devour one another (Gal. v. 15), the rich will devour the poor, the strong the weak, the bold the meek. But now, by the grace of God, nothing of the kind happens. Those who live honestly, naturally have no

need of the correctionary measures by the chiefs: law is not made for the righteous man (1 Tim. i. 9). But if vicious people were not restrained by fear of the chiefs, they would fill the cities with endless calamities. Knowing this, Paul said: There is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained by God (Rom. xiii. 1). What the crossbeams are in the houses, the chiefs are in the cities. Destroy them, the walls will fall to pieces and crumble: thus, if the chiefs and the fear which they cause were to be taken away from the world, the houses, and cities, and nations would with great boldness fall upon each other, for there would not be any one to restrain and stop them and by the threat of punishment to compel them to keep the peace." (pp. 585 and 586.)

118. God provides for individuals. Proved by Holy Scripture.

119. God provides mainly for the righteous: solution of a perplexity. The perplexity is, why are the righteous unhappy? The answer is, that they receive their rewards beyond the grave.

120. Manner in which God provides for man, and connection with the next part. There are two methods of divine providence: natural and supernatural.

121. The moral application of the dogma:

"Himself ruling the kingdoms of earth, the Highest himself puts kings over them, by means of a mysterious anointment imparts power and dominion to his chosen ones, and crowns them in honour and glory for the good of the nations. Hence it is the duty of each son of his country: (*a*) to stand in awe before his monarch, as before the anointed one of God; (*b*) to love him as the common father, given by the Highest for the great family of the nation, and weighted down with cares about the happiness of one and all; (*c*) to obey him as one who is clothed in power from above, and ruling and guided by God in his affairs of state; (*d*) to pray for the king that the Lord

may grant him, for the happiness of his subjects, health and salvation, success in everything, victory over his enemies, and many years of life (1 Tim. ii. 1). Through their kings, as their anointed ones, God sends to the nations all their inferior powers. Consequently it is the duty of every citizen: (*a*) to submit to all authority for the Lord's sake (3 Peter ii. 13), for whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; (*b*) to render to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour (Rom. xiii. 7)." (pp. 597 and 598.)

Thus ends the First Part of the Theology. With this moral application of the dogma ends the Simple Theology.

SECOND PART OF THE DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

X.

Of God the Saviour and his special relation to the human race (Θεολογία οἰκονομική).

Thus begins the Second Part.

122. Connection with the preceding, importance of the subject, doctrine of the church about it, and the division of the doctrine. "Heretofore we were, so to speak, in the sanctuary of the Orthodox dogmatic theology; now we enter the sanctum sanctorum." (p. 7.)

This Second Part, which enters the sanctum sanctorum, indeed, sharply contrasts with the First.

In the First are shown the propositions and questions which have always lain in the soul of each man: about the beginning of everything — God, about the beginning of the material and of the spiritual world, about man, about the soul, and about man's struggle between the good and the evil.

In this Second Part there is no longer anything of the kind. None of the dogmas which are disclosed here answer any question of faith, but they are arbitrary propositions, which are not connected with anything human, and which are based only on a certain very coarse interpretation of all kinds of words of Holy Scripture, and so cannot be analyzed or judged on the basis of their relation to reason. There is no connection whatsoever. These dogmas may be viewed only in relation to their correct-

ness and their interpretation of the words of Scripture. The dogmas which are expounded here are: (1) the dogma of the redemption, (2) the dogma of the incarnation, (3) the dogma of the manner of redemption, (4) the dogma of the church, (5) the dogma of grace, (6) the dogma of the mysteries, (7) the dogma of the particular retribution, (8) the dogma of the general judgment and of the end of the world. All these dogmas are answers to questions which a man seeking the path of life has not put and cannot put. These dogmas receive an importance only from the fact that the church asserts that it is necessary to believe in them, and that he who does not believe in them will perish. All these are propositions which are in no way connected with questions of faith, and are independent of them. All of them are based only on the demand of obedience to the church.

Composition of division I. Of God the Saviour.

The central dogma of this part is the dogma of the redemption. On this dogma is based the whole doctrine of this part. It consists in this, that in consequence of the supposed fall of Adam his descendants fell into actual and spiritual death, their reason was dimmed, and they lost the image of God. For the salvation of men from this supposed fall the necessity of redemption is proposed, — paying God for Adam's sin. This pay, according to the teaching of the church, takes place by means of the incarnation of Christ, his descent upon earth, his suffering and death. Christ the God descends on earth and by his death saves men from sin and death. But since this death is only imaginary; since after the redemption men remain actually the same as was Adam, as they were after Adam, as they were in the time of Christ and after Christ, and as men have always been; since in reality there remain the same sin, the same propensity to do evil, the same death, the same labour pain, the same necessity of working in order to support oneself, which are all peculiar to

man, — the whole teaching of the Second Part is no longer a teaching about faith, but pure myth. For this reason the teaching of this Second Part has a special character. In this Second Part stand out sharply those incipient departures from common sense which were made in the exposition of the dogmas of the First Part, about God, about man, about evil. Apparently the teaching of the First Part is based on the faith in the Second Part, and the second does not result from the first, as the Theology is trying to make out; on the contrary, the faith in the mythology of the Second Part serves as the basis of all the departures from common sense, which we find in the First Part. Here is that teaching:

"124. The necessity of divine assistance for the rehabilitation of man with the possibility for it on the part of man. (1) Man has committed three great wrongs, by not observing the original command of God: (*a*) with his sin he has offended infinitely his infinitely good, but also infinitely great, infinitely just Creator, and thus has been subjected to an eternal curse (Gen. iii. 17–19); (cf. Gen. xxvii. 26); (*b*) he has infected with sin all his being, which was created good: has dimmed his intellect, has perverted his will, has mutilated in himself the image of God; (*c*) has by his sin produced disastrous results in his own nature and in external Nature. Consequently, in order to save man from all these evils, in order to unite him with God and make him once more blessed, it was necessary: (*a*) for the sinner to satisfy the infinite justice of God, which was offended by man's fall, — not because he wanted vengeance, but because no attribute of God can be deprived of its proper action: without the execution of this condition man would for ever remain before the justice of God as the child of wrath (Eph. ii. 3), as the child of curse (Gal. iii. 10), and the reconciliation and union of God with man could not even begin; (*b*) to destroy sin in the whole being of man, to enlighten his reason, correct his

will, and reëstablish in him the image of God: because, if, after the justice of God were satisfied, the being of man still remained sinful and impure, if his reason remained in darkness, and the image of God were mutilated, — the communion between God and man could not take place, any more than between light and darkness (2 Cor. vi. 14); (*c*) to destroy the disastrous results which man's sin has produced in his nature and in external Nature: because, if even the communion of God with man should have begun and should exist, man could not again become blessed, until he should feel in himself or should experience in himself anew those disastrous consequences. Who could execute all the above mentioned conditions? None but the one God." (pp. 10 and 11.)

125. The means chosen by God for the rehabilitation, or redemption, of man, and the significance of that means. "God found for the rehabilitation of man a means in which his mercy and truth are met together, and righteousness and peace have kissed each other" (Psalm lxxxv. 10), and in which his perfections appeared in their highest form and in full concord. This means consists in the following:

"The second person of the Most Holy Trinity, the only-begotten Son of God, voluntarily wished to become man, to take upon himself all the human sins, to suffer for them everything which the just will of God had determined, and thus to satisfy for us the eternal justice, to wipe out our sins, to destroy their very consequences in us and in external Nature, that is, to recreate the world." (p. 15.)

There follow confirmations from Holy Scripture and from the holy fathers.

126. The participation of all the persons of the Most Holy Trinity in the work of redemption, and why the Son was incarnated for this purpose. "However, although for our redemption was chosen, as the best means, the incar-

nation of the Son of God, the Father and the Holy Ghost also took part in this great work." (p. 19.)

Proofs from Holy Scripture.

127. The motive for the work of redemption, and the purpose of the descent upon earth of the Son of God. "I. Why did it please the tri-hypostatic God to redeem us? There is one cause for it: his infinite love for us sinners. II. As to the purpose of the embassy and of the descent into the world of the Son of God, that is clearly indicated by the holy church when it teaches us to profess: 'Who has descended from heaven for the sake of us men, and for the sake of our salvation.'" Proved by Holy Scripture.

128. The eternal predetermination of the redemption, and why the Redeemer did not come earlier upon earth.

The redemption had been predetermined from eternity. God, in spite of his goodness, foresaw the fall of man and all his sufferings. God did not redeem us at once, (1) in order that men might feel their fall and desire their redemption; "(2) it was necessary that the infection of the sin, which had deeply penetrated the nature of man, should slowly come to the surface." (p. 28.)

For this purpose it was necessary for billions of people to fall into sin and misfortune.

"(3) It was necessary to prepare people for the arrival upon earth of such an extraordinary Messenger of God as was the Redeemer." (p. 28.)

It was necessary for a period of 5,500 years to prepare humanity for it by signs.

(4) It was necessary that humanity should pass a long series of purifications and sanctifications in the host of the holy men of the Old Testament. (p. 29.)

129. The preparation by God of the human race for the reception of the Redeemer, and the faith in him at all times. The preparations of the human race were: (1) the

prophecies, such as that the woman would bruise the serpent's head, and so forth.

"From the time of this protoevangely about the Messiah, which was announced even in Paradise, and of the establishment of sacrifices, which pointed to his sufferings and death, the saving faith in the Lord Jesus has existed uninterruptedly with the human race. In accordance with this faith Adam called his wife 'life' (Gen. iii. 20), although he had heard the judgment of the Judge: Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return (Gen. iii. 19); according to this faith Eve called her first-born Cain: I have gotten a man from the Lord (Gen. iv. 1). Unquestionably in this faith the hypostatic all-wisdom of God, as the All-wise witnesses and the church professes, guarded the first formed father of the world, that was created alone, and delivered him out of his transgression (Wis. of Sol. x. 1), for there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved (Acts. iv. 12), except the name of Jesus Christ." (pp. 30 and 31.)

Besides the prophecies, there were also signs, such as: the sacrifice of Isaac, Jonas in the belly of the whale, the paschal lamb, the brazen serpent, the whole ritual of Moses, and finally the moral and civil laws.

130. The moral application of the dogma is this, that (1) we ought to learn humility, (2) ought to love God and one another, and (3) ought to stand in awe before the wisdom of God.

The dogma of the redemption will be expounded further on in detail, and in that place will be analyzed those proofs on which the church bases it; now I will speak only of the significance which the dogma may have to thinking people. It is useless to refute this dogma. The dogma negates itself, for it does not affirm anything about what is mysterious and incomprehensible for us, as was affirmed in the case of the attributes and persons of

God, but asserts something about ourselves, men, about something which is best known to us, and asserts it obviously contrary to reality. It was possible to refute with proofs of common sense that God the Spirit has fourteen attributes, and so forth, for the attributes of God are not known to us, but there is no need to refute with proofs of common sense the argument that by the incarnation and death of Jesus Christ the human race was redeemed, that is, is freed from the propensity to commit sin, from the dimming of the intellect, from child labour, from physical and spiritual death, and from the unfruitfulness of the earth. In this case there is not even any need to show that none of the things asserted exist, for everybody knows that. All of us know full well that they do not exist, that men are evil, die, and do not know the truth, that women suffer in child labour, and that men earn their bread in the sweat of their brows. To prove the incorrectness of this teaching would be the same as proving that he is wrong who asserts that I have four legs. The assertion made by a man that I have four legs can only cause me to look for the cause which may have led a man to assert what is palpably wrong. The same is true of the dogma of the redemption. It is obvious to all that after the so-called redemption by Jesus Christ no change took place in the condition of man; what cause has, then, the church to assert the opposite? That is a question which involuntarily presents itself to one. The dogma is based on original sin. But the dogma itself about original sin, as we have seen, is a transference of the question about good and evil from a sphere which is accessible to the inward experience of each man to the sphere of mythology.

The most mysterious foundation of human life, — the internal struggle between good and evil, the consciousness of man's freedom and dependence on God, — is, by the doctrine about the redemption, excluded from the con-

sciousness of man and transferred to mythological history. What is said is: 7,200 years ago God created the free Adam, that is, man, and this man fell on account of his freedom and so God punished him and punished his posterity. The punishment consisted in this, that the men so punished were placed in the same position, in regard to the choice of good and evil, in which man had been before the punishment. Thus this teaching, which explains nothing in the essential question about the freedom of man, slanderously accuses God of injustice, which is so out of keeping with his goodness and justice. This injustice is, that the descendants are punished for somebody else's sin. If the teaching about the fall explained anything to us, we might be able to understand the rational cause which has led to the transference of the question from the inner consciousness to the sphere of myths; but there are no explanations for the question about the freedom of man, and so there must be some other cause for it. This cause we only now find in the dogma of the redemption.

The church asserts that Christ has redeemed men from evil and death. If he has done so, there arises the question: Whence comes evil and death among men? And for this the dogma of the fall of man is invented. Christ the God has saved men from evil and death; but men are creatures of the same good God, so how could evil and death have come to men? To this question the myth of the fall of man gives an answer. Adam, having misused his freedom, did wrong and fell, and with him his posterity fell and lost immortality, the knowledge of God, and life without labour. Christ came and returned to humanity all that it had lost. Humanity became unailing, unworking, doing no evil, and undying. In this imaginary state humanity is already freed from sin, suffering, labour, and death, if only it believes in the redemption. It is this that the church teaches, and in this

lies the cause of the invention of the redemption and of the fall of man, which is based upon it.

In connection with this dogma of the redemption and with the preceding dogma of the providence of God, there involuntarily arise considerations which are common to both and to all that has been expounded in the First Part of the Theology: Is he the Trinity, and what are his attributes? Has God redeemed me, or not, and how has he redeemed me? Does God provide both for the world and for me, or not, and how does he provide? What business have I with all that? It is clear to me that I shall not understand the ends and means and thought and essence of God. If he is the Trinity, if he provides for us, if he has redeemed us, so much the better for me. Providence and redemption are his business, while I have concerns of my own. This is precisely what I want to know and do not want to err in: I do not want to think that he is providing for me, where I ought to provide for myself; I do not want to think that he will redeem me, where I ought to redeem myself. Even if I saw that everything which the Theology tells me is rational, clear, and proved, I should still not be interested in it. God is doing his work, which I shall never be able to comprehend, and I have to do my work. What is most important and precious to me is to have my work pointed out to me; but in the Theology I see constantly that my work is being made less and less, and in the dogma of the redemption it is reduced to nothing.

XI.

In this chapter is expounded the teaching about the second person of the Trinity. Chapter II. About our Lord Jesus Christ in particular. Section I. About the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, or about the mystery of the incarnation.

The importance and incomprehensibility of the dogma; a short account of it, the doctrine of the church about it, and the composition of the doctrine.

The redemption was accomplished by God, the second person, the man Jesus Christ. The man Jesus Christ is both a man and God. From everything which has been expounded heretofore, the concepts of man and God are not only quite different, but almost diametrically opposed. God is independence, man is dependence; God is the Creator, man is the created; God is good, man is evil. How is the combination of the two concepts, on which all this is based, to be understood? There follows an explanation, but this explanation, as always, finds its expression in the form of a controversy with those who do not regard Christ as a God, with those who regard him as all God, all Trinity, and with those who regard him as half-God; then with those who did not recognize a human soul in him, with those who said that Jesus Christ was born simple, like anybody else; then with those who separated the man and God in Christ, with those who blended God with the man in Christ, with those who separated God and the man, but said that in him there was but one will, and with those who asserted

"that Christ according to his human substance was not the proper son of God the Father, but a son by grace and adoption — "

"Amidst all these numberless heresies in regard to the person of the Lord Jesus, the Orthodox Church has since the apostolic days constantly defended and disclosed one and the same teaching, which it has with peculiar force expressed at the Fourth Œcumenical Council in the following words: 'Following our Divine Father, we all unanimously teach men to profess the one and selfsame Son our Lord Jesus Christ, perfect in divinity and perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, composed of soul and body; consubstantial with us according to the manhood; in everything like us, except sin; born before all ages of the Father according to the Divinity, but in the latter days according to the manhood of Mary the Virgin, the Mother of God, for the sake of us and of our salvation; the one and selfsame Christ, the Son, the Lord, the only-begotten, unblendingly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably recognized in two essences (no distinction of the two essences being removed by the union, but the attribute of each essence being preserved, as concurring in one person and one hypostasis); not cut or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son, and the only-begotten God, the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, as anciently the prophets and our Lord Jesus Christ himself have taught us, and as the symbol of our fathers has transmitted it to us.' From this we see that the whole teaching of the Orthodox Church about the person of our Lord Jesus consists of two chief propositions: I. of this, that in Jesus Christ there are two essences, the divine and the human, and II. of this, that these two essences form in him one hypostasis." (pp. 46 and 47.)

It is impossible not to stop here. The words of this definition are a series of contradictions. The concept of essence, as connected with God, excludes the concept of

God, since an unlimited spirit cannot have any essence. Two essences form one hypostasis. But hypostasis can have no meaning, since hypostasis has no significance in language and has never been defined. There is no rational sense in the dogma, but this dogma, like all the others, is based on the church. The church is holy and infallible, and ever since it has existed, from the very beginning, it has asserted this dogma. It is expressed, the Theology says, in Holy Tradition and in Scripture. Let us see whether it is so.

Though I have decided to pass cursorily all this Second Part, nevertheless, at this spot where it is proved that Christ is God, I feel that it is necessary to stop, since this place, though inserted in the middle, as it were, of the disclosure of further truths, which have been expounded in the beginning, in reality is the foundation of the dogma about the Trinity, which was put forward in the beginning; and if there is a dogma about the Trinity, it results only from recognizing Christ as God. Only later is the third person of the Holy Ghost attached to it. The beginning of the assertion that God is not one, but has persons, is due to the deification of Christ. This is what Art. 133 says: "Our Lord Jesus has a divine essence and is the Son of God." This article has for a purpose the proof that Jesus Christ has the divine essence, but not in the sense in which any man created by God has it, but differently from all other men, — he is the second person of God. The same meaning is ascribed to the words "the Son of God." It is proved that Jesus Christ is not a son of God in the sense in which other men are, but an especial Son of God, the only one, the second person of the Trinity. Here are the proofs from the Old Testament:

"In Psalm ii., which all the holy apostles (Acts iv. 24–28; xiii. 32–34; Heb. i. 5; v. 5) and the ancient Jews themselves refer to the Messiah. The Messiah witnesses about himself: The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my

Son; this day have I begotten thee (Psalm ii. 7), that is, I have begotten or beget eternally. In Psalm cx., which by the holy apostles (Acts ii. 34–36; Heb. i. 13; vii. 21, 24, 25) and by the ancient Jews is also referred to the Messiah, God himself says to him: From the womb, that is, from my substance, before the morning, that is before all time, have I begotten thee (v. 3). The prophet Micah, in prophesying that the Messiah would arise from Bethlehem, added that he had also another origin, an eternal one: Whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting (Mic. v. 2), and this prophecy has also been referred to the Messiah by the whole Jewish Church (Matt. ii. 4–6; John vii. 42).

"(2) By the Lord God (Adonai, Elohim), and even Jehovah, a name which is exclusively applied to the one God. Such, for example are: (*a*) the words of Psalm xlv.: Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: the sceptre of thy kingdom is a right sceptre. Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness: therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows (v. 6–7), which the apostle (Heb. i. 7–9) and the ancient Jews have referred to the Messiah; (*b*) the words of Psalm cx.: The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand (v. 1), which Christ himself (Matt. xxii. 41–46) refers to the Messiah; (*c*) the prophecy of Malachi: Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight in: behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts (Mal. iii. 1), which the Saviour himself (Matt. xi. 10, 11) refers to the Messiah; (*d*) the prophecy, twice repeated by Jeremiah: Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely:

and this is his name whereby he shall be called, the Lord (Jehovah) is righteous to us (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6; cf. xxxiii. 15, 16)." (pp. 47 and 48.)

Not one of these places refers to Jesus Christ. The Psalmist is speaking of himself, and not of Christ. If it were necessary to understand Christ by "I, me," he would have said so.

"His goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting," means, that the goings forth, that is, the origin of each man, are from the beginning of everything. There is nothing in common here with the divinity of Christ. The words of Psalm xlv. refer only to God, and not to Christ. The prophecies of Malachi refer to any prophet. The words of Jeremiah refer to a certain king, and there is not a shadow of a reference to Christ.

Those are all the so-called confirmations of the divinity of Christ from the Old Testament. There follow confirmations from the New Testament. (1) Here is the passage from the conversation with Nicodemus, which is adduced in proof of the divinity of Christ:

"13. And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven. . . . For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. . . . He that believeth on him, is not condemned: but he that believeth not, is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God (John iii. 13, 16, 18). Here (*a*) the Saviour in the first words clearly ascribes to himself omnipresence, a property which does not belong to one of the created beings; (*b*) then he calls himself the only-begotten Son of God (μονογενής), no doubt in the proper sense, that is, as being born from the essence of God, having a divine essence, for to this Son belongs omnipresence, a divine attribute; (*c*) finally he bears witness that without faith in him as

the only-begotten Son of God, who is omnipresent, no salvation is possible for men." (pp. 48 and 49.)

To Nicodemus's question as to how a man can be reborn in order to enter the kingdom of heaven, Jesus replies that no one can enter heaven and come to God except he who knows God already, who already ascends heaven. No matter how these words may be understood, they cannot be interpreted in such a way as that Jesus is speaking about himself, since he is apparently speaking about all men and directly says that what he is speaking about is the son of man. Independently of the fact that from the meaning of the whole conversation with Nicodemus, which begins with Jesus' saying that no one shall see the kingdom of heaven, if he is not born from above, it is evident that Jesus does not refer it to himself, but to all men; independently of this obvious meaning, everything which is said, is said now of the son of man and now of the only-begotten, or, more correctly, of the one-begotten son, but it does not say that this son of God is exclusively Christ. Above all, these words cannot have the meaning which the church ascribes to them, because the word "son of man" has the definite meaning of the son of man, that is of men, and the appellation of the son of God is precisely what Christ teaches the men to call themselves, and so Christ, if he had intended to say that he stood in an exclusive relation to God, would have been compelled to choose another expression in order to give it that meaning. I cannot permit myself to believe that Jesus should not have been able or willing to express such an important dogma. If, then, he called himself a son of God, and called other people also sons of God, he wanted to say that, so that the text expresses precisely the opposite of what the author wants to prove.

I am not going to quote here evidences from the gospels which directly deny the divinity of Christ, for I will quote them in their proper place, but I will analyze those

which are quoted here in what purports to be a confirmation of the divinity of Christ. (2) Another passage is the parable about the "vineyard, which a certain man planted, and set an hedge about it, and let out to husbandmen (Mark xii. 1); understanding by it the heavenly Father, who had planted his church among the Jewish nation and had turned it over to the leaders of the nation, the Saviour said that at first the master of the vineyard, at a certain time, sent his servants, one after another, to the husbandmen, in order to receive of the fruit of the vineyard (v. 2). But when the husbandmen beat one of the messengers, and sent him away shamefully handled, and even killed others (v. 3–5), the master decided to send his son to them: Having yet therefore one son, his wellbeloved, he sent him also last unto them, saying, They will reverence my son. But those husbandmen said among themselves, This is the heir; come, let us kill him, and the inheritance shall be ours. And they took him, and killed him, and cast him out of the vineyard (v. 6–8)." (p. 49.)

In this parable the husbandmen, according to the interpretation of the church, mean the Jews, the fruits are the good deeds, the master means God, then why should the son mean the son only? According to the spirit of the parable, the son, too, must have and does have a transferred meaning. The whole parable proves that by the son something is to be understood, only not the son.

"(3) When the Saviour cured him that was diseased, and the Jews sought to slay him, because he had done these things on the Sabbath day (John v. 16), he, as though in justification, replied to them: My Father worketh hitherto, and I work (v. 17). This answer, in which the Lord Jesus ascribes to himself an equality with God the Father in right and power —"

Jesus told all to pray to God the Father, and to call and regard God as a father, and so this place can only prove

the opposite, namely that Jesus regarded himself as just such a man as everybody else, and defined his relation to God just like the relation of all other men to God. His words, "I am working as my Father worketh," apparently have the same meaning as the words, "Be as perfect as your Father!" Here he refers his words to others, but when he says, "I am working as my Father worketh," and refers these words to himself, he speaks of himself as man, and not as God.

"The Jews understood it in the same way: Therefore the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he not only had broken the Sabbath, but said also that God was his Father, making himself equal with God (v. 18)." (p. 49.)

These words, no matter how one may read them, have no other meaning but that St. John, wishing to clear up the real meaning of Christ's sonhood to God, represents an example of a false comprehension of Christ's words. These words denote only that the Jews, rebuking Christ, fell into the same error into which the church is falling now when it praises him. These words can have no other meaning.

"At that time Jesus did not remark to the Jews that they comprehended him wrongly, but continued: Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise! (v. 19)."

These words are said in reply to the reproaches that he and his disciples are breaking the Sabbath. He says that God and he himself do not stop working, or providing, so why should man stop? "For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them; even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. For the Father judgeth no man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour

the Father. He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father which hath sent him (John v. 21–23)."

What is said about the healing on the Sabbath, is also said here, namely, that a man may cure on the Sabbath, and may decide for himself what is to be done, so long as he lives in a godly manner and tries to be as perfect as the Father, and that man is the Son of God and ought to be honoured like God.

"For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself (v. 26)." (p. 50.)

This means only what Jesus has been teaching all the time, that the true life is the knowledge of the true God, and that each man has this life in himself. All these passages, without speaking of their significance, have one undeniable meaning, namely, that Jesus Christ acknowledges himself to be precisely such a son of God and of man as all other men, and not only does not equal himself to God, as the Jews slanderously say he did, but constantly opposes himself to God. The words "my beloved Son," even if they are spoken from heaven, mean only that Christ is a son of God, like any other man, but beloved of God.

"(4) To the evidence of the Old Testament writings: Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life: And they are they which testify of me (John v. 39)." (p. 50.)

The Scriptures speak of the Prophet, of his teaching, but there is not even a hint as to his divinity.

"Another similar incident presented itself soon. When the Saviour once came into a temple at Jerusalem, and the Jews, surrounding him, kept asking persistently: How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly (John x. 24), he, replying to them, said, among other things: I and my Father are one (v. 30)." (p. 50.)

This is a conscious lie. He did not reply, among other

things, "I and my Father are one," but spoke those words for the following reason: He did not say it "among other things," but spoke as follows: Jesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not: the works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me. But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand. My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all; and none is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand. I and my Father are one (John x. 25–30).

He said distinctly that his sheep, that is, those who listen to him, cannot be taken from him, because he leads them by the will of God. And what he teaches them is that in which is the will of God.

Only that do the words, "I and my Father are one," mean. And in confirmation of the statement that these words mean nothing else, and in order to caution people not to give a false interpretation to these words, the Evangelist immediately adds the false, coarse conception of the Jews, showing in this manner how the words were not to be understood.

This passage, which clearly denies the divinity of Christ, is rendered by the Evangelist as follows: the words so irritated those who were asking him, that they "took up stones to stone him, saying, For a good work we stone thee not; but for blasphemy, and because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God (v. 31, 33)." About this passage the Theology says:

"However, even at that particular time the Saviour not only failed to remark to the Jews that he did not at all call himself God, as they thought, but, on the contrary, proceeded to prove that idea, by calling himself directly the Son of God." (p. 50.)

How else was he to have called himself, in order to prove to them that he did not consider himself to be God, but a son of God, which he taught all men to be? Here is the whole passage: Then the Jews took up stones again to stone him. Jesus answered them, Many good works have I shewed you from my Father; for which of those works do ye stone me? The Jews answered him, saying, For a good work we stone thee not; but for blasphemy; and because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God. Jesus answered them, Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? (Psalm lxxxii. 6). If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken; say ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God? If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works: that ye may know, and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in him (John x. 31–38).

How could he have said more plainly that he was not God, but that those were in whom was the word of God, and that he called himself, as all other people, a son of God. But the Theology takes this as a proof that Jesus Christ confessed that he was God, equal to God, and proceeds:

"(5) A third, similar, but still more striking case happened before the death of the Saviour. He was brought bound before Pilate to be judged. Here, after listening to many false witnesses against Jesus, the high priest finally rose and solemnly asked him: I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ the Son of God (Matt. xxvi. 63; cf. Mark xiv. 61), and Jesus, without any hesitation replied: I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven (Mark xiv. 62). Then the high priest rent his clothes, saying, He hath

spoken blasphemy; what further need have we of witnesses? behold, now ye have heard his blasphemy. What think ye? They answered and said, He is guilty of death (Matt. xxvi. 65, 66). And bringing Jesus before Pilate, the Jews said to him: We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God (John xix. 7). Thus the Saviour did not hesitate to confirm the truth of his divinity by his own death." (p. 51.)

Christ is again asked in court, not whether he recognizes himself to be God, — there is not even a question about that, — but whether he is the Son of God, and Christ replies: "I am," and immediately afterward speaks of the significance of the Son of man, who, according to his expression, "is sitting on the right hand of power, in the clouds." He is condemned for calling himself "the Son of God," and from this is deduced the proof that he is God. The Jews are all the time accusing Christ, who is calling all to acknowledge his sonhood of God, and who is blasphemous because he makes himself the equal of God. Christ keeps replying that not he is one-born, near to God, the Son of God, but the Son of man, and he repeats the same in court, and for this he suffers capital punishment. And this is taken as a proof of his acknowledging himself to be God, and, considering the divinity of Christ proved by himself, the Theology sees a further confirmation of it in the fact that Christ ascribes to himself, as the Son of man, the one-born God, the attribute of a divinity. In proof of this are adduced the following verses: And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven (John iii. 13). For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them (Matt. xviii. 20). Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even

unto the end of the world. Amen (xxviii. 20). And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was (John xvii. 5). As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father: and I lay down my life for the sheep (John x. 15). All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him (Matt. xi. 27).

All these verses, according to the Theology, show that Christ ascribed to himself divine attributes, — omnipresence, self-existence, eternity, almightiness, omniscience.

All these verses speak only of the oneness of birth of the Son of man with God, but in no way prove the especial divinity of Christ, as the Theology tries to prove. On the same basis it would be just as correct to ascribe a Godhead to Christ's disciples, to whom he on every side repeated one and the same thought, that they were in him and he was in them, just as the Father was in him. With this end the proofs of the Godhead of Christ as expressed by him. After that follow proofs from the words of the apostles.

"III. As Christ the Saviour taught about himself, even so his disciples taught about him, according to the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. For example: (1) The Evangelist Matthew, representing the miraculous conception of the Saviour, refers to him the prophecy of Isaiah: Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us (Matt. i. 23; Is. vii. 14)." (p. 51.)

I quote everything which is said about it in this Theology, without leaving out a single line. This is regarded as the first proof from the words of the apostles. One reads and wonders how it is possible to explain these words as a proof that Christ is God. Emmanuel is a name which

means "God with us." This passage is quoted from the prophet to prove that Jesus was the Messiah. What connection there is between these words and the divinity of Christ is absolutely inexplicable. Second proof:

"(2) The Evangelist Mark begins his Gospel with the words: The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God (Mark i. 1), and later, when he tells of the baptism of the Saviour, he says: And straightway coming up out of the water, he saw the heavens opened, and the Spirit like a dove descending upon him: and there came a voice from heaven, saying, Thou art my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased (Mark i. 10, 11)."

The words of the Gospel, "The Son of God," and, "Thou art my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," signify only that the beloved Son of God can by no means be God himself.

"(3) The Evangelist Luke quotes the prophecy of the angel to Zechariah about the coming birth of his son John, the forerunner of the Saviour: And many of the children of Israel shall he turn to the Lord their God. And he shall go before him in the spirit and power of Elias (Luke i. 16, 17)." (p. 52.)

The words of the prophecy of the angel to Zacharias refer to God, and not to Christ. Fourth proof:

"(4) St. John begins his Gospel with the words: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made (John i. 1–3), that is, he directly calls the Word God, represents it as existing from the beginning, or from eternity, separate from God, and as having created everything which exists. Farther on he writes: And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth — for the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came

by Jesus Christ (John i. 14, 17), that is, he bears testimony to the fact that this Word is indeed the only-begotten Son of God the Father, that it became incarnated, and is none but Jesus Christ." (p. 52.)

That the Word is none but Jesus Christ, who has created everything, not only does not appear from anything, but to any one who will carefully read the whole chapter it will become clear that the word "Logos" has a general, metaphysical meaning, which is quite independent of Christ. No matter how this chapter is understood, it is evident that its meaning is not that Christ is God. In order to say that, it was not necessary to speak of the Word, nor of the Light, nor of the birth of men. The proof which the church deduces from this chapter about the divinity of Christ is based on the arbitrary connection of one sentence of verse 1, where it says, "In the beginning was the Word," with verse 14, where it says that "the Word was made flesh," and then with verse 17, where it says that grace was given by Jesus Christ. The first sentence of the first verse does not stand alone, but is a connecting sentence between the first and the last. After that, mention is made of the light which shines on every man who comes into the world, of the birth of men, of the power or possibility for all to become the children of God, — not of Christ alone who was begotten of God, but of the many which were born of God. All such ideas, far from confirming the proposition that the Word is Christ, show directly that the Word, or the Logos, is the beginning of the true life of all men. Then mention is made of the fact that the Word was made flesh, and from the subsequent verses we must assume that the appearance of Jesus Christ is meant. But here, in the 17th verse, nothing is said about this Word being Christ himself, but there is reference to the manner in which this Word found its expression for men; it found its expression in grace and truth, and, it seems, excludes every possibility of

acknowledging Christ to be God; immediately it goes on to say: "No man hath seen God at any time," so that the words, "We beheld his glory," can by no means be referred to Christ the God, whereas this very passage is regarded as the best proof of the divinity of Christ.

"Farther on," says the Theology: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared (v. 18), that is, he shows that Jesus Christ is the only-begotten Son in the proper sense, as existing in the bosom of the Father." (p. 52.)

If the only-begotten Son of the Father professed the God whom no man can ever see, then it is evident that this Son is not God. But the Theology makes the opposite deduction:

"And concluding his Gospel," says the Theology, "the evangelist remarks that the purpose of his writing was to prove the Godhead of Jesus Christ: But these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name (John xx. 31)."

That is simply untrue. John's remark does not intend to prove the divinity of Christ, but speaks only of Christ's sonhood to God.

"The same apostle in the beginning of his first Epistle calls Christ the Word of life (1 John i. 1), that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested to us (v. 2), and at the end of the Epistle he says: And we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true, and we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life (1 John v. 20), calling here the true Son of God and true God him whom before he had called the eternal life." (p. 52.)

This discussion is simply unscrupulous. The words, "he that is true," can apparently not be referred to Christ,

but refer to God. Those are all the proofs from the Gospels.

"Finally in Revelation are frequently quoted the words of the Saviour who appeared to him: I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, the first and the last (Rev. i. 8, 11, 17, 18; ii. 8; xxii. 13), and there it is said that Christ is the prince of the kings of the earth (i. 5), and king of kings and lord of lords (xix. 16)." (pp. 52 and 53.)

As any one may see, even in these passages of Revelation, a book which has no significance for the explanation of the teachings of Christ, there is not even an indication of the divinity of Christ. Then follow proofs from the apostles.

"(5) St. Jude, the apostle, representing the heretics, says: For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of our God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ (Jude 4)." (p. 53.)

The oldest texts of the Epistle of St. Jude read as follows: "Denying the only lord and master (δεσπότην), Jesus Christ." In the later, and in our texts, it runs as follows: "Denying the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ." In the first reading there cannot even be a question about the Godhead of Christ; in the second, one would think, there can be even less any question about the Godhead of Christ, for here God is called, as he is always called, "only," and after him Jesus Christ is mentioned as a prophet or righteous man. But the absence of such proofs are regarded as proofs. Even such are the proofs from the Epistles of St. Paul. Here they are:

"(6) St. Paul calls the Saviour in his Epistles: God manifest in the flesh (1 Tim. iii. 16), the Lord of glory (1 Cor. ii. 8), the great God (Tit. ii. 11–13), God blessed

for ever (Rom. ix. 4–5), God's own (ἴδιον) Son (Rom. viii. 32), who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God (Phil. ii. 6); he ascribes to him divine attributes: eternity (Heb. xiii. 8), unchangeableness (Heb. i. 10–12), almightiness (Heb. i. 3; Phil. iii. 21), and says: For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him: and he is before all things, and by him all things consist (Col. i. 16, 17).

In these Epistles Christ is in three places called God (Rom. ix. 4–5; Tit. ii. 11–13; 1 Tim. iii. 16). I examine the texts, and I discover that all three indications by St. Paul that Christ is God are based on the addition of words to the old texts, and on the incorrectness of the translations and the punctuation. The passage in Timothy is read in various ways. In the oldest texts the word "God" does not occur at all, but instead of it there is a relative pronoun, now of the masculine, and now of the neuter gender. In any case this whole verse refers to Christ, and not to God, and the substitution in later texts of the word "God" for the pronoun cannot serve as a proof of the divinity of Christ. Then follows the passage Tit. ii. 11–13. The verse stands as follows: "Looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ." The conjunction "and" is taken by the Theology to be the same as a colon and an equality, and, instead of understanding the passage, as many similar passages are understood, as speaking of the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, these words are taken as a proof of the divinity of Christ. Finally, the last passage is Rom. ix. 5. This passage is read in such a way that Christ is called a blessed God, only because the punctuation mark which ought to stand after "flesh Christ came," has been changed from a period to a comma.

The whole verse ought to read: "Whose (the Jews') are the fathers, and whose Christ is according to the flesh." After that there ought to be a period. Then follows the usual praise to God: "Who is over all, God, is blessed forever" (and not "blessed for ever"). This intentional error is regarded as a proof of the divinity of Christ. In the whole book Christ is mentioned as a prophet, and the words "Son of God (υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ) are not even used, but instead, παῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ, that is, more correctly, servant of God. Those are all the proofs.

It is evident that those are not proofs, but juxtapositions of words which may serve as a confirmation of a proposition which has no foundation whatever in the Gospels and the Epistles. For any man who studies Holy Scripture in the original, who is acquainted with the criticism of Scripture and of the history of the church, it is evident that in the first century of Christianity, when the Epistles and Gospels were written, there was not even any mention made of the divinity of Christ. The best refutal of the proofs of the church about the Godhead of Christ is found in the vain endeavours which it makes to find anything resembling a proof. Everything which might have looked as an indication, every such a phrase, every juxtaposition of words, every blunder, every chance for an incorrect reading, is taken as a proof, but no real proof exists or can exist, because that idea was foreign to Christ and to his disciples. This is especially apparent from the reading of the Acts of the Apostles in the original. Here is described the teaching of the apostles, and here Christ is mentioned many times, and not only is he not spoken of as God, but no special meaning above any saint is ascribed to him; he is called saint, prophet, messenger of God, and not even υἱός, as John and Paul call him, but παῖς τοῦ θεοῦ, which can in no way be connected with the present teaching of the church about Christ the God. But in order to have clear and manifest proofs of

the fact that the chief disseminator of the teaching of Christ, Paul, never even so much as thought of the divinity of Christ, it is necessary to read those passages of his Epistles which directly determine the relations of Christ to God.

But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him (1 Cor. viii. 6). One God and Father of all, and in us all (Eph. iv. 6). That the God of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and so forth (Eph. i. 17). The head of Christ is God (1 Cor. xi. 3). Simplest and most indubitable of all it is in 1 Tim. ii. 5: For there is one God, and one mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus.

Indeed, there appears a man who teaches men of the relation which ought to exist between man and God, and preaches this teaching to all men. His relation and that of all men to God he expresses by the relation of the Son to the Father. That there might be no misunderstanding, he calls himself, and men in general, the son of man, and says that the son of man is the Son of God. In explaining man's relation to God, he says that as the son ought to emulate the father, and have one aim and one will with him (in the parable of the shepherd), even so must man strive to be like God and to do the same that God is doing. And he says of himself that he is the son of God. Indeed, what else could Christ have said, since he taught them the sonhood to God? If he cannot help saying about himself that he is a son of God, since it is this precisely that he is teaching to all men, there cannot be said of him, what neither the Jews, nor he himself had the least idea about, that he was God and the second person of the Trinity; for, though he never denied his filial relation to God, he never ascribed any special importance to it. He was told: "If you are a simple man, like all, eating and drinking with the publicans, you have nothing to teach us about;

but if you are a Son of God, a Messiah, show us your power, or be executed." He denied both. He said: "I am not a simple man, — I am fulfilling the will of God my Father, and teaching men about it; but I am also not a special son of God, but only one who is doing his Father's will, and this I teach to all men."

It is with this that he struggled all his life, and this they now ascribe to him, and try to prove that he said what he actually denied and what, if he had said it, would have destroyed the whole meaning of his teaching. According to the teaching of the church it turns out that God descended to earth only in order to save men. Their salvation consists in believing that he is God. It would not have been much trouble for him to say outright, "I am God," or, if not outright, at least not by such circumlocution that there is a possibility of understanding him quite differently without any desire to do wrong. Let it even be by circumlocution, if only it would be possible to explain his words as meaning that he was God. Well, even if his words were not exact, at least they should not contradict the statement that he was God. But, as it is, he has spoken in such a way that it is not possible to understand him otherwise than that he asserted to many that he was not God. If he had only revealed this secret to his nearest disciples so that they might have imparted it to other men, but, as it is, the disciples taught only that he was a righteous man, a mediator between man and God, and not a God.

Suddenly it turns out that for our salvation, which comes from him, his words have to be comprehended not as he and his disciples have spoken them, and that we must not rely on our common sense, but must believe the church, which, basing itself on tricks and misinterpretations of certain verses, asserts the opposite of what he has said about himself, and what his disciples have said of him. I have not dwelt on this passage in order to prove

that Christ is not God, — it is useless to prove that, — for to him who believes in God, Christ cannot be God. That was already evident in the exposition of the dogma of the Trinity and of the whole consequent inevitable tangle, but I have dwelt on this part as on one in which lies the source of all the preceding monstrosities and absurdities. It is evident to me that after Christ's death, his disciples, who were profoundly affected by his teaching, in speaking and writing of him, of the man who taught that all men were the sons of God and must blend with God in life, and who in his life up to his death carried out this subjection of himself to the will of God and this union with him, — it is evident to me that his disciples called him divine and the beloved Son of God on account of the elevation of his teaching and of his life, which fully realized his teaching ; and it is explicable to me how ignorant people, listening to the teaching of the apostles, did not understand it, but instead understood the mere words and on these ignorantly conceived words built up their own teaching and, with the stubbornness which generally goes with ignorance, stuck to their comprehension, denying every other interpretation, even because they were unable to understand it, and how later such ignorant people confirmed this terrible error at the first and the second Œcumenical Councils.

In the dogma of the original sin I can admit the comprehension of those people who in the story of the fall of man can see nothing but that there was an Adam and that he did not keep God's command not to eat of the forbidden fruit. This comprehension is not wrong, it is crude. Even thus I can admit the comprehension of men who say that Jesus was God and by his death and sufferings saved men. This comprehension is not wrong, it is only crude and imperfect. The conception of man's fall as due to the fact that he did not obey God is correct in so far as it expresses the idea that man's dependence,

weakness, death, — all those are the consequences of his carnal passions. Just as correct is the statement that Christ was God in so far — as was actually the fact and as John says — as he made God manifest to us. But the moment men begin to assert that the form in which this thought is expressed is the only truth, I no longer can admit what they say, because their elucidations and assertions explain the meaning of the idea which they enunciate, and this idea excludes the possibility of all oneness of faith and clearly shows that the source of their stubbornness in their assertions is crudity and ignorance. It is precisely this that the church has been doing all the time in the name of its sanctity and infallibility.

After this follows Art. 134. The Lord Jesus has a human nature and is indeed the son of the Virgin Mary. Then Art. 135 proves that Christ was born in human form from the Virgin Mary, and that Mary, having given birth to him, remained a virgin. There are quoted proofs for what cannot be comprehended, and explanations of the fathers of the church.

"Not only did they teach so, but they frequently tried to disclose that such a miraculous manner of the Messiah's birth was possible and exceedingly proper: in proof, or as an explanation of the possibility, they pointed to the almightiness of God and to certain other miraculous cases of the kind, as, for example, to the burning bush which did not burn up, and to the fact that the Saviour, after his resurrection, entered through closed doors into the room where his disciples were." (p. 70.)

136. The Lord Jesus is a sinless man. "(1) The Word of God teaches us, in the first place, that the Lord does not partake of the original sin." (p. 75.)

"(2) In the second place, the Word of God teaches us that our Lord Jesus is quite free from any personal sin.

"(3) In pursuance of so clear a teaching of the Word of God, the church has invariably believed that our Lord

Jesus, consubstantial with us according to his manhood, is like us in all but sin. This sinlessness of Christ the Saviour the church has since antiquity understood not merely in the sense that he is free from the original and all voluntary sin, but also in the sense that he cannot even sin and that he is free from all sensuous desires or propensities to sin, free from all inward temptation. Therefore, when Theodore of Mopsuestia took the liberty to assert, among other things, that our Lord Jesus was not exempt from inward temptations and the struggle of the passions, the fifth Œcumenical Council (in the year 553) condemned this heresy as one of the most important ones." (pp. 77 and 78.)

II. On the unity of the hypostasis in Jesus Christ.

137. The actuality of the union in Christ of two natures in one hypostasis. "In professing two natures, a divine and a human, in Jesus Christ our Lord, we at the same time profess that there is in him but one person and that the two natures are in him combined into one hypostasis of God the Word, for we believe that the Son of God assumed in his own hypostasis the human flesh which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary from the Holy Ghost and became incarnate (Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs on the Orthodox Faith, section 7), and that, consequently, his humanity has in him no especial personality and does not form a separate hypostasis, but was accepted by his divinity into a union with his divine hypostasis. Or, let us say with the words of St. John Damascene, 'The hypostasis of God the Word became incarnate, having received from the Virgin the beginning of our composition, the flesh animated by a reasoning and rational soul, so that it itself became a hypostasis of flesh. . . . One and the same hypostasis of the Word, having become a hypostasis of two essences, does not permit any one of them to be anhypostatic, nor does it permit them to be variously hypostatic among themselves; nor is it the hypostasis

now of one essence, and now of another, but always remains a hypostasis of both hypotases indivisibly and inseparably. . . . The flesh of God the Word did not assume an independent hypostasis and did not become a hypostasis, different from the hypostasis of God the Word, but having in it received a hypostasis, was rather received into the hypostasis of God the Word than became an independent hypostasis.'" (p. 79.)

It is absolutely impossible to render this into one's own words: it is simply the delirium of an insane man. The Trinity in one person breaks up into two, and these two are again one.

"III. Holy Scripture presents the firmest foundations of this truth. It teaches: (1) that in Christ Jesus, with two essences, a divine and a human, there is one hypostasis, one person, and (2) that this hypostasis of the Word or of the Son of God, having accepted and united with itself the human hypostasis with the divine, abides inseparably as one hypostasis of either essence." (pp. 79 and 80.)

All that is confirmed by Holy Scripture, the fathers of the church, and the decrees of the councils.

Finally common sense, too, is invoked:

"IV. And common sense, on the basis of theological principles, cannot help but notice that the Nestorian heresy, which divided Jesus Christ into two persons, absolutely rejects the mystery of the incarnation and the mystery of the redemption. If the divinity and the humanity in Christ are not united into one hypostasis, but form two separate persons, if the Son of God was united with Christ the man only morally, and not physically, and lived in him, as formerly in Moses and the prophets, — then there was no incarnation at all, and it is impossible to say: The Word was flesh, or, God sent his Son, born of a woman; for it would turn out that the Son of God was not born of a woman and did not take upon

himself the human flesh, but only coexternally became consubstantial with Christ who was born of a woman. On the other hand, if for us suffered and died on the cross not the Son of God, with his flesh taken up by him into a union with his hypostasis, but a simple man, Christ, who had only a moral union with the Son of God, — then there could not have taken place our redemption, because man, no matter how holy he may be, on account of his limitations, is not able to bring sufficient satisfaction to the infinite justice of God for the sins of the whole human race. And, by tearing down the mystery of the incarnation and the mystery of the redemption, the Nestorian heresy tore down the whole structure of the Christian faith." (pp. 85 and 86.)

Thus it turns out that what cannot be comprehended or even expressed, what cannot be thought of otherwise than by learning it by heart and repeating these words, is precisely what the whole structure of the Christian faith is reared on. In connection with the disclosure of this dogma one involuntarily comes to the conclusion that the dogma of the Trinity and those of the redemption, of grace, of incarnation, — that the more monstrous and senseless they are, the more important they turn out to be in the opinion of the church and the more controversies there have been in regard to them.

Have there been so many controversies because the dogma is monstrous, or has the dogma turned out to be so monstrous because it is the outgrowth of controversy and malice? I think both have happened. A dogma which by its nature is monstrous causes controversy, and the controversy makes the dogma still more monstrous. Another remarkable thing is that the more important a dogma is regarded to be by the church, the more controversies and malice and executions there have been, and the less meaning or possibility of moral application it has. The dogmas of the emanation of the Spirit, of the essence

of Christ, of the sacrament of communion, have agitated the church in proportion as they were removed from any possibility of a moral application. After that follows:

138. The manner of the hypostatic union in Christ of the two natures. "In what manner the two essences in Jesus Christ, the divine and the human, in spite of their difference, were united into one hypostasis; how he, being perfect God and perfect man, is only one person, — all that, according to the Word of God, is a great mystery of godliness (1 Tim. iii. 16), and, consequently, inaccessible to our reason. But in so far as this mystery is accessible for our faith, the holy church teaches us, on the basis of the same Word of God, that the two essences have united in our Saviour, (1) on the one hand, without blending (ἀσυγχύτως) and unchangeably, or immovably (ἀτρέπτως), in spite of the heresy of the Monophysites, who blended the two essences in Christ, or who assumed in him the transformation of the divinity into flesh; (2) on the other hand, inseparably (ἀχωρίστως), in spite of the error of the Nestorians, who separated the essences in Christ, and of other heretics, who denied that they had been united constantly and uninterruptedly; cf. the Dogma of the Council of Chalcedon." (p. 86.)

This is proved besides from Scripture:

"(3) Finally, also from considerations of common sense, which, on the basis of its natural principles, cannot in any way admit: (*a*) that the divine and human essences should have blended or mingled in Christ and formed a new, third essence, having lost their attributes, for the Godhead is unchangeable, and the blending or mingling of two quite simple essences, of the human soul and of the divinity, is impossible, and so much the more physically impossible is the blending of the coarse human flesh with the simplest divinity; (*b*) nor that the divine essence should have changed into a human, or the human into a divine essence: the first is contrary to the un-

changeableness and unlimitedness of God, the latter is contrary to the limitedness of man. On the basis of the principles of the revealed, or Christian, theology, reason must tell us that only in the unblended and untransferred union of the two essences in Jesus Christ, and only with their perfect integrity, could have taken place the great work of our redemption, for the Saviour could have suffered on the cross only with his humanity, and only his divinity could give an infinite value to his sufferings. Consequently, to acknowledge in Christ the blending or transmutation of the two essences into one, means to overthrow the mystery of our redemption." (pp. 89 and 90.)

139. The consequences of the hypostatic union of the two essences in Jesus Christ, (*a*) in relation to himself. "The consequences of the first kind are: I. The communion in Jesus Christ of the two attributes of his essences. It consists in this, that in the person of Jesus Christ each of his essences transfers its attributes to the other, namely, what is proper to him according to his humanity is appropriated to him as to God, and what is proper to him according to his divinity is appropriated to him as to man. II. The deification of the human essence in Jesus Christ. The deification is not in the sense that the human in Christ is changed into divinity, has lost its limitedness, and has received, in the place of the human attributes, other attributes of God; but that, having been received by the Son of God into a union with his hypostasis, it has been communicated to his divinity, has become one with God the Word, and through incorporation with the divinity has been heightened in its perfections to the highest degree to which humanity can rise, at the same time not ceasing to be humanity." (p. 95.)

"III. To Jesus Christ, as to the one person, to the God-man, it behoves us to give one, undivided divine

worship, both according to his Godhead and according to his humanity."

"IV. In Jesus Christ there are two wills and two actions." There follow long controversies about the two wills and the two actions. Refutals and proofs from Scripture and from common sense. The mental morbidity has so increased in this chapter that it is painful to read it, if you read with the desire to understand what the author is talking about. Then, in accordance with the subdivision made in the beginning of the chapter, where it said that the consequences of the hypostatic union of Jesus Christ are of two kinds, in relation: (*a*) to himself, (*b*) to the Virgin Mary, and (*c*) to the Most Holy Trinity.

140. (*b*) In relation to the Most Holy Virgin, the Mother of our Lord Jesus. The consequences of the hypostatic union in relation to the Virgin Mary are analyzed. Contents: a polemic with the Macedonians and the Nestorians. The subdivision about the consequences in relation to Christ and to the Virgin Mary is made only in order to dispute against Nestorius, who called the Virgin Mary the Mother of Christ.

141. (*c*) In relation to the Most Holy Trinity. It is proved that, in spite of the incarnation, the Trinity remained a Trinity. This is the way it is to be understood:

"The words of St. John Damascene: 'I do not introduce a fourth person into the Trinity, which it shall not be; but I profess the one person of God the Word and of his flesh. The Trinity remained the Trinity even after the incarnation of the Word. The flesh of God the Word did not receive an independent hypostasis, and did not become a hypostasis different from the hypostasis of God the Word; but in it, having received the hypostasis, it became rather received into the hypostasis of God the Word than an independent hypostasis. For this reason it

does not remain anhypostatic and introduce another hypostasis into the Trinity.'" (p. 114.)

142. Moral application of the dogma about the mystery of the incarnation. All these dogmas give us the following lessons: (1) all these blasphemous controversies, in the opinion of the author, "confirm the faith in us;" (2) faith reminds us of hope; (3) kindles in us the love for God; (4) teaches us to glorify not only God, but also "to glorify with all the strength of our being the Most Holy, Most Blessed, Glorious Lady, our Mother of God and Ever Virgin Mary;" (5) "to respect in ourselves the dignity of man," because Christ was God and man; (6) "finally, presents to us in the incarnated Son of God a most perfect example for emulation, in accordance with his own words: 'For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you' (John xiii. 15)." (p. 115.)

XII.

The following place, "Section 2," as it is called in the Theology, is especially important, although in the middle of the exposition it is called only the 2d Section from Chapter II., Part 2: About God the Saviour in his especial relation to the human race.

In general, the division of the Theology into parts, divisions, chapters, sections, articles, into (1), (2), (3), (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), and so forth, is to such a degree complicated and arbitrary and based on nothing that there is absolutely no possibility of remembering all the subdivisions, and it is necessary to consult the book every minute or learn everything by heart. This place is especially important because here, in this very spot, we find the key to all contradictions. Here is to be found the radical, internal contradiction from which resulted the tangle of all the other parts. Here, in this place, is made the substitution of its own teaching in place of the teaching of Christ, and it is done in such a way that it is not possible at a first glance to discern this substitution, and that it appears as though to the teaching of Christ, which is clear and manifest to all, there were only attached certain revealed truths, which, far from impairing the teaching of Christ, only enhance the greatness of Christ and of his teaching.

The contradiction, which is here imperceptibly carried into the teaching, and which later will form the subject of elucidation in the division on grace, consists in this, that Christ the God saved men by descending upon earth

to them who had entirely fallen; at the same time he gave them a law which, when adhered to, will save them. The contradiction consists in this, that, if men were entirely lost and God had pity on them and sent to them his Son (who is also God) to suffer and die for men and take them out of the condition in which they had been before the redemption, that condition ought to have changed; but at the same time we hear the assertion that God also gave a law to men (a law of faith and works), which if they do not follow, they perish just as much as they perished before the redemption. Thus it turns out that if obedience to the law is a condition of salvation, the salvation of men by the death of Christ is superfluous and quite useless. But, if the salvation by Christ's death is real, obedience to the law is useless and the law itself is superfluous. It is necessary to choose one or the other, and the church teaching in reality chooses the latter, that is, it acknowledges the reality of the redemption, but, in acknowledging it, does not dare make the last necessary deduction that the law is superfluous; it does not dare do so because this law is precious and important to every man, and so it acknowledges the law only in words (and that, too, in a very indefinite manner) and carries on all the discussion in such a way as to prove the reality of the redemption and therefore the uselessness of the law. Christ's law is in this exposition something quite superfluous, something which does not result from the essence of the whole matter, something which is not connected with the whole progress of the discussion, and so falls off by itself. That is apparent even from the manner of the expression in the heading: About the act of salvation performed by the Lord, or about the mystery of the redemption, and from the division of the chapter, in which the moral teaching occupies only a small half of the three species of salvation, and from the number of the pages which are devoted to this subject.

Section 2. About the act of salvation performed by our Lord Jesus Christ, or about the mystery of the redemption.

143. How did our Lord Jesus achieve our salvation? He achieved our salvation as Christ. Christ means the Anointed. The anointed were the prophets, the high priests, and the kings. From this the Theology concludes that Christ was a prophet, a high priest, and a king. And on this foundation the salvation through Christ and his ministration to men are divided into three parts, into the prophetic, the sacerdotal, and the regal; why do they make such a division, which, to say the least, is queer? Why is Christ called by the improper name of king, which not only God Christ, but any moral man, would not wish to accept? To this there is no other answer except that so it was written in former Catechisms. First comes: I. About the prophetic ministration of Jesus Christ.

144. Conception of the prophectic ministration of Jesus Christ and the truth of his ministration. It is proved by Holy Scripture that Christ was a prophet.

145. The way in which the Lord Jesus achieved his prophetic ministration, and the essence of his sermon. The prophetic ministration, according to the Theology, consists of two parts: of the law of faith, and of activity. For the salvation of men Christ gives the law of faith and of activity. The law of faith consists in the belief in God the Trinity, in the fall of Adam, in the incarnation, and in the redemption. The law of activity consists in self-renunciation and loving God and your neighbour.

146. This article speaks of Jesus Christ having taught a new, more perfect law in place of the law of Moses. Here is expounded the difference between the law of Christ and the law of Moses, again mainly in relation to faith. In relation to the activity there is but half a page, in which we are informed that the demands of the Gospel law are higher than the law of Moses, but nothing is said

as to the extent to which the execution of these demands is obligatory for salvation, or what they consist in. But, in considering the demands as put forth here, and their execution in reality, it is evident that the law of evangelical activity is not recognized as obligatory for salvation. We are told that by the law of Christ are demanded the endurance and forgiveness of offences, the love of our enemies, self-renunciation, humility, chastity, not only physical, but also spiritual; it is evident that if those are all the demands of Christ's law of activity for salvation, not only will the human race not be saved, but there has not been, and never will be, saved one in a million. It is evident that that is said only in order not to overlook the moral teaching of Christ, and that this teaching has no place and is not wanted in the Theology.

147. Jesus Christ taught the law to all the people and for all times. That the law was given for all men and for all times is proved by texts from Scripture, that is, not by indicating that there can be no other law, but by confirming from Scripture that this law is for all men and for all times, meaning by this law only the law of faith.

148. Jesus Christ taught the only saving law which, therefore, is necessary for the attainment of eternal life. In this article the proof is given that this law gives eternal life, and that is again not proved by an elucidation of the meaning of the moral law, but by the assertion that it is confirmed by Scripture and by the holy fathers, and again the law of faith alone is meant. That is the end of the teaching about the prophetic ministration of Jesus Christ. Then follows what is most essential to the church: II. About the sacerdotal ministration of Jesus Christ, that is, about the redemption.

149. The connection with the preceding; conception of the sacerdotal ministration of Jesus Christ; truth and superiority of this ministration. Here it says:

"As a prophet, Christ the Saviour only announced to us the salvation, but did not then achieve the salvation itself: he enlightened our intellect with the light of true divine knowledge and bore witness that he was the real Messiah who was come to save that which was lost (Matt. xviii. 11); he also explained how he was going to save us, and how we could make his deserts our own, and pointed out to us the straight road to the eternal life. But with his work he saved us from sin and from all the consequences of sin, — with his work itself he earned the eternal life for us through his sacerdotal ministration." (p. 133.)

"But with his work itself he saved us from sin." There is here expressed what constitutes the whole essence of the teaching about the salvation; the sacerdotal ministration, in which are included the demands of the law of activity, was only the "announcement," but the salvation was in the sacrifice, in his death.

"This ministration of our Saviour consisted in this, that he brought himself as an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the world and thus reconciled us with God, freed us from sin and its consequences, and acquired eternal benefits for us." (p. 133.)

The salvation takes place from that calculation of the divinity which was achieved independently of us. Farther down is the exposition of how it happens that Christ is the high priest, while the divinity brings the sacrifice and Christ is the victim:

"The truth of the sacerdotal ministration of our Saviour (*a*) was proclaimed in the Old Testament by God himself through the mouth of the prophet Daniel, speaking to the Messiah: Thou art a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec (Psalm cx. 4); (*b*) was testified to by Christ the Saviour, in referring to himself the prophetic Psalm, in which he is called the priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec (Matt. xxii. 44; Mark xii. 36; Luke xx. 42); (*c*) finally, it was disclosed in detail by St.

Paul in his Epistle to the Hebrews. Here he: (1) clearly and on several occasions called Jesus Christ priest, high priest, sanctifier. For example: So also Christ glorified not himself to be made an high priest; but he that said unto him, Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee. As he saith also in another place, Thou art a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec (Heb. v. 5, 6); Consider the apostle and high priest of our profession, Christ Jesus (Heb, iii. 1); Seeing then that we have a great high priest, that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God, let us hold fast our profession (Heb. iv. 14–16); (2) it is explained why he is called the high priest of Melchisedec. That is due to the fact (*a*) that Melchisedec was not only a priest of the most high God, but also the King of Salem, — a king of righteousness and peace, and by this unusual combination of two high ministrations he predicted the unusual high priest of the king (Heb. vii. 2); (*b*) that Melchisedec (since Holy Scripture does not mention his family, nor the beginning and end of his life, nor his predecessor, nor heir) represents the image of Christ, the Son of God, who abideth a priest continually (v. 3); (*c*) finally, that, having received the tenth of the spoils from Abraham himself, he blessed all who were yet in his loins, the sons of Levi, the priests of the Old Testament, and from them received a tithe, — and since without any contradiction the lesser is blessed by the greater, he represented in himself the priesthood of Christ, which was more perfect than the Levitical priesthood of the Old Testament (v. 4–11)." (p. 134.)

Do you understand it? In this part there is noticeable not so much the indifference of the writer as to whether what he says has any sense, as an apparent desire to collect such words as can have no meaning. If any sense can be made out of this chapter it is this, that Christ sacrificed himself to God for men, and that the one who wrote the Epistle, in which he wished to express the idea that

Christ was the Redeemer of sins, chose an obscure comparison with Melchisedec, and that the church, who accepted all the Epistles of Paul and those that are ascribed to him as writings of the Holy Ghost, has stuck to the word "high priest," which explains nothing and gets things mixed up. The sense is that Christ brought himself as a sacrifice for men. To elucidate it, there are quoted the words of St. Gregory the Divine, St. Epiphanius, and others.

"(*b*) St. Gregory the Divine: 'He was the victim and also the high priest; a priest, but also God; he presented his blood to God, but purified the whole world; he was raised to the cross, but nailed sin to the cross.' (*c*) St. Epiphanius: 'He sacrificed himself in order that, by bringing a most perfect and living sacrifice for the whole world, he might make void the sacrifices of the Old Testament; himself the victim, himself the sacrifice, himself the sacrificer, himself the king, himself the high priest, himself the sheep, himself the lamb, who became everything for our sake.'"

150. How did our Lord Jesus perform his sacerdotal ministration? His sacerdotal ministration consisted in this, that (1) men fell by their pride and disobedience. He was humble and obedient, and (2) since men had become worthy of the wrath of God, Christ took upon himself the whole wrath of God (suffered and died), and became the curse. It is impossible to express what is meant by it, — it is necessary to read the article as it is written.

"Here, as the high priest, he really sacrificed himself on the cross as an expiatory victim to God for the sins of the world, and redeemed us with his precious blood (1 Peter i. 19), so that his incarnation and his whole life on earth served only as a preparation and, as it were, a gradual ascent toward that great sacrifice. Consequently, in the Word of God and in the teaching of the church is represented to us —

"151. Especially the death of Jesus Christ as a sacrifice of redemption for our sake." (p. 139.)

His death is the chief sacrifice of redemption for our sake. God sacrifices to God and redeems an obligation from the good God. All these are internal contradictions. There is a contradiction in every sentence, and these sentences are contradictorily combined with each other. I repeat what I said about the dogma of the Trinity. It is not exactly that I do not believe, — I do not know what there is to believe. I can believe or not believe that to-morrow a city will appear in heaven or that the grass will grow as high as the sun, but I cannot believe that to-morrow will be to-day, or that three will be one and yet three, or that pain does not pain, or that one God was divided into two and yet is one, or that the good God punishes himself and redeems from himself his own error of creation. I simply see that the one who is talking does not know how to talk or has nothing to say.

There is no rational connection. The only external connection is the references to Scripture. They give at least some kind of an explanation, not of what is being talked about, but why such terrible absurdities may be uttered. As in many preceding places, the quotations from Scripture show that the assertion of these absurdities does not take place voluntarily, but results, as in the history of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, from a false, for the most part, crude, comprehension of the words of Scripture.

Here, for example, in confirmation of the fact that the death of Christ the God has redeemed the human race, there are quoted the passages from the Gospel. From the discourse with Nicodemus: Even so must the Son of man be lifted up: that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life (John iii. 14, 15).

It says "The Son of man must be lifted up." How can that mean the redemption of the human race by

God? He who will read the whole conversation with Nicodemus, will see clearly that it could not mean anything like that. It means precisely what the words themselves mean: the Son of man (meaning by "son" himself as man, or man in general) must be lifted up like the brazen serpent of Moses. By what manner of reasoning can one come to the conclusion that it means the death on the cross, or, more wonderfully still, the redemption?

The next passage adduced as a proof is the one where John says: Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh the sin of the world (John i. 29). This passage runs in Greek as follows: ἴδε, ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ αἴρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου. This cannot be translated otherwise than: The lamb which lifts off, takes away the sin of the world. And this passage is translated by "taketh," to which the new translations add "upon himself." And this interpolation is regarded as a proof. The next proof is this: Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many (Matt. xx. 28).

How can this verse mean anything but that the man, he himself, or man in general, must give his life for men, for his brothers?

Farther: The good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep. I am the good shepherd. I lay down my life for the sheep (John x. 11, 14, 15).

The shepherd gives his life for his flock, just as I am doing. How does the redemption follow from that? When they ask a sign from him, similar to the manna, he says: I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world (John vi. 51). Continuing his comparison, he says that he is the only bread that men ought to eat. And this bread, that is, his example

and teaching, he would confirm by giving his flesh for the life of the world. How does the redemption follow from that?

Farther: This is my body which is given for you (Luke xxii. 19). And he took the cup, saying, This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins (Matt. xxvi. 27–28).

Bidding his disciples farewell, with a cup of wine and bread in his hands, he says to them that he is supping with them for the last time and that he will die soon. "Think of me at your wine and bread; with your wine think of my blood, which will flow for you that ye may live without sin; with the bread think of the body, which I am giving for you." Where is here the redemption? "He will die, will give his blood, will suffer for the people," are the simplest kind of expressions. The peasants always say about martyrs and saints, "They pray, work, and suffer for us." This expression means nothing more than that the saints intercede before God for the unrighteous and the sinful.

But that is not enough: they adduce as proof from the Gospel of John the following reflection of the author of the Gospel on the words of Caiaphas: And this spake he not of himself: but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation; and not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad (John xi. 51, 52).

It is evident that there are no indications in the Gospel, not to speak of proofs, about the redemption, if such words are adduced as proofs. Caiaphas predicts the redemption, and immediately afterward has Christ killed. That is all which is adduced from the Gospel in proof of the redemption of the human race by Jesus Christ.

After that follow proofs from Revelation and from the writings of the apostles, that is, from those books which

the church collected and corrected when it already professed the dogma of the redemption. But in these books, in the Epistles of the apostles, we do not yet see the confirmation of the dogma, but there occur here and there obscure expressions, with which all the Epistles are filled, and which may rudely be interpreted in the sense of the dogma, as has been done by the consequent so-called fathers of the church, but not by those of the first centuries. It is enough to read the history of the church to be convinced that the first Christians did not have the slightest conception about this dogma. Thus, for example:

"The Apostle Peter commands the Christians: Pass the time of your sojourning here in fear: Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers: But with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot" (1 Peter i. 17–19).

Peter says that it is possible to mend only through faith in the teaching which was branded by the death of him who was as innocent as a lamb. And this is taken as a confirmation of the dogma of the redemption.

"Because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that we should follow his steps — who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness: by whose stripes ye were healed (1 Peter ii. 21, 24). For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God" (1. Peter iii. 18).

The cruel death of Christ, who left us an example of life to follow him by, ought to make us heal ourselves from sins and come to God. The expression is concise and metaphorical, just as the masses speak when they say that the martyrs have worked for us. And that is taken as a proof: "For I delivered unto you first of all

that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. xv. 3). "For" means in consequence of our sins. "Christ also hath loved us, and hath given himself for us an offering and sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour" (Eph. v. 2). Christ's love for us brought him to a shameful death. That, too, is considered a confirmation of the dogma. "Who was delivered for our offences, and was raised again for our justification" (Rom. iv. 25). The resurrection is mentioned as a miracle, and it says that he was delivered on account of our sins. "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past" (Rom. iii. 25). Again a misty, tangled sentence, like all of Paul's expressions, which denote one and the same thing, namely, that the death of a just man has freed men from their previous errors. And all that is regarded as a proof. But the chief proof is found in the interpretations of the fathers of the church, that is, of those men who have invented the dogma of the redemption.

"(*a*) St. Barnabas: 'We will believe that the Son of God could not have suffered except for us — for our sins he wished to bring as a sacrifice the vessel of the spirit.' (*b*) St. Clement of Rome: 'We shall look up to our Lord Jesus Christ, whose blood was given for us — we shall look up attentively to the blood, and shall consider how precious his blood is before God, since, having been spilled for our salvation, it obtained the grace of repentance for the whole world.' (*c*) Ignatius Theophorus: 'Christ died for you, in order that you, believing in his death, might be saved from death.' (*d*) St. Policarp: 'He suffered death itself for our sins —; he suffered everything for us, that we might live in him.'" (p. 142.)

Or another place, as a sample of that arbitrariness and blasphemous pettiness, with which the whole book is permeated.

"If one of us should ask, not from love of controversy, but from a desire to know the truth: 'Why did the Lord suffer death on the cross rather than any other?' let him know that that particular death, and no other, could save us, and the Lord suffered precisely that for our salvation, for, if he came for the purpose of taking upon himself the curse which had been upon us, then how else could he become a participant of the curse, if he did not suffer the death which was under the curse? And that is the death on the cross, for it is written: Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree (Gal. iii. 13). In the second place, if the death of the Lord is the redemption of all, if by it the middle wall of partition is broken down (Eph. ii. 14) and the calling together of the tongues takes place, then how could he have called us to the Father, if he had not been crucified? For it is only on the cross that one can die with extended hands. And so that is the reason why the Lord had to suffer death on the cross and on the cross to extend his arms, in order with one hand to attract to himself the ancient nation, and with the other the pagans, and thus to unite them in himself. He predicted that about himself when he wanted to show with what kind of a death he meant to redeem all: If I be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all men unto me (John xii. 32). And again: the enemy of our race, the devil, having fallen from heaven, is wandering here in the aerial sphere and ruling over demons who are like him in disobedience, and by means of them he entices with visions those who fall victims to his deception, or in every way tries to hinder those who are tending upwards; thus speaks of him the Apostle Paul, calling him the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience (Eph. ii. 2). For this reason the Lord came to depose the devil, to clear the air of him, and to open a new path for us to the heavens, as the apostle has said, through a curtain, that is, through his flesh; but that he

could do only through his death, and what death could it have been other than one that takes place in the air, that is, on the cross? For only he who is crucified dies in the air. And thus the Lord has not without cause suffered death on the cross: having been lifted on the cross, he purified the air from the snares of the devil." (p. 144.)

Redemption, the church says, is a fundamental dogma, on which the whole doctrine is based. Where is it expressed? In the Gospels, that is in the words of Jesus Christ himself, who came to save men, and in the words of the evangelists who wrote down the words of Christ, there is not any mention of this dogma. The church asserts that the dogma is expressed in Christ's words, "The Son of man must be lifted up;" in the spurious words, "The lamb which taketh upon himself the sins of the world;" in the words, "The Son of man has come to minister;" in the words, "I am a good shepherd who will not spare my life for my sheep;" then in the words, when, breaking the bread, he said, "This is my body, for you do I break it," and, at last, in what Caiaphas said. That is, obviously, untrue, but, according to the teaching of the church, all this is expressed more clearly in the Epistles, that is, in the interpretations of Christ's words, and more clearly still in the interpretations of the fathers. But the redemption is the fundamental dogma of our salvation, — how is it then that Christ, who came to save us, did not more clearly express the dogma, but left all this to the interpretation of Epiphanius, to the unknown Epistle to the Hebrews, and to others. If this dogma is not only so important that on the belief in it depends all our salvation, but also is simply necessary to men, and Christ came down upon earth out of love for men, he ought to have expressed it clearly and simply at least once, but as it is he did not even hint at it. And everything which I can find out about this great truth, which is necessary for my salvation, I must draw from the writings about

Christ, composed by various persons, and from the interpretations of some fathers, who apparently did not understand themselves what they were saying. This is what it goes on to say, what I must believe in, and what Christ meant to say to all men, but did not say.

152. Very detailed exposition in the word of God of our redemption through the death of Jesus Christ.

(1) Christ has purified us; (2) has redeemed us; (3) has reconciled us to God; (4) has freed us from the slavery of sin; (5) has established a new covenant with God; (6) has made us the adopted children of God; (7) has given us the means for being holy; (8) has obtained eternal life for us. It turns out that Christ has given us eight advantages through his sacrifice, but all these advantages are imaginary, for no one has ever seen them or ever will see them, as was the case with that sleight-of-hand performer who reeled the Virgin's endless hairs, which no one could see.

After Christ all of us became pure, holy, no longer slaves to sin, eternal, and so forth. Thus the fathers assure us, and I am compelled to believe this time what they tell me, not about something invisible, but about myself, although I know that all that is untrue. And again, as always, what is not and cannot be, is explained at great length. About the moral law of Christ there is just half a page, *en passant;* but about the essences, about redemption, there is no end to words, though that has never been and never can be. One would think that all has been said, but no, now we get a discussion about the —

153. Disclosure of the method itself of our redemption through the death of Jesus Christ. "The whole mystery of our redemption through the death of Jesus Christ consists in this, that he in our place paid the debt with his blood and fully satisfied the justice of God for our sins, for which we ourselves had been unable to pay; in other

words, in our place he achieved and suffered everything which was necessary for the remission of our sins. The possibility in general of such a substitution of one person for another before the judgment of the justice of God, of such an acquittal of a moral debt by one person in the place of another or of others, must necessarily be admitted by common sense: (*a*) when for this substitution we have the will of God and the consent of the Supreme Lawgiver and Judge; (*b*) when the person who has taken upon himself to pay the debt for other delinquent debtors does not himself stand in the place of debtor before God; (*c*) when he voluntarily determines to execute all the conditions of the debt that the Judge may impose upon him, and (*d*) when, at last, he actually offers the pay which fully satisfies the debt.

"All these conditions, which we have borrowed from the example of our Saviour and have only generalized, have all been fulfilled by him in his great deed for our sake: Our Lord Jesus suffered for us pain and death by the will and with the permission of his Father, our Supreme Judge. It was precisely for this purpose that he, the Son of God, came down upon earth, in order to do, not his will, not his own will, but the will of him who sent him (John vi. 38), and during his whole life busied himself only with doing the will of his Father." (p. 148.)

I have quoted this as a specimen of that involuntarily blasphemous form of speech which is employed by the author, whenever the subject of his speech is a blasphemy. What kind of debt, and pay, and court is he talking about? What kind of an expression is this, "God busied himself only"?

And thus, (1) Christ suffered for obeying his Father; (2) he was sinless; (3) he suffered voluntarily; (4) the pay for the debt as offered by Christ surpasses the amount of the debt, and a surplus — some change — is left. It is

even analyzed who gets the pay for the debt. All that is not my invention.

"Who received the pay for this redemption? Some represented that it was brought for the prince of this world, the devil, in whose captivity we all are. But St. Gregory discusses as follows: 'For whom and for what was this blood spilled, which he spilled on account of us, the blood of the great and most glorious God and high priest and victim? We were in the power of the deceiver, sold for our sins, having bought our injury by our lust. And if the price of the ransom is given to no other than the one who has us in his power, I ask: To whom and for what reason was this ransom paid? If to the deceiver, then that is offensive. The robber receives the ransom, and receives not only from God, but God himself; for his oppression he takes such an extortionate price that it was right that we should be spared for it! But if to the Father, then, in the first place, in what manner? We were certainly not in captivity to him. And, in the second place, for what reason is the blood of the Only-begotten One agreeable to the Father, who did not receive even Isaac, who was offered by his father, but exchanged the offering, having given a ram in place of the sacrifice of the promise? But from this we see that the Father received the ransom not because he demanded or needed it, but on account of his house-management, and because man had to be sanctified by the manhood of God, in order that he himself might free us, having overcome the tormentor by force, and might lead us up to him through the Son, who mediates and arranges everything in the honour of the Father, to whom he turns out to be obedient in everything.'" (p. 154.)

154. The extent of the redemptory actions of Christ's death.

Christ's sacrifice not only redeemed the sin, but a surplus was left. This surplus is (1) for everybody; (2)

extends over all sins, (*a*) redeems the original sin, (*b*) every sin, (*c*) all previous sins, (*d*) all future sins. This truth was unanimously preached by the teachers of the church, for example:

"(*a*) By St. John Chrysostom: 'That the benefits given by Jesus Christ are more numerous than the evils destroyed, and that not only the original sin was destroyed, but also all other sins, that the apostles said in these words: The free gift is of many offences unto justification (Rom. v. 16),' and farther: 'By the grace was destroyed not only the original sin, but also all other sins; and not only the sins were destroyed, but righteousness was given to us, and Christ set aright not only what was injured by Adam, but reëstablished everything in a greater measure and a higher degree.'" (p. 157.)

"(3) For all times, that is, from the beginning of the fall of man to the end of the world. Therefore, (*a*) Christ is called, on the one hand, a lamb, and, on the other, a high priest. Similarly, (*b*) the redemption achieved by him is called eternal, (*c*) and his priesthood unchangeable, for he ever liveth to make intercession for them (Heb. vii. 24, 25). How to understand this intercession for us by Christ the Saviour in heaven, is explained by St. Gregory the Divine: 'To intercede means here (Heb. vii. 25) to negotiate (πρεσβεύειν) for us in the capacity of a mediator, as is said of the Spirit who maketh intercession for us (Rom. viii. 26). . . . Thus also we have an advocate in Jesus (1 John ii. 1), not in the sense that he humbles himself before the Father and falls down before him as a slave: far be from us such a dreadfully slavish thought, which is unworthy of the Spirit! It is not proper for the Father to demand it, or for the Son to suffer it, and it is not right to think so of God.' The blessed Theophilactes of Bulgaria: 'Some have understood the expression *to intercede for us* to mean that Jesus Christ had a body (and had not put it off, as the Manicheans speak idly). That is

precisely what his intercession before the Father is. For, looking at it, the Father recalls his love for men, for the sake of which his Son assumed the body, and is inclined to charity and mercy.'" (p. 158.)

By the way, as one reads similar passages, it becomes evident that the whole mysterious, incomprehensible Trinity represented itself in the imagination of the holy fathers in the form of three distinct, quite well defined anthropomorphic beings. And finally:

"(4) The redemption extends over the whole world." The world of the angels was separated before, but now men unite with it. Nature was cursed and did not produce of itself; now this curse no longer exists, so that the redemption extends over everything, except the devils, because the devils were so infuriated. Some Christians assume that the devils, too, were redeemed: "The opinion of the ancient Gnostics, Marcionites, and Origenists, who extended the action of the redemption to the fallen angels themselves, was rejected by the teachers of the church and solemnly condemned by the whole church at the Fifth Œcumenical Council."

All that is confirmed by Holy Scripture and forms part of a dogma.

155. The consequence of the deserts of the cross of Jesus Christ in regard to himself: the condition of his glorification. Christ is glorified as a reward for having come down into the world.

156. The relation of the sacerdotal ministration of Jesus Christ to his prophetic ministration. "Although the chief aim of the sacerdotal ministration of Jesus Christ, that is, of his whole exhaustion and especially of his death on the cross, was to achieve our redemption, he at the same time subjected himself to this exhaustion also for other purposes." (p. 162.)

The chief aim is the redemption, but in addition there were also the following purposes: (1) to give us an ex-

ample by his life; (2) to deprive the Jews of their faith in the coming of the Messiah in glory; (3) to make void the laws of Moses; (4) finally, he died in order to give a clear testimony of the truth that he was God, that is, that which he constantly denied being.

All this chapter is remarkable in that it has not the slightest foundation in the Holy Canonical Scripture, but is all based on the apocryphal account, has not the slightest human meaning, and, what is most important, appears to every fresh man quite superfluous. Only by subjecting the Theology to a close study, can one guess what it is needed for. There is but one purpose which this chapter has, and that is, to solve the contradiction that all men perished before Christ, whereas we recognize the saints of the Old Testament. What is to be done with them! And so the apocryphal account of Christ's descent into hell is taken, and the question is solved, and there appears the royal ministration of Christ. After that follows a chapter on the royal ministration of Christ.

"III. 157. Connection with what precedes, conception of the royal ministration of Christ, and the truth of his ministration. The truth of the royal ministration of our Saviour is quite clearly testified to in the Word of God. (1) He was born a king and vested with power. For unto us a child is born, proclaims the prophet Isaiah, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Angel of the Great Council, Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, the Father of the future life. And great is his government, and of his peace there is no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even for ever (Is. ix. 6, 7; cf. Luke i. 32, 33; Matt. ii. 2). He was a king and had a royal power in the days of his humiliation, for he himself adopted the name of king, as

is seen from the accusation which was brought against him by the Jews (Matt. xxvii. 11–37; Mark xv. 1–32), and as he actually affirmed before Pilate (John xviii. 37). He applied to himself the regal power, as the words of his prayer to God show: Father, the hour is come; glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee: as thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him (John xvii. 1, 2). In his very acts he showed himself a king, when he entered Jerusalem, according to the ancient prophecy: Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Sion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto thee: he is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass (Zech. ix. 9; cf. John xii. 15; Matt. xxi. 5), and when he received the solemn acclamation of the people: Hosanna to the Son of David; blessed is the King of Israel that cometh in the name of the Lord (Matt. xxi. 9; John xii. 13). Finally, in all his glory and power he appeared as a king in the condition of his glorification, when he said to his disciples: All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth (Matt. xxviii. 18), and when God actually set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come: and hath put all things under his feet (Eph. i. 20–22)."

Those are the proofs of the regal order which the church ascribes to him who said that what is great before men is an abomination before God.

158. In what actions was the royal ministration of Jesus Christ expressed? His miracles. His ministration was expressed in miracles. They are all counted out: Cana of Galilee, and Lazarus, and the casting out of the devils. "Even thus in the days of the exhaustion of our Saviour, when he was achieving mainly his pro-

phetic and sacerdotal ministration, his miracles showed that he was at the same time the King of the Universe, the vanquisher of hell and death." (p. 168.)

159. The descent of Jesus Christ into hell and his victory over hell. Another regal action of Christ's descent into hell and his victory over it. "I. The teaching that the Lord Jesus actually went into hell with his soul and divinity, when his body was in the grave, and that he went down there to preach salvation, is an apostolic teaching." There follow proofs. But not all agree upon what Christ did in hell. Some say that he took them all out, while others maintain that he took out only the righteous.

"St. Epiphanius: 'Christ's divinity together with his soul went down into hell in order to lead to salvation those who had died before, namely the holy patriarchs.' St. Cassianus: 'Having penetrated into hell, Christ with the splendour of his glory dispelled the impenetrable darkness of Tartarus, broke the brazen doors, and led the holy prisoners, who were kept in the impenetrable darkness of hell, with him to heaven.' St. Gregory the Great: 'The wrath of God, in relation to the souls of the righteous, passed away with the arrival of our Redeemer, for the intercessor of God and of men freed them from the prisons of hell, when he himself went down there and led them up to the joys of Paradise.'

"It must be added that if some of the ancients expressed the idea that Christ led out of hell not only the just men of the Old Testament, but also many others, or even all the prisoners of hell, they expressed that only in the form of guesses, suppositions, private opinions."

160. Resurrection of Jesus Christ and his victory over death. "As Christ destroyed hell by his descent into hell, though he had even before shown his regal power over the forces of hell, even so he vanquished death by his resurrection from death."

161. The ascension of Jesus Christ into heaven, and the opening of the kingdom of heaven to all who believe in him.

"Before the descent upon earth of the Son of God, heaven was, so to speak, shut against all earth-born men and, though in the house of the Father there are many mansions (John xiv. 2, 3), there were no places in them for the sinful posterity of Adam; the just men of the Old Testament, after their death, themselves descended with their souls to hell (Gen. xxxvii. 35). But, after our Lord appeared in the flesh and reconciled God with men, heaven with earth; after he had freed the just men of the Old Testament from hell, by his descent into it, and had risen from the dead, he, at last, solemnly ascended heaven with the human essence which he had assumed and in this manner opened for all people a free access to the kingdom of God."

A proof of this is the expression of the symbol, which is to be taken in the direct sense: Having ascended heaven (in the body), and sitting (in the body) on the right hand of his Father.

162. Will the royal ministration of Jesus Christ come to an end? The kingdom of Christ will end when there will be the judgment. All will be resurrected. Then Christ will transfer the kingdom to the Father, say some, "but the Evangelist Luke (i. 33) and Solomon (Wis. iii. 4–8) understood the original power, in which, having an uninterrupted dominion from eternity to eternity, the Son never received his dominion from the Father and never will turn it over to the Father." (p. 178.)

Thus there appears an explanation of the royal dignity of Christ. The words about the kingdom of heaven give the church an idea about the royal dignity of Christ. The royal dignity is considered by the church as something very good and it attaches it to Christ, to him who proclaimed the blessedness of the poor, who preached to

them, and who himself said that the last will be the first.

163. Moral application of the dogma about the mystery of the redemption. One would think that there could be but one application of the dogma: Christ earned above his calculation, with a surplus. These deserts saved us from all present, past, and future sins; so one has to believe firmly in that, and one is saved. Thus says a part of the Reformed Church, and thus live all our Orthodox Churches. But for decency's sake, it says among the lessons that in order to follow the teaching of Christ it is necessary: (1) to believe and live thus; (2) to walk in the regeneration of life; (3) to esteem the law; (4) to give thanks for the sacrifice; (5) to make the sign of the cross with the hand, because Christ died on the cross; (6) to live holily; (7) not to be afraid of suffering; (8) to pray to him; (9) not to be afraid of the devil; (10) to hope that we shall be resurrected; (11) to hope for the kingdom of heaven.

Christ appears and brings with him a joyful message of blessedness for men. His teaching is humility, a submission to the will of God, love. Christ is tormented and executed. Up to his death he continues to be true to his teaching. His death confirms his teaching. His teaching is adopted by his disciples, and they preach him and say that he is equal to God by his virtues, and that by his death he has proved the truth of his teaching. But his teaching is salutary for people. The crowd joins the new teaching. They are told that he is a divine man and that by his death he has given us the law of salvation. Of all his teaching the crowd understands best that he is divine, consequently a God, and that his death has given us salvation. The crude conception becomes the possession of the crowd and is mutilated, and the whole teaching recedes, and the first place is taken up by the divinity and the saving quality of his death.

The whole business is to believe in this new God and that he has saved us: it is necessary to believe and pray. That is contrary to the teaching itself, but there are teachers who undertake to reconcile and elucidate and they reconcile and elucidate. It turns out that he is God-man, that he is the second person of the Trinity, that sin and a curse were upon us, and he has redeemed us. And the whole teaching is reduced to the faith in this redemption, and the whole teaching is left out and gives place to faith. It is necessary to believe in Christ the God and in redemption, and in that alone lies the salvation.

Of the teaching of Christ, since it cannot be rejected, there is the merest mention. It says that, among other things, Christ taught self-renunciation and love, and that it does not hurt and is even good to follow him. Why follow? Nothing is said about that, since, in reality, it is not needed for salvation, and salvation is obtained anyway by the sacerdotal and royal ministration of Christ, that is, by the very fact of the redemption. Here we have again the same as in the case of the original sin and the deification of Christ. The doctrine about the redemption is obviously crude; a true idea, verbally comprehended, is reduced to a teaching, and a prohibition is imposed on any other interpretation than the one accepted by the church. With a certain effort, as I recall my childish years and some feeble-minded persons, I can imagine how such a narrow conception of the meaning of Christ may be alone accessible. But why not permit me to think, as I do, that Christ has saved us by having discovered the law which gives salvation to those who follow it, and that he has redeemed us by having sealed the truth of his teaching by his death on the cross? My conception includes that of the church, and not only does not destroy anything, but puts forward as the first important work effort, that effort by which, according to the

words of Christ, the kingdom of heaven is now received; it does not exactly reject, but merely ascribes less importance to those reflections about the purposes and means of God, about which I can know nothing, and which I understand less the more I am told about them. Is it not better for me to believe only that God has certainly done the best for me, and that I, too, must do the best I can? If I am going to do so, without discussing what the redemption consisted in and what it was, whatever it may have been, it will not get away from me. And how about it, if I put my reliance in the redemption of Christ and neglect that which I ought to do for my redemption?

XIII.

Division II. About God the Saviour and his special relation to the human race.

Such is the title of this division. All this division, with the exception of the last chapter about retribution, is occupied with the exposition of the teaching about the church and its mysteries.

Chapter I. About God as a sanctifier. 165. Conception of sanctification; participation of all the persons of the Most Holy Trinity in the matter of sanctification, and recital of means or conditions for sanctification. In this article, after the teaching and the proofs of the fact that all three persons take part in our sanctification (the Father is the source, the Son — the cause, the Holy Ghost — the one who achieves the sanctification), it says:

"IV. In order that we might be able to make the deserts of our Saviour our own and really be sanctified, he (1) founded on earth his kingdom of grace, the church, as a living instrument through which our sanctification takes place; (2) communicates to us in the church and through the church the grace of the Holy Ghost, as a force which sanctifies us; and (3) has established sacraments in the church, as means through which the grace of the Holy Ghost is communicated to us." (p. 187.)

Christ has founded the church for our sanctification. The concept of the church I met in the very beginning of the Theology. In the very beginning it said that a dogma was a decree of the church, and later on, in the whole exposition of the dogmas, their correctness was defined by stating that the church taught so in regard to

them. But heretofore there has been no definition of the church, of what is to be understood by the word. From everything which I knew before, from everything which had been expounded so far, I assumed that the church was a collection of believers, established in such a way that it can express and determine its decrees. But now begins the teaching about the church as being an instrument for the sanctification of men. It says that the church is Christ's kingdom of grace, that it communicates to us the grace of the Holy Ghost, and that it has sacraments, but nothing is said about the church on which the dogmas which have been expounded heretofore are based; on the contrary, the church receives here an entirely different meaning from what I ascribe to it as the foundation of the whole teaching about faith. Then follows:

166. The different meanings of the word "church." The sense in which the teaching about it will be expounded here, and points of view on the subject. The various meanings of the word "church" are explained. All three meanings which are ascribed to the word "church" are such that with them is impossible the conception of that church which has established the dogmas.

The first meaning of the word "church" is, according to the Theology, "a society of all the rational and free beings, that is, of the angels and of the men who believe in Christ the Saviour, and of the men who are united in him as in their one head." (p. 187.)

Such a definition of the church not only does not make clearer the conception of the church which establishes dogmas, but imparts in advance to the forthcoming definition of the church certain symptoms, with which it is still harder to understand how such a church could ever have established any dogmas. The further elucidations of this first meaning do not clear it up. All it says is: "that in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in

heaven, and which are on earth; even in him: and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come: and hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be the head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all (Eph. i. 10, 20–23)." (p. 188.)

This, according to the Theology, forms one meaning of the word "church." Here is the second meaning:

"According to the second, less broad and more accepted meaning, the church of Christ embraces all men who profess and who have professed the faith of Christ, every one of them, no matter at what time they have lived and wherever they may be, whether living upon earth, or already in the country of the dead."

According to this second meaning, the church cannot be what I supposed it to be, and cannot establish dogmas, for an aggregate of all men living and of those who have lived at any time cannot express any dogmas. Then follows an analysis who of the dead belong to this church and who do not (pp. 190, 191), and after dividing the church into militant and triumphant, there is given the third meaning of the word "church."

"Finally, in a still narrower, but most accepted and usual sense, the church of Christ signifies only the militant church of the New Testament, or Christ's kingdom of grace. 'We believe as we have been taught to believe,' say the bishops of the East in their epistle on the Orthodox faith, 'in the so-called and real, the One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic Church, which embraces all in every place, no matter who they may be, who believe in Christ, who, still existing in their earthly pilgrimage, have not yet taken up their abode in the kingdom of heaven.' In this sense we are going to take the church in the present exposition of the doctrine concerning it." (p. 191.)

According to this meaning, by the word "church" are understood all those who believe or have believed in Christ. This meaning is in general intelligible, but even in this sense the church does not correspond to that activity of the church, the sanctification of men, and still less to that other activity, the establishment of dogmas, of which the Theology has been speaking in all preceding chapters. Such a church cannot serve as an instrument of sanctification, for, if by church are to be understood all the believers in Christ, then all believers will be sanctifying all believers. In order that the church should be able to sanctify all believers, it must of necessity be a special institution among all the believers. Still less can such a church establish any dogmas, for, if all believing Christians believed alike, there would be no dogmas and no teaching of the church in refutal of heretical teachings. The fact that there are believers in Christ who are heretics and who reject some dogmas and put forward others which in their opinion are true, shows that the church must of necessity be understood not as all believers in Christ, but as a certain establishment, which not only does not embrace all the Christians, but even is a special institution among Christians who are not heretics.

If there are dogmas which are expressed in definite, unchangeable words, these words must be expressed and worked out by an assembly of men who have agreed to accept this, and not another expression.

If there is an article of a law, there must of necessity exist lawgivers or a legislative assembly. Although I may be able to express myself by saying that the article of the law is a true expression of the will of the whole nation, I, in order to explain this institution, must show that the legislative assembly which gave the law is a true exponent of the will of the people, and for that I must define the legislative assembly as an institution. Just so the Theology, which has expounded so many dogmas,

which has recognized them as the only true ones, and which asserts their truth by saying that the church has accepted them as such, must tell us what the church itself is that has established these dogmas. But the Theology does nothing of the kind: on the contrary, it gives to the church the meaning of a union of angels and men, both living and dead, and the union of all believers in Christ, from which can result neither sanctification, nor the establishment of dogmas. The Theology in this case acts as would act a man, who, trying to assert his right to a legacy, instead of announcing first of all those grounds on which he bases his rights, should speak of the legality in general and of the right of inheritance, should prove the falseness of the pretensions of all the others, and should even explain his own management of the debatable property, but should not say a word about that on which his rights are based. That is precisely what the Theology does in all this division about the teaching of the church. It speaks of the foundation of the church by Christ, of the heretical teachings which do not agree with the church, of the activity of the church, but not a word is said as to what is to be understood by the true church, and the definition of the church as such which corresponds with its activity — the sanctification of men and the establishment of dogmas — is given only at the end, and here again not in the form of a definition, but in the form of a description and subdivision. And thus, without giving a definition of the church which would correspond to reality, the Theology says:

"In order that this exposition may be as detailed as possible, we shall view the church: (1) from the more external side, namely, from the side of its origin, dissemination, and purpose; (2) from a more internal side ('more' — for it is impossible entirely to separate the internal from the external side of the church), and we shall speak of the composition and internal structure of the church; (3) finally,

as a consequence from everything which has been said, we shall give an exact idea about the essence itself of the church and of its essential properties." (p. 191.)

167. Here the Theology speaks of the establishment of the church by our Lord Jesus Christ. It is proved that the church, according to the definition of the Theology, — as men who believe in Christ, — was established by Jesus Christ. In this article it is proved that Jesus Christ wished that men, having accepted the new faith, should not maintain it separated from each other, but should form for this purpose a separate religious society.

"The desire to form one society out of his followers, the Saviour has frequently expressed, for example, (*a*) after the Apostle Peter, in the name of all the apostles, professed him as the Son of God: Upon this rock, that is, on this confession, our Lord then said to us, will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it (Matt. xvi. 18); (*b*) in the parable of the good shepherd, in these words: I am the good shepherd, and know my sheep, and am known of mine. And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold, and one shepherd (John x. 14, 16); (*c*) in the prayer to the Heavenly Father: That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us (John xvii. 20, 21). With the idea of founding his kingdom of grace upon earth he began his first sermon to men, as the Evangelist Matthew tells us: From that time Jesus began to preach, and to say, Repent: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand (Matt. iv. 17). With the same sermon the Lord sent his disciples out among the Jews: Go, he said to them, to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. And as ye go, preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand (Matt. x. 6–8). And how often he spoke to men about this kingdom of God, both in parables

and not in parables! (Matt. xiii. 24, 44–47; xxii. 2; xxv. 1; Luke viii. 10, and elsewhere)." (p. 192.)

All that so far only tells us that Christ wanted to disseminate his teaching, — the teaching about the kingdom of heaven. So far nothing contradicts the meaning which the Theology ascribes to the church. All believers in Christ naturally had to unite in faith in Christ. But after that the Theology says:

"(2) What Christ intended to do, that he accomplished. He himself laid the foundation for his church, when he chose his twelve disciples, who, believing in him and being under his power, formed one society under one head (John xvii. 13) and formed his first church; when, on the other hand, he himself arranged everything necessary in order to form a definite society out of his followers, namely: (*a*) he established the order of the teachers who were to disseminate his faith among the nations (Eph. iv. 11, 12); (*b*) he established the sacrament of the baptism, in order to receive into that society all those who believed in him (Matt. xxviii. 19; John iii. 22; iv. 1; Mark xvi. 16); (*c*) the sacrament of the eucharist, for the closer union of the members of the society among themselves and with him, as the head (Matt. xxvi. 26–28; Mark xiv. 22–24; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xii. 23–26); (*d*) the sacrament of repentance, for the reconciliation and new union with him and with the church of those members who violate his laws and decrees (Matt. xxviii. 15–18), as also all other sacraments (Matt. xviii. 18; xxviii. 19; xix. 4–6; Mark vi. 13, and elsewhere). For that reason the Lord spoke in the days of his public service about his church as already existing (Matt. xviii. 17)." (p. 193.)

Here with the words "definite society" begins the obvious departure from the given meaning of the church, and there is introduced an entirely different idea of the church than as being a union of believers. Here the Theology is apparently speaking of the teaching church, of

which nothing has as yet been said. It says that Christ appointed teachers for the dissemination of his faith among the nations, although the idea of the teaching church does not enter into the definition of the church as being a union of believers. Still less do the sacraments enter into that definition: both define the church of the chosen among the believers. But let us suppose that the Theology is not sticking closely to its definition, that it expounds the teaching about that exclusive church which has the power to teach and impart the mysteries. Let us see what it is based upon. It says that Christ himself established the church with its teachers and with the sacraments of the baptism, eucharist, and repentance, and the texts are referred to, but not quoted. Here are the texts:

"And now come I to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in themselves (John xvii. 13)." This is adduced as a proof that Christ established the one society, the church. It is evident that the text has nothing in common with the establishment of the church.

"And he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ (Eph. iv. 11–12)." These words of Paul, who did not even know Christ, are ascribed to Christ. The other texts have been quoted, but striking is the text which proves that Christ established the sacrament of repentance:

"And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth (Matt. xxviii. 18)."

On this passage the Theology bases the establishment of the sacraments by Christ, without considering that all that is said here is that (according to an incorrect interpretation of the Theology, which will be examined later)

Christ transfers his power to the apostles. But it does not say wherein this power is to consist. Consequently any false teaching may with equal right be based upon these words. But, having picked out these quasi-confirmatory texts, the Theology in the end corrects itself and admits that in the time of Christ there did not yet exist a church with sacraments and teachers. In these discussions the Theology already prepares the reader for that substitution for the conception of the church as a union of all believers of the conception of a teaching and sacramental church.

In the following discussion the church is mentioned no longer in the sense in which it was mentioned before, as being a union of all believers, but as an exclusive church, separate in its structure and in its rights from all the other believers.

"(3) Having received power from above (Luke xxiv. 45), the holy apostles, after receiving the divine message, went forth, and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following (Mark xvi. 20), and (*a*) from the believers in various places tried to form societies which they called churches (1 Cor. i. 2; xvi. 19); (*b*) enjoined these believers to have gatherings in which to hear the word of God and send up prayers in common (Acts ii. 42, 46; xx. 7); (*c*) exhorted them to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace, presenting to them that they formed one body of the Lord Jesus, of whom they were but members in particular, and had one Lord, one faith, one baptism (Eph. iv. 3, 4; 1 Cor. xii. 27), and were all partakers of the one bread (1 Cor. x. 17), that is, had everything for their internal as well as their external union; (*d*) finally, they were commanded not to forsake their assemblings, under the penalty of expulsion from the church and eternal perdition (Heb. x. 24, 25). Thus, with the will and coöperation of the Saviour, who himself immediately put

down the foundation of his church, it was then planted in all the corners of the world." (p. 194.)

It says that the church was not one, but that there were many separate churches. It says that they were all one body of Christ, but that at the same time there was one church, from which were expelled those who left the assemblings. What kind of a church it was that expelled members it does not say. Thus, it is evident that the Theology no longer is treating about the church which it defined before, but some other church, of which the definition is not given. In the proper place I will show how incorrectly the Theology makes use of the texts of the Gospel, in order to confirm its statements. In the next article it becomes apparent that there is no longer any mention of the church as a union of all the believers in Christ, but of some other kind of a church.

168. The extension of the church of Christ: who belongs to this church, and who does not belong to it.

In this article the proof is brought that to this still undefined church belong all the Orthodox believers. But it does not say who decides the question of Orthodoxy and un-Orthodoxy. At the same time there is a detailed definition of who these un-Orthodox believers are. That is discussed on ten pages. This discussion about the heretics and dissenters, who are excluded from the Orthodox Church, which is not yet defined, is remarkable:

"In order to judge correctly in respect to the propositions disclosed by us as to the heretics and dissenters, it is necessary to know what heresy and what dissent is, and what kind of heretics are meant here. About heresy and dissent we receive the following ideas from the ancient teachers of the church: (*a*) From Basil the Great: 'The ancients understood one thing by heresy, another by dissent, and still another thing by arbitrary concourse. They called heretics those who fell off and became es-

tranged from faith; dissenters — those who differed in opinion in regard to certain church subjects and questions which admitted of healing; but arbitrary concourses — meetings formed by disobedient presbyters and bishops and the ignorant people;' (*b*) from St. Jerome: 'Between heresy and dissent there is, in my opinion, this difference, that heresy consists in the subversion of the dogma, while a dissent similarly expels from the church on account of a disagreement with the bishop (*propter episcopacem dissensionem*). Consequently these two things may in certain relations appear different by their origin; but in reality there is no dissent which has not something common with some heresy in its revolt against the church.'" (p. 202.)

Why not tell the truth? The following words are not merely remarkable, but simply disgusting:

"When we say that the heretics and the dissenters do not belong to the church, we do not mean those who hold the heresy or dissent in secret, trying to appear as belonging to the church and outwardly carrying out its regulations; or those who are carried away by heretical and schismatic errors in their ignorance and without any malice or stubbornness, for it is evident that neither have they absented themselves from the society of the believers, nor have they been excommunicated by the power of the church, although they may already be excommunicated by the judgment of God, though neither they nor we may know it: such people it is best to leave to the judgment of him who knows all the secret thoughts of man, and searches their hearts and entrails. But we mean the declared heretics and dissenters, who have already separated themselves from the church or are excommunicated by it, consequently intentional, stubborn, and therefore in the highest degree guilty heretics and dissenters. Against them were chiefly directed the utterances of the holy fathers and teachers of the church, which we have quoted above." (p. 203.)

That is, lie before God, and we will not excommunicate you; but seek the truth and dare not to agree with us, and we will curse you. The church, in the sense in which the Theology takes it, consists in all the believers in Christ, and this church separates the heretics and excommunicates them.

169. The aim of the church is the sanctification of sinners. "The church is ordained and therefore obliged: (*a*) to preserve the precious pledge of the saving faith (1 Tim. vi. 20; 2 Tim. i. 12–14) and to disseminate the teaching of that faith among the nations; (*b*) to keep and use for the good of men the divine mysteries and sacraments in general; (*c*) to preserve its government as established by God and to make use of it in conformity with the intention of the Lord." (p. 206.)

The church is understood as all those who believe in Christ, and yet it speaks of the church as having to perform sacraments, and govern. It is evident that all the believers are not able to perform the sacraments and rule themselves, and so the Theology by the word "church" understands something different, which it puts in the place of the first definition of the church. Farther on it says:

170. Outside the church there is no salvation, and the proof is given that it is necessary to belong to the church. This is asserted in the following way:

"(1) The faith in Jesus Christ who reconciled us with God: for there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved (Acts iv. 12), and even before that the Saviour said: He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him (John iii. 36). But the true teaching of Christ and about Christ is preserved and preached only in his church and by his church, without which there cannot be a true faith (Rom. x. 17)." (pp. 206 and 207.)

Thus the faith in Christ is no longer merely a definition of the church, but it turns out that in the place of the belief in Christ is put the belief in the church.

"(2) The participation in the holy sacraments, whereby are given unto us all divine powers that pertain unto life and godliness (2 Pet. i. 3)." (p. 207.) And —

"(3) Finally, the last, a good, godly life."

The proofs for all that:

"Outside the church there is no hearing, no comprehension of the Word of God; there is no true divine worship; Christ is not found; the Holy Ghost is not communicated; the death of the Saviour does not furnish salvation; there is not the feast of the body of Christ; there is no fruitful prayer; there can be no works of salvation, nor true martyrdom, nor exalted virginity and purity, nor fasting salutary for the soul, nor the benevolence of God. (2) In the church, on the contrary, there is the benevolence and grace of God; in the church abides the triune God; in the church is the knowledge of truth, the knowledge of God and of Christ, and a superabundance of spiritual benefits; in the church are the true saving dogmas, the true faith as derived from the apostles, true love, and the straight path of life." (pp. 209 and 210.)

Everything has been said about the church that the Theology has to say. It was said that it was founded by Christ; it was determined who belonged to it, and who not; its aims and means have been mentioned; it was said that it is necessary to belong to it in order to obtain salvation, but the church itself has not yet been defined. All that was said was that its meaning is — all the believers in Christ, but with this proviso, that the church is composed by those who believe in Christ precisely as the church teaches them to believe in him, that is, the meaning of the church is now modified to mean: all those who believe in the church. But what this church itself is, which sanctifies men and establishes dogmas, has not

yet been determined. Only in the 2d Division, in Art. 171, this mysterious church at last gets, not a definition, but a description, from which, at last, we can deduce its definition, which corresponds to its activity, — the sanctification and the establishment of dogmas.

"171. Having determined the extent of his church, having pointed out to it its aim, and having given it the proper means for the attainment of that aim, the Lord Jesus gave it at the same time a definite structure, by which the attainment of this aim is secured and made easy. The organization of the church consists in this: (*a*) according to its composition, it is divided into two essential parts: the congregation and the divinely established hierarchy, which are placed in a certain relation to each other; (*b*) the hierarchy is subdivided into its three essential degrees, which are distinct from each other and are connected among themselves; (*c*) the congregation and the hierarchy are subject to the supreme judgment of the councils, and (*d*) last, the whole harmonious body of the church, which is formed from so many different and wisely apportioned members, has its only head in the Lord Jesus Christ himself, who vivifies it with his Holy Ghost." (pp. 210 and 211.)

Only now do we at last get a definition of what the church is which has been talked about all the time, the same that is to sanctify men, the same that has uttered all the dogmas which have been expounded heretofore. I do not yet protest against this, that the establishment of the church which has determined all the dogmas is one and holy and has Christ for its head, and that it is not possible to find salvation outside it, but I should like first the subject uttered, and then the predicate; I should like first to know what they are talking about that is holy and one and has Christ for its head, and then only that it is holy, and so forth. But in the exposition of the Theology the reverse order has been observed. All the time it spoke

of the unity, holiness, infallibility of the church and expounded its teaching, and only now it says what it is. Only now it becomes clear from Art. 171 what that church is which sanctifies men through sacraments, and which, amidst false dogmas, establishes those that are true. It says that the church is divided into a hierarchy and the congregation. The hierarchy sanctifies and teaches, the flock is sanctified, ruled, and taught by the hierarchy. It must obey, consequently it is only the hierarchy that sanctifies and establishes dogmas, and so the hierarchy alone answers that definition of the church, from which results its activity of the sanctification and of the establishment of the dogmas, and so the hierarchy alone is holy and infallible, and only the hierarchy answers completely to that which has all the time been mentioned under the name of the church. In Art. 173, it says that the pastors must teach the flock, must perform the sacraments for it, and must govern it, and that the flock must obey.

"St. Gregory the Divine says: 'As in the body some parts govern and, as it were, preside, while the other parts are under their rule and dominion, even so it is in the churches. God has decreed that some, for whom this is more useful, should by word and deed be directed to the performance of their duties, should remain herded and under rule, while others, standing above the rest in virtue and nearness to God, should be pastors and teachers for the perfecting of the church, and should have the same relation to others that the soul has to the body, and the mind to the soul, so that one and the other, the defective and the superabundant, being like the members of the body, united and joined into one composition, bound and coupled with the Spirit, may represent one body, perfect and truly worthy of Christ our head. For that reason the societies of the Christians, who of their own will departed from their obedience to the bishop and the presbyters,

were regarded by the ancient teachers of the church as unworthy of the name of the church, and were called heretical, a rabble of apostates, evil-thinking, harmful, and so forth.'" (p. 217.)

The church, the one upon which the whole teaching is based, is the hierarchy. The Theology before that expounded about the one church, the kingdom of grace, the body of Christ, the church of the living and the dead and the angels; then of all those who believed in Christ; then by degrees it added to this first definition another concept; then at last the hierarchy is substituted for that church. The Theology knows very well that according to its conception the church is nothing but the hierarchy, and sometimes it says so, as in the Introduction to the Dogmatic Theology, as in the expressions of the Eastern Patriarchs, as always in the expressions of the Catholic Church; but the Theology has at the same time to confirm its definition that the church is an assembly of all the believers, and so it does not like to say directly that the church is the hierarchy. The Theology knows that the essence of the matter is the infallibility and sacredness of the hierarchy, and so it has to prove first that the hierarchy was established by Christ, and that the Theology is an exposition of the dogmas as confirmed by that same hierarchy. All that is necessary is to prove that the hereditary hierarchy was established by Christ, and that we are the inheritors of this hierarchy, and then, no matter how you may understand it, the church, the essence of the church, as the keeper of truth, will be nothing but hierarchs. For that reason the Theology uses all its efforts to prove the impossible, namely, that Christ established the hierarchy, and a hereditary one at that, and that our hierarchy is the legitimate heir, and such and such a hierarchy, not ours, is illegitimate.

172. The flock and the divinely established hierarchy with their mutual relations. "I. It is not difficult to

show, in spite of the opinion of certain evil-thinking men, that the division of the church into the two above-mentioned classes has its origin with the Saviour himself. Unquestionably the Lord himself founded in his church a special order of men, who formed the hierarchy, and empowered those men, and only those, to make use of those means which he gave to the church for its purposes, that is, he empowered them to be teachers, ministers of the sacraments, and spiritual guides, and in no way left it indiscriminately to all the believers, having, on the contrary, enjoined them to obey the pastors." (p. 211.)

"The Protestants, who do not acknowledge that Christ established in the church a special priesthood, or hierarchy, affirm that all the believers, by force of the sacrament of the baptism, are equally priests of the most high God; but as it is impossible for all to perform the duties of priesthood, the believers choose from their own midst special men as their representatives, whom they clothe in the rights of priesthood."

In the above quotation it says that a large part of Christendom, the Protestants, do not recognize the hierarchy. This proof is very important, for the whole teaching of the church has been reduced to the doctrine about the hierarchy. It turns out that Christians who are not worse or more stupid than we directly deny according to Scripture what we assert, that is, the hierarchy. Here is the way the Theology proves the establishment of the hierarchy by God. I cite the following places from the Theology, which are supposed to prove the establishment of the hierarchy by Christ. I quote every one of them, not in order to refute them, for any one who reads them will see how useless that is, but in order to present all the proofs of the church in favour of the hierarchy.

"(1) As we read the Gospel, which contains in itself the history of the life and words of our Saviour, we see:

(*a*) that he chose from among his followers twelve disciples whom he called apostles: And when it was day, says St. Luke, he called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named apostles (Luke vi. 13), and so he said to them: Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you (John xv. 16)." (p. 211.)

That is the first proof. Christ chose twelve apostles. Apostle means messenger in Greek, and so it says that Christ chose twelve messengers. If he had chosen seventeen, he would have sent seventeen messengers. The Theology adduces that as a proof that the hierarchy was established by Christ. To that are added the words: Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. These words were said in the chapter of the farewell speech, where Christ spoke of his love for his disciples, and have nothing in common with the passages in connection with which they are quoted, and still less with the establishment of the hierarchy.

Second proof: "(*b*) That to them alone he gave the command and the power to teach all the nations, to perform the holy sacraments for them and to direct the believers to salvation (Matt. xxviii. 19; xviii. 18; Luke xxii. 19)."

The verses are not cited. Here they are: Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matt. xxviii. 19). Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven (Matt. xviii. 18). And he took bread and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them, saying, This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me (Luke xxii. 19).

The Theology gives only the number of the verses, but does not quote the passages themselves, knowing that the verses do not confirm the statement that Christ gave to

anybody a special right to teach the nations. There is nothing there about the power, and nothing about the sacraments. Something is said about baptizing, but it does not say that the breaking of the bread is a sacrament, or that these actions are left in charge of the hierarchy. One cannot help observing the strange phenomenon that continually exactly the same obscure texts are chosen to prove all kinds of theses: such are the texts Matt. xxviii. 19, Luke xxii. 19, John xx. 23, and several others. These texts are repeated a hundred times. On them is based the Trinity, and the divinity of Christ, and the redemption, and the sacraments, and the hierarchy. That is all about the second proof.

Third proof: "(*c*) That he transferred the power to the holy apostles just as he received it from the Father: All power is given unto me . . .; go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matt. xxviii. 18, 19); as my father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained (John xx. 21–23)." (p. 212.)

In order to confirm the power which is supposed to be transferred, the texts are tampered with here. The text is quoted as, "All power is given unto me . . .; go ye," and so forth. The real text runs like this: "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. (Period.) Go ye therefore, and teach all nations." Considering the period, it cannot be said that he gave the power; but with the several dots and by omitting "in heaven," which cannot refer to the disciples, it is possible to interpret it as that he gave the power to the disciples. The text from John does not say anything about the hierarchy or about the power; all it says is that Christ gave the

Holy Ghost to his disciples and commanded them to teach men, that is to deliver them from sin, as it is correctly translated; but even if it be translated by "remit the sins," the hierarchy does not in any way result from the remission of the sins.

Fourth proof: "(*d*) That to these twelve he immediately added seventy definite disciples, whom he sent out on the same great work. (Luke x. 1, *et seq.*)" (p. 212.)

The fact that Christ sent out, at first twelve messengers, and then seventy more men, whom he ordered, like pilgrims, without a supply of clothing, without money, to visit the cities and villages, is regarded as a proof that the ruling hierarchy of the present day derives its origin by heredity from Christ. Those are all the proofs that Christ himself established the hierarchy. Everything that could possibly be adduced, has been adduced. In the opinion of the Theology, the quotations with their tampered texts confirm the establishment of the hierarchy. No other proofs could be found. After that follow proofs that later this power was transferred from the apostles to the fathers of the church, and then to the hierarchy which came after them. This is the way the transmission is proved:

"(*e*) That transmitting his heavenly message to the twelve disciples, he wanted it to pass from them directly to their successors, and from these, passing from generation to generation, to be kept in the world to the end of the world itself. For, when he said to the apostles, Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature (Mark xvi. 15), he immediately added, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world (Matt. xxviii. 20). Consequently he, in the person of the apostles, sent out for the same work and encouraged by his presence all their future successors, and in the literal sense gave the church not only apostles, prophets, and evangelists, but also pastors and teachers (Eph. iv. 11)." (p. 212.)

Here again the texts are changed in order to bring forward a specious proof. It does not follow from anything that after the words, "Preach the gospel to every creature," he said "immediately" afterward, "I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Nor can it in any way be said that one passage follows immediately after the other, since one thing is said by one evangelist, Mark, while the other is said by Matthew. Mark says: "Go into all the world, and preach the gospel," which has no meaning of any transmission; but the words, "I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world, Amen," are the concluding words of the Gospel of Matthew, and therefore can by no means signify that he wanted to transmit the power to them. But even if that meant what the Theology wants it to mean, there is nothing to warrant the assertion that he encouraged with his presence all their future successors. That cannot be argued out of anything.

Here is the second proof of the succession:

"(*f*) Finally, that, having in this manner clothed his apostles with divine power, he, on the other hand, very clearly and with terrible curses compelled all men and the future Christians to receive the teaching and the sacraments from the future apostles, and to obey their words: He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me; and he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me (Luke x. 16); Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned (Mark xvi. 15, 16; cf. Matt. x. 14; xviii. 15–19)." (p. 212.)

I do not leave out a single word. And that is given out as a proof not only of the establishment of the hierarchy, but also of the succession, and it says:

"And that is why, even when the Lord ascended to heaven, Matthias was, by his indication, added to the

eleven apostles, in the place of Judas (Acts i. 26); and only by the voice of the Holy Ghost were Barnabas and Saul separated for the work whereunto our Redeemer had called them (Acts xiii. 2; cf. ix. 15)." (p. 212.)

This last proof, the meaning of which I absolutely fail to make out, contains the first part of the proofs as to why the hierarchy is to be considered as founded by Christ.

After that follow proofs from the Acts and the Epistles. One would think that here it would be easier to find texts which might confirm the divine origin of the hierarchy, but again the same takes place. It turns out that in all the texts, quoted and not quoted, there is nowhere a word about those rights (as though it were a legal establishment) which the Theology proclaims from the very first words.

"(2) Still more clearly is this intention of the Lord seen in the actions of the apostles who were guided by his Spirit. These actions are of two kinds and both equally refer to the confirmation of the truth under discussion. The actions of the first kind are the following: (*a*) the holy apostles constantly asserted their right and carried out the obligations which the Lord had enjoined on them (Acts v. 42; vi. 1–5; 1 Cor. iv. 1; v. 4–5; ix. 16), in spite of all obstacles on the part of the enemies who tried to take that divine power from them (Acts iv. 19; v. 28–29)." (pp. 212 and 213.)

These references to the apostles and especially to the Acts are remarkable. The author does not write them out, because he knows that, if anything at all is to be deduced from them, it is the very opposite of what he is trying to prove. Every passage where Christ's disciples preach his teaching is adduced as a proof that the hierarchy was established; for example, in Acts iv. 19, Peter and John said: "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye."

The other references are of the same kind. Thus it goes on for two pages, from which it is clear, to any one who has read even a short Seminary history of the church, that no one at any time, during the first centuries of Christianity, ascribed any especial rights or power to himself. Elders (presbyters, bishops, overseers) were appointed, and all those appellations meant one and the same thing, and were a human institution, which was diversified according to men and places. All that is evident from the texts which are quoted by the Theology itself.

After that follows the third part of the proofs, in which it says directly in the name of the holy fathers that this power was given to the hierarchy by Christ himself. But here we get the proofs only of the fact that those men who ascribed the power to themselves asserted quite arbitrarily that the power had passed to them from God, that is, what now our, and any other, hierarchy asserts at the present time. Here it says:

"(*b*) The pastors, who formed that special class, always deduced their power from Jesus Christ himself and called themselves the successors of the apostles and the representatives in the church of the Saviour himself. Here, for example, are the words of Clement of Rome: 'Having received a full foreknowledge, the apostles appointed the above-mentioned men (that is, bishops and deacons) and at the same time handed down the rule that when they deceased other experienced men should take up their ministry.' St. Ignatius Theophorus: 'Bishops are appointed in all the corners of the world, by the will of Jesus Christ.' St. Irenæus: 'We can name those whom the apostles have placed as bishops and their successors over the churches down to our time, but they taught nothing of the kind and knew nothing of what the heretics have invented. For, if the apostles knew the secrets, which they revealed only to the perfect, and to no other, they

so much the more certainly revealed them to those to whom they entrusted the churches themselves: for the apostles wished that those whom they left as their successors, transmitting to them their own ministration of the teaching, should be quite perfect and without a blemish in every respect.' St. Cyprian: 'We are the successors of the apostles, ruling the church of God by the same power.' St. Ambrose: 'The bishop represents in his person Jesus Christ and is the vicegerent of the Lord.' St. Jerome: 'With us the place of the apostles is occupied by the bishops.'" (pp. 214 and 215.)

Having armed itself with these proofs, that is, with the barren assertions of those men who appropriated to themselves the divine power, that this power had been transferred to them from God, the Theology now gives the direct definition of the church, a part of which (namely, the words of Gregory the Divine) I have quoted before. After that it says (from p. 217–229) that there are three degrees of the ecclesiastic hierarchy: the episcopal, the presbyteral, and the diaconal; but, it is necessary to remark that there are no more of them. The utterances of the fathers of the church confirm that:

"Clement of Alexandria: 'The degrees of bishops, presbyters, and deacons, which exist in the church, are, in my opinion, the representation of the angelic order.' Origen: 'Paul speaks to the rulers and chiefs of the churches, that is, to those who judge the people who are in the church, namely, to the bishops, presbyters, and deacons.' Eusebius of Cæsaria: 'Three orders: the first of the presiding officers, the second of the presbyters, the third of the deacons.'" (p. 223.)

174. There is a detailed description of the different orders of the spiritual persons among themselves and in relation to their flocks.

"The bishop is the chief overseer in his own particular church (Acts xx. 28; cf. Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs

about the Orthodox faith, section 10). First of all he has the power over the hierarchy under his rule and over the clergy. All priests and servants of the church are obliged to obey his injunctions, and without his permission nothing is done in the church; all are subject to his surveillance and judgment (1 Tim. v. 19), in consequence of which he may subject them to various punishments. In addition to the clergy, the whole flock which is entrusted to his care is subject to the spiritual power of the bishop. He is under obligation to watch over the execution in his eparchy of the divine laws and church commandments. He has more especially and preëminently the right to bind and loose, according to the rules of the holy apostles, the holy councils, and according to the unanimous testimony of the ancient teachers of the church. For that reason the apostles so forcibly impressed all the believers with the necessity of obeying the bishops. The presbyters have also power to bind and loose, and in general to feed the flock of God which is entrusted to them (1 Peter v. 1, 2), but this power they receive from their archpastor by means of the sacramental ordination. Some chosen ones are, by the will of the bishop, admitted, in general to bear with him the burden of the church government and even form with him for that purpose a permanent council. But, according to an old expression, they only serve in the place of the bishop's eyes and in themselves, without his consent, can do nothing. But the deacons have not received from the Lord the right to bind and loose, and so in themselves do not have any spiritual power over the believers. But the deacons may be the eye and the ear of the bishops and presbyters, as also the hands of the presiding officers, with their consent, for the purpose of performing ecclesiastic duties.

"After all which has been said, we find quite comprehensible the high names and expressions which are applied to the bishops, such as that they are alone, in the

strict sense, the successors of the apostles, that the church is resting firmly on its bishops, as on supports; that a bishop is 'a living image of God on earth, and, by force of the sacramental power of the Holy Ghost, a prolific source of all the sacraments of the church, by means of which he procures salvation; and so he is as necessary for the church as breathing is for man, as the sun is for the world' (Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, Section 10); that in the bishops is the centre of the believers who belong to his eparchy; that he is even the particular head of his spiritual realm; that, finally, as Cyprian says, 'the bishop is in the church, and the church (which is subject to him) is in the bishop, and that he who is not in communion with the bishop is not in the church.'" (pp. 227–229.)

The pastors of various degrees, united among themselves, decide, and the people have to obey, and all that which is called the church not merely as an ornament of speech, but in reality, that is, that organ which expresses the faith which men must follow, — that church is the bishops.

175. This article shows that the church is the bishops, and that the higher power above them is an assembly of all the bishops, which is called a council, that is, of several bishops. In this article there is a very detailed account, such as is given in the Statute about the justices of the peace, about the relations of all these persons among themselves:

"From this may be seen, without any new proofs, that the right to sit in councils, both local and œcumenical, and the right to pass on ecclesiastical matters belong exclusively to the bishops as the heads of the separate churches; and the presbyters, who in everything depend on their local archpastors, may be admitted to the councils only by their consent, and then only as counsellors, or assistants, or their plenipotentiaries, and may occupy only

the second place. Even so may be admitted the deacons, who must stand before the face of the bishops. For this reason the councils were by the holy fathers of the church generally called assemblies of the bishops. The Second Œcumenical Council called the Symbol of Faith which was composed at the first council, 'the faith of 318 holy fathers' (for that was the number of bishops present at that council); the council in Trullo called the definitions of faith of all the previous œcumenical councils 'profession or faith of the holy fathers, the bishops, according to the number of those who met at these councils.'" (p. 231.)

Then comes Art. 176, in which we have an exposition of Christ's being the head of the church. That is apparent (1) from the fact that Christ before the ascension said, not to the church but to his disciples, "I am with you to the end of the world, Amen." In the Theology, the following words are added to that: "and with all your future successors," and that is taken as a proof that all those who call themselves the interpreters of Christ regard themselves as his successors.

"(2) From this fact in particular that, although he entrusted the power of teaching to the apostles and their successors, he told them to call him only the supreme teacher, who invisibly, through them, taught the believers (Matt. xxiii. 10), and so he said: He that heareth you heareth me; and he that despiseth you despiseth me (Luke x. 16)." (p. 232.)

This passage with its references is striking. I thought that nothing in the Theology would startle me, but the boldness with which this verse is quoted, and with which an opposite significance is given to it, is staggering. Here is the verse, or, rather, the whole passage: But be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your Master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren. And call no man your father upon the earth: for one is your Father, which is in heaven.

Neither be ye called masters: for one is your Master, even Christ (Matt. xxiii. 8–10).

This very verse, these words, which are said directly against those who call themselves teachers, fathers, and masters, — this verse is connected with the verse (Luke x. 16), which has absolutely nothing in common with the first, and is adduced as a proof that those very teachers, who call themselves so against the command of Christ, have Christ as their head. After that follow proofs that (Art. 177) the church is One, (179) Holy, (180) Catholic and Universal, and (181) Apostolic.

In Division III., about the Universal Church, it says:

"III. The special privilege of the Catholic, or Universal, Church consists in this, that in matters of faith 'it cannot err in any way, nor deceive, nor be deceived; but, like Divine Scripture, it is infallible and has eternal dignity' (Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, Section 12), a privilege of which enough has been said by us in the proper place."

The moral application of this dogma for the first time results directly from the dogma. The application of the dogma consists in obeying the church.

"(1) The Lord Jesus founded his church that it might regenerate men and educate them for eternal life; and so our relation to it has to be that of children to their mother; we are obliged to love the church of Christ as our spiritual mother and to obey it in everything as our spiritual mother. In particular our Lord Jesus: (2) enjoined the church to keep and teach to men its divine doctrine; it is our duty to receive this teaching from the mouth of the God-given church, and to understand it precisely as the church, which is instructed by the Holy Ghost, understands it; (3) he entrusted to the church the performance of mysteries and, in general, sacraments for the sanctification of men; it is our duty in awe to make use of the saving mysteries and all the other sacraments, which it performs over us; (4) he entrusted the church

with the guidance of men and with confirming them in their godly lives; it is our duty without murmuring to submit to the inspiration of such a guide and holily to execute all the commands of the church; (5) he himself established the hierarchy and priestly order in the church, pointed out the difference between the flock and the pastors, and showed each a definite place and service; it is the duty of all the members of the church, of the pastors and the flock, to be that which they are called to be, and to keep well in mind that we have gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us (Rom. xii. 6), and that to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ (Eph. iv. 7)." (p. 246.)

So that is what the church is as an establishment, as a keeper and announcer of truths, of dogmas! That on which the whole Theology is based is a self-constituted hierarchy and, in distinction from all others, a hierarchy which regards itself alone as holy and infallible and as being the only one that has the right to preach the divine revelation. Thus the whole doctrine of the church, as the Theology teaches it, is all based on establishing the conception of the church as the only true keeper of divine truth, in order to substitute for this conception that of a certain, definite hierarchy, that is, to connect a human institution, the outgrowth of pride, malice, and hatred, which utters dogmas and instructs the flock only in that teaching which it alone regards as true, with the conception of the assembly of all believers who have invisibly at their head Christ himself, — the mystical body of Christ. To that the whole teaching of the Theology reduces itself.

This teaching asserts that the only, true church, — the body of Christ, is it alone. The train of thought is as follows: Having collected the disciples, God revealed the truth to them and promised to be with them. That truth

is complete and divine. The truth which we preach is the same truth. Even leaving out of discussion the fact that for every man who has read Holy Scripture and who has seen the arguments which the Theology adduces in proof, it is evident that Christ never established any hierarchy, any church, in the sense in which the Theology understands it; leaving out of consideration that for every one who reads history it is evident that many men have imagined themselves to be such churches, while they contended with one another and did one another harm, — there involuntarily rises the question: on what grounds does our hierarchy consider itself to be the true one, and the other hierarchies and assemblies not to be true? Why is the Nicene symbol an expression of the true, holy church, and why not the Arian symbol, which our hierarchy has been contending against, for were not the bishops, partisans of Arius, as much ordained by succession from the apostles as the partisans of the Nicene symbol? And if this ordainment does not save men from error, why is our church the keeper of truth, and not of untruth? The Theology does not even make an attempt at answering this, for by its doctrine it cannot give any answer, since subjects that are arbitrarily passed upon cannot be proved, and so the hierarchy says only that it is right because it is holy and infallible, and it is holy and infallible, because it is a follower of the hierarchy which has acknowledged the Nicene symbol. But why is the hierarchy which has acknowledged the Nicene symbol the true one? To that there is, and there can be, no answer, so that the recognition of the hierarchy, which calls itself the true, holy, only, universal and apostolic church, is only an expression of a demand that faith should be put in it, an assertion like the one made by a man who says, "Upon my word, I am right." But this assertion is particularly weakened by the fact that every assertion of the hierarchy about being holy is always due

to this, that another hierarchy, which on some point disagrees with it, says precisely the opposite and asserts that it is right and to the words, "It is permitted to us and to the Holy Ghost," replies that the Holy Ghost lives in it, — something like what happens when two men swear, denying each other.

All the theologians, no matter how much they may try to conceal it, speak and do nothing else. The church — the union of all believers, the body of Christ — is only an adornment of speech, in order to add importance to a human institution, the hierarchy and its assumed succession, upon which everything is built up. Remarkable and instructive in this respect are the attempts of the modern theologians, of Vinet and his followers, of Khomyakóv and his scions, to find new supports for the teaching about the church, and to build up the definition of the church not on the hierarchy, but on the whole assembly of the believers, on the flock. These new theologians, without noticing it themselves, in their attempts to make stable the tree which is planted without roots, make it fall entirely. These theologians deny the hierarchy and prove the falseness of that foundation, and they think that they are giving it a different foundation. But, unfortunately, this other foundation is nothing but that sophism of theology, under which it tries to conceal the crudity of its doctrine about the church being the hierarchy. That sophism the new theologians take for a foundation and they completely overthrow the doctrine of the church, while they themselves are left with a most palpable sophism, but without a foundation.

Their error is like this: The church has received among believers two main meanings, — one, that the church is a human, temporal institution, and the other, that the church is the totality of men living and dead, who are united by one true faith. The first is a definite historical phenomenon: an assemblage of men subject to certain

rules and regulations, and one from which statutes may issue. Whether I speak of the Catholic Church of such and such a year, or of the Roman, or Greek Orthodox Church, I am speaking of certain people, — the Pope, patriarchs, bishops, — who are organized in a certain manner and who in a certain way direct their flocks. The second is an abstract idea, and if I speak of the church in this sense, it is evident that attributes of time and place cannot be its definitions, and under no circumstance can there be definite decrees, expressed in definite words. The only definition of such a church, as the carrier of divine truth, is a correspondence with what is the divine truth.

The equating of these two conceptions to each other, and the substitution of one for the other, has always formed a problem of all Christian confessions of faith. An assemblage of people, wishing to convince others that it possesses the absolute truth, asserts that it is holy and infallible. Its holiness and infallibility it builds on two foundations: on the manifestations of the Holy Ghost, which find their expression in the holiness of the members of that community and then in miracles, and on the legitimate succession of the teachership, which proceeds from Christ.

The first foundation does not stand criticism: holiness cannot be measured or proved; miracles are detected and proved deceptions, and so miracles cannot be adduced as proofs, so there is left but one proof, the correct succession of the hierarchy. That, too, cannot be proved, but equally it cannot be refuted, and so all the churches hold themselves on that foundation; on that argument alone do the churches at the present time hold themselves, and it is the only one on which they can hold themselves. If a Catholic, an Orthodox, an Old Ceremonialist, affirm that they have the truth, they can incontrovertibly base their assertions only on the infallibility of the succession of the keepers of the Tradition. The

Catholic Church recognizes the Pope as the head of the hierarchy, and in its development inevitably had to acknowledge the infallibility of the Pope. The Greek Church could fail to recognize the Pope, but in not recognizing the necessity of that supreme member of the hierarchy, it could not help but recognize the infallibility of the hierarchy itself; even so the Protestant Church, in failing to recognize Catholicism during its decadence, could not help but recognize the infallibility of that hierarchy whose dogmas it recognizes, for without the infallibility of the succession of the keepers of the Tradition it would have no foundation for the assertion of its truth.

All the churches maintain themselves only by recognizing the infallibility of that hierarchy which they accept. You may not agree in saying that such and such a hierarchy is the only correct one, but when a man says that he accepts as true the hierarchy whose dogmas he accepts, you cannot prove to him the incorrectness of his dogmas. That is the only indestructible foundation, and so all the churches cling to it. Now, the new theologians destroy this only foundation, thinking that they are substituting a better one for it. The new theologians say that divine truth is kept, not by the infallibility of the hierarchy, but in the totality of all believers who are united in love, and that only to men who are united in love is divine truth given, and that such a church is defined solely by faith and oneness in love and in concord. This reflection is good in itself, but, unfortunately, from it cannot be deduced a single one of the dogmas which the theologians profess.

The theologians forget that, in order to recognize a certain dogma, it was necessary to recognize Tradition to be holy and definitely expressed in the decrees of the infallible hierarchy. But by rejecting the infallibility of the hierarchy, it is impossible to affirm anything, and there is not a single proposition of the church which could unite

all the believers. The affirmation of these theologians that they recognize those decrees which express the faith of all undivided Christians and reject all the arbitrary decrees of the separate Christians is quite incorrect, because there has never existed such a complete oneness of the Christians. Side by side with the Nicene symbol, there was an Arian symbol, and the Nicene symbol was not accepted by all, but only by one part of the hierarchy, and other Christians recognized that symbol only because they recognized the infallibility of the hierarchy which expressed it, saying, "It pleased us and the Holy Ghost." But there has never been a time when all the Christians agreed on anything, and the councils were assembled for the very purpose of getting in some manner away from the controversies about the dogmas, which divided the Christians.

Thus the oneness in love has, in the first place, never existed, and, in the second place, this oneness in love, by its very essence, cannot be expressed or defined in any way. The new theologians affirm that by church they understand the union of all the believers, the body of Christ, and by no means the infallible hierarchy and a human institution; but the moment they touch on matters of the church, it becomes evident that by church they understand, and must of necessity understand, a human institution. The cares of all these theologians, beginning with Luther, about the relation of church and state, prove conclusively that these theologians understand by church a still more debased human institution than is understood by the Catholics or the Orthodox. The church theologians are more consistent in their discussions. The church, according to their doctrine, is the bishops and the Pope; thus they speak, and so it is. The Pope and the bishops must, according to their teaching, stand at the head of all worldly institutions, and there can be no question about the relation of the church to the

state. The church is always the head of everything. Among the Protestants there appears, in spite of the apparently high significance which they ascribe to the church, the question about the relations of church and state. They are all busy now separating or freeing the church from the oppression of the state, and all of them complain of the wretched condition of divine truth and of Christ at its head, who is in captivity under Bismarck, Gambetta, and so forth, but they forget that if the state can exert any influence on the church, it is evident that, in speaking of the church, we are speaking not of the divine truth which has Christ at its head, but of a human institution.

Men who believe in the teaching of the church cannot base their faith on anything but the legality, the regularity of the succession of the hierarchy. But the regularity and legality of the succession of the hierarchy cannot be proved in any way. No historical investigations can confirm it. On the contrary, historical investigations not only fail to confirm the regularity of any hierarchy, but show directly that Christ did not establish an infallible hierarchy, that in the first times it did not exist, that that system arose in the time of the decline of the Christian teaching, during the time of hatred and malice on account of some interpretation of dogmas, and that all the most varied Christian teachings have asserted just as positively their rights in the regularity of the succession in their church, and have denied that regularity in others, so that the whole doctrine of the Theology, which in regard to the church is not verified in any respect, comes down for me to the desire of certain persons to advance, in opposition to other teachings (which have just such pretensions and which with just as much right assert that they are in the right), their own teaching as the only one which is true and holy.

So far I have not seen in this teaching anything true

and holy, and not even anything rational and good. The attempts of these theologians, especially of our Khomyakóv, to overthrow the foundation of the church, the infallibility of the hierarchy, and to put in its place the mystical conception of all the believers who are united in love, is the last convulsion of this church teaching, a support which brings the whole structure to its fall. Indeed, a remarkable *quid pro quo* takes place here. To conceal its crude assertion that the church is the infallible hierarchy, the Theology cloaks itself with false definitions of the church in the sense of an assemblage of all the believers. The new theologians grasp this external and false definition and, imagining that they are basing their church upon it, destroy the one essential support of the church, the infallibility of the hierarchy. Indeed, for any one who does not even wish to trouble himself to investigate the arguments of the church about the infallibility of the hierarchy, it is sufficient to read all that which the Protestant literature has worked out in this respect. The foundation of the infallibility of the hierarchy is destroyed in the name of the foundation of the church as an assemblage of believers united in love. However, an assemblage of believers united in love can, obviously, not define any dogma, or a Nicene symbol, as Khomyakóv and other theologians believe.

An assemblage of believers united in love is such a general conception that upon it no common creed, or dogma, common to all the Christians, can be based, so that the work of the new theologians, if they are at all consistent, reduces itself to this, that the only foundation of the church, the infallibility of the church, is destroyed, but the new one is left what it was, a mystical conception from which can follow no creed, much less a confession of faith. The only foundation is the infallibility of the hierarchy, — for those who believe in it.

XIV.

Section II. Of divine grace as a force with which the Lord sanctifies us. This whole division expounds the Saviour's special relation to men. Section I. expounded the conception of the church, that instrument by which the human race is saved; now, it would seem, ought to be expounded those means by which men are saved, but that will be expounded in Section III. This 2d section will expound wherein the salvation will actually consist. It is this doctrine that will be expounded in this section. This doctrine is called the doctrine about grace. What is meant by the word "grace"?

Art. 183 begins with various definitions of grace:

"1. Under the name of divine grace is in general understood all that which the Lord gives to all his creatures without any deserts on their parts (Rom. xi. 6; 1 Peter v. 10)."

That is the definition of grace. Then follow subdivisions.

"For that reason divine grace is divided into natural and supernatural. To natural grace belong all natural gifts of God to the creatures, such as, life, health, reason, freedom, external well-being, and so forth. To supernatural grace belong all gifts which are communicated by God to the creatures in a supernatural manner, in addition to the gifts of Nature, when, for example, he himself directly enlightens the mind of rational beings with the light of his truth, and strengthens their will with his power and coöperation in matters of godliness. This

supernatural grace is divided into two species: into the grace of God the Creator, which he communicates to his moral creatures that abide in a condition of innocence; he communicated it to man before his fall, and even now imparts it to his good angels; and into the grace of God the Saviour, which he has given more properly to fallen man through Jesus and in Jesus Christ (Tit. iii. 4)." (p. 248.)

This latter subdivision is further subdivided into three parts: grace is divided into (1) the incarnation of Christ and the redemption; (2) extraordinary gifts for the advantage of the church, such as prophecy, miracles, and so forth, and (3) —

" Last, by grace is understood a special force, a special action of God, which is communicated to us on account of the deserts of our Redeemer, and which achieves our sanctification, that is, which, on the one hand, purifies us from sin, renovates, and justifies us before God, and, on the other, confirms us and turns us back to virtue for eternal life. In this latter sense grace forms the proper subject of the dogmatic teaching about it." (p. 249.)

This latter subdivision contains in it three more particular conceptions.

" (1) It is: (*a*) a special force, a special divine action in man, as is to be seen from the words of the Lord himself to the Apostle Paul: My grace is sufficient for thee: for my strength is made perfect in weakness, and then from the words of St. Paul: Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me (2 Cor. xii. 9). (*b*) It is given to us for nothing, on account of the deserts of Jesus Christ, as the same apostle teaches us: For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus (Rom. iii. 23, 24). (*d*) It is given to us for the sake of our sanctification, that is, for our purification and justification,

for our success in godliness and salvation. That is confirmed by the following passages in Scripture: Grace and peace be multiplied unto you through the knowledge of God, and of Jesus our Lord, according as his divine power hath given unto us all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and virtue (1 Peter i. 2, 3), and so forth. This sanctifying grace is, for the greater clearness of its teaching, subdivided into two particular kinds. It is called external in so far as it acts upon man externally, through external means, such as, the Word of God, the preaching of the Gospel, miracles, and so forth; and internal, in so far as it acts directly in man himself, destroying the sins in him, enlightening his reason, exciting and directing his will toward the good. It is called temporary, when it produces special impressions upon a man's soul and coöperates in his special good deeds; and constant, when it abides constantly in man's soul and makes him righteous and pleasing before God. It is called premonitory, when it precedes each good deed and incites man to commit good deeds; and accompanying or coactive, when it accompanies each good deed. It is called sufficient, when it imparts to man sufficient force and convenience to act for his salvation, though it may not be accompanied by the action itself on the part of man; and real, when it is accompanied by the action itself and produces in man saving fruits." (pp. 249 and 250.)

Thus there are in all fourteen different kinds of grace, and all those will be properly disclosed. All the contrary opinions will be refuted, and everything will, according to the usual method, be confirmed by Holy Scripture. In no part of the doctrine, so manifestly as in the doctrine about grace, will the remark be confirmed that the less the doctrine is necessary in order to explain the meaning of life to man and to guide him to union with God, the more has the church been talking about it, the less it is com-

prehensible, and the more controversies, lies, malicious attacks, wars, and executions have taken place because of it, as we know from history. Indeed, what can be more remarkable, for uselessness, than this remarkable teaching about grace, about what, according to the definition of the Theology, is given by God to his creatures without the least desert on their part. One would think that according to this definition grace is the whole of life, everything, for everything is given to us by God without the least desert on our part, and that therefore the relation of man to grace is the relation of man to life. So it is, but since the Theology understands man's relation to life in the most perverse manner, all the discussions about grace reduce themselves to the attempt to lower the meaning of life to a most monstrous and crude conception.

First it takes the account of the creation of man, in which Holy Scripture expresses in the person of Adam the relation of man's freedom to grace, that is, to the external world. The whole account is taken by the Theology in the historical sense only. Adam fell, and the whole human race perished, and before Christ there was no relation of man's freedom to grace, that is to life, there was no life, and men did not do wrong. Christ came and redeemed the whole human race, and then, speaking strictly, according to the teaching of the Theology, there was again destroyed the relation of man's freedom to grace, to the external world, for according to the church teaching man became all holy and now does only what is good. But, as we know, nothing of the kind has ever happened, and the whole meaning of the Old Testament and Gospel teaching and of all moral and philosophical teachings consists only in finding a solution of the contradictions of good and evil, which are struggling in man. Although theology asserts that man after his redemption became entirely good, it knows that that is an untruth. It is not true that all men were bad before the redemption and

became all good after that, and so the Theology sees that the question, as it stood before Adam, — whether to eat or not to eat the apple, and as it stands before us, — whether to live or not to live according to the teaching of Christ, is still standing before men, and so it was compelled to invent a doctrine by which the question of what man must do should be supplanted by the question of what he ought to confess and speak. And for that purpose is invented the teaching, at first, of the church, and now, of grace.

But, as we shall later see, this teaching about grace is insufficient, and there is invented another, a new teaching about faith, which is to coöperate in the obfuscation before people of the chief religious and moral question as to how men ought to live. It is impossible connectedly to render this teaching about grace in the manner in which it is expounded. The more you penetrate into it, the less you comprehend it. You read and fail to understand, not only what is being expounded, but even why it is all expounded. Only after reading the whole Theology through, after reading the chapter on the sacraments and on the mysteries, and recalling the contradiction with reality, which is put in the dogma of the redemption, is it possible, at last, to divine the cause which made them invent those strange aberrations, and to explain to ourselves that remarkable doctrine.

The explanation of the doctrine about grace I find to be as follows: the hierarchy (for exactness' sake I will from now on use this word instead of the obscure "church") teaches us that Christ redeemed the human race, destroyed sin, evil, death, diseases, and the unfruitfulness of the earth. In reality nothing of the kind has been destroyed; everything was left as of old. How, then, justify the unjustified assertion? In order to justify it, it is necessary to attach to the salvation of the human race by Christ another condition, without which this salvation cannot take place, so as

to have the right to say that the redemption took place, but is not active, because men did not observe the condition with which alone it is active. That teaching is grace. The Theology says outright:

"Divine grace is necessary for the sanctification of sinful man in general, that is, in order that the sinner shall be able to come out from his sinful state, become a true Christian, and, in this manner, make his own the deserts of the Redeemer, or else be changed, purified, justified, renovated, and then abide in godliness and attain eternal salvation." (p. 259.)

Thus the redemption became active only on condition that grace be obtained, and so the non-achievement of the redemption is explained by the absence of grace, and the whole aim of the believers is now directed toward obtaining grace, and grace is transmitted through the sacraments. This sanctification by sacraments, that is, the drawing of people toward sacerdotal rites, forms another cause for the teaching about grace. Thus the teaching about grace has two causes, one — logical, an explanation of the statement that the whole world has changed, whereas it has not, and the other — practical, the use of sacraments and mysteries as means for obtaining grace.

The doctrine about grace is, on the one hand, an inevitable result of a false premise that Christ by his redemption has changed the whole world, and, on the other, it is the foundation of those sacerdotal rites, which are necessary for the believers, in order to throw dust in their eyes, and for the hierarchy, in order that it may take advantage of its sacerdotal calling. This teaching about grace is in itself striking by its complexity, entanglement, and absolute barrenness of contents. If previously some parts of the teaching involuntarily reminded one of a man who pretended before a public to measure hundreds of yards of the imaginary hair of the Virgin, this teaching may be compared with the action of this man, who, after measuring

the imaginary hairs, should make it appear that the hairs which he has measured out have become tangled and he is trying to unravel them. Besides, this teaching about grace, the purpose of which is to pull the wool over the eyes of the believers because of the non-achievement of the promise of redemption, and to increase the income of the clergy, bears in itself that terrible germ of immorality which has morally corrupted the generations that confess this teaching. If a man is going to believe in the deception that he can be cured from diseases by the grace of the chrism, or that he will be immortal if he receives the grace, or in the concealment of the fact that the earth continues to be unfruitful, — all these deceptions have been comparatively harmless, but the deception about man's being always sinful and impotent and about the uselessness of his striving after good, if he does not acquire grace, — this teaching cuts down to the root everything which is best in human nature. The immorality of this teaching could not help but startle all the best men who have lived amidst this confession, and so against this side of the doctrine — about the relation of man's freedom to grace — have risen the more honest men in the church itself, and so this question has been complicated by endless controversies, which until the present divided the different creeds.

In Art. 184 there is an exposition of these controversies about grace :

" The dogma about grace which sanctifies sinful man has been subject to very many mutilations on the part of the heterodox and heretics. I. Some of these have erred and still err, in a greater or lesser degree, as regards the necessity of grace for man. To these belong the Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, Socinians, and rationalists. The Pelagians, who appeared in the beginning of the fifth century in the Western church, taught as follows: ' Since Adam by his fall in no way impaired his nature and consequently his

descendants are born without any natural corruption or original sin, they may by mere natural forces attain moral perfection and have no need for that purpose of any supernatural divine aid and force.' Against Pelagius and his followers first of all rose St. Augustine, who wrote very many works in refutal of them. There rose also many other pastors of the church, and both in the East and in the West there met in a short time more than twenty councils which unanimously condemned that heresy. The defenders of the truth unanimously maintained: (*a*) that man, who has fallen and is born in original sin, cannot in himself create any spiritual good without the aid of grace; (*b*) that by it are to be understood not merely the natural forces of man, the law of Moses, the teaching and example of Jesus Christ, external aids, but the supernatural power of God, which is inwardly communicated to man's soul; (*c*) that this grace does not consist merely in the remission of former sins, but offers real assistance in keeping man from committing new ones; (*d*) it not only illuminates reason and imparts to it the knowledge of what is to be done and what avoided, but also gives it the strength to carry out what has been found good, and pours love into the heart; (*e*) it not only makes easier for us the execution of the divine commands, which we are supposed to perform by ourselves, though inconveniently so, but acts as an assistance, without which we are not able to execute the divine law and to do the good which coöperates in our salvation.

"At the present time the teaching of the Orthodox Church, as directed against the heresy of the Pelagians, may be seen in the three following rules of the Council at Carthage, which is accepted among the number of the nine local councils, and which met to refute Pelagius: 'If any one says that divine grace, by which men are justified in Jesus Christ our Lord, is active only in the remission of sins already committed, but does not in addition to

that furnish any assistance, unless new sins be committed: let such a one be anathema. For divine grace not only gives the knowledge of what is proper to do, but also inspires us with love, that we may be able to carry out what we know.' 'If any one says that the same divine grace, which is about Jesus Christ our Lord, aids us only in keeping us from sinning, since by it is revealed and manifested to us the knowledge of sins, so that we may know what to seek and what to avoid, but that by it are not given to us the love and the power of doing that which we have found good to do: let such a one be anathema. For both are the gifts of God, both the knowledge of what is proper to do, and the love of the good which it is proper to do.' 'If any one says that the grace of justification is given to us so that what may be performed by our free will may be more conveniently done through grace, for, without receiving divine grace, we have been able, though inconveniently, to perform the divine commandments: let such a one be anathema. For of the fruits of the commandments the Lord has not said: Without me you will do inconveniently, but he has said: Without me ye can do nothing.'"

That, according to the Theology, is the first error. The second error consists in this, that to some God has given grace and has preordained them to the judgment, while to others he has given grace and has preordained them to salvation. This is the way it has to be considered:

"We believe that the all-good God has preordained to glory those whom he has chosen from eternity; and whom he has rejected he has turned over to the judgment, not, however, because he wishes in this manner to justify some, and leave others and judge them without cause: for that is not characteristic of God, who is common to all, and is not a revengeful Father, who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. ii. 4); since he foresaw that some will make

good use of their free will, while others will not, he has preordained some to glory, and others he has condemned. Of the use of freedom we judge in the following manner: since divine goodness has given us the divine grace, which, like the light illuminating the path of those who walk in darkness, guides us all, those who wish freely to submit to it (for it assists those who have it, and who do not oppose it) and to fulfil its commands, which are absolutely necessary for salvation, for that reason receive a special grace, which, coöperating with them and strengthening and constantly perfecting them in divine love, that is, in those good works, which God demands of us (and which also the premonitory grace has demanded), justifies them and makes them preordained; but those, on the contrary, who will not obey and follow grace, and who therefore do not fulfil the divine commandments, but, following the instigation of Satan, make ill use of their freedom, which God has given them for the purpose of arbitrarily doing good, are given over to eternal condemnation. But what the blasphemous heretics say of God's preordaining and condemning, without paying any attention to the works of the preordained or the condemned, we regard as madness and ungodliness." (pp. 255 and 256.)

The error cannot be rendered in one's own words; here it is:

"In regard to the nature of the sanctification or justification, as taken in its broad meaning, the Protestants assert that it consists: (*a*) not in that the divine grace acts inwardly on man and actually, on the one hand, purifies him from all sins, and, on the other, coöperates with the renovated, righteous, holy; (*b*) but in this, that, by God's will, the sins are pardoned only externally and are not put against the man, though in reality they remain in him, — that Christ's righteousness is put to his account only in an external manner. Such is the

teaching of the Lutherans and of the Reformers. The teaching of the Orthodox Church is of an entirely different kind. Speaking of the fruits of the sacrament of baptism, in which properly takes place our justification and sanctification through grace, the church teaches:

"'In the first place, this sacrament destroys all sins: in babes — original sin, and in grown persons both original and arbitrary sin. In the second place, it reëstablishes for him that righteousness which he had in the condition of innocence and sinlessness.' And in another place: 'It cannot be said that the baptism does not free from all former sins, but that they remain indeed, but no longer have any force. It is extreme ungodliness to teach in that manner; it is an overthrowing of faith, and not a confession of it. On the contrary, every sin which exists or has existed before the baptism is destroyed and is regarded as though it did not exist or had never existed. For all the forms under which baptism is represented show its purifying power, and the utterances of Holy Scripture give us to understand that through it we receive complete purification, which is seen from the very name of baptism. If it is a baptism by the Spirit and by fire, it is evident that it offers complete purification, for the Spirit purifies completely. If it is light, every darkness is dispelled by it. If it is regeneration, everything old passes away; and this old thing is nothing but the sins. If the man who is baptized is divested of the old man, he is also divested of sin. If he is invested in Christ, he with the same becomes sinless through baptism (Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, Section 16).'" (pp. 256 and 257.)

186. The necessity of grace for the sanctification of man in general. It is proved by Holy Scripture, and this is the way it is determined by the councils:

"If any one asserts that for our purification from sins God waits for our desire, and does not confess that the desire itself to purify ourselves takes place in us through

the emanation of the Holy Ghost and his coöperation, he contradicts the Holy Ghost." (p. 262.)

It is not permitted to believe that God is waiting for our desire to purify ourselves, but we must believe that the Holy Ghost, that is, the same God in another person, produces this desire to purify ourselves. If the desire has already taken place and I am myself a creature of God, and the desire is directed toward God, it is evident that this desire must not be acknowledged as anything else but as having emanated from God. All these utterances remain completely unintelligible, if we do not keep in mind the aim toward which they lead. This aim consists in replacing the tendency to do good by the external actions of the sacraments which impart grace. Further:

"If any one asserts that a man may, by the force of his nature, think rightly, or choose something good, which refers to eternal salvation, and agree to receive the saving, that is, the evangelical, sermon without the illumination and instigation of the Holy Ghost, he is seduced by a heretical spirit (Rule VII.)." (p. 262.)

A man cannot wish for anything good without the inspiration of the Holy Ghost; but the inspiration of the Holy Ghost is imparted through grace; grace is communicated through the sacraments; and the sacraments are communicated by the hierarchy.

187. The necessity of grace for faith and for the very beginning of faith, or for a man's conversion to Christianity. "Divine grace, which is necessary in general for man's illumination and salvation, is necessary in particular for his faith and for the very beginning of the faith in the Lord Jesus." (p. 263.)

Proofs from Holy Scripture and decrees of a council:

"If any one says that the increase, as well as the beginning of faith, and the very disposition toward it, by which we believe in the justification of the ungodly

and proceed to the regeneration in the sacrament of baptism, are in us not by the gift of grace, that is, by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, who directs our will from unbelief to belief, from godlessness to godliness, but takes place naturally, — such a one proves himself to be an opponent of the apostolic dogmas (Rule V.)." (p. 267.)

The meaning of the decree is that the believers must acknowledge that the change from godlessness to godliness cannot take place naturally, but is only the result of grace, that is, of some unnatural, external action. But if our will is completely directed by the Holy Ghost, then what free will has the Theology just been speaking about when it said that God wants all men to be saved, but that he foresaw that some would make good use of their free will, while others would not? If he wants to save and everything depends on him, why does he not save?

"188. Being necessary for the very conversion of man to Christianity, for his faith, and for the beginning of faith, divine grace remains necessary for man even after his conversion, so that he may fulfil the evangelical law for a worthy life according to Christ." (p. 271.)

Proofs from Holy Scripture conclude with this:

"Although man may be inclined toward good before his regeneration, and choose and do moral good, nevertheless, in order that he may be able after his regeneration to do spiritual good (for the works of faith, being the cause of salvation and being performed by supernatural grace, are generally called spiritual), it is necessary for grace to premonish and guide, so that he cannot by himself do works that are worthy of a life according to Christ, but can only wish or not wish to act in accordance with grace." (p. 274.)

The meaning of this discussion is still more definite, and its expression is much bolder. Here it says distinctly

that, although a man may be able to do good deeds without grace, he loses the possibility of doing good deeds the moment he accepts the teaching of the church, and can only wish for it, by invoking the aid of the hierarchy. But even the desire for grace, as has just been said, is given only by the Holy Ghost, that is, again by grace. The Theology is evidently moving in a magic circle.

"189. If without divine grace man cannot become a believer, or believe in Christ, or do deeds that are worthy of a life according to Christ, it follows naturally that without the coöperation of divine grace man cannot abide in the Christian faith and godliness to the end of his life."

Here it says that the coöperation of this external grace is not exhausted by baptism and faith, but that for the salvation the constant aid of the hierarchy is needed. All that would seem to be clear, but now follows Art. 190, which refutes the heretics. In this and the following articles the whole disconnection of the teaching becomes manifest.

The hierarchy needs a teaching which would reduce the whole teaching about life to a teaching about the sacraments, but that cannot be expressed outright: the immorality of such a teaching is too obvious. Besides, there have been many controversies in regard to this question. Some reflected consistently: if grace saves, the free efforts of man are useless; others said: if the free efforts of man are needed, the whole thing lies in them, and grace is imparted to them; but our Theology refutes both, and itself becomes entangled and persists in that tangle.

"Contrary to the errors of the Calvinists and Jansenists, which are that God gives his grace only to a few men, whom he has unconditionally preordained to righteousness and eternal bliss, and therefore gives an invincible grace, the Orthodox Church teaches: (*a*) that divine grace extends over all men, and not only on the preordained to

righteousness and eternal bliss; (*b*) that the preordainment of some by God to eternal bliss and of others to eternal damnation is not unconditional, but is based on the foreknowledge whether they will take advantage of the grace, or not; (*c*) that divine grace does not embarrass man's freedom, does not act invincibly upon it, and (*d*) that, on the contrary, man takes an active part in what divine grace works in him and through him (Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs, Section 3)." (pp. 277 and 278.)

The preceding article defines man's salvation in such a way that it obviously no longer results from his efforts, but completely depends on the communication of grace from without. Consequently there had naturally to appear the reflection: if salvation depends not on man, but on God, and God is omniscient, some people are predetermined to salvation, and others to perdition. But the Theology does not agree with the Calvinists.

191. Divine grace extends over all men, and not only over those who are preordained to righteousness and eternal bliss. Proofs are adduced to refute the Calvinists. And here it turns out involuntarily that in refuting the Calvinists the Theology refutes all the decrees of the councils, which determined that man cannot save himself by his own efforts.

"St. John Chrysostom: 'If Christ lighteth every man that cometh into the world (John i. 9), how then do men remain without illumination? He actually illuminates everybody. But if some, voluntarily closing the eyes of their intellect, do not wish to receive the beams of this light, their abiding in darkness does not depend on the nature of the light, but on the ungodliness of those who by their will deprive themselves of that gift. For the grace has poured forth on all, and those who do not wish to make use of such a gift must, in justice, blame themselves for their blindness.' St. Ambrose: 'He rose, like a mysterious sun, for everybody; if some one does not

believe in Christ, he deprives himself of the universal benefit.' St. Augustine: 'God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved (John iii. 17). And then as to the physician: he came to cure a patient; and he who does not wish to keep the commands of the physician achieves his own ruin. The Saviour came into the world, — why is he called the Saviour if not because it is his aim to save the world, and not to condemn it? Do you not wish to be cured by him? You will be your own judge.'" (p. 280.)

Before this it was said in the councils that he who asserts that for our purification from sins God expects our consent, and that we can choose the good, is not right, but here it suddenly turns out that a man must choose by all means. Then follows Art. 192, which is to prove that there is a predetermination, and that there is no predetermination.

"3. St. Paul teaches distinctly that divine predetermination is based on prescience, saying: For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son . . . , moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified (Rom. viii. 29, 30). He did not simply predestinate, says the apostle, but he predestinated, because he foreknew; whose deserts he foresaw, those he preordained, or, as St. Jerome expresses himself: 'Of whom God knew that they would be conformed to the image to his Son in their lives, those he preordained to be conformed to him in the glory itself.'"

This whole article about predestination bears upon itself the distinctive character partly of the Byzantine but more especially of the Russian theology. Here is repeated what we find in all debatable passages of the Theology. Some theologians say that the whole matter is in works, while others say that the whole matter is

in grace. Either may be proved with a certain degree of consistency, but Russian theology never takes the trouble to analyze thought and to go consistently from deduction to deduction. It says: You say it is grace, then we will generalize it and say: it is both works and grace, and it does not in the least trouble itself about the fact that one excludes the other. It strings out a few unintelligible sentences, quotes the fathers of the church, and comes to a conclusion, imagining that the question is solved. Proof from Scripture.

"4. The doctrine about the unconditional predestination of God is contrary to common sense. Common sense is convinced that God is just and that, consequently, he cannot without any cause preordain some to eternal happiness, and others to eternal damnation. It is convinced that God is infinitely good and, consequently, can not without any cause condemn any one to eternal perdition. It is convinced that God is infinitely all-wise and, consequently, cannot give man freedom and yet embarrass it by his unconditional predetermination and take away the whole moral value of its actions." (p. 286.)

This discussion directly ignores everything which has been said against it in the previous articles. And with this obvious contradiction the whole argument is closed.

Art. 193 still more mixes up the matter. Here there is a contradiction in every word: "Though God worketh in us to do of his good pleasure (Phil. ii. 14), and we are not able without his grace to undertake anything, nor accomplish anything truly good: still that divine power, working in us and through us, in no way embarrasses our freedom and does not draw it invincibly to the good." (p. 286.)

What does that mean? Translating the sentence into intelligible language, it turns out that grace does not embarrass our freedom, but we can do nothing good without it. Where is the freedom? According to this defi-

nition it consists only in doing all kinds of evil. The whole discussion is of the same character, so that in conclusion it says:

"5. Common sense on its side cannot help but remark that if divine grace embarrasses man's freedom and draws it forcibly to the good, then every merit is taken away from a man's good actions, every incitement to do good, and in general his whole morality is undermined, and the cause of it all is God himself! Can such ideas be admitted? It is true, reason cannot explain in what way the mighty power of God, acting upon man, leaves his freedom intact, and cannot with certainty define their mutual relations; but none the less this mystery must be for us above all doubt, since we have so many grounds for belief that man is not only not deprived of liberty under the influence of grace upon him, but also actively takes part in its action, which takes place in him and through him." (p. 288.)

That is, in other words, the Theology confesses that it does not understand anything of what it has said, but that it thinks that it is necessary to believe in that mystery, that is, in something meaningless and contradictory, which it is even impossible to express.

Art. 194 continues the tangle, proving that man takes an active part in what divine grace accomplishes in him and through him.

"St. Theodoret: 'The apostle called it a gift of God not only to believe, but also to suffer gloriously (Phil. i. 29), without rejecting the participation of the free will (of man), but teaching us that the will in itself, deprived of grace, cannot achieve anything good. Both are necessary: our readiness, or desire, to act, and the divine coöperation. And as for those who have not that desire it is not enough to have the grace of the Spirit, even so, on the other hand, the mere desire, not strengthened by grace, cannot gather the riches of the virtues.'" (p. 291.)

Thus the article asserts that a man who cannot do anything good without grace at the same time takes part in the action of grace. Leaving out the absurdity, contradictoriness, and immorality of the whole doctrine, one asks himself involuntarily: For what and for whom is that wanted? And if any one needs it, what is that tangle for? All right, a man cannot do anything without grace: then say so. But no, the proof is given that man cannot be saved without grace, and yet he must look for that grace, and coöperate, and through the whole tangle it would seem impossible to answer the question what it is all for. And if we did not know what is going to follow, we should get no answer. But there is a direct answer: grace, as understood by the hierarchy, is not the grace of the Calvinists, a preordained salvation, but the grace of the hierarchy, — its sacraments, and these have to be sought for.

The sacraments are transmitted to the flock by the priests, and the priests get money for them. Consequently it is impossible to be saved without grace, and grace must be looked for in the sacraments. What is bad about it is that with that is not only destroyed the whole moral significance of the teaching of Christ, but every moral teaching is obscured by the search after these sacraments which can be bought for money. But what is to be done? Without it there would be no hierarchy. Consequently the whole doctrine about grace is very important. That alone can explain to us the wonderful doctrine about grace.

XV.

The doctrine about grace is now regarded by the Theology as firmly established, and there begins the exposition of the statement that upon it is based the doctrine about sanctification:

"In rejecting the error of the Protestants, who under the name of justification or sanctification of man by grace understand the mere remission of sins, although man in reality perseveres in them, and a mere external imputation of the righteousness of Christ, though in reality man does not become righteous, but as a condition for justification and sanctification recognize only faith on the part of man, the Orthodox Church teaches: (*a*) that the sanctification of man consists in his being actually purified from sin by the grace of God and, with its aid, becoming righteous and holy." (pp. 292 and 293.)

Here by the words "sanctification of man" are meant the sacraments. Thus, after the proofs from Holy Scripture, is quoted the utterance by St. John Chrysostom:

"The Jewish priests had the power to cleanse bodily leprosy, or, more correctly, not to cleanse, but to testify to the cleansing. But these (the Christian priests) have received the power not merely to testify the cleansing, but completely to cleanse (ἀπαλλάτειν παντελῶς), not the bodily leprosy, but the impurity of the soul."

Thus the action of grace, which heretofore was unintelligible, so long as the question was about grace in the abstract, becomes clear at once. Grace is a holiness which is communicated by the priests, and so we now can com-

prehend what is meant by the statement that grace is necessary for salvation, and that man cannot be saved by good works without the sanctification through sacraments. Without the teaching about the sacraments a man will strive to become better. According to the doctrine of the hierarchy that is not necessary; what is needed is nothing but grace. To seek grace means to seek the sacraments. To seek the sacraments means to accept the sacraments from the priest. The concluding words of this article are important, because they strikingly confirm the proposition which I have enunciated that the dogma of redemption is one of the foundations of the sacerdotal institution, of the hierarchy:

"The reëstablishment or redemption is nothing but the reduction of man to his original condition, in which he was before the fall. But before the fall man was actually innocent, righteous, and holy. Consequently it is necessary for him through this reëstablishment to return to precisely the same condition. In other words, if those who are reëstablished, or justified, remain as before in sin, without righteousness or holiness, and receive only a remission of sins, and externally cloak themselves in the righteousness of Christ, there is in that case no reëstablishment properly speaking, and it is nothing but a phantasm or a seeming reëstablishment." (p. 297.)

Reëstablishment is man's elevation to the former state of innocence. Redemption, according to the assertion of the hierarchy, has done that. But the hierarchy itself sees that nothing of the kind exists: redemption has done nothing of the kind. In what, then, is this reëstablishment to be assumed? It is impossible to recognize that the reëstablishment consists in this, that actually good men, having learned the law of Christ, do more good than evil, because in that case only good men would be redeemed, and bad men would be in perdition. Nor is it possible to assume that the bad men are no longer bad,

and that they are reëstablished in innocence, because Christ has redeemed them; consequently it becomes necessary to invent an imaginary innocence and holiness, and such visible instruments for the communication of sanctity as will make it possible to assure all men without exception that, no matter how bad they may be, they are none the less holy. And it is precisely this that is invented.

But for the rearing of this artificial building, the imaginary redemption, the teaching about grace is not sufficient: there is needed a new link in this chain of deception. And so, in Art. 197, there is an exposition of that very method of self-deception by means of which men, doing good deeds, cannot regard their deeds as good, if they do not observe certain conditions established for the purpose, and unrighteous and not innocent men may in fulfilling those conditions regard themselves as reëstablished, holy. This self-deception is based on the conception of faith, which is introduced into the book now for the first time, and which is understood in an intentionally most mixed up manner. What is said is that faith is the first condition on the part of man for his sanctification and salvation. A most tangled definition of faith is given: its tendency is to substitute for the idea of faith an action which is in the power of each man, and the conclusion is drawn that he who believes that he is becoming sanctified and reëstablished in complete sanctity and innocence, that he alone is actually reëstablished in complete sanctity and innocence. But, if one believes that he is holy, and there is no other means for ascertaining his sanctity but the faith in his sanctity, it is impossible to assert that he is actually holy, though he may unquestionably regard himself as such. If an insane man believes that he has a tower on his nose, there can be no doubt about his actually imagining that there is a tower on his nose, but no one will think of asserting that there is really a tower

on his nose. And yet on precisely such a consideration is built the whole doctrine about the sanctification through faith. Here is the discussion:

"197. Divine grace, which achieves our sanctification, indeed extends over all men, but does not act upon them against their will, and in fact sanctifies a sinner, and thereupon saves him, only when certain conditions are observed on his part. The first of these is faith."

This unexpected introduction into the discussion of the idea of faith is particularly remarkable because all those dogmas which have been disclosed to us heretofore, beginning with the concept of God, were nothing but truths of faith. Up till now there has not once been any mention made about faith and there has not been any definition of what is to be understood by the word "faith." Heretofore it was assumed that faith was that correct knowledge of God, as indeed the Eastern Patriarchs say, that correct conception about God, which lies at the foundation of every other knowledge, and that everything else resulted from faith, but there has by no means been given that definition of faith by which it is the action of the human will. Here it turns out to be some kind of an action:

"(1) Under the name of faith in general is understood here the free acceptance and appropriation by man with all the powers of his soul of those truths which it has pleased God to reveal to us in Christ for our salvation. By faith is meant this acceptance and appropriation, because the revealed truths are for the most part incomprehensible to our reason and inaccessible to knowledge, but can be appropriated only through faith." (p. 298.)

Grace does not act against the will. Men must make an effort of will in order to accept it. Faith is a free acceptance, an appropriation of incomprehensible truths. Involuntarily there arises the question: how does the appropriation take place? Through reason, or through the will? Impossibly through reason, since the truths

are incomprehensible; consequently through the will. What, then, is meant by "to appropriate by an effort of will"? Speaking plainly, it means "to obey." Thus faith, according to this definition, is reduced to obedience. Precisely in this way the word "faith" is understood in the Theology, though farther down, to obscure the definition, another misty definition is made, in which faith is mixed up with charity and hope. (p. 301.)

"The necessity of faith for our sanctification and salvation is comprehensible also from considerations of reason. Without faith we cannot appropriate to ourselves the truths of the divine revelation; consequently we shall not know what God has done for our salvation, nor what we are obliged to do. In this manner revelation, together with the whole house-management of salvation, will remain foreign to us, and we shall be foreign to revelation and salvation. In believing in Christ the Saviour and in his revealed word, we, so to speak, open our soul for all divine actions of salvation upon us; and in not believing, we shut ourselves up against these actions, and repel the divine assistance. For this reason, although faith is roused in us by premonitory grace and in its origin is a divine gift, it becomes on our part, the moment it is germinated in us, with our free consent, the first instrument for the actual acceptance in our soul of the saving grace, or of the divine powers that pertain unto life and godliness (2 Peter i. 3), the very first condition for our regeneration, sanctification, and salvation through grace." (pp. 303 and 304.)

Heretofore I understood faith as the foundation of man's whole activity, but here faith is spoken of as an activity. Involuntarily the question arises: on what is the activity based, which is seeking the faith and even choosing in advance the faith, which it is seeking? Strangest of all is the fact that nothing has been said about faith so long as the revealed, fundamental truths

of faith about God, creation, man, soul (for it is necessary to believe in all that) were expounded; nothing was said about faith, but here, where it behoves the Theology to expound about sanctification and reëstablishment, which do not exist, it suddenly becomes necessary to define faith, and unexpectedly faith is defined, not as the knowledge of God, but as confidence in what the hierarchs say. Indeed, under the word "faith" the Theology understands something quite different from what it is generally understood to mean. This is seen in the clearest and quickest way from the following passage of Filarét's Catechism. There is there a question about which is more necessary, faith or good works. And the answer is: "Faith, because Scripture says, Without faith it is impossible to please God." And immediately after that comes the question: "Why must good works be inseparable from this faith?" And the answer: "Because it says, Faith without works is dead." The second answer to the question as to why good works must be inseparable from faith, because faith without works is dead, destroys the separation of faith from good works. If faith cannot exist without good works, why then separate them, and say: (1) faith, and (2) good works. This logical blunder is not an accidental one.

The same intentional blunder is repeated in the Theology. It is clear that by the word "faith" the Theology does not want to understand what the word actually means, not what Paul and the Eastern Patriarchs understand by it, and what we understand by it. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, that is, a trust in the unseen as though it were seen, in what is wished and waited for, as if it were present," says Paul. Paul says nothing about this evidence and hope being communicated by any one. "By faith we mean the correct knowledge of God and of divine subjects," say the Eastern Patriarchs. "Nobody can be saved without faith," they say further on. "Faith is the

substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, and a correct understanding about God." The same it is understood by all men to be. We perish in this life without the knowledge of God, — faith gives us salvation. All the works of salvation are by that very thing good works, and all good works are good only because they are works of salvation, which result from our knowledge of God, that is, from faith. Faith is not exactly inseparable from good works, but is the only cause of good works; but good works are inevitable consequences of faith. Consequently, it would seem impossible to ask which is more important: faith or good works? that is the same as asking which is more important, the sun or its light? And yet precisely such a division has been made in consequence of having given to faith a false, narrow definition, not of faith, but of trust and obedience.

The separation of faith from works, and the comparison between them, show clearly that by faith is understood something different from the definition given by Paul and by the Eastern Patriarchs, and from what the word itself means, but what it signifies here is what the Eastern Patriarchs say in another place: "We believe as we are taught to believe (Section 10)." It is evident that in Filarét, as well as in all the theological works, by faith is meant only an external agreement with what theology preaches, and this mere agreement is regarded as necessary for sanctification and salvation, and so we get here a definition not merely of faith in general, but at the same time of what men ought to believe in, and an explanation that he who believes will get great advantages, and he who does not believe will fare badly. Before this, in the exposition of each dogma, there was an exposition of the dogma, say of God, the Trinity, redemption, the church, and the causes which led us to that faith were adduced, but nowhere was it said that it was necessary to believe and that it was profitable to believe. But here,

instead of proofs, instead of the disclosure of truths, we suddenly hear that it is necessary to make a free effort, not to oppose oneself, but to try to believe, and that he who believes will be saved, and he who does not believe will perish.

Before this were disclosed the God-revealed truths, and it was assumed that this disclosure led us to the only aim of the teaching, to faith, that is, to the knowledge of God. Now an opposite method is used: we are told that in order that the truth about sanctification should be disclosed to us, it is necessary first to believe in that sanctification: believe, and then everything will be disclosed to you. But does not the whole purpose of the teaching consist in bringing me to faith? But if you abandon that path of the disclosure of truths which lead me to faith, and tell me that it is necessary to believe what you say, as any man would say it, if he wanted to be believed, I have no longer any right to believe. If it comes all to a question of trust, my trust will depend only on the greater or lesser respect for him who is trying to convince me, and on the comparative probability of the evidence of truth. There is, however, no probability of this evidence in the teaching of the hierarchy, as we have seen heretofore, and so only one thing is left for me to do: to become frightened at the threats which are uttered against me for not believing, and, out of fear, to submit my reason to what is called grace, that is, to what the hierarchy teaches.

This attempt to submit our reason, this non-resistance to grace, we have all tried; it not only becomes inactive, but all the proofs in its favour militate against it, the moment a man seriously searches after truth. You say that I shall for ever ruin my soul if I do not believe you, but I do not believe you for the very reason that I am afraid that I may ruin my soul for ever. Especially now, when, after analyzing this article, it has become clear to me that the Theology, in taking up that which is most

precious and important to it, the establishment of the sacraments, has itself declined to ascribe any meaning to that institution, and has been unable to justify it by anything but a naïve assertion that it is necessary to believe that it is so.

By reducing in this manner the conception of faith to trust and obedience, and by dividing the inseparable, the Theology has involuntarily arrived at the question about the relation to each other of these two imaginary, unthinkable conceptions of faith, trust in what you are told, and good works, which are independent of faith. The following Art. 198 analyzes the relation of these two imaginary conceptions.

In order to understand the following article, it is necessary to keep in mind that since the earliest times when the false conception of trust in place of faith was introduced, there has arisen the question as to what saves, whether faith, or good works, and that those who have confessed this teaching have since the earliest times been divided into two hostile camps. Some say that faith saves, and others say that works save. Our Theology, with its customary method and complete freedom from all bonds of logic, affirms that both save. And here is the import of the following 198th article:

"However, no matter how great may be the value of faith, which embraces in its broader sense both hope and charity, and although this faith is the first condition for the appropriation by man of Christ's deserts, — it alone is not sufficient for its aim. By faith alone a man may receive his justification and cleanse himself from sin in the sacrament of baptism, only when he just enters the kingdom of Christ's grace: he may after that receive the gifts of grace through the other sacraments of the church. But, that he may be able, after having entered the kingdom of grace, to preserve the righteousness and purity which he has acquired in baptism; that he may be

able to make use of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which he has received through all the other sacraments; that he may be able to strengthen himself in his Christian life and gradually rise in Christian sanctity; that, finally, he may be able, after having completed his terrestrial activity, to appear as justified and sanctified at the terrible judgment of Christ, — for all that, in addition to faith, he needs good works, that is, those in which faith, hope, and charity, which abide in the soul of a Christian, are expressed in an external manner, as in their fruits, and which may serve as a precise execution of the divine will, which has been imparted to us in the Gospel law." (p. 305.)

After that are adduced proofs from Holy Scripture, which directly deny the whole preceding division into faith and works, and the preëminence of faith over works:

"(*a*) That faith alone without works is insufficient for salvation, is testified: (*aa*) by Christ the Saviour himself: Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven (Matt. vii. 21; cf. xvi. 27); (*bb*) by Apostle James: Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only (James ii. 24); (*cc*) by Apostle John: He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him (1 John ii. 4); (*dd*) by Apostle Paul: For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified (Rom. ii. 13); (*b*) that a Christian is obliged to show his faith, hope, and charity in good works: Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone . . . shew me thy faith without thy works. . . . For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also (James ii. 17, 18, 26); every man that hath this hope in him (in our Lord Jesus) purifieth himself, even as he is pure (1 John iii. 3); he

that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me (John xiv. 21); my little children, let us not love in word, neither in tongue; but in deed and in truth (1 John iii. 18); (*c*) that men are called to the kingdom of Christ's grace for the very purpose that they may do good works: For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them (Eph. ii. 10); For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ; who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works (Tit. ii. 11–14.)" (pp. 305 and 306.)

All the texts quoted, especially those from the evangelists, show incontestably that faith cannot be separated from good works and that works are the results of faith, and consequently it would seem that this article directly destroys the whole meaning of the preceding article about the first meaning of faith. But the Theology is not in the least embarrassed by that. In the first article it contended against all the Christians who recognized salvation in works, and here it contends against those who recognize it in faith, and calmly destroys its own propositions, which does not keep it in the end from declaring triumphantly that the true teaching consists in accepting both, in spite of the fact that one excludes the other.

Indeed, no matter how irregular the separation of faith from works is, if that separation has once taken place in the conception of the believers, it is naturally possible to affirm that either faith alone or works alone can save. If through faith we become completely purified and holy, good works evidently are superfluous. They are assumed

in themselves, but no longer form an aim. But if we are saved by an effort of our will, as was said in the preceding article, it is obvious that first of all there must be that condition of will, that is, the act, and then only will there be faith and salvation. Both assertions are logical and consistent, but our hierarchy, arming itself with faith in itself, regards any logical consistency as superfluous; it enunciates both the contradictory propositions in the same breath. The concluding words of the article, which are to prove the necessity of good works, prove precisely the opposite.

"We cannot do good works except with the coöperation of divine grace, for which reason they are called the fruits of the Holy Ghost (Gal. v. 22). But since in the performance of good works we need the participation of our free will; since through this free participation in good works we express our faith, charity, and hope in God; since this participation frequently costs us great endeavours and troubles in our struggle with the enemies of our salvation, the world, the flesh, and the devil, — our Lord God has been pleased to take our good works into account, and, in proportion as we succeed in godliness with the aid of grace, he has been pleased to increase in us our spiritual gifts, in order that by its aid we may ascend from power to power, from glory to glory (2 Cor. iii. 18)." (p. 311.)

The whole part quoted is a repetition in different expressions of one and the same contradiction: we cannot do good works except through grace, but for that purpose we need the participation of our free will.

The moral application of this dogma is more ludicrous than ever. Indeed, it is very hard to find any moral application for the most immoral of dogmas, whose aim it is to justify and permit vices and give an income to the hierarchy, but still we find *à propos:* (1) to pray to God that he may give us grace; (2) to thank God; (3) again to

pray; (4) to follow the inspiration of grace; (5) man who has become as innocent as Adam ought to try to become innocent; (6) "let us walk with a true heart in the substance of faith to the throne of grace!"

XVI.

Section III. Of the sacraments of the church, as means through which divine grace is communicated to us. The sacraments are defined as follows:

"(1) A sacrament is a holy action which under a visible form communicates to the soul of the believer the invisible grace of God, an action which was established by our Lord, and by which every one of the believers receives divine grace.

"Consequently the nature of the sacraments the church assumes to consist in this, that there are sacramental actions which actually communicate divine grace to the believer, that they 'are not only signs of divine promises, but instruments which necessarily act through grace upon those who proceed toward them.' As essential qualities of each of the sacraments it regards: (*a*) the divine establishment of the sacrament, (*b*) some visible or sensual image, and (*c*) the communication of invisible grace by the sacrament to the soul of the believer." (p. 313.)

It is necessary to direct the attention to the definition of the nature of the sacraments and to the words "divine establishment of the sacraments," in order that we may later be able so much the more clearly to analyze the deception on which the Theology tries to establish the dogma of the sacraments. Seven sacraments are counted out, and the heresies of all the other Christians, except of our hierarchy, are refuted. Here are the heresies:

"(1) Of the nature of the sacraments. According to

Luther, they are simple signs of divine promises for the sake of rousing our faith in Christ, who remits sins. According to Calvin and Zwingli, they are divine signs, by which the one who is chosen is confirmed in the faith into which he is received and in the divine promises, or, he still more confirms his church in his faith than he confirms himself. The Socinians and Arminians see in the sacraments mere external rites, by which the Christians differ from the Gentiles. The Anabaptists regard the sacraments as allegorical signs of spiritual life. The Swedenborgians regard them as symbols of a mutual union between God and man. The Quakers and our Dukhobors completely reject the visible side of the sacraments, and recognize them only as internal, spiritual actions of the heavenly light. All these and other similar conceptions about the sacraments, which are held by various Protestant sects, with all their differences, agree in this, that they equally reject the true conception about the sacraments as external sacramental actions, which actually communicate divine grace to the believers, and through it regenerate, renovate, and sanctify man. (2) Of the number of sacraments. As though not satisfied with the mere rejection of the true conception about the nature and efficacy of the sacraments, Protestantism has extended its sacrilegious hand upon this, in that it has diminished the number of sacraments, and, although in the beginning the Protestants showed a great diversity of opinions in this matter, they have finally agreed, of course each sect in its own way, to recognize only two sacraments: baptism and the eucharist. Of our dissenters, the so-called Popeless sectarians, though not denying that seven sacraments have been established, are satisfied with two only, saying, In need two of them are sufficient, baptism and repentance, and the others are not necessary.' (3) Of the conditions for the performance and actuality of sacraments. According to Luther's doctrine, no lawfully

established priest or bishop is needed for the performance of the sacraments; the sacraments may be performed by any clergyman or layman, by either man or woman, and they preserve their power, no matter how they are performed, even without any intention of performing, and even with ridicule or mystically. A full half of our dissenters, who form the Popeless sect, permit laymen also to perform the sacraments; but the other half, under the name of the Popish sect, leave them to the clergy, but to clergymen who are either under the ban or even entirely unfrocked, and who have in any case run away from the Orthodox Church, and have renounced it for the sake of joining the dissenting sect. On the other hand, the ancient Donatists, in the twelfth century, and later the Waldenses and the Albigenses, and beginning with the fifteenth century, the Wycliffites, fell into the opposite extreme, asserting that for the performance and efficacy of the sacraments not only a legally established priest but even a virtuous priest was needed, and that the sacraments which were performed by a tainted servant of the altar had no significance whatever. Finally the Reformers and Lutherans invented a doctrine that the efficacy of the sacraments depended not on the worth and inner disposition of the performer of the sacraments, but on the disposition and faith of the persons who received the sacraments, so that the sacrament is a sacrament and has power only during its acceptance and application together with faith, and that when it is not used, or when it is not accepted with faith, it is not a sacrament and remains sterile." (pp. 314–316.)

The Theology does not refute these heresies, but proceeds to expound its doctrine about the sacraments, each separately. I will analyze each one of these so-called sacraments, but first it is necessary to point out the deceit of the specious proof of the divine establishment of the sacraments, which alone and in one and the same form

will be applied to all the sacraments. The deception consists in the following: in the definition of the sacrament it was said that it is an external action which communicates actual grace, that is, a special spiritual power, given to him who receives the sacrament as established by Christ, and then it is pointed out that Christ has prescribed to the believers and to his disciples (but only in the case of baptism) a certain external action, and from this the conclusion is drawn that Christ has established the sacraments, that is, such actions as, when they are performed by the hierarchy, communicate to the believers a special spiritual power. The deception consists in this, that the assertion is made that Christ established the sacrament, that is, an external action which communicates internal grace, or, to speak more correctly, that Christ established the dogma of the sacrament, that is, the teaching that the immersion into water or the eating of bread and drinking of wine communicates some especial power to him who is immersed, or who eats bread and drinks wine. In order to prove the establishment of the Christian dogma of the sacraments, it is necessary to show that Christ ascribed to those external actions, to which the hierarchy points, calling them sacraments, those properties which the hierarchy ascribes to them, whereas there is not only no indication, but not even the slightest hint at such an understanding of the sacraments as practised by Christ. In asserting that Christ commanded men to bathe and sup in remembrance of him, the hierarchy has not the slightest foundation for the assertion that Christ established the sacraments of baptism and of the eucharist with all the meaning which the hierarchy ascribes to them, and about which there is, and there can be, no hint in Christ's teaching. Thus Art. 202 proves the divine origin of baptism as a sacrament by pointing out that Christ said to his disciples: "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore and teach all

nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world (Matt. xxviii. 18–20); he that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned (Mark xvi. 16)."

In the first place, Mark xvi. 16 is a later addition to the Gospel, like that other tempting addition that believers shall take up serpents and not be hurt by drinking deadly things. Even if the genuineness of this passage be admitted, neither from it, nor from Matt. xxviii. 19, does it follow that baptism communicates any special power to those who are baptized. In Matthew men are to be baptized and taught to observe whatever Christ has commanded; in Mark it is mentioned that he who believes and is baptized shall be saved. Where is there the establishment of the sacrament such as it is defined to be by the Theology? All that may be said from these verses in Matthew and in Mark in favour of the rite of bathing is that Christ has selected, or, more correctly, has not rejected, the external sign of bathing, adopted by his predecessor John, for all the believers in his teaching.

But everything which is understood by the hierarchy under the invisible action of baptism has been established by that hierarchy, and by no means by Christ. That may be seen from the subsequent exposition of the article, in which there is a detailed account of the visible and the invisible side of the sacrament, for which no indication can be found in Holy Scripture.

203. The visible side of baptism. There is a detailed exposition of the sacrament about what to bathe in, how many times to immerse, who is to do the bathing, and what is to be said during the act. The proof is given that those who do differently are heretics, and that grace does not operate if there is any deviation from these rules.

204. The invisible actions of the sacrament of baptism and its unrepeatedness. Here it is said that at the same time "that the catechumen is visibly immersed in the waters of baptism, with the words, 'The slave of God is recognized . . . in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost,' divine grace invisibly operates on the whole being of the one who is baptized and (1) regenerates or re-creates him; (2) purifies him from all sin, and justifies and sanctifies him; (3) makes him a child of God and a member of Christ's body; (4) saves him from eternal punishment for sins and makes him an inheritor of eternal life." All that has not the slightest foundation in Christ's teaching.

205. The necessity of baptism for all. The baptism of babes. Baptism by blood. The proof is given that it is necessary to baptize infants because they are cursed by the original sin, and if an unbaptized child dies, it goes to hell, whereas if it is baptized it goes to heaven. All that is proved from Holy Scripture.

206. Who may perform baptism, and what is demanded of those who are baptized. It is proved that priests ought to baptize, but deacons may sometimes, and sometimes even simple people may. All that is proved from Holy Scripture. To be baptized, one needs faith, the same that was spoken of in the article about grace and repentance. When infants are baptized, the sponsors must guarantee their faith, that is, pronounce the words of the creed and renounce the devil.

It is evident that all that has been established, not by Christ, but by one of the many diverging hierarchies. After baptism follows unction with chrism.

207. Connection with what precedes; the place of the sacrament of unction with chrism in the series of the rest; the conception about this sacrament, and its name. "Through baptism we are born into spiritual life, and pure from all sin, justified, and sanctified do we enter into

Christ's kingdom of grace. But as a natural living man, the moment he is born, has need of air, light, and the other external assistances and powers for the support of his existence, for his gradual strengthening, and for his growth, even so it is in spiritual life: immediately after man's birth from above, he has need of the grace-giving powers of the Holy Ghost, which may serve for him as spiritual air and light, and with the aid of which he may not only support his new life, but also constantly strengthen himself and grow. It is these divine powers which pertain unto life and godliness (2 Peter i. 3) that are given to each who is reborn in baptism, through another sacrament of the church, through the sacrament of unction with chrism." (pp. 345 and 346.)

It is proved that the sacrament of unction with chrism was established by Christ. Here are the proofs:

"(1) Gospel history proves that Christ the Saviour had intended and promised to give the Holy Ghost to those who believed in him. In the last day, that great day of the feast, says St. John the Divine, Jesus stood and cried, saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink. He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. (But this spake he of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive: for the Holy Ghost was not yet given; because that Jesus was not yet glorified) (John vii. 37–39). Here, evidently, mention is made of gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are offered to and consequently are necessary for all believers in our Lord Jesus, and not of extraordinary gifts, which are communicated only to a few believers for special purposes (1 Cor. xii. 29, and so forth), though it does not say by what visible mediation the necessary gifts of the Holy Ghost are to be transmitted to all believers. (2) The Book of the Apostolic Acts tells us that after Jesus Christ was glorified, the apostles actually gave the Holy Ghost to those

who believed in him, and that they did by the laying on of hands. Such, for example, is the following case: Now when the apostles which were at Jerusalem heard that Samaria had received the word of God, they sent unto them Peter and John: who, when they were come down, prayed for them, that they might receive the Holy Ghost: (for as yet he was fallen upon none of them: only they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus). Then laid they their hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost (Acts viii. 14–17). From this it is quite clear: (*a*) that the Holy Ghost was communicated by the apostles, not through baptism (in which the believers are only regenerated or re-created by the Holy Ghost suddenly, without receiving him for ever), but by the laying on of hands on the one who is baptized; (*b*) that by this laying on of hands the apostles communicated to the believers the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are necessary for all who have received baptism, but not extraordinary gifts, which are communicated only to the few; (*c*) that this laying on of hands, united with a prayer to God about sending the Holy Ghost down on those who are baptized, should form a special sacrament, distinct from baptism, and (*d*) finally, that this sacrament, distinct from baptism, has a divine origin, because the apostles in all their words and acts, in spreading the Gospel teaching, were inspired by the Holy Ghost, who taught them every truth, and brought to their remembrance all the things which the Lord Jesus had commanded them (John xiv. 26; xvi. 13)." (pp. 347 and 348.)

The deception which the hierarchy has appropriated to itself for the purpose of assuring the flock that Christ has established the sacraments consists, as we have seen, in taking the slightest hint given by Christ or the apostles in regard to some external action and ascribing to it the improper meaning of a sacrament, and of asserting that Christ has established that sacrament. But this de-

ception has some plausibility only in the case of baptism; in the other cases there is not even any cause for deception, and the hierarchy has to invent the cause itself, as it has done in the present case. Because Christ has said, "He that believeth on me, as the scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water," it follows that all have to be anointed with oil, and that Christ promises a special advantage from it. Then follows the exposition of the dogma.

209. The visible side of the sacrament of unction with chrism. The visible side consists in this, that the anointing is done in the form of a cross and certain words are pronounced. Proofs from Holy Scripture.

210. The invisible side of unction with chrism, and its unrepeatedness. The invisible action consists in this, that the Holy Ghost enters into him who is being anointed, and there enters grace, (1) which enlightens in the truth of faith, (2) confirms in godliness. Mention is made that in former days they began to prophesy and speak in various tongues after it, but now that does not happen, — the Holy Ghost merely enters.

211. To whom the sacrament of unction with chrism belongs, and when it is to be performed. A priest, and not the bishop only, may anoint with chrism, and so the Catholics are wrong, and that is proved at great length.

212. Connection with the preceding. Conception of the sacrament of the eucharist. Its superiority and different appellations.

"Through the sacrament of baptism we enter Christ's kingdom of grace pure, justified, regenerated for spiritual life. In the sacrament of unction with chrism we receive in ourselves the powers of grace, which are necessary for our strengthening and growth in the spiritual life. Finally, in the sacrament of the eucharist we are made worthy for the same high purpose of partaking of the food and drink which gives salvation, — the pure flesh

and blood of our Lord Jesus, and most sincerely unite with the very fountain of life (Psalm xxxvi. 9)." (pp. 366 and 367.)

This sacrament, in which we most sincerely unite with God, surpasses all the others:

"(1) By its superabundance of mysteriousness and incomprehensibility. In all the other sacraments the incomprehensibility consists in this, that under a certain visible form divine grace is invisibly operating upon man, but the substance of the sacraments itself, for example, in baptism, the water, in unction with chrism, the chrism, remain unchangeable. Here, on the contrary, the substance itself changes: the bread and the wine, which keep their form, are miraculously changed into the true body and blood of our Lord, and only then, when they have been received by the believers, do they invisibly produce in them their actions of grace. (2) By the superabundance of the Lord's love for us, and by the extraordinary grandeur of the gift, which is communicated to us in this sacrament. In the other sacraments the Lord Jesus communicates to those who believe in him such or such particular gifts of saving grace, in conformity with the substance of each sacrament, — gifts which he acquired for men by his death on the cross. But here he offers as food for his believers his own self, his own body and blood, and the believers, directly uniting with their Lord and Saviour, are in this manner united with the very fountain of saving grace. (3) Finally, by this, that all the other sacraments are only sacraments which act savingly upon man, but the eucharist is not only the most incomprehensible and the most saving of the sacraments, but at the same time is a sacrifice to God, a sacrifice which is brought to him for all the living and all the dead, and gains his favour." (pp. 367 and 368.)

The doctrine about this sacrament indeed differs from all the others. It differs first of all in that it completely

departs from the former definition of the sacrament. This sacrament, according to the Theology: (1) not only gives power to him who receives it, but also represents a constantly repeated miracle; (2) gives us God to be eaten up; (3) is a sacrifice which God himself brings for himself, — all kinds of phenomena which do not enter into the first definition. According to the definition of this sacrament, it not only communicates grace to those who receive it, but is also a transmutation of a substance, a conversion of God into food for men, and a sacrifice of God, brought by God himself. But that does not disturb the Theology. It goes on to prove that this especial sacrament was established by Christ.

213. The divine promise of the sacrament of the eucharist, and its very establishment. To prove that this sacrament was established by Christ, there is adduced from the Gospel the sixth chapter of John, the words from the holy supper, and the Epistle to the Corinthians. In looking through the chapter of John, it is easy to see that, avoiding all interpretation and sticking to the literal meaning, he, his flesh and blood, is the bread of life, that he gives that bread of life to men, and that he who will not eat that bread will not have life. Christ promises to give to men the bread of life, which he calls his flesh and blood and, without saying what is to be understood by his flesh and blood, commands men to eat that bread. The only conclusion which can be drawn from that is that men must eat the bread which Christ has called his flesh and blood, that this bread exists and must exist, and that therefore men must seek that bread, as he told them to do, but in no way is it possible to draw the conclusion which the church draws, namely, that that bread is the baked leavened bread and grape wine, not every kind of bread and every wine, but that of which we shall be told that Christ has commanded us to partake of.

The other place on which is based the sacrament of

the eucharist is the passage from the Gospel and from the Epistle to the Corinthians, where it says that Christ, bidding his disciples farewell, said to them: "Here I break bread and give you wine. This is my blood and my body, which is given to save you from sin. Eat and drink all of you!" Christ before his death said to his disciples, as he broke bread and handed them the cup: "This wine and this bread are my flesh and my blood. Drink now and then do it in remembrance of me!" From these words it may be concluded that Christ, bidding his disciples farewell, told them that he was dying for men and that he commanded them to do likewise, that is, like him to give their body and blood for men; it is possible to conclude that as he broke bread and gave them the wine he commanded them to think of him; it is possible to stick to the most literal meaning about the flesh and blood and conclude that he did a miracle before his disciples and gave them, in the form of bread and wine, his own body to eat and his blood to drink; it is even possible to conclude that he commanded his disciples to perform the same miracle, that is, out of bread and wine to make the body and blood of each particular disciple; if you wish, it is possible even to conclude the most far-fetched proposition, that he commanded them to perform a miracle, which was, to make Christ's blood and flesh out of bread and wine, — but under no consideration is it possible to conclude what the church concludes from it, namely, that not only the disciples, whom he addressed, but certain men at a certain time and under certain conditions must produce something similar to that miracle, and must believe and assure others that the bread and wine which they offer is the very body and blood of Christ; that, in receiving this bread and wine with the assurance that they are Christ's body and blood, men are saved. This conclusion, which our hierarchy makes, is absolutely impossible, the more so since the hierarchy

asserts that many perform this miracle irregularly. It is impossible to tell when this miracle is performed and when not, for there are no other signs of that miracle but faith in the fact that it is being performed. However, it is superfluous to prove the irrationalness and arbitrariness of this sacrament; it is sufficient to follow out the conclusions to which the Theology leads in this matter, having accepted that conception of it, in order that the absurdity of this sacrament and its blasphemy may become manifest.

214. The visible side of the sacrament of the eucharist. The visible side of the sacrament consists: (1) of the substance employed; (2) of the sacramental action, and (3) of words pronounced. The bread used in it must be of wheat, pure and leavened. There are five pages of proof that the bread must be leavened. The wine must be made from grapes. There are described all the manipulations which the priest must perform during it: the offertory, the liturgy, and the words which are to be pronounced. It also mentions which words are the most important of all.

215. The invisible essence of the sacrament of the eucharist; the actuality of the presence of Jesus Christ in that sacrament. The invisible action consists in this, that not symbolically (τυπικῶς), as some say, not with a superabundance of grace, as others say, not essentially (ὑποστατικῶς), not through the penetration of the bread (κατ' ἐναρτισμόν), "but truly and actually, so that after the sanctification of the bread and wine, the bread is transformed, transubstantiated, transmuted into the true body of Christ, which was born in Bethlehem of the Ever-virgin, was baptized in the Jordan, suffered, was buried, was raised from the dead, ascended to heaven, sits on the right of God the Father, is to appear in the clouds of heaven."

Precisely thus must we believe.

There follows a controversy. All are wrong, but:

"The doctrine of the Orthodox Church about the actuality of the presence of Jesus Christ in the sacrament of the eucharist has imperturbable foundations in Holy Scripture, as well as in Holy Tradition." (p. 386.)

Here is a sample of the proofs why this action is to be understood as the church understands it: "In establishing the eucharist, the Lord established the greatest sacrament of the New Testament, which he commanded to be performed at all times (Luke xxii. 19, 20). But the importance of the sacrament necessary for our salvation, and the nature of the promise, and the nature of the commandment demanded alike that the clearest and most definite language be used, so that it might not lead to any misunderstandings in so important a matter."

216. The manner and consequences of the presence of Jesus Christ in the sacrament of the eucharist. "(1) If this presence consists, as we have seen, in this, that after the sanctification of the holy gifts, there are present in the eucharist and are communicated to the believers not the bread and wine, but the real body and the real blood of the Lord, — that does not mean that he is present in the sacrament, that he, as it were, penetrates (according to the Lutheran heresy) the bread and wine, which remain intact, and only coexists with them (*in, eum, sub pane*) with his body and blood, but that the bread and wine are transformed, transubstantiated, transmuted into the very body and blood of the Lord. (2) Although the bread and wine in the sacrament of the eucharist are transformed properly into the body and blood of the Lord, he is present in this sacrament, not with his body and blood alone, but with his whole soul, which is inseparably connected with this body, and with his very divinity, which is hypostatically and inseparably connected with his humanity. (3) Although the Lord's body and blood are broken in the sacrament of the communion and are

divided up, that happens only with the forms of the bread and wine, in which Christ's body and blood may be seen and felt; in themselves they are completely integral and indivisible. (4) Similarly, although the sacrament of the eucharist is performed in endless places of the world, Christ's body is always and everywhere one, and Christ's blood is always and everywhere one, and everywhere one and the same Christ, complete God and complete man, integrally takes part in it. (5) If the bread and wine through the sacramental sanctification is transubstantiated into the real body and blood of Christ the Saviour, that means that from the time of the sanctification of the holy gifts he is constantly present in the sacrament, that is, he is present not only in the application and reception of the sacrament by the believers, as the Lutherans assert, but even before the reception, for the bread and wine, having been transubstantiated into Christ's body and blood, no longer change back into their former substances, but remain the body and blood of the Lord for ever, independently of whether they will be used by the believers or not. (6) If the bread and wine in the holy, life-giving sacraments are the real body and the real blood of our Lord Jesus, then these sacraments ought to receive the same honour and divine worship which we owe to our Lord Jesus himself." (pp. 396–402.)

217. Who may perform the sacraments of the eucharist. Who may receive the communion, and wherein the preparation for it is to consist.

The power to perform this sacrament belongs to the bishop. The bishops transfer the power to the presbyters, but deacons may not perform it; nor can laymen. But all, even babes, may receive the communion. There is a controversy about that.

218. The necessity of the communion of the eucharist, by all means under two kinds, and the fruits of the sacrament.

All must receive the communion. Proofs. Men must be communed over bread and wine, and not over bread alone. Again controversy and proofs. For this controversy Hus was burnt and his followers were tortured. I mention only in words the controversy and the proofs. But, O Lord, what a terrible book would be that history of theology, which should tell about all the violence, deceptions, tortures, murders, which have taken place because of each of these controversies! As one now reads about these controversies, all that seems so unimportant and ludicrous, but how much wrong they have done in the world!

219. The eucharist as a sacrifice: (*a*) the verity or actuality of this sacrifice. "In believing and confessing that the most holy eucharist is a true sacrament, the Orthodox Church believes also and confesses, in spite of the aberrations of the Protestants, that the eucharist is at the same time a true and real sacrifice, that is, that in the eucharist is the body and blood of our Saviour, which on the one hand are offered as food to men, and on the other are brought as a sacrifice to God." (p. 414.)

220. (*b*) Relation of this sacrifice to the sacrifice on the cross, and its properties. "The sacrifice which is brought by God in the sacrament of the eucharist is precisely the same as the sacrifice on the cross."

Further on it says that this sacrifice has the property of propitiating God, and so it is necessary immediately after it, and as soon as possible to remember men. That will cause God to help men.

"Since a bloodless sacrifice has the power of propitiating and inclining God toward us, it naturally has the power to gain for us various benefits from God, and, being propitiatory, it is at the same time precatory and intercessory. For this reason the holy church, in bringing a bloodless offering, not only prays God to remit sins and save the living and the dead, but also asks God for all kinds of

gifts, spiritual and bodily, which are necessary for human life."

That ends the exposition of the sacrament of the eucharist. It took up eighty pages. Everything which has been expounded here, the whole blasphemous delirium, all that was founded by Christ. The fall is taking place with terrible celerity, the fall from the height of questions into the bog of most incomprehensible superstitions. The first fall happened when it was asserted that God redeemed us in a visible manner, and now the last, when there are described the actions of that grace. There is no place to go any lower. What is the difference between a Chuvash, who smears his God with cream, and an Orthodox, who eats a small piece of his God, or who is hastening to offer five kopeks, that his name may be mentioned in a certain place and at a certain time? Then follows the sacrament of repentance.

221. Connection with the preceding; conception of the sacrament of repentance and its various appellations. "In the three saving sacraments of the church, heretofore discussed by us, there is imparted to man the whole abundance of spiritual gifts, which are necessary for him to become a Christian and, having become one, to abide in Christian godliness and attain everlasting happiness. Baptism purifies sinful man from all of his sins, both the original and the voluntary, and introduces him into Christ's kingdom of grace. Unction with chrism communicates to him divine powers for his strengthening and growth in the life of grace. The eucharist furnishes him with divine food and unites him with the fountain of life and of grace. But since, having become completely cleansed from all sin in the bath of baptism, man is not freed from the consequences of original sin and inherited corruption, such as, in the soul, the propensity to do evil, and in the body, diseases and death (Arts. 91–93), since even after baptism, being a Christian, he may sin,

and even very often (1 John i. 8, 10), and be subject to diseases, sometimes very serious ones, which bring him to the grave, — it has pleased the all-good God to establish in his church two other sacraments, as two saving remedies for his ailing members: the sacrament of repentance, which remedies our spiritual ailments, and the sacrament of unction with oil, which extends its saving action over the bodily ailments."

But why only over the ailments? Did we not hear before that the redemption freed men from diseases and death, and that this redemption becomes operative through the sacrament of unction with oil? Consequently unction with oil destroys diseases and death. But laws are not written for the Theology. Unction with oil, as will be seen later, operates against diseases and death, but only a tiny little bit.

"Repentance, taken in the sense of a sacrament, is a sacramental action in which the pastor of the church, by strength of the Holy Ghost, absolves the repentant Christian from all sins committed by him after his baptism, so that the Christian again becomes innocent and sanctified, such as he came out of the waters of baptism." (pp. 425 and 426.)

From the standpoint of the church, what is important in this sacrament is not the humility with which the repentant man approaches it, not that verification of himself, but only that purification from sin which the hierarchy dispenses by force of an imaginary power. I even wonder why the church does not entirely abolish this sacrament, substituting for it that remissory prayer, which it has introduced and which is said over the dead: "I, unworthy man, by force of the power given to me, remit your sins." The church sees only this external imaginary purification and cares only for it, that is, it sees only the external action to which it ascribes a curative significance. What is taking place in the soul of the repentant sinner

is of no consequence to it. Though there are added certain reflections about how the repentant sinner is to approach the sacrament, they are given only *en passant* and are no important condition under which the imaginary purification takes place. The whole matter is in the imaginary purification over which the hierarchy has the power. The proof is given, as in the case of all the other sacraments, that it was established by Christ, but, as in all sacraments, there is not the slightest proof that Christ uttered the words which he spoke, no matter how we may understand them, having the sacraments in view.

222. The divine establishment and the efficacy of the sacrament of repentance. To prove this imaginary power, there are adduced the words of Matthew (xviii. 17, 18), which are explained in this sense, that the pastors have always enjoyed the divinely given right to bind and loose. The hierarchy understands these words to mean that it has the right to remit sins, and everything is based on that conversation: And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven (Matt. xviii. 17, 18).

Here is the whole passage: "If thy brother shall trespass against thee (these words the hierarchy omits in order to introduce its own interpretation), go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained a brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on

earth, shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven (Matt. xviii. 15–18)."

This clear place, which is given as an instruction for all men, is expounded topsyturvy only because here is used the word ἐκκλησία, assembly, which later has received a different meaning, and is represented as a confirmation of an imaginary power of the hierarchy, which is that of remitting sins.

But, let us assume, contrary to the text and to common sense, that these words were addressed by Christ not to all men, but exclusively to his disciples; let us assume that he gave them the power to remit sins, — in what way does from that result the sacrament of repentance, which makes each who receives it an innocent man? Again there is the old trick: a sacrament, which was established after Christ, and of which no one in his time could have had any conception, is ascribed to Christ. Then follows the exposition of the rules of that sacrament.

223. Who may perform the sacrament of repentance, and who receives it. This sacrament, that is, the remission of sins, may be performed only by the priests.

224. What is demanded of those who approach the sacrament of repentance? Approaching repentance it is necessary to have: (1) contrition for sins. There is even a description of the character of that contrition: "As regards the nature of the contrition respecting the sins, it is necessary to see to it that it does not result merely from the fear of punishment for the sins, not from the conceptions in general of the deleterious consequences for us arising from them in the present and in the future life, but mainly from love for God, whose will we have violated, and from a living consciousness that with our sins we have offended our greatest benefactor and Father, have appeared ungrateful before him, and have become unworthy of him;" (2) an intention of not sinning again;

(3) an oral confession of our sins, and then the priest says: "Our Lord and God Jesus Christ, with the grace and gifts of his philanthropy, may forgive thee, my child, all thy trespasses, and I, unworthy priest, by the power given me forgive and loose thee from all thy sins, in the name of the Father and the Holy Ghost. Amen." (p. 437.)

And then the man is purified. It is very useful and necessary that the guiltiness of the sins should be loosed by the priest's prayer before the last day. But it does not say what will happen if there is not that contrition which is demanded, when there is not the firm and determined intention not to sin again, while the priest gives the remission of sins; but we know that there never is that contrition which is demanded, nor that intention not to sin and to believe. Thus from the whole description of this sacrament of the church, which considers all its essence to consist in the power of remitting sins through its hierarchy, we get a kind of a toy, something ridiculous, or, at least, a senseless action.

225. The visible side of the sacrament of repentance; its invisible actions, and its extent.

Here it is proved that there is no sin that could not be forgiven by the hierarchy, except the sin of not believing in what the hierarchy teaches.

226. Penances, their origin and use in the church. "Under the name of penances (ἐπιτιμία) are meant prohibitions or punishments (2 Cor. ii. 6), which, according to the church rules, the minister of the church, as a spiritual physician, determines in the case of certain penitent Christians for the sake of curing their moral ailments."

This power the hierarchy has received from God.

227. The significance of the penances.

228. The incorrectness of the doctrine of the Catholic Church about the indulgences. For twenty-two pages we

get an extended controversy with the Catholics about penances and indulgences. Penances are correctionary punishments, and not punishments of revenge. All that is proved by Holy Scripture against the Catholics, who prove the opposite from the same Holy Scripture. In regard to the indulgences, the question stands as follows: Christ has redeemed the whole world with a profit, — a surplus is left; besides, the priests by their good lives have increased this surplus so that there is now a big pile of goodness. All these profits are at the service of the church. With these profits, which are hard to dispose of, the church, all the time guided by the Holy Ghost, pays God for the sins of its members, and the members pay to it not with something mysterious, but simply with cash. Now this doctrine is not so much objected to, as it is corrected. Our hierarchy agrees to the fact that the church has complete charge of this capital and with this capital pays for the sins of men, remitting the sins to these men in the sacrament of repentance; but the controversy is as to whether the church or its head may arbitrarily forgive these sins without the penitence of the sinner himself. The Catholics say that it can, our men say that it cannot. Of course, there is no sense in either assertion, just as there is no human sense in the question itself; but in this case, as in many other controversies with the Catholics and Protestants, our hierarchy, if it has any distinguishing feature at all, is characterized by stupidity and by an absolute inability to express itself in conformity with the laws of logic. Precisely the same happens in this controversy. The Catholics are logically more correct. If the church can remit sins by dint of its power, and the church is always holy, why should it not pardon robbers, as indeed all the churches do? After that follows the sacrament of unction with oil.

229. Connection with the preceding; conception of unction with oil, and its appellations. "The sacrament of

repentance, as a healing of grace, is intended for all Christians, but only for curing their spiritual ailments. The sacrament of unction with oil is another healing of salvation, which is intended for Christians who are infirm of body, and has for its purpose the healing of not only their spiritual, but also their bodily infirmities." (p. 464.)

Here is precisely a case which confirms what I have more than once said about the characteristic feature of our church, — its stupidity. It was said before that repentance heals the soul of sins, and that unction with oil heals the body of diseases and death. It would, therefore, be necessary to explain why unction with oil cures neither diseases nor death. It cannot be concealed that there is no such cure. About the soul it is possible to say what you please, but here that cannot be done: the matter is too obvious; it is necessary either not to say anything about its ability to cure death, or to invent something. The Catholics are bound by logic, and so they have decided that this sacrament is imparted as a farewell ceremony over such patients as are sick unto death, and call it the extreme unction. But our church does not refute its power to cure, and has not invented anything to conceal the matter, but, as always, gets out of the difficulty by saying: "It does cure, but only in part, a tiny little bit, and at certain times." Then follow proofs of the divine origin of the sacrament.

230. The divine origin of the sacrament of unction with oil and its efficacy. There is not even a single hint in the Gospels as to the establishment of this sacrament by Jesus Christ, but that does not keep the Theology from asserting that it has been established by God:

"Of the sacrament of unction with oil distinct mention is made in Holy Scripture by Apostle James, when he instructs the Christians: Is any among you afflicted? let him pray. Is any merry? let him sing psalms, and

immediately adds: Is any sick among you? let him call for the elders of the church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him (James v. 14, 15). From these words there are disclosed to us at once the divine origin and its efficacy, as a sacrament. (1) The divine origin: for on the one hand it is evident from the context that the apostle does not speak of unction with oil, as of something new, which the Christians did not know before, but points out to them this means of healing, as something which has existed before and which was universally known to them, and which he commands them to use in case of sickness. On the other hand, it is evident that the apostles never preached anything of themselves (Gal. i. 11, 12), but taught only what they had been commanded by our Lord Jesus (Matt. xxviii. 20), and what the Divine Spirit inspired them with (John xvi. 13); and it is known that they called themselves the servants of Christ, and stewards, and not establishers, of divine sacraments (1 Cor. iv. 1). Consequently unction with oil, which is commanded to the Christians by St. James, as a sacramental healing of diseases, both bodily and spiritual, was commanded by our Lord Jesus Christ himself and by the Divine Spirit. We do not find any statement in Scripture at what particular time our Lord established this sacrament, for many things which he taught and did on earth are not transmitted in writing (John xxi. 25). But it is most natural to think that this sacrament, like two others (baptism and repentance), through which remission of sins is granted, was established by our Lord after his resurrection, when all power was given unto him in heaven and in earth (Matt. xxviii. 18), and when he showed himself to the apostles for forty days and spoke to them of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God (Acts i. 3), that

is, of the establishment of his church, an essential part of which is formed by the sacraments." (pp. 465, 466.)

There are no other proofs. What is striking is that not only are there no foundations for any sacrament, but there is not even the slightest cause for this particular sacrament; none the less it is proved that this, too, was founded by God.

231. To whom and by whom the sacrament of unction with oil may be communicated. We are told that all the sick, and not merely the dying, as with the Catholics, may be anointed, and that the anointing may be done by priests, still better, by bishops. Best of all it is if seven priests do the anointing, but even three, or one, may do it.

232. The visible side of the sacrament of unction with oil, and its invisible actions of salvation.

The visible side consists in anointing and saying prayers, and the invisible side, — what do you suppose it is? The invisible side is the healing of bodily infirmities.

"The sacrament of unction with oil is established more particularly for those who are sick in body: consequently the healing of bodily ailments forms the very first saving fruit of this sacrament." (p. 472.)

The healing is classed with the invisible side, because, of course, unction with oil does not produce it. The Theology is not embarrassed, but says outright that there is a cure, but it is invisible.

"This action does not always follow on unction with oil. That is true. But: (*a*) at times it actually takes place and the patient slowly gets well and rises from his sick-bed. More frequently, (*b*) the dangerously sick man receives, at least, temporary relief from disease or is strengthened or aroused to bear it, and that is also one of the aims of unction with oil, for the verb ἐγείρω signifies not only 'raise up,' but also 'to rouse, to encourage, to strengthen.' At times, however, (*c*) those who receive the sacrament of unction with oil do not receive from it

a healing of ailments, perhaps for the same reason that those who receive the sacrament of the eucharist, instead of saving fruits, only eat and drink damnation for themselves (1 Cor. xi. 29), that is, on account of their unworthiness, on account of an absence of a living faith in our Lord Jesus, or on account of hard-heartedness. Finally, (*d*) to wish or to demand that each time when a man is receiving unction with oil he should be cured of his diseases would be the same thing as demanding that he should never die; but that is contrary to the very plan of our regeneration, according to which it is necessary for us to depose this sinful, mortal body, in order to clothe ourselves in proper time, beyond the grave, in an immortal body. For this reason every man who approaches the sacrament of unction with oil, every sick person, ought entirely to abandon himself to the will of God, who knows better than we, to whom it is more useful to send down a cure and prolong his life, and whose life is to be cut short before its time." (pp. 472 and 473.)

What use was there then of talking about the cure of diseases and of death? And so the first invisible action is the non-existing cure of diseases; the second is the cure of spiritual infirmities.

After that there is a refutal of the doctrine of the Catholics, which ascribed at least some meaning to the sacrament; what is refuted is that this sacrament is meant as a farewell action before death. Then follows the sixth sacrament, established by God.

233. Connection with what precedes. Marriage as a divine institution, and its aim; the conception of marriage as a sacrament, and its appellations. "Three sacraments of the Orthodox Church, baptism, unction with chrism, communion, are intended for all men, so that all may become Christians and then abide in Christian godliness and obtain everlasting salvation. Two other sacraments, repentance and unction with oil, are intended for all

Christians as two saving remedies, one, in case of spiritual infirmities, and the other, in case of bodily and, at the same time, spiritual ailments. But there are two more sacraments, established by God, which, even though they are not predetermined and necessary for all men and though they are not necessary directly for each of the members of the church, are necessary for the purposes of the church in general, for its existence and flourishing condition. Those are: (*a*) the sacrament of marriage, which communicates to certain persons grace for the natural procreation of children, the future members of the church, and (*b*) the sacrament of priesthood, which communicates to special persons the grace for the supernatural procreation of the children of the church and for their education for the eternal life." (pp. 475 and 476.)

But, according to its definition, a sacrament is a holy action which under a visible form communicates to the soul of the believer the invisible grace of God. But the procreation of children is not an invisible grace. Besides, in defining a sacrament, it was said: "For the performance of a sacrament three things are needed: a proper substance, such as water is in baptism, bread and wine in the eucharist, oil, and other substances according to the sacrament." (p. 314.)

Here no substance is needed. Marriage apparently does not fit in with the definition of a sacrament, and in general differs from all the other sacraments by this essential feature, that in all the other sacraments (including priesthood) by sacrament are understood external actions, which are performed over something which is supposed to take place, which is not connected with anything real, and which is entirely useless, whereas here by sacrament are meant certain external actions, which are performed over something real, and one of the most important acts in human life. The Theology says:

"Marriage may be considered from two sides: as a law

of Nature, or as a divine institution, and as a sacrament of the New Testament church, which now, after the fall of man, sanctifies this law." (p. 476.)

The sanctifying sacrament consists in this: "In order to sanctify, uplift, and strengthen the law of matrimony, which is holy and pure in itself as to its origin from God and as to its purposes, but which because of the disturbance of human nature has fallen under the harmful influence of sin and has in many ways been distorted by men who have abandoned themselves to sensuality, our Lord Jesus has been pleased to establish in his church a special sacrament, that of marriage. Under the name of this sacrament is understood a sacred action in which to the contracting parties, who before the church make a promise of mutual conjugal fidelity, there is communicated from above, through the blessing of the servant of the church, divine grace, which sanctifies their conjugal union, elevates it to an image of Christ's spiritual union with the church, and then coöperates with them in the blessed acquisition of all the purposes of marriage." (pp. 478 and 479.)

That is, in connection with the law of marriage, which in itself is holy, the hierarchy finds it necessary to sanctify again.

234. A divine origin of the sacrament of marriage, as a sacrament, apparently does not, and cannot, exist in the Gospels, nor is there anything in them to hitch on to, and so the place is chosen in the Gospel where the word "marriage" is used. That place about the marriage in Cana of Galilee, which has nothing in common with the establishment of marriage, not even with its blessing and approval, is taken as a basis. The Theology itself feels, as in the case of the unction with oil, that there is nothing to hitch on to, and so it says:

"Of when and how the Lord established the sacrament of marriage, whether when he was present at the marriage

in Cana of Galilee (John ii. 1–11), or when, in consequence of the well-known question of the Pharisees, he disclosed the true conception about marriage, and said, What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder (Matt. xix. 3–12), or after his resurrection, when for forty days he appeared to his disciples, and spoke to them of the things pertaining to the kingdom of heaven, that is, of what had reference to the establishment of his church (Acts i. 3), the Gospel does not say anything: for there are many other things, which Jesus did, which are not written in these books (John xx. 30; xxi. 25)." (p. 479.)

But that is the very reason why it is considered proved.

235. The visible side of marriage, and invisible actions. The visible side of marriage is this, that groom and bride promise to be husband and wife, and the priest pronounces certain words. The invisible side: (1) grace sanctifies the union, as of Christ with the church; (2) strengthens, as Christ with the church; (3) coöperates in the performances of the obligations, as Christ with the church. Suddenly there is for some reason introduced the comparison of Christ and the church with husband and wife, and in that the invisible side of the sacrament is supposed to lie.

236. Who may perform the sacrament of marriage, and what is demanded of those who proceed to this sacrament. Popes may unite in marriage; the Orthodox (or at least one of the contracting parties an Orthodox) may marry. All others do not marry, but only cohabit.

237. The properties of Christian marriage, sanctified by the sacrament. One may marry only one woman, and divorce is granted only in the case of adultery. All that is regarded as a sacrament founded by God himself.

Of the sacrament of priesthood.

238. Connection with the preceding; the priesthood, as a special divinely established ministration in the church

(hierarchy), and its three degrees; conception about priesthood as a sacrament.

"In expounding the doctrine of the sacraments, we have heretofore remarked in the case of each of them that it may be performed and communicated to the believers only by the pastors of the church, by bishops and presbyters. But in order that men may become pastors of Christ's church and receive the power to perform the sacraments, the Lord has established a special sacrament, the sacrament of priesthood." (p. 490.)

Indeed, leaving out of consideration the fact that of all the sacraments not one has been established by Christ as a sacrament, and that in reference to four of them, to unction with chrism, repentance, unction with oil, and marriage, not even the slightest reference has been discovered, — all the sacraments, even according to the definition of the church, become sacraments only when they are performed by pastors of the church, that is, by true pastors, and so all the preceding sacraments are based on this sacrament of priesthood. If this is not a sacrament, and its origin cannot be proved, all the other sacraments fall of themselves, even though their efficacy may be proved. Farther on it says:

"Priesthood is understood in two senses, as a special class of men, a special ministration in the church, known under the name of hierarchy, and as special sacerdotal action, by which men are consecrated and ordained for this ministration. In the first case, we have already discussed the priesthood, and we have seen that the Lord himself established the hierarchy, or the order of pastors, whom alone he has empowered to be teachers in the church, performers of sacraments, and spiritual stewards, and that he has by no means permitted all the believers to assume all that." (p. 490.)

The sacraments may be performed only by priests, but, in order to be a priest, it is necessary that the sacrament

of priesthood be performed on him. In the preceding articles it was said that every sacrament is inefficacious, if it is not performed by real priests. In the explanations much was said about the heretical teachings which have a false priesthood. Consequently the whole strength, not only of this sacrament of priesthood, but of all other as well, lies in the clear proofs that the priesthood was established by Christ, that the transmission of this priesthood was established by him, and that among the many existing usurpating priesthoods the one under discussion is the only true one. And so we get:

239. The divine establishment and efficacy of the sacrament of priesthood. The proof is given that this sacrament is from God. Not only are there no proofs of the establishment of this sacrament, but, as in the case of the sacraments of unction with chrism and with oil, there is not the slightest reference to this sacrament in the Gospels. Here are the proofs:

"The divine establishment of the sacrament of priesthood is to be seen from the actions of the holy apostles, who themselves, by the instruction from the Holy Ghost who reminded them of everything which the Lord Jesus commanded them (John xiv. 26), performed this sacrament, and by the laying on of hands raised to the three degrees of the hierarchy." (p. 491.)

Then follow the proofs of the fathers and of the councils, so that it is even more obvious than in the case of the previous sacraments, that this sacrament was invented by the hierarchy independently of the teaching of Christ. Then follows an exposition of the sacrament.

240. The visible side of the sacrament; its invisible action and unrepeatedness. The visible side of the sacrament consists in the laying on of hands on the head, and in the saying certain words.

"The invisible action of the sacrament of priesthood consists in this, that by it, after the prayer, there is

actually imparted to him who is being ordained divine grace to correspond to his future ministration, — the grace of priesthood." (p. 495.)

The importance of the sacrament is as follows:

"If any one will reflect how important it is for a man, while he is still burdened with flesh and blood, to be present near the blessed and immortal essence, he will see clearly what honour the grace of the Spirit has bestowed on the priests. By them the sacrifices are offered and all the other high ministrations are performed, which have reference to our dignity and salvation. They still live and move about upon earth, and they have received the power which God has granted neither to the angels, nor to the archangels." (p. 495.) "The grace of priesthood, which is imparted through the laying on of hands, though in various degrees, upon deacons, presbyters, and bishops, and which vests them with a certain measure of spiritual power, abides in the soul of each of them unchangeably, for which reason neither a bishop, nor a presbyter, nor a deacon is a second time ordained for the same dignity, and the sacrament of priesthood is regarded as being unrepeatable." (p. 496.) Controversies about it.

241. Who may perform the sacrament of priesthood, and what is demanded of those who receive it.

"According to the teaching of the Orthodox Church, the power to lay on hands for an order of priesthood belongs only to the immediate successors of the apostles, the bishops."

Then follow long controversies about when this laying on of hands is efficacious, and when not. Priests must be: "(1) Orthodox Christians; (2) men experienced in the word of faith and in life, according to the righteous word; (3) if they are chosen to the dignity of bishop, they must be free from the bonds of marriage; but if they are chosen to the rank of presbyter or deacon, they may, if they so wish, live in a condition of matrimony." (p. 500.)

Then there comes a controversy about celibacy, but the question as to how it is proved that our hierarchy is the true successor of the apostles, and not one of the other hierarchies, which regard themselves as such, is not even mooted, so that of all the sacraments the one on which all the others are based not only fails to be proved or determined, but is also introduced quite arbitrarily and without the least sign by which it may be distinguished from anything resembling it. After that follows a division which is called Division VIII. General remarks on the sacraments. In these general remarks we find an exposition:

243. Of the nature of the sacraments. "The sacraments are not only signs of divine promises for the purpose of rousing faith in men, not merely simple rites, which distinguish Christians from Gentiles, not only symbols of spiritual life and so forth, as the heretics wrongly think (Art. 200), but sacramental actions, which under some visible form really impart to the believers an invisible grace of God; they are instruments which of necessity operate as grace on those who approach unto them." (p. 505.)

244. On the septenary number of the sacraments. It is proved that there are precisely seven sacraments. From these proofs the very opposite is clearly demonstrated.

"After that we must not be misled by the fact that some ancient teachers, as the need arose, or in conformity with the purpose chosen by them, or for some other reasons, speak in their writings now of two, now of three, and now of four sacraments, without mentioning the rest. It is quite wrong to conclude from that, as the Protestants have concluded, that the ancient church recognized only two sacraments (why not three or four?), baptism and the eucharist, for it is known that other teachers of the church at the same time or even earlier mentioned also all the rest; for it is known that the same teachers, mentioning baptism and the eucharist by name, at times point also to

other similar sacraments and in various passages of their writings clearly speak separately of each of the seven sacraments." (pp. 511 and 512.)

Any one who has read church history knows that there were seven sacraments, precisely seven, because there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, seven candelabra, seven seals, and so forth.

245. On the conditions for the performance and efficacy of the sacraments. For the performance of the sacraments, that is, for the communication of grace to the believers, are needed: "(1) A legally ordained presbyter or bishop; (2) a legal (that is, according to the divine ordainment) sacramental action of the sacraments." (pp. 513 and 514.)

"But, on the other hand, many heretics have wrongly thought: (*a*) that for the performance and efficacy of the sacraments is needed not only a legally ordained minister of the church, but also a pious servant, so that the sacraments performed by tainted servants of the altar have no significance, or (*b*) that the actuality and efficacy of each sacrament depends on the faith of the persons receiving it, so that it is a sacrament and has its full power only during the time of its reception or use with faith, and that when not used, or in case of acceptance without faith, it is not a sacrament and remains sterile (Art. 200). (1) The first is wrong, for the power of grace of the sacraments depends really on the deserts and the will of Christ the Saviour, who himself performs them invisibly, and the pastors of the church are only his servants and visible instruments, through whom he imparts the sacraments to men. (2) Wrong is also the second opinion, which assumes that the power and actuality of the sacraments is in complete dependence on the faith and disposition of the persons who receive the sacraments." (pp. 514–517.)

That is clear. The sacraments are purely external ac-

tions, like incantations against the toothache which act upon people, and there is no sense of speaking or thinking of any spiritual side either on the part of the one who pronounces the incantation, or on the part of those who are being cured. It is necessary to make certain motions with the hands and feet, and grace will come down.

246. Moral application of the dogma. The application of the dogma concludes the section about the sacraments. The only obvious application is to have recourse to the hierarchy for sanctification by means of sacraments. The whole doctrine about the sacraments, after it has been analyzed, is reduced to the following: among the number of senseless, discordant followers of Christ there are some who consider themselves to be ordained by those men who themselves have been ordained by the laying on of hands, who, finally, were ordained by the apostles. These people give no signs of their right of succession, but they assert that the grace of the Holy Ghost has come down to them, and that, in consequence of it, they know seven actions through which the grace of the Holy Ghost descends upon people, and this grace, though it is not determined by anything visible, they are able to bring down on people. The communication of this invisible grace by these men is in reality the doctrine about the sacraments.

XVII.

Chapter II. Of God as the Judge and Retributer.

Here the didactic part of the Theology is really ended. The doctrine about the sacraments is the aim and crown of all. It is necessary to prove to people that their salvation does not lie in them, but depends on the hierarchy, which can sanctify and save them. All men have to do is to obey and seek salvation; paying the clergy for it in honours and money. The next chapter is really not a teaching, but a threat, which will incite the flock to have recourse to the hierarchy. There is a short recapitulation of the doctrine from the beginning.

247. Connection with the preceding; conception of God as the Judge and Retributer, and the composition of the church doctrine about it.

" For the full rehabilitation and salvation of fallen man it was necessary to perform three great acts: (*a*) to reconcile the sinner with God, whom he has infinitely offended by his fall; (*b*) to cleanse the sinner from sins and make him righteous and holy; (*c*) to free the sinner from the punishments themselves for his sins, and to present to him the benefits which he has earned in accordance with his sanctity (Art. 124). The first act the Lord God achieved himself without our participation, when he sent down upon earth his only-begotten Son, who, having become incarnate and having taken upon himself the sins of the whole human race, has by his death brought full satisfaction to eternal justice, and in this manner has not only redeemed us from sins and from

punishments for sins, but has also made us partake of the gifts of the Holy Ghost and of eternal happiness (Art. 153). The second act the Lord God achieves with our coöperation. He has founded on earth his holy church as a living and constant instrument for our purification from sin and for our sanctification; he sends down to us in the church and through the church the grace of the Holy Ghost, as an actual force, which purifies us from sins and sanctifies us; he has established various sacraments in the church for communicating to us the various gifts of this saving grace, in conformity with all the needs of our spiritual life, and it lies with us whether we shall make use, or not, of the means of sanctification, which God offers to us." (pp. 520 and 521.)

God took pity on men who were perishing from their evil will, and redeemed them. But the condition of men after the redemption remained the same that it had been in the time of Adam and the patriarchs. Just as they who were before the redemption had to look for salvation, so we must do, who come after the redemption. The difference between the condition of the Old Testament and that of grace is this, that then there did not exist the mechanical means of the sacraments, but now it exists. The difference is this, that Jacob and Abraham could save themselves by their good lives, by the fulfilment of God's will in life, and now we can be saved through sacraments.

All that would be very nice, but with this teaching, it would seem, it would be impossible to recognize retribution, because retribution results from the absolutely free activity of man, while with salvation through the sacraments man is not free. Salvation through good works differs from any other in that it is absolutely free. A man is for moral good as free on the cross as at home; but the salvation through sacraments does not fully, and sometimes does not at all, depend on the will of man, so

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that, in spite of the whole desire to be baptized, anointed, communed, man may not have the chance to be so. Consequently retribution appears as unjust, when grace is taken into consideration. Adam could be punished for the apple; he could have eaten, or not eaten it; but a punishment because a man had no chance or possibility to be baptized or to commune, such a punishment destroys the idea of God's justice, and that is precisely what results from church grace. According to the Old Testament, God is represented as crude and cruel, but none the less just; according to the new grace, as the hierarchy teaches it, he is represented as an unjust judge, as one gone mad, who punishes men for what is beyond their will.

Evidently one cannot get away from the laws of reason. The first error, or lie, of the redemption led up to the greater lie of grace, and grace led to a still greater lie, to the faith of obedience, and this again to the mechanical actions of the sacraments. The necessity of an incitement for the performance of the sacraments led up to retribution, and that teaching has found its expression in a horrifying monstrosity.

God, to save all men, gave his Son up to execution, and from this it follows that if a pope is too late with his sacrament when I am dying, I shall go, if not directly to hell, somewhere where I shall be much worse off than he who has stolen a lot of money and has hired a pope or several popes to be always about him. That is not a misuse, but a direct conclusion. But that does not embarrass the Theology. It says: "The first thing is that God has saved us; the second thing is that he has given us sacraments; the third thing the Lord God achieves after the performance of the second, which he achieves with our help: he then appears as the judge of men, who justly weighs our deserts, whether we have made proper use, or not, of the means of purification from sins and of sanctifi-

cation, which he has given us on earth, and whether we are worthy, or not, to be freed from punishments for sins and to receive happiness; he appears thereupon as a just Retributer, who determines the due part for each man according to his deserts." (p. 521.)

The means against it are the sacraments. Then follows the usual exposition. In the retribution all three persons of the Trinity take part.

248. The circumstance which prepares the private judgment. Man's death. Death is spoken of as something new and unknown to anybody. The cause of death is the fall of the first man, and from the first man we took that habit. All that is proved.

249. The actuality of the private judgment. It is proved that after death there takes place a private judgment of man in distinction from the general judgment. The judgment, that is, a certain process of investigation and the retribution which follows from it, is ascribed to omniscient and all-good God.

250. Representation of the private judgment: teaching about the torments. "Holy Scripture does not tell us how a private judgment takes place. But an objective representation of this judgment, based mainly on Holy Tradition and in agreement with Holy Scripture, we find in the teaching about the torments (τελωνία), which has existed since antiquity in the Orthodox Church." (p. 528.)

The torments are described and confirmed by Holy Scripture on ten pages. We are told that "at the parting of our soul from our body there will arise before us, on the one hand, a host of the heavenly powers, and on the other, the powers of darkness, the evil keepers of the world, the aerial chiefs of torments, the inquisitors and arraigners of our deeds. Upon seeing them, the soul will be excited, and will be convulsed and tremble, and in confusion and terror will seek for defence among the angels of God; but

even when it will be accepted by the holy angels, and under their protection will flit through the aerial spaces and rise to the height, it will encounter various torments, as it were barriers or toll-gates where taxes are collected, which will bar its way to the kingdom and will stop and arrest its striving toward it. At each of these torments an account of some special sins will be demanded: at the first torment, of the sins committed by means of the lips and mouth; at the second torment, of the sins of vision; at the third, of the sins of hearing; at the fourth, of the sins of smell; at the fifth, of all lawlessness and abominable deeds done by means of the hands. To the other torments belong the other sins, such as anger, hatred, envy, vanity, and pride. . . . In short, every passion, every passion of the soul, every sin will similarly have its tormentors and inquisitors." (p. 529.)

252. Retribution to the righteous: (*a*) their glorification in heaven, in the church triumphant.

"Retribution for the righteous, by the will of the heavenly Judge, also has two forms: (*a*) their glorification, though not yet complete, in heaven, in the church triumphant, and (*b*) their glorification upon earth, in the church militant." (p. 534.)

It is hard to understand how the word "glorification" occupies such an important place in the teaching of the church, especially when one thinks of Christ's teaching, which is constantly directed against glory, and one feels with his heart that the love of glory, of glorification, is one of the most petty of human feelings. I can understand as a reward the contemplation of God, peace, Paradise, Eden, even Mohammed's Paradise, Nirvana; but in order to understand the reward in glorification, I have to imagine myself in the place of the crudest of men or when I was only fifteen years old. But the Theology regards glorification as a great reward. This glorification is represented to consist in this, that wreaths will be put on them and

that they will be in honour and glory. That is proved from Holy Scripture.

253. The glorification of the righteous upon earth, in the church militant: (*aa*) the worship of the saints. "At the same time that the righteous Judge and Retributer honours the righteous, after their decease, with a glorification, anticipatory though it be, in heaven, in the church triumphant, he honours them also with a glorification upon earth, in the church militant." (p. 546.)

This glory is again represented in the form of wreaths, gold, precious stones, obeisances, censers, singing, masses, and so forth. Then follow controversies with those who do not consider it necessary to worship the saints in such a way. All that is proved from Scripture.

254. (*bb*) Invocation of the saints. "Respecting the saints, as true servants, favourites, and friends of God, the holy church at the same time invokes them in its prayers, not as some gods, who might help us by their own power, but as our intercessors before God, the only sources and distributers of all the gifts and favours to the creatures (James i. 17), as our representatives and intercessors, who have the power of mediation from Christ, who alone is in the proper sense the independent mediator between God and men, who gave himself a ransom for all (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6). Holy Scripture teaches us that dogma." (pp. 553 and 554.)

It is a dogma. The dogma consists in this, that: (*a*) it is necessary to pray to the saints, (*b*) that the saints hear us, (*c*) that they pray for us.

All that is proved by Holy Scripture, and the proof is concluded by an excerpt from a decree of a council:

"If any one does not confess that all the saints, who have been since eternity and who have pleased God, as before the law so also under the law and under grace, are worthy before him of honour in their souls and bodies, or if he does not invoke the prayers of the saints, as having

the permission to mediate for the world, according to the church tradition: anathema."

That is, obviously, a sufficient proof.

255. (*cc*) The worship of holy relics and of other remainders of those who have pleased God. Besides, it is necessary also to glorify the relics and other remainders of the saints. That is proved:

"(*a*) Because when a dead man barely touched the body of Prophet Elisha, he revived, and stood up on his feet (2 Kings xiii. 21); (*c*) because the mantle of Elijah, which was left by him to Elisha, with its touch opened the waters of the Jordan for the passage of the latter prophet (2 Kings ii. 14); that even the handkerchiefs and aprons of St. Paul, which in his absence were put on those who suffered from diseases or were possessed by devils, cured the diseases and drove out the devils (Acts xix. 12). (2) In the history of the church we find an endless number of similar miracles, which the Lord has performed through the relics and other remainders of the saints for all those who had recourse to them with faith.

"(3) The most startling miracle, with which the Lord has glorified the bodies of many saints, is their incorruptibility. This incorruptibility of the holy relics, this exemption of theirs through the miraculous divine action from the universal law of corruption, serving, as it were, as a living lesson of their future resurrection and as strong incitement to us to worship the very bodies of the saints who are glorified by God and to emulate their faith, is not subject to the slightest doubt. In Kíev and Nóvgorod, in Moscow and Vológda, and in many other places of our divinely guarded country openly rest many incorruptible relics of saints, and by the incessant miracles, which are wrought on those who have recourse to them in faith, they loudly testify to the truth of their incorruptibility." (pp. 563–567.)

All of us know about the Duke Decroix, of hundreds

and hundreds of incorruptible bodies, due to physical conditions; we know that accidentally a certain Siberian bishop did not decompose and now is lying in Kíev in a cellar, waiting for the opening of the relics; we know of those relics that are kept under a bushel, about the scarecrows, with which pennies are gathered in for the hierarchy, and whose garments are clandestinely changed by the members of the hierarchy; we know about the oil which is poured into the fragrance-spreading heads. Not a single student of a seminary nor a peasant believes in all that, so what sense is there in expounding it in the Theology as a dogma? Even if there were in the Theology anything resembling a disclosure of the truths of faith, even if everything were sensible and correct in it, such an assertion about the relics would invalidate the whole thing.

The proof is given that the relics and all kinds of handkerchiefs and pantaloons have to be honoured and kissed, and that pennies are to be put on them, and the whole concludes with a decree of the Seventh Œcumenical Council:

"And thus, those who dared to reject the relics of the martyrs, which they knew to be genuine and true: if they are bishops or clergymen, let them be deposed; if they are monks or laymen, let them be deprived of communion." (p. 570.)

But all that is not enough. It is not enough to substitute saints, their fingers and pantaloons, in the place of God. We need still the images.

256. (*dd*) The worship of the holy images. The church commands us: (*a*) to use images in churches, houses, and streets; (*b*) to honour them with the burning and offering of tapers; and it condemns: (*a*) the ancient iconoclasts, (*b*) the modern Protestants, (*c*) those who worship them as though they were gods. There begin proofs and controversies. Those controversies have cost

much malice, many executions, much blood. Only by an absolute departure from the questions of faith can we explain those controversies and those assertions and proofs, which are adduced in the book.

"III. The endless signs and miracles which the Lord has been pleased to perform through the images for the believers serve as a new incitement for the worship of the holy images. With accounts of these miracles are filled the chronicles, of the church in general, as also of our church in particular. Several images of Christ the Saviour, of his immaculate Mother, of St. Nicholas, and of other saints have, on account of the abundance of miracles wrought by them, since antiquity been known under the name of miracle-working images, and, being found in various places of the Orthodox Church, by the will of God our benefactor, have not yet ceased to be as it were channels or guides of his miraculous power, which gives us salvation." (p. 580.)

It is for these channels of his miraculous power that controversies have existed and differences of opinions still exist: the question is whether they are channels or not. If the Lord has deigned to work miracles through those images, then not only a rude peasant, but even the greatest philosopher cannot help but pray to the image. If a case is decided through a secretary, the secretary has to be invoked, and there is no way out of it. We have long ago descended upon earth from the sphere of questions about religion. The discussion was about sacraments which mechanically impart grace, independently of the spiritual condition of the pastor and believer, only when there are no causes for cassation; and now the subject under discussion is the images, which are channels of miraculous power, which therefore have to be prayed to, though they are not gods.

About the history of these channels we learn from the Theology, that during the first three centuries "the pa-

gans at times rebukingly asked the Christians why they had no certain representations," because "one of the councils in Spain, the one at Elvira, which took place in the year 305, in its 36th rule directly forbade the use of images in temples. But: (*a*) first of all this rule incontestably proves that images were then in use in the churches; (*b*) this rule forbade men to represent upon the walls of the temples that which the Christians worshipped (*quod colitur et adoratur*), that is, as is assumed, to represent God in his substance, which is invisible and unrepresentable; (*c*) not improbable is another guess, which is, that the rule was enunciated in conformity with the conditions of place and time: in Spain just then raged the Diocletian persecution, and the Pagans, who frequently broke into the temples, desecrated the holy representations of the Lord and his saints, and so, in order to avoid that, this rule was adopted for a certain time." (p. 584.)

257. Retribution to sinners: (*a*) their punishment in hell. "The sinners, suddenly after death and the private judgment, depart with their souls to a place of sorrow and grief." (p. 584.)

Proofs from Holy Scripture. The place to which they depart is called the extreme darkness, a fiery furnace. Not all agree where that Gehenna is, but there are several subdivisions in hell: "It may be assumed that hell has its separate abodes, lockups, and dungeons of the souls, its separate divisions, of which one is properly called Hell, another Gehenna, a third Tartarus, a fourth a Fiery Lake, and so forth. At least there is in Revelation a passage where hell and the lake of fire are distinguished (Rev. xx. 13, 14). These unequal torments of the sinners in hell after the private judgment are not full and complete, but only anticipatory."

Proofs from Holy Scripture.

258. (*b*) The possibility which some sinners have of receiving alleviation, and even immunity from the pun-

ishments of hell, because of the prayers of the church. "However, while the Orthodox Church teaches that all sinners, after their death and the private judgment over them, all alike depart to hell, a place of sorrow and of grief, it at the same time confesses that for those who have repented before their departure from the present life, but have not had time to bring the fruits which are worthy of repentance (such as prayer, contrition, the consolation of the poor, and the expression in acts of love for God and for their neighbours), there is still left a chance of getting alleviation in sufferings and even of being completely freed from the bonds of hell. Such an alleviation and immunity the sinners may obtain, not through any of their own deserts or through repentance (for after death and the private judgment there is no place either for repentance or for deserts), but only through the infinite grace of God, through the prayers of the church, and through the benefactions done by the living for the dead, and especially through the power of the bloodless sacrifice, which in particular the servants of the church bring for every Christian and for the deceased, and which the Catholic and Apostolic Church in general brings every day for all." (p. 589.)

That is proved. That natural consideration how, if God is just (as a man is just), as the hierarchy understands it, he can forgive a sinner for somebody else's prayers is decided in the following way:

"St. Augustine: 'There is no cause for the slightest doubt that they (prayers of the holy church, saving sacrifices, and alms) are beneficial to the dead, but only to those who before their death have lived in such a way that they can be beneficial to them. For in behalf of those who have departed without faith, which is accompanied by charity, and without the communion in the sacraments, their friends will in vain perform the works of that godliness, an earnest of which they did not have

in themselves, when they were here, and when they did not receive or vainly received divine grace, and treasured up for themselves not mercy, but wrath. Thus, no new deserts are obtained for the dead, when their friends do something good in their behalf, but the consequences are extracted from the foundations which they have laid before.'" (p. 599.)

What good is there, then, in prayers? Is it possible God will not make out the foundations which they have laid before, without the mediation of advocates? What use is there, then, in the prayers and sacrifices of the church? However disagreeable it is to say so, there is no other cause for them except that of collecting pennies. Indeed, this natural heartfelt sentiment of every praying person, in addressing God, to remember the souls of friends, — this holy, this good sentiment, the hierarchy, by its touch, has managed to change into something stupid, base, and degrading.

Then follow reflections about the prayers of the church: (1) the deceased are divided into those for whom it is necessary to pray, and into those for whom it is not necessary to pray (the unrepenting and the stubborn); (2) there is a refutal of the opinions of those who assert that there is no need of praying for those who have passed away having received the last sacrament, on the ground that they are holy as it is; (3) it is proved that it is necessary to pray for them; (4) prayers have an effect only on the private judgment; the same reflection by St. Augustine as quoted above, that prayer is a kind of remembrance; (6) that there are some who can no longer be saved by prayers, while others may be saved; (7) the church prays "on the third day for the sake of him who on the third day rose from the dead; on the ninth day in commemoration of the living and of the dead; on the fortieth, because for that length of time the people lamented Moses;" (8) in case we pray for those who are

already " in heaven or among the number of the rejected," the prayers, " though no longer useful to them, can do them no harm;" (9) " if the church prays for all who have died in repentance, and its prayers are very strong before God and beneficial to them, then all will be saved, and no one shall be deprived of bliss? To that we shall say, 'Let it be so, and oh, if it were so!'" (p. 606.)

259. (*c*) Remarks about purgatory. Controversy with the Catholics about purgatory, and proofs that they are in the wrong.

260. The moral application of the dogma about the private judgment and retribution naturally is: to be afraid of the judgment and have recourse to the relics and images and pay money to the hierarchy that it may pray for the departed.

Section II. On the general judgment. 261. Connection with what precedes; the day of the general judgment; the uncertainty of that day, and signs of its approach, especially the appearance of the antichrist.

" The private judgment, to which every man is subjected after his death, is not the complete and final judgment, and so naturally makes us wait for another, the full and decisive judgment. At the private judgment the soul receives its award without any participation of the body, although the body has shared with it its good and bad works. After the private judgment, the righteous in heaven and the sinners in hell have opened unto them only an anticipation of that happiness or torment, which they have deserved. Finally, after the private judgment a few sinners still have a chance to alleviate their fate and even to free themselves from the bonds of hell, if not through their own deserts, at least through the prayers of the church. But the day, the last day, will certainly come for the whole human race (John vi. 39–40)." (p. 613.)

The day will come when the body will receive accord-

ing to its deserts. Then are defined the symptoms of the coming of that day:

"(1) On the one hand extraordinary successes of good upon earth, — the dissemination of Christ's Gospel in the whole world: (2) on the other hand, extraordinary successes of evil and the appearance of the antichrist upon earth."

This is who the antichrist is going to be:

"(*a*) It will be a definite person, by all means a man, but only a lawless man under the special operation of Satan; (*b*) he will in his character be distinguished by extraordinary pride and will give himself out as a God; (*c*) for the purpose of attaining his end he will preach a false doctrine, which is contrary to the saving faith of Christ, an enticing teaching, with which he will draw after him many weak and unworthy people; (*d*) in confirmation of his teaching and for the greater seduction of men, he will perform false signs and miracles; (*e*) finally he will perish from the actions of Jesus Christ the Saviour, when he comes to judge the living and the dead. We shall further remark: (*a*) he will come from the tribe of Dan; (*b*) he will be a powerful lord, who will usurp the power by force, and will extend his dominion over all the nations; (*c*) he will cause a terrible persecution of the Christians, will demand divine worship of himself, will draw many after him, and those who will not follow him he will put to death; (*d*) for the counteraction to the antichrist, God will send from heaven two witnesses, who, as is said in Revelation, shall prophesy the truth and work miracles, and when they shall have finished their testimony, they shall be killed by a dragon, and after three days and a half they shall rise from the dead and ascend to heaven; (*e*) the dominion of the antichrist will last only three years and a half." (pp. 616–618.)

All that is proved by Holy Scripture.

"It will not be superfluous to remark that the predic-

tions about the antichrist have more than once been applied to various persons. Some, according to the testimony of St. Augustine, saw the antichrist in Nero; others saw him in the Gnostics; others again in the pontiff at Rome and in general in popery: an idea which arose and was quite common in the Middle Ages in the West among many sectarians, but which became especially strengthened with the appearance of Protestant communities, and which has penetrated into their theological systems and has many times been discussed in special works, and so forth." (p. 619.)

The author does not mention that the greater part of the Russian people regards our hierarchy as the hierarchy of the antichrist.

262. Events which are to take place on the day of the general judgment, and their order. "The actions of the antichrist on earth will last to the very judgment day." (p. 619.)

263. The premonitory circumstances of the general judgment: (*a*) the arrival of the Lord Judge over the living and the dead. On that day the Lord Jesus Christ will come down upon earth. Everything is proved by Holy Scripture.

264. (*b*) The resurrection of the dead, and the transformation of the living. "On that last day (John vi. 40–44) and just at the time that the glorious descent of the Lord upon earth, surrounded by those who live in heaven, will take place, he shall send before him with a great sound of a trumpet (Matt. xxiv. 31), and the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God (John v. 25); for the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive shall be changed (1 Thes. iv. 16, 17; 1 Cor. xv. 52)." (pp. 622 and 623.)

That is, in Russian: first all the dead shall arise, and

then the living shall be changed. It is proved by Holy Scripture that there shall certainly be a resurrection of the dead, and that the possibility of the resurrection of the dead cannot be subject to doubt. This is the way it is proved:

"In the world nothing is destroyed or annihilated, but everything remains whole in the power and in the right hand of the Almighty; our bodies lose their existence through death only for us, but not for God, who knows full well all the smallest particles of each dead body, though they may be scattered everywhere and may be united with other bodies, and is always able to reunite these particles into the former organism." (p. 625.)

When it comes to talking about particles, the question is not about replacing the particles, but about the fact that there will not be enough particles to go around. The body of my great-grandfather is rotten: parts of his body have gone into the grass; a cow has eaten the grass; a peasant boy has drunk those parts in his milk, and these particles have become his body, and his body has rotted. There will not be enough particles to go around, so that it is absolutely impossible for God to do that by means of the particles. It would be better to prove that in the old way like this:

"(*a*) In reply to the objection that the resurrection of the dead is incomprehensible to us, men have pointed to other, not less incomprehensible things, such as: the birth of each man, the original formation of the human body out of the dust, the creation of the world out of nothing, and so forth."

That proves the possibility of the resurrection in the body, and the necessity of it is proved like this:

"By the very nature of Christianity it is necessary that, as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor. xv. 22), and that not only our first enemy, the devil, but also our last enemy, death, shall be des-

troyed (1 Cor. xv. 26). Otherwise the purpose of Christ's descent upon earth, the purpose of the whole Christianity, will not be fully realized: man will not be all saved, his enemies will not be all vanquished, and in Christ we shall receive less than we have lost in Adam. (p. 628.) According to their qualities, the resurrected bodies: (1) will be essentially the same that they have been in connection with certain souls during their life upon earth; (2) but, on the other hand, they will also be distinct from the present bodies: because they will arise in a transformed state in resemblance to the resurrected body of Christ the Saviour. They will be: (*a*) incorruptible and immortal; (*b*) glorious or light-bearing; (*c*) strong and sound; (*d*) spiritual. (p. 629.) We shall all of us have eternal bodies, but not all alike. If one is righteous he will receive a heavenly body in which he will be able properly to have relations with the angels; but if one is sinful, he will receive an eternal body, which is to suffer torments for sins, in order to burn for ever in fire and not to be destroyed. (pp. 631 and 632.) Some have thought that after the resurrection of the bodies the distinction of sexes will be abolished; others, on the contrary, have assumed that the distinction will remain; others again, that all the dead will rise as males, an opinion against which St. Augustine had armed himself. Some have divined that all the dead, old men, middle-aged men, youths, and children will rise as being of one age, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ (Eph. iv. 13); others have said that they will not be of the same age, though they have not admitted that babes and youths would rise in their respective ages, but have thought that they would rise at a maturer age." (p. 632.)

Besides the resurrection of the dead, there is disclosed also the mystery in regard to those whom the judgment will find still living, and who will be transformed in a very short time.

265. The general judgment itself: its actuality, manner, and properties. "Soon after the appearance upon earth of the Judge of the living and the dead in all his glory, when with his voice there shall arise the dead and the living shall be changed, the judgment over them, the general judgment, will begin." (p. 633.) The representation of the general judgment, as sketched to us in the Word of God, shows to us: (1) the Judge sitting on the throne of glory; (2) the executors of his will, the angels; (3) the defendants: (*a*) all the living and the dead people; (*b*) the righteous and the bad; (*c*) the devils. (4) As subjects for the judgment will serve: (*a*) not only the works of men, (*b*) but also their words.

Nothing is said about the devils.

When the judgment is over, the righteous will be separated from the bad. Some will be placed on the right, the others on the left. Then will take place the proclamation of the sentence by the Judge to either division:

"Then shall the King say unto them on the right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world (Matt. xxv. 34). Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels (*ib.* 41). The holy fathers and the teachers of the church have recognized this representation of the general judgment as unquestionably correct, and have written their interpretations of it."

Here are the interpretations:

"We must not think that the coming of the Lord will be local and carnal, but we must expect him in the glory of the Father suddenly throughout the whole world. . . . But we must assume that much time will be lost before each will see himself and his works; and the mind will in a twinkling of time represent to itself the Judge and the consequences of the divine judgment with unspeakable power; all that the mind will vividly sketch before

itself, and in the mightiness of his soul, as in a mirror, will see the pictures of what he has done." (p. 637.)

The Theology says that the judgment is not to be understood as local and carnal, but how is it to be understood? for it says that the judgment will be:

"(1) General. . . . The King comes down from his place in order to judge over the earth; his hosts accompany him in great terror and trepidation. These mortal members come to be witnesses of the terrible judgment; and all men, no matter how many there have been and are upon earth, come into the presence of the King. No matter how many have been born or will be born will all come to this spectacle, to see the judgment." (p. 637.)

"(2) Solemn and open. . . . And he will call heaven and earth to be with him at the judgment; and those who are above and far away will appear with terror and trepidation. And the celestial hosts and the legions of hell will tremble before the Judge who knows no favours, and who will come accompanied by terror and by death."

That is the way Christ will come!

"(3) Stern and terrible: because it will be done according to the whole divine righteousness, and according to nothing but righteousness; it will be a day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God (Rom. ii. 5.)

"(4) Decisive and the last: because it will unchangeably determine for eternity the fate of each of the defendants."

That is, it will condemn the sinners to torments. Nothing can be added to that. The only feeling which I experienced in quoting these passages was that of terror and horror before that blasphemy which I was committing in copying and repeating them.

266. Concomitant circumstances of the general judgment: (*a*) the end of the world. "During that last day, in which the last judgment of God will take place over the whole world, there will also ensue the end of the

world." (p. 638.) "The end of the world will not consist in its being completely destroyed and annihilated, but in its being changed and renovated by fire.—The matter of the reëstablishment of men will come to an end with the general judgment, where will take place the revelation of the sons of God. Consequently, the creatures themselves must be freed from labour and corruption, into the freedom of the glory of the children of God; the whole material world must be purified from the deleterious consequences of human sin and be renovated. This renovation of the world will take place on the last day by means of fire, so that in the new heaven and the new earth nothing sinful will be left, but righteousness alone will abide (2 Peter iii. 13)." (p. 639.)

So here is clearly expressed the idea that the renovation of the world was not achieved by the redemption, that that was spoken of only as an adornment of speech, and that the present renovation will be produced by Christ, not at his first, but at his second coming.

Proofs from Holy Scripture of the correctness of this end and the renovation of the world by fire.

267. (*b*) The end of Christ's kingdom of grace and the beginning of the kingdom of glory; remarks about the chiliasm, or millennium, of Christ. That is confirmed. The kingdom of grace will come to an end and the kingdom of glory will begin, that is, the real liberation from sin and death, that is, what heretofore has been asserted of the kingdom of grace. Proofs of that from Holy Scripture, and a controversy with those who said that one thousand years before the end Christ would come upon earth, would raise the righteous from the dead and would reign with them for a thousand years. That is not true.

268. Connection with the preceding, and nature of this retribution. After the judgment, Christ will pronounce the sentence. "This retribution after the general judgment will be full, complete, decisive. Full, that is, not

only for the soul of man, as after the private judgment, but both for the soul and the body, — for the full man. Complete: for it will not consist merely in an anticipation of happiness for the righteous and of torment for the sinners, as after the private judgment, but in complete happiness and torment, in accordance with the deserts of each. Decisive: for it will persist unchangeable for ever, and not for one of the sinners will it be possible ever to free himself from hell, though such a chance is open to some of the sinners after the private judgment." (p. 649.)

269. Retribution for the sinners. (*a*) In what will the everlasting torments consist? The eternal torments of the sinners will consist: (1) in the separation from God and in the curse; (2) in the deprivation of the benefits of the kingdom of God; (3) they will be in hell with the devils, who will torture them; (4) they will experience internal torments; (5) they will experience external torments, of the undying worm and the unextinguished fire.

"When you hear of the fire, do not imagine that the fire of that place is like what it is upon earth: our fire will burn whatever it gets hold of, and changes it into something else; but that other fire will eternally burn the one it gets hold of, and will never stop, — and so it is called inextinguishable. For the sinners, too, have to be vested in immortality, not for their honour, but as an eternal requisite for the torment in hell. No mind is able to imagine how terrible it is, unless from the experience of small calamities one may get a small conception of those great, great torments: if you are ever in a bath-house which is heated more than is proper, you may imagine the fire of Gehenna; and if you ever burn in a high fever, you may mentally transfer yourself to that flame, and then you will be able properly to understand that distinction. For, if the bath-house and the fever torment and worry you so, what are you going to feel

when you fall into that river of fire which will be flowing before the terrible judgment?"

(*a*) They will eternally weep and gnash their teeth.

"What will be," says another holy father, "the condition of the body which is subjected to these unending and unbearable torments where there is the inextinguishable fire, the immortally tormenting worm, the dark and terrible pit of hell, bitter sobbing, unusual groans, weeping and gnashing of teeth, and where there is no end to sufferings? From all that there is no liberation after death, and there are no means and no chance to be freed from those terrible torments." (p. 654.)

Such is the condition of the sinner; but what will be the condition of the good God who will eternally look upon it?

270. (*b*) Degrees of the torments of hell. "However, although all sinners will be subjected to torments in hell, they will not be in the same degree, but each in conformity with his sins." (p. 654.)

All that is proved by Holy Scripture.

271. The eternity of the torments of hell. "But differing from each other in degree, the torments of the sinners in hell will by no means differ in respect to duration, for they will be equally eternal and unending for all." (p. 656.)

All that is confirmed by Holy Scripture, and there is a refutal of the opinion that the teaching about the eternity of torments is contrary to common sense (not to common sense, but to some low conception of God).

According to the teaching of the Theology torments that are not eternal are contrary to sound reason.

272. Retribution for the righteous: (*a*) wherein will their happiness consist? "As much as, on the one hand, the Word of God depicts in gloomy colours the fate of the sinners after the general judgment, so, on the other, it depicts in bright and joyous colours the fate of the

righteous. (1) They inherit the kingdom which is prepared for them from the foundation of the world; (2) in this kingdom, city, house of God, the first source of the happiness of these righteous people will be their constant coexistence and cohabitation with God himself and with the Lord Jesus Christ, and the constant participation in the divine glory, as much as that is possible for a creature; (3) living all the time with the Lord in the kingdom of heaven, the righteous will be permitted to behold the Tri-hypostatic One face to face."

That is, that terrible God who, having created men out of love, torments them for ever.

273. (*b*) Degrees of the happiness of the righteous:

"The happiness of the righteous in heaven, which is common for all of them, has its degrees, in accordance with the moral dignity of each." That is proved by Holy Scripture.

274. (*c*) The eternity of the happiness of the righteous.

The happiness of the righteous is eternal.

275. The moral application of the dogma about the general judgment and retribution. "Oh, if we only thought often and attentively of that great day (Acts ii. 20), the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God (Rom. ii. 5), with which some day the whole house-management of our salvation will end! If we only presented to ourselves vividly and in detail those endless benefits which are prepared for the righteous in heaven, and those eternal torments which await the sinners in hell! How many incitements we should find for ourselves to abstain from sins and to abide in godliness! So give us all, O Lord, and for ever, the living and undying remembrance of thy future glorious coming, of thy last terrible judgment over us, of thy most just and everlasting retribution for the righteous and for the sinners, — that in its light and in the light of thy grace and aid we may live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present

world (Tit. ii. 12), and in that manner finally attain the eternal, blissful life in heaven, so as to glorify thee with all our being, thee, with thy beginningless Father and most holy and good and life-giving Spirit, for ever and ever."

CONCLUSION

So there it is, the whole disclosure of the divinely revealed truths. They have all been disclosed. There is nothing else left. And it is not permitted to understand them in any other way. He who understands them differently: anathema.

A man asks what this world is in which he finds himself. He asks what the meaning of his existence is and what he is to be guided by in that freedom which he feels within himself. He asks all that, and God through the lips of the church established by him replies to him:

Do you want to know what this world is? Here it is:

There is a God, one, omniscient, all-good, almighty. This God is a simple spirit, but he has will and reason. This God is one and yet three. The Father begot the Son, and the Son sits in the flesh at the right of his Father.

The Spirit emanates from the Father. All three of them are Gods, and they are all different and all one. This trine God has existed eternally one in three, and suddenly it occurred to him to create the world and to create it from nothing with his thought, will, and word. At first he created the spiritual world, the angels. The angels were created good, and God created them solely for their own good, but, being created good, these beings suddenly of their own will became bad. Some angels remained good, while others became bad and were turned into devils. God created a very large number of angels and divided them into nine orders and three classes: angels, archangels, cherubim, seraphim, powers, dominions.

beginnings, principalities, and thrones. Devils are also divided into categories, but the names of these categories are not precisely known.

Then much time passed and God began to create anew and made the material world. He made it in six days. By day is to be understood the turning of the earth about its axis. And there was morning and evening the very first day. If during those first days there was no sun, God himself shook the illuminating matter, so that there might be morning and evening. God made six days; on the sixth day he made Adam, the first man, out of earth, and blew the soul into him; then he made woman. Man is made out of soul and body. The destination of man is to remain true to the power of God. Man was created good and absolutely perfect. His whole duty lay in this, that he should not eat the forbidden apple, and God not only had created him perfect, but also aided him in every way possible, teaching, amusing, and visiting him in the garden.

But Adam none the less ate the forbidden apple, and for that the good God wreaked revenge on Adam and drove him out of the garden, cursing him, the whole earth, and all the descendants of Adam.

All that is not to be understood in any transferred, but in a direct sense, as having actually occurred. After that, God, that same God in three persons, the omniscient, all-good, almighty God, who had created Adam and cursed him and all his posterity, still continued to provide, that is, to care for their good, for Adam, for his descendants, and for all the creatures which he had made. He preserves the creatures, coöperates with them, and rules over them all and over each in particular.

God rules over the bad and good angels, and over the bad and good men. The angels help God to rule the world. There are angels who are attached to kingdoms, to nations, and to men, and omniscient, almighty, and

all-good God, who has created them all, cast down for ever legions of evil angels, and all men after Adam, but has not ceased caring for them in a natural and even in a supernatural manner. This supernatural manner of his care consists in this, that when five thousand years had passed, he found a means for paying himself for Adam's sin, whom he himself had made such as he was. This means consisted in this, that among the persons of the Trinity one is the Son. He, that person, has always been the Son. So this Son issued from a virgin, without impairing her virginity; he entered into the Virgin Mary as her husband, the Holy Ghost, and came out as a Son, Jesus Christ, and this Son was called Jesus, and he was God, and man, and a person of the Trinity.

This God-man has saved men. This is the way he saved them. He was a prophet, a high priest, and a king. As a prophet, he gave a new law; as a high priest he sacrificed himself by dying on the cross, and as a king he performed miracles and went down into hell, let out from it all the righteous, and destroyed sin, and the curse and death in men.

But this means, however strong it was, did not save all men. Legions of legions of devils remained devils, and men must know how to take advantage of that salvation.

In order to take advantage of this means, a man must become sanctified, but only the church may sanctify, and the church is all those people who say about themselves that certain men have laid their hands on them, men upon whom other men have laid hands, and so forth, upon whom hands were laid by the disciples of the God Jesus himself, upon whom hands were laid by God the Son, the Saviour, himself. When God himself laid his hands upon them, he blew, and with that blowing he gave to them, and to those to whom they would transmit it, the power to sanctify men, and that very sanctification is necessary in order to be saved. What sanctifies man and saves him

is grace, that means, the divine power which in a certain form is transmitted by the church. In order that this grace should be efficacious, it is necessary for the man who wishes to be sanctified to believe that he is being sanctified. He may even not believe entirely: he must obey the church and, above all, not contradict, and then grace will pass into him. In his life a man who is sanctified by grace must not believe as he has believed before, he must believe that if he does good, he does so because grace is operating in him, and so the only care he must have is that the grace shall be in him. This grace is transmitted by the church by various manipulations and by the pronunciation of certain words, which are called sacraments. There are seven such manipulations:

1. Baptism. When the hierarch of the church has bathed a person in the proper way, that person becomes cleansed from sin, above all, from Adam's original sin, so that if an unbathed infant dies, it will perish as being filled with sin.

2. If he anoints that person with oil, the Holy Ghost enters into him.

3. If the person eats bread and wine under certain conditions and with the conviction that he is eating the body and blood of God, he becomes pure from sin and receives everlasting life.

(In general there is a lot of grace about this sacrament and, as soon and as quickly as possible after it has been performed, a person must pray, and then the prayer will be heard according to the grace.)

4. When the priest has listened to that person's sins, he will say certain words, and the sins are gone.

5. When seven popes anoint a person with oil, his bodily and spiritual diseases will be cured.

6. When the wreaths are put on the bridal pair, the gift of the Holy Ghost will enter them.

7. When the hands are laid on, the Holy Ghost will enter.

Baptism, unction with chrism, repentance, communion sanctify man and sanctify him for ever, independently of the spiritual condition of the priest and of him who receives the sacrament; if only everything is in proper order, and there is no cause for cassation.

In these manipulations lies that means for salvation which God has invented. He who believes that he is sanctified and purified, and will receive eternal life, is actually sanctified and purified and will receive eternal life. All those who believe in that will receive their retribution, at first a private retribution, soon after death, and later a general one, after the end of the world. The private retribution will consist in this, that they will be glorified in heaven and on earth. On earth their relics and images will be honoured with incense and tapers, and in heaven they will be with Christ in glory. But before attaining that, they will pass through aerial spaces, where they will be stopped and questioned by angels and devils, who will contend with each other on their account, and those for whom the defence of the angels shall be stronger than the accusation of the devils will go to Paradise, and those whom the devils shall win will go to eternal torment, into hell.

The righteous, those who will go to Paradise, will there settle in various places, and those who shall be nearer to the Trinity may there, in heaven, pray for us to God, and so we must here worship their relics, their garments, and their images. These objects do miracles, and it is necessary to pray to God near these objects, and then the saints will intercede for us before God. The sinners, all the heretics, the unbaptized, the unbelievers, those who have not received their communion, will go to hell, but they will be there in different places, according to the degree of their guilt, and there they will be to the end of the world.

The prayers of the priests, especially such as will be said immediately after the eucharist, may alleviate their condition in hell.

But there will be an end of the world and a general judgment. The end of the world will be like this: one person of the Trinity, God Jesus, who sits in the flesh in heaven on the right side of his Father, will come down upon earth in a cloud, in the form of a man, such as he had when he was upon earth. Angels will blow trumpets, and all the dead will rise in their very bodies, but the bodies will be a little changed. Then all the angels, all the devils, and all men will assemble, and Christ will judge and will separate the righteous to the right: they will go to heaven with the angels; and the sinners he will put on the left: they will go with the devils to hell, and there they will be tormented with greater torments than burning. These torments will be everlasting. But all the righteous will eternally glorify the good God.

To my question as to what sense my life will have in this life, the answer will be as follows:

God, by his arbitrary will, created a strange world; a wild God, half-man, half-monster, created the world as he wanted it, and he kept saying that it was good, that everything was good, and that man was good. But it all turned out bad. Man fell under a curse, and his whole posterity was cursed, but God continued to make men in the wombs of their mothers, though he knew that all of them, or many, would perish. After he had invented a means for saving them, everything was as of old, and even worse, because while, as the church says, men like Abraham and Jacob could save themselves by their good lives, I am now certainly going to perish, if I was born a Jew, or a Buddhist, and accidentally do not come in contact with the sanctifying action of the church, and I shall be eternally tormented by the devils; more than that, —

if I am among the number of the fortunate, but have the misfortune to regard the demands of my reason as legitimate and do not renounce them, in order to believe the church, I perish just the same. More than that, — even if I believe everything, but have not had time to receive the last sacrament and my relatives absent-mindedly forget to pray for me, I shall just as much go to hell and remain there.

According to this teaching the meaning of my life is an absolute absurdity, much worse than what presented itself to me by the light of my reason. Then I saw that I was living and was enjoying life so long as I was living, and that when I died I should not feel anything. Then I was frightened by the meaninglessness of my own life and by the insolubility of the question: What are my strivings, my life, for, since all that will end?

But now it is much worse: all that will not end, but that absurdity, somebody's arbitrary will, lasts for ever. To the question as to how I should live, the answer of this teaching directly denies everything which my moral feeling demands, and demands that which has always appeared as the most immoral thing to me, — hypocrisy.

From all the moral applications of the dogmas there results but this: Save yourself by faith; you cannot understand what you are commanded to believe, — say that you believe, crush out with all the powers of your soul the necessity of light and truth, say that you believe, and do what results from faith. The matter is clear. In spite of all the statements that good works are for some reason necessary, and that it is necessary to follow the teaching of Christ about love, humility, and self-renunciation, it is evident that those works are not needed, and the practice of life of all the believers confirms that. Logic is inexorable. What is the use of works, when I am redeemed by God's death, when even

all my future sins are redeemed, and when it is necessary only to believe. And how can I struggle and strive after the good, in which alone I formerly understood good works to consist, when the main dogma of faith is this, that man cannot do anything by himself, and everything is given gratis by grace. All that is necessary is to look for grace; but grace is not obtained by me alone; it is imparted to me by others. Even if I do not succeed in sanctifying myself with grace during my lifetime, there are means for making use of it even after my death: I can leave money for the church, and they will pray for me. All that is asked of me is that I should try to find grace. Grace is given by sacraments and by the prayers of the church, consequently I must have recourse to them and put myself in such a state that I may never be deprived of them; I must have popes around me or live near a monastery, and leave as much money as possible for memorial masses. More than that. Having thus secured my future life, I may calmly enjoy this life, and for this life make use of the instruments given to me by the church, praying to God the Provider to aid me in my earthly works, for I am told in what manner these prayers will be most efficacious. It is most efficacious to pray near images and relics, during the liturgy.

And the answer to the question of what I should do results directly from the teaching; this answer is too familiar to everybody, and too coarsely contradicts conscience, but it is inevitable.

I remember, when I did not yet doubt the teaching of the church, I read the words of the Gospel, Blasphemy against the Son of man shall be forgiven you, but blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven you, neither in this world, neither in the world to come, and I could not understand those words.

But now those words are only too terribly apparent to me. Here is that blasphemy against the Holy Ghost,

which will not be forgiven, either in this world, or in that to come.

That blasphemy is the terrible teaching of the church, the foundation of which is the teaching about the church.

(Just as this volume was going through the press, there appeared in England a second edition of the Russian original. It comes in time to be utilized for the correction of a number of inaccuracies and for the insertion of the following conclusion, which is absent in the first edition. What has to be omitted is a number of unessential quotations from Makári's Theology. — *Translator's Note.*)

The Orthodox Church!

With this word I no longer can connect any other conception than that of a few hirsute men, extremely self-confident, deluded, and ignorant, in silk and velvet, with diamond panagias, called bishops and metropolitans, and thousands of other hirsute men, who are in a state of the grossest, most servile servility to those dozens of men, who, under the guise of performing certain sacraments, are busy cheating and fleecing the people.

How can I believe in this church, which to man's profoundest questions about his soul answers with petty deceptions and insipidities, and affirms that no one must dare to answer these questions in any other way, and that in everything which is most precious in my life I should not be guided by anything but what it points out to me? I may choose the colour of my pantaloons, I may choose my wife according to my liking, but in everything else — precisely that in which I feel myself to be a man — I must be guided by them, those idle, cheating, and ignorant people.

In my life, in the holiness of my soul, I have for a guide and pastor the parish priest, a dull, illiterate lad who has been let out of the seminary, or a hard-drinking old man whose only care it is to take in as many eggs

and kopeks as possible. They command the deacon to yell half the time, "Many years for the Orthodox, godly" harlot Catherine II. or "for the most godly Peter," the robber, the murderer, who blasphemed over the Gospel, and I am compelled to pray for them. They command me to curse, burn, and hang my brothers, and I must cry after them "anathema." These people command me to regard my brothers as cursed, and have to cry "anathema." They command me to drink wine out of a spoon and swear that it is not wine, but the body and blood, and I must do so.

But this is terrible!

It would be terrible, if it were possible; but in reality it is not so, not because they have weakened in their demands, — they still shout "anathema," or "many years," if they are commanded to do so, — but because in reality no one listens to them.

We, the experienced and cultured people (I recall my thirty years outside the church), do not even despise them: we simply pay no attention to them and do not even have the curiosity to know what they are doing, writing, and saying. A pope has come, — very well, give him half a rouble. A church has been built for vanity's sake, — very well, dedicate it, send for a shaggy-maned bishop, and give a hundred roubles.

The masses pay still less attention to them. During Butter week we must eat pancakes, and during Passion week we must prepare ourselves for communion; and if there arises a spiritual question for one of our kind, we go to clever, learned thinkers, to their books, or to the writings of the saints, but not to the popes; and the people from the masses turn dissenters, Stundists, Milkers, the moment the religious sentiment is awakened in them. Thus the popes have for a long time been serving only themselves, and the weak-minded and rascals and women. It is to be assumed that very soon they will be instructing themselves only.

That is so, but what does this mean, that there still are wise men who share this delusion? What does the church mean, which has led them into such impassable forests of stupidity? The church, according to the definition of the hierarchs, is an assembly of the believers, of infallible and holy priests.

All of them have asserted with one accord that the pastors of the church are the true successors of the apostles, and that they alone have through the succession received the legitimate power and duty of being the guardians and interpreters of the divine revelation, while all the lay people are to listen to the voice of their pastors, and have no right to teach.

"It is not proper for a layman," says the 64th rule of the Œcumenical Council, "to utter words, or to teach and take upon himself the teacher's dignity, but to obey the orders established by God, to open his ear to those who have received the grace of the teacher's words, and by them to be instructed in the divine Word. For in the one church God created various orders, according to the words of the apostle (1 Cor. xii. 27, 28), which Gregory the Divine explains, showing clearly the orders contained in them, when he says, 'This order, O brothers, let us respect and guard: let one be the ear, and the other the mouth, one the hand, and the other something else; let one teach, and the other be taught.' And after a few words he proceeds: 'Let him who learns be in obedience, and him who gives give with pleasure, and him who serves serve with zeal. Let us not all be the tongue, though this be nearest to all, nor all apostles, nor all prophets, nor all commentators.' And after a few words he says again: 'Wherefore hast thou made thyself a shepherd, being a sheep; wherefore dost thou make thyself a head, being a foot; wherefore dost thou pretend to lead the armies, since thou art placed in the rank of the soldiers?' And in another place he enjoins wisdom.

'Be not rash with thy mouth (Eccl. v. 2); being poor, labour not to be rich (Prov. xxiii. 4); try not to be wiser than the wise. And if one be found guilty violating the present rule, let him be removed from the communion with the church for the period of forty days.'"

After this it is obvious in what sense the word "church" is to be taken, when reference is made to its infallibility in matters of teaching. Infallible, without doubt, is the whole church of Christ in general, which consists of pastors and the flock. But, since the class of pastors are more particularly enjoined to watch, preach, and interpret to people the divine revelation (636); since the flock is compelled in this holy matter unflinchingly to follow the voice of their God-given instructors (Ephes. iv. 11–15; Acts xx. 28; Heb. iv. 13–17), — it is evident that in disclosing the teaching of the infallibility of the church it is necessary above all to have in view the teaching church (637), which, however, is inseparably connected with the instructed church (638).

From this it is clear what the church means by church: it means nothing but the exclusive right for it to teach. In explanation of this right it says that it is infallible. And it is infallible, it says, because it derives its teaching from the source of truth, — from Christ.

But the moment there are two teachings, which equally deduce their teachings from Christ, this foundation, the proofs, and everything reared upon it fall to pieces, and nothing is left but incitements for such an absurd teaching. The impelling causes are as obvious now, at the sight of the palaces and carriages of the bishops, as they were in the sixth century, if we look at the luxury of the patriarchs, and as they were in the first apostolic times, if we take into consideration the desire of each teacher to confirm the truth of his teaching. The church affirms that its teaching is based on the divine teaching. Proofs are incorrectly adduced in this case from the Acts

and the epistles, because the apostles were the first people who put forth the principle of the church, the truth of which has to be proved, and so their doctrine can as little as the later doctrine assert that it is based on Christ's teaching. No matter how near in time they may be to Christ, they are, according to the church doctrine, men, while he is God. Everything which he said is true; everything which they said is subject to proof and rejection. The churches felt this, and so hastened to put on the apostolic teaching the seal of the infallibility of the Holy Ghost. But if we brush aside this snare and take up Christ's teaching itself, we cannot help but be struck by that bold impudence with which the teachers of the church wish to base their doctrine on the teaching of Jesus Christ, who denied all that which they want to affirm.

The word ἐκκλησία, which has no other meaning than that of assembly, is used but twice in the Gospels, and that, too, only in Matthew: On thee, on my faithful disciple, as on a rock, I shall establish my union of men, and the other time in this sense, that if thy brother will not hear thee, tell it in an assembly of men, because what ye shall loose here (meaning "your anger, your annoyance") will be loosed in heaven, that is, in God. Now, what have the priests made of it?

Having appeared upon earth, in order to accomplish the great work of our redemption, the Saviour at first claimed only for himself the right to instruct people in the true faith, which he had received from the Father. The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord (Luke iv. 18, 19); and passing through the cities and villages, preaching the Gospel, he added, To this end

was I born, and for this cause came into the world (John xviii. 37), for therefore am I sent (Luke iv. 43); enjoining at the same time the people and the disciples, But be ye not called Rabbi: for one is your master, even Christ (Matt. xxiii. 1, 8, 10). Then he transferred his divine right of the teachership to his disciples, to the twelve and the seventy, whom he purposely chose for this great ministration from the midst of his hearers (Luke vi. 13; cf. x. 1, and the following): at first he transferred it only temporarily during the days of his earthly existence, when he sent them to preach the Gospel of the kingdom only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel (Matt. x. 5–16, and elsewhere), and later for all time, after his resurrection, when, having himself accomplished all his work upon earth and going up to heaven, he said to them, As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you (John xx. 21); go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matt. xxviii. 19); and on the other hand he very clearly and with terrible threats enjoined all men and future Christians to receive the teaching of the apostles and to obey them: He that heareth you heareth me; and he that despiseth you despiseth me; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me (Luke x. 16; cf. Matt. x. 14; xviii. 15, 19; Mark xvi. 16).

Finally, at the same time that the Lord transferred his divine right of the teachership to the apostles, he expressed the wish that from the apostles this right might pass directly to their successors, and from the latter, passing from generation to generation, might be preserved in the world to its very end. For he said to his disciples, And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you:

and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world (Mark xvi. 15; Matt. xxviii. 18–20).

"But these disciples evidently could not live to the end of the world, and if they were able to preach the Gospel to all the nations which were contemporaneous with them, they certainly could not preach it to the nations of the subsequent times. Consequently, in the person of his apostles the Saviour sent out all their future successors to the work of the universal preaching, and also encouraged them with his presence. This is not a simple divination of the mind, but the positive doctrine of one of the apostles themselves, who said that Christ himself gave his church not only apostles, prophets, evangelists, but also pastors and teachers (Ephes. iv. 11)."

Even if we accept that incomprehensible, obviously interpolated passage about baptizing in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, there is not a word to point to the church. On the contrary, there is a direct indication that no one should call himself a teacher.

What can more clearly be said against the church, according to the ideas of the church? And this very place, as though in ridicule of its exact meaning, they quote! And against the teachership? Not two or three passages speak against the teachers, but the whole meaning of the Gospel (We have taught in thy name; go into eternal fire, ye who are working iniquity): all the speeches to the Pharisees and concerning the external worship, — that the blind should not lead the blind, for they would fall down together, — but mainly the whole meaning of Jesus' teaching in John and in the other gospels. He comes to announce the good to those who are lowly in spirit, and he calls them blessed. He repeats several times that his teaching is accessible and intelligible to babes and to the imprudent, in contradistinction to the wise and the learned. He chooses the foolish, the imprudent, the downtrodden, and they understand him; he says that

he came, not to teach, but to fulfil; and he fulfils with his whole life. He repeats again and again that he who will fulfil will find out whether it is from God, and that blessed is he who fulfils, and not he who teaches: that he who fulfils is great, and not he who teaches. He is angry only with those who teach. He says, Do not judge others. He says that he alone opened the door for the sheep, and that he knows the sheep, and the sheep know him. And there the uncalled pastors — the wolves in sheep's clothing — came in the garments of harlots, stood up before him, and said — they, the doers of iniquity — that not he, but they, were the door for the sheep.

The impelling causes are comprehensible, especially during the first times, when the first Paul spoke of the church, of the infallibility. It is comprehensible how an excitable man, who is carried away by the true faith, may have failed fully to understand the spirit of the teacher, and so departed from his teaching. It is comprehensible for that nearest time, as well as later, under the pressure on Constantine's power, how they could have been carried away by the desire as quickly as possible to establish their external faith; we can understand all the wars which were waged in the name of this departure from the spirit of the teaching. But the time has come for separating the sheep from the goats, for they have already separated themselves in such a way that the true teaching can no longer be met with in the churches. And it is clear that the teachership of the church, though it arose from a small departure, is now the worst enemy of Christianity, and that its pastors serve what they please, except the teaching of Jesus, because they reject it.

The doctrine about the teaching church is now a doctrine which is purely inimical to Christianity. Having departed from the spirit of the teaching, it has corrupted it to such an extent that it has reached a point where it rejects it with the whole life: instead of humility there

is grandeur; instead of poverty, luxury; instead of not judging our neighbours, the most cruel condemnation of all; instead of forgiving offences, hatred and wars; instead of endurance of evil, punishments. And all men deny one another, but not themselves.

The name of Christ's kingdom cannot save it, but in its definition there is, in addition to the definition as a church of pastors, also another obscure definition as a church of the pastured, who must obey. What is understood by the first is clear, but what is to be understood by the second is completely obscure.

An assembly of believers?

If believers have come together, believing in one and the same thing, they constitute an assembly of believers. There is such an assembly of believers in Wagner's music, an assembly of believers in the social theory.

To them the word "church" is not applicable, with the concept of infallibility, which is attached to it, and that is all there is to it. It is an assembly of believers and nothing else, and it is impossible to see the limits of this church, because faith is not a carnal matter. The religion of our popes can indeed be felt in the vestments, the panagias, and all the remaining nonsense, but the faith of the believers, that one thing which is the life and the light in men, cannot be felt, and it cannot be said where it is and how much there is of it. Consequently, this is said only for the purpose that the pastors may have some one to herd, and there is no other meaning to it. The church, all this word, is the name of a deception by means of which one set of men wants to rule another. There is no other church, and there can be none. Only in this deception, which is based on the true teaching and is carried on by all the churches, have there appeared all those monstrous dogmas which distort and conceal the whole teaching of the church, — such as the divinity of Jesus and of the Holy Ghost, and the Trinity,

and the Virgin Mary, and all the savage customs called sacraments; it is evident that they have no sense and are of no use to any one, except the dogma of the sacrament of orders, which is needed for the purpose of enabling men to collect eggs.

But who would have preserved the Holy Scripture? What would people have believed in and who would have taught, if there had not been the church?

Not those have preserved the Holy Scripture who have disputed, but those who have believed and done. The Holy Scripture is a tradition of days and life. The only teaching that is needed is the one which teaches through life, so that their light may shine before men. People have always believed in works only. If ye believe not me, believe my works. Neither I, nor any one else, is called to judge others, and the past. I see that works alone are capable of adoption, and teach me and the people, and only the doctrine and the controversies corrupt the people and deprive them of faith. Indeed, all these theological controversies were carried on in reference to matters which are of no use to any one, which are not the subject of faith. It has come to such a pass that as a subject of faith there presents itself the question as to the infallibility of the popes and of Mary, who bore a child in a strange manner, and so forth.

Life has never been a subject of faith: it could not be the subject of a controversy, — for how will you show faith, while I show works?

"But where is the true church of the true believers? How can we find out who is in the right, and who not? will those ask who do not comprehend the teaching of Jesus. Where is the church, that is, where are its limits? If you are in the church, you cannot see its limits. But if you are a believer, you will say: "How can I be saved? What do I care about judging others?"

To him who has comprehended the teaching of Jesus,

the teaching consists in this, that to me, to my light, the power is given to go to the light, to me my life is given. Outside of it and beyond it there is nothing but the source of all life, — God.

The whole teaching of humility, the renunciation of wealth, the love of my neighbour, has only this meaning, that I can make this life infinite in itself. Every relation of mine to another life is only an exaltation of my own, a communion and oneness with it in peace and in God. Through myself only can I comprehend the truth, and my works are the consequences of the exaltation of my life.

I can express this truth in myself. What question can there be for me, who understand life thus (I cannot understand it otherwise), as to what others think, how they live? As I love them, I cannot help but wish to communicate my happiness to them, but the one tool which is given me is the consciousness of my life and its works. I cannot wish, think, believe for another. I exalt my life, and this alone can exalt the life of another; and is not another myself? So, if I exalt myself, I exalt all.

I am in them, and they in me.

The whole teaching of Jesus consists only in what the common people repeat with simple words: — to save one's soul, — but only one's own, because it is everything. Suffer, endure evil, do not judge, — all this tells the same. At every contact with the affairs of the world Jesus teaches us by his example of complete indifference, if not contempt, how we must bear ourselves toward worldly matters, — toward raiment, toward tribute for the church and for Cæsar, toward litigations about inheritance, toward the punishment of the sinning woman, toward the spilling of the costly ointment. Everything which is not thy soul is not thy concern. Seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness in your soul, and everything will be well. Indeed, my soul is given into my power, even as it is

given to another. Souls other than mine I not only cannot rule over, but am not even able to comprehend; how, then, can I mend and teach them? And how can I waste my strength on what is not in my power, and overlook that which is in my power? Outside the teaching, Jesus showed by his life the falseness of the structure of this world, in which all pretend to be busy with the good of others, whereas their aim is nothing but a pampering of their lust, a love of darkness. Look at any evil whatsoever, and you will see that every man gives out as his pretext the good of his neighbour. When you see that a man is taking hold of another, and insulting him, saying that he is doing so for the good of humanity, try to find out what it is that the man wants, and you will see that he is doing it for his own sake.

Failing to comprehend all this, the false faith has enticed people into the vicious desire to teach others and has given birth to the church with all its horrors and monstrosities. What will happen, if there shall be no church? There will be what now is, what Jesus has said. He spoke, not because he wanted to, but because it is so. He said, Do good deeds that men, seeing them, may glorify God. And it is only this one teaching which will be and has been ever since the world has existed. In works there is no diversity, but if in the confession, in the comprehension, in the external worship, there is and shall be any diversity of opinion, it does not touch the faith and the works, and is in nobody's way. The church wanted to unite these confessions and external worships, and itself broke up in innumerable sects, one denying the other, and has thus shown that neither the confession nor the worship is a matter of faith. The business of faith is only the life in the faith. Life alone is higher than anything, and cannot be subjected to anything but God, who is cognized through life alone.

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MY RELIGION

1884

MY RELIGION

I HAVE lived in the world for fifty-five years, and, with the exception of fourteen or fifteen years of my childhood, have passed thirty-five years as a nihilist in the full sense of the word, that is, not as a socialist and revolutionist, as which this word is generally understood, but as a nihilist in the sense of an absence of every faith.

Five years ago I came to believe in Christ's teaching, and my life suddenly became changed: I ceased desiring what I had wished before, and began to desire what I had not wished before. What formerly had seemed good to me, appeared bad, and what had seemed bad, appeared good. What took place with me was what takes place with a man who goes out on some business and suddenly decides on his way that he does not need that business, and returns home. And everything which was on the right is now on the left, and what was on the left is now on the right: the former desire — to be as far as possible away from the house — is now changed to a desire to be as close as possible to it. The direction of my life, my desires, became different: what was good and bad changed places. All this was due to the fact that I came to understand Christ's teaching differently from what I had understood it before.

I do not mean to interpret Christ's teaching, but want to tell only how I came to understand what simple, clear,

intelligible, indubitable, universally accessible qualities Christ's teaching possessed, and how that which I now understood upturned my soul and gave me peace and happiness.

I do not wish to interpret Christ's teaching; the one thing I want is to prevent men from interpreting it.

All the Christian churches have always acknowledged that all men, who are not equal in learning and reason, — the wise and the foolish, — are equal before God, that the divine truth is accessible to all. Even Christ said that it is the will of God that what is hidden from the wise be revealed to the unwise.

Not all men can be initiated into the deepest secrets of dogmatics, homiletics, patristics, liturgics, hermeneutics, apologetics, and so forth, but all men can and ought to understand what Christ has told all the millions of simple, unwise men who have lived since his day. So it is this, which Christ told those simple people, who had not yet had the chance of turning to Paul, to Clement, to Chrysostom, and to others, for the elucidations of his teaching, that I had not understood before and came to understand then: and it is this that I wish to communicate to all men.

The robber on the cross believed in Christ, and was saved. Would it really have been bad and harmful for any man, if the robber had not died on the cross, but had come down from it, and had told all men how he came to believe in Christ?

Even so I, like the robber on the cross, believed in Christ, and was saved. This is not a far-fetched comparison, but a very close approximation to that spiritual condition of despair and terror before life and death, in which I was formerly, and of that condition of peace and happiness, in which I now am.

Like the robber, I knew that I lived badly, that the majority of men around me lived as badly. Like the rob-

ber, I knew that I was unhappy and suffered, and that around me men were as unhappy and suffered as much, and saw no way out, except death, from this condition. Like the robber on the cross, I was nailed by some power to this life of suffering and of evil.

And as for the robber there was in store the terrible darkness of death after senseless sufferings and the evil of life, so also the same was in store for me.

In all this I was precisely like the robber, but there was this difference between the robber and me, that he was already dead, while I was still living. The robber could believe that his salvation would be there, beyond the grave: but I could not believe that, for besides the life beyond the grave, I still had to live here. And I did not understand this life. It seemed terrible to me. Suddenly I heard Christ's words, and I understood them, and life and death no longer appeared to me as an evil, and instead of despair I experienced the joy and happiness of life, which are not impaired by death.

Can it really harm any one, if I tell how this happened with me?

I.

I HAVE written two large works, the Critique of Dogmatic Theology, and a new translation and harmonization of the four gospels with explanations, in which I explain why I had not comprehended Christ's teaching, and how I came to understand it. In these works I try methodically, step by step, to analyze everything which conceals the truth from men, and verse after verse translate anew, collate, and harmonize the four gospels.

This work has been going on for six years. Every year, every month, I find new explanations and confirmations of the fundamental idea, correct the mistakes which have crept in through hurry and overzeal, and add to what has been done. My life, of which not much is left, will, no doubt, be ended before this work. But I am convinced that this labour is needed, and so I do what I can, while I live.

Such has my assiduous external work been on the theology, on the gospels. But the internal work, of which I wish to tell here, was different. It was not a methodical investigation of the theology and texts of the gospels, but a sudden removal of everything which concealed the very meaning of the teaching, and a sudden illumination by the light of truth. It was an event which was like what would happen to a man who from a false drawing tries to reconstruct a statue out of a heap of small pieces of marble, when suddenly he discovers from one insignificant piece that it is an entirely different statue, and, having begun the new reconstruction, suddenly sees the confirmation of his idea, instead of the former incoherency of the frag-

Tolstóy writing in his study.

ments, in every piece, which with all its lines combines with the neighbouring pieces and forms one whole. It was this that happened with me. And of this I wish to tell.

I want to tell how I found this key for the comprehension of the teaching of Christ, who revealed to me the truth with a clearness and a conclusiveness that exclude every doubt.

This discovery was made by me in the following manner: ever since the first period of my childhood, when I began to read the Gospel for myself, I was most touched and affected by that teaching of Christ, where he preaches love, meekness, humility, self-renunciation, and retribution of evil with good. Such always remained for me the essence of the Christian teaching, and I loved it with my heart, and in the name of it I, after despair and unbelief, recognized as true the meaning which the labouring people ascribe to the Christian life, and in the name of it I subjected myself to the beliefs which these people confess, that is to the Orthodox Church.

But, in submitting to the church, I soon observed that I should not find in the church doctrine the confirmation and elucidation of those principles of Christianity which to me seemed to be of greatest importance: I observed that this essence of Christianity, which was so dear to me, did not form the chief point in the church doctrine. I observed that that which to me seemed to be of most importance in Christ's teaching was not regarded as such by the church. The church regarded something else as of greatest importance. At first I did not ascribe any meaning to this peculiarity of the church teaching.

Well, I thought, in addition to the meaning of love, humility, self-renunciation, the church recognizes also the dogmatic, the external meaning. This meaning is foreign to me, even repels me, but there is nothing harmful in it.

But the longer I lived, submitting to the church doc-

trine, the more obvious it became to me that this peculiarity of the church doctrine was not so immaterial as it had seemed to me to be at first. What repelled me from the church was the strangeness of the church dogmas, and the recognition and approval given by the church to persecutions, capital punishment, and wars, and the mutual rejection of the various creeds; but what shattered my confidence in it was that indifference to what to me seemed to be the essence of Christ's teaching and the bias for what I regarded as inessential. But I could not make out what was wrong; I could not make it out, because the church doctrine, far from denying that which to me seemed to be of prime importance in Christ's teaching, fully recognized it, but it did so in such a way that what was of prime importance in Christ's teaching did not occupy the first place. I could not rebuke the church for denying the essential things, but the church recognized them in such a way that they did not satisfy me. The church did not give me what I expected from it.

I passed from nihilism to the church only because I was conscious of the impossibility of living without faith, without the knowledge of what is good and what bad, in spite of my animal instincts. I hoped to find this knowledge in Christianity. But Christianity, as it presented itself to me at that time, was only a certain, very indefinite mood, from which did not result clear and obligatory rules of life. I turned to the church for these rules. But the church gave me such rules as did not in the least bring me nearer to the Christian mood, which was so dear to me, and only removed me farther from it, and I could not follow it. The life which was based on the Christian truths was necessary and dear to me; but the church gave me rules of life which were entirely foreign to the truths which I valued so highly. I did not need the rules which the church gave me about the belief in dogmas, about the observance of sacraments, fasts, and prayers, and

there were none that were based on the Christian truths. Moreover, the church rules weakened, and at times destroyed outright, that Christian mood, which alone gave me the meaning of my life. What troubled me more than anything else was that all the human evil — the condemnation of private individuals, of whole nations, of other creeds, and the executions and wars, which resulted from such condemnations — was all justified by the church. Christ's teaching about meekness, about refraining from condemnations, about forgiveness of offences, self-renunciation, and love, was exalted by the church in words, and yet, in fact, that which was incompatible with this teaching was justified by it.

Could it be that Christ's teaching was such that these contradictions ought to exist? I could not believe it. Besides, it had always seemed strange to me that, in so far as I knew the Gospel, those passages on which the definite rules of the church about the dogmas were based were the most obscure of all, while those from which resulted the execution of the teaching were most definite and clear. And yet, the dogmas and the obligations of a Christian which result from them were defined by the church in a most clear and precise manner; while the execution of the teaching was mentioned by it in most obscure, hazy, mystical terms.

Is it possible Christ had that in mind, when he imparted his teaching to men? The solution of my doubts I could find only in the gospels, and I read and re-read them. Out of all the gospels the sermon on the mount always stood out as something special, and I read it oftenest of all. Nowhere else does Christ speak with such solemnity as in this place; nowhere else does he give so many moral, clear, intelligible rules, which reëcho at once in the hearts of all men; nowhere does he speak to a greater assembly of all kinds of simple people. If there existed clear, definite Christian rules, they must be ex-

pressed here. In these three chapters of Matthew I tried to find an explanation of what troubled me. Many, many a time did I read the sermon on the mount, and every time I experienced the same feelings of enthusiasm and meekness of spirit, as I read the verses about offering the cheek, giving up the coat, making peace with all men, and loving our enemies, and the same feeling of dissatisfaction. The words of God, which were directed to all men, were not clear. There was demanded a too impossible renunciation of everything, which destroyed life itself, as I understood it, and so the renunciation of everything, I thought, could not be a peremptory condition of salvation. And as long as it was not a peremptory condition of salvation, there was nothing definite and clear.

I read not only the sermon on the mount, but also all the gospels and all the theological commentaries upon them. The theological explanations, that the utterances of the sermon on the mount were an indication of that perfection toward which man must strive, but that the fallen man was abiding in sin and could not with his powers attain this perfection, and that man's salvation was in faith, prayer, and grace, did not satisfy me.

I could not agree to this, because it had always seemed strange to me why Christ, who knew in advance that the execution of his teaching was impossible with the human powers alone, gave such clear and beautiful rules, which had reference directly to every individual man. As I read these rules, it seemed to me that they had special reference to me and demanded that I, if no one else, should execute them.

As I read these rules, I was always overcome by the joyful certainty that I could henceforth, from that very hour, do all that. I wanted and tried to do it; but the moment I experienced a struggle in the execution, I involuntarily recalled the teaching of the church that man is weak and cannot do it of himself, and I weakened.

I was told that we must believe and pray.

But I felt that I had little faith, and so could not pray. I was told that I must pray so that God might give me faith, that faith which gives prayer, which gives that faith, which gives that prayer, and so on, *ad infinitum*.

But reason and experience showed me that only my efforts to carry out Christ's teaching could be real: and so, after many, many vain searchings and studies of what had been written in proof of the divinity of this teaching and in proof of its un-divinity, after many doubts and sufferings, I was again left alone with my heart and with the mysterious book before me. I could not give it the meaning which others ascribed to it, and could find no other meaning for it, and yet could not reject it. And only after I had lost faith in all the interpretations of both the learned criticism and the learned theology, and had rejected them all, according to Christ's saying, If you receive me not as do the children, you will not enter into the kingdom of God, did I suddenly understand what I had not understood before. I did not understand because I in some way artificially and cunningly transposed, collated, interpreted; on the contrary, everything was revealed to me because I forgot all interpretations. The passage which for me was the key to the whole was Verses 38 and 39 of the fifth chapter of Matthew. It hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, That ye resist not evil. I suddenly for the first time understood the last verse in its direct and simple meaning. I understood that Christ said precisely what he said. And immediately, not something new appeared, but there disappeared that which obscured the truth, and truth arose before me in all its significance. Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say, Do not resist evil. These words suddenly appeared entirely new to me, as though I had never met them before.

Formerly, when I read this passage, I always, by some strange blindness, omitted the words, But I say, Do not resist evil. It was as though these words did not exist, or had no definite meaning.

Later I frequently had occasion in my conversations with many, very many Christians, who knew the Gospel, to observe the same blindness in respect to these words. Nobody remembered these words, and often, when talking about this passage, Christians would take up the Gospel in order to assure themselves that the words were there. Similarly I used to omit the words, and began to understand only from the next words on, But whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him, etc. And these words always presented themselves to me as a demand for sufferings and privations which are not proper to human nature. These words affected me, and I felt that it would be nice to fulfil them. At the same time I felt that I should never be able to fulfil them, merely to suffer. I said to myself, Very well, I will turn my other cheek to a man, and he will strike me a second time; I will give them what they ask of me, and they will take everything from me. I shall have no life. Life is given to me, why should I deprive myself of it? Christ could not have asked for this.

Formerly I used to say that to myself, imagining that in these words Christ praised sufferings and privations, and, praising them, was speaking in exaggeration and so without precision or clearness; but now that I came to understand the saying about non-resistance to evil, it became clear to me that Christ did not exaggerate at all and did not demand any suffering for the sake of suffering, but meant very definitely and clearly what he said.

He said, Do not resist evil; and doing so, remember that there will be found people who, having struck you on one cheek and finding no resistance, will strike you on the other also; having taken your coat, will take your

cloak also; having made use of your labour, will compel you to work more; who will take without returning. And when this happens, you must still not resist evil. Continue to do good to those who will strike and offend you.

And when I comprehended these words, in the manner in which they were said, everything which had been dark became clear, and what had seemed exaggerated became entirely clear. I understood for the first time that the centre of gravity of the whole thought was in the words, Do not resist evil, and that what follows is only an explanation of the first proposition. I understood that Christ does not at all command us to offer our cheek and give up our coat in order that we may suffer, but commands us not to resist evil, and says that, in doing so, we may also have to suffer. Just as a father, sending his son out on a long journey, does not order him to stay awake nights, go without eating, be drenched, and freeze, when he says, Travel on the road, and even if you are to be drenched and frozen, keep to the road, — so Christ does not say, Offer your cheek, suffer, but, Do not resist evil, and no matter what may happen to you, do not resist evil.

These words, Do not resist evil, understood in their direct sense, were for me indeed the key that opened everything to me, and I marvelled how I could have so perverted the clear, definite words. You have been told, A tooth for a tooth, and I say, Do not resist evil, and no matter what evil persons may do to you, suffer, give up, but do not resist evil. What can be clearer, more intelligible, and more indubitable than this? I needed only to understand these words in a simple and direct manner, just as they were said, and everything in Christ's teaching, not merely in the sermon on the mount, but in all the gospels, everything which had been tangled, became clear; what had been contradictory became concordant; and, above all else, what had seemed superfluous became necessary. Everything welded into one whole and each thing

indubitably confirmed everything else, as pieces of a broken statue, when they are recomposed as they ought to be. In this sermon and in all the gospels the same teaching of non-resistance to evil was confirmed on all sides.

In this sermon, as in all other passages, Christ represents to himself his disciples, that is, the men who carry out the rule of non-resistance to evil, not otherwise than men who offer their cheek and give up their cloak, as persecuted, beaten, and poor.

Christ says again and again that he who has not taken the cross, who has not renounced everything, that is, he who is not prepared for all the consequences arising from the execution of the rule of non-resistance to evil, cannot be his disciple. To his disciples Jesus says, Be mendicants; be prepared, while not resisting evil, to receive persecutions, suffering, and death: he prepares himself for suffering and death, without resisting the evil men, and sends away Peter, who is sorry about it, and dies himself, forbidding men to resist evil, and without becoming untrue to his teaching.

All his first disciples carry out this rule of non-resistance, and pass all their life in poverty and persecutions, and never repay evil with evil.

Consequently Jesus says exactly what he says. We may affirm that the constant execution of this rule is very difficult; we may not agree with this, that every man will be blessed in carrying out this rule; we may say that it is foolish, as the unbelievers say, that Christ was a dreamer and idealist, who uttered impracticable rules, which his disciples in their foolishness carried out; but we cannot fail to admit that Christ very clearly and definitely said what he wanted to say, namely, that man, according to his teaching, must not resist evil, and that, therefore, he who has accepted his teaching cannot resist evil. And yet neither believers, nor unbelievers, understand this simple and clear meaning of Christ's words.

II.

When I understood that the words, Do not resist evil, meant, Do not resist evil, all my former conception of the meaning of Christ's teaching suddenly changed, and I was horrified, not at the lack of comprehension, but at the strange comprehension of the teaching, in which I had lived until then. I knew, we all know, that the meaning of the Christian teaching is in the love for men. To say that we must offer our cheek and love our enemy is to express the essence of Christianity. I knew this since childhood, but why had I not understood these simple words in a simple manner, and why had I looked in them for some allegorical meaning? Do not resist evil, means, Never resist evil, that is, never use violence, that is, do not commit an act which is always opposed to love. And if thou shalt be offended in doing so, endure the insult, and still use no violence against others. He has said this as clearly and as simply as it can be said. How, then, could I, who believed, or tried to believe, that he who said this was God, say that it was impossible to do this with one's own strength?

My master says to me, Go and chop some wood; and I reply to him, I cannot do this with my own strength. When I say so, I say one of two things: either that I do not believe in what my master is telling me, or that I do not wish to do what my master wants me to do. Of the commandment of God, which he gave to be kept, and of which he said, He who shall keep it and teach so, shall be accounted greater, and so forth, and of which he said that only those who fulfil it receive life, of the com-

mandment, which he himself kept, and which he expressed so clearly and simply that there cannot be any doubt as to its meaning, of this commandment I, who had never even attempted to keep it, said, Its execution is impossible with my own strength, — I must have a supernatural aid.

God came down upon earth to give salvation to men. The salvation consists in this, that the second person of the Trinity, God the Son, suffered for men, redeemed their sin before the Father, and gave men the church, in which is preserved the grace that is transmitted to those who believe; besides all this, this God the Son gave men a teaching and an example of life for salvation. How, then, could I say that the rules of life, which are so simply and so clearly expressed for all, are so hard to execute that this cannot be done without supernatural aid? He not only said nothing of the kind, but said definitely, By all means fulfil it, and he who will not fulfil it, will not enter the kingdom of heaven. And he never said that the execution was difficult, but, on the contrary, My yoke is good, and my burden light; John the evangelist said, His commandments are not hard. How, then, could I say that that which God has commanded men to do; that that, the execution of which he so clearly defined, and of which he said that it was easy to do it; that that which he himself executed as a man, and which his first followers executed; how could I say that this execution was so difficult that it was even impossible without supernatural aid?

If a man puts all the effort of his mind on destroying a certain law, what more effective objection, in order to destroy this law, could the man bring forward than that this law is by its essence impracticable, and that the lawgiver held in respect to his law that it was impracticable, and that supernatural aid is necessary in order that it be executed? It was precisely this that I thought in respect to the commandment of non-resistance to evil.

I tried to recall how and when this strange idea had got into my mind that Christ's law was divine, but that it could not be executed; and analyzing my past, I understood that this idea had never been communicated to me in all its nakedness (it would have repelled me), but that I, imperceptibly to myself, had imbibed it with my mother's milk from my earliest childhood, and that my subsequent life only confirmed me in this strange delusion.

I have been taught since childhood that Christ is God and his teaching divine, but, at the same time, I was taught to respect the institutions which through force secured my immunity from evil, — I was taught to respect these institutions as sacred. I was taught to resist evil, and was impressed with the idea that it is base and disgraceful to submit to evil and to suffer from it, and praiseworthy to resist it. I was taught to judge and punish. Then I was taught to make war, that is, to resist evil men with murder, and the military caste, of which I was a member, was called the Christ-loving military, and their activity was sanctified by a Christian blessing. Besides, from childhood up to my manly estate I had been taught to respect what directly opposed Christ's law. To resist the offender, to avenge by the use of violence a personal, family, national insult, — all this they not only did not deny, but impressed upon me as something beautiful and not contrary to Christ's law.

Everything which surrounded me, my family's peace and their safety and my own, my property, everything was based on the law which Christ rejected, on the law, A tooth for a tooth.

The church teachers taught that Christ's teaching was divine, but that its execution was impossible on account of human weakness, and that only Christ's grace could coöperate in its execution. The worldly teachers and all the structure of life directly recognized the impracticability and visionariness of Christ's teaching, and by their words

and deeds taught what was contrary to this teaching. This recognition of the impracticableness of God's teaching had so slowly and so imperceptibly percolated in me and become habitual with me, and to such a degree coincided with my lusts, that I had never before noticed the contradiction in which I lived. I did not see that it was not possible at one and the same time to confess Christ the God, the foundation of whose teaching is non-resistance to evil, and consciously and calmly to work for the establishment of property, of courts, government, and army; to establish a life which was contrary to the teaching of Christ, and to pray to this Christ that the law of non-resistance to evil and of forgiveness be fulfilled among us. It did not yet occur to me, what now is so clear, that it would be much simpler to arrange and establish life according to Christ's law, and then only to pray for courts, executions, and wars, if they are so necessary for our good.

And I understood whence my delusion came. It arose from confessing Christ in words and denying him in fact.

The proposition about non-resistance to evil is a proposition which binds the teaching together, but only when it is not an utterance but a rule which must be executed, — when it is a law.

It is indeed a key which unlocks everything, but only when the key is put into the lock. The recognition of this proposition as an utterance, which is impossible of execution without supernatural aid, is an annihilation of the whole teaching. How can such a teaching, from which the fundamental, binding principle has been removed, present itself otherwise than as impossible? But to unbelievers it simply appears stupid, and it cannot appear in any other light.

To put up an engine, fire the boiler, set the engine in motion, and not connect the transmitting belt, — it is precisely this that has been done with Christ's teaching,

when they began to teach that a man may be a Christian without executing the proposition about non-resistance to evil.

A little while ago I read the fifth chapter of Matthew with a Jewish rabbi. At nearly every utterance the rabbi said, "This is in the Bible, this is in the Talmud," and pointed out to me in the Bible and in the Talmud utterances which very closely resembled those in the sermon on the mount. But when we reached the verse about non-resistance to evil, he did not say, This, too, is in the Talmud, but only asked me with a smile, "And do the Christians execute this? Do they offer the other cheek?"

I could make no reply, the more so, since I knew that just at that time the Christians not only failed to offer their cheeks, but struck the Jews on the cheeks which they turned to them. Still it interested me to know whether there was anything like it in the Bible or in the Talmud, and I asked him about it.

He said, No, that is not there, but tell me, Do the Christians keep this law? With this question he told me that the presence of such a rule in the Christian law, which not only no one executes, but which also the Christians consider impracticable, is a recognition of the irrationality and uselessness of this rule. And I could not answer him.

Now that I have come to understand the direct meaning of the teaching, I see clearly the strange self-contradiction in which I had lived. Since I recognized Christ as God and his teaching as divine and, at the same time, arranged my life contrary to this teaching, what was there left for me to do but recognize this teaching as impracticable? In words I recognized Christ's teaching as sacred, but in reality I did not at all confess the Christian teaching, and bowed before non-Christian institutions, which on all sides embraced my life.

The whole Old Testament says that the misfortunes of the Jewish people were due to their believing in false gods, and not in the true God. Samuel, in the First Book, Chapters VIII. and XII., accuses the people of having, to their previous transgressions against God, added a new one: in the place of God, who was their king, they placed a man-king, who, in their opinion, was to save them. Do not believe in *thohu*, emptiness, Samuel says to the people (xii. 12). It will not help you, and will not save you, for it is *thohu*, empty. If you do not wish to perish with your king, keep the one God.

Now the belief in this *thohu*, in these empty idols, veiled the truth from me. On the way toward it, barring its light, stood before me those *thohu*, which I was unable to renounce.

The other day I went through the Borovítski Gate; in it sat an old man, a lame mendicant, wrapped to his ears in a dirty rag. I took out my purse, to give him something. Just then a young, dapper, red-cheeked grenadier, in a Crown fur coat, came running down from the Kremlin. When the mendicant saw the grenadier, he jumped up in fright and ran limping toward the Alexander Garden. The grenadier started in pursuit after him, but stopped before reaching him, and began to curse the mendicant for disobeying the order not to sit down in the gate. I waited in the gate for the grenadier to return. When he was in a line with me, I asked him whether he could read.

"I do, what of it?"

"Have you read the Gospel?"

"I have."

"Have you read, And he who shall feed the hungry?"

I quoted the passage to him. He knew it, and listened to it, and I saw that he was troubled. Two passers-by stopped to listen. It was evident that the grenadier was pained to feel that he, who excellently executed his duty,

which was to drive people away from where they were not permitted to stay, suddenly appeared unjust. He was confused and, apparently, was trying to find a justification. Suddenly a light gleamed in his bright black eyes, and he turned sidewise toward me, as though ready to walk away.

"Have you read the Military Regulation?" he asked.

I told him that I had read it.

"Then don't talk," said the grenadier, with a victorious toss of his head, and, wrapping himself in the fur coat, he went dashingly back to his place.

This was the only man in my whole life who in a strictly logical way solved that eternal question, which in our social structure had stood before me and stands before every man who calls himself a Christian.

III.

They speak in vain who say that the Christian teaching touches the personal salvation, and not the general questions of state. This is only a bold and barren assertion of a most palpable untruth, which is destroyed at the first serious thought of it. Very well, I will not resist evil, will offer my cheek as a private individual, I say to myself, but there comes an enemy, or nations are oppressed, and I am called to participate in the struggle with the evil men, — to go and kill them. I must inevitably solve the question, In what does the service of God and the service of *thohu* consist? Must I go to war, or not go to war? I am a peasant; I am chosen an elder, a juryman, and am compelled to swear, to judge, to punish, — what must I do? Again I must choose between the law of God and the law of man. I am a monk, who lives in the monastery, and the peasants have taken our mowing away, and I am sent out to take part in the struggle with the evil men, to enter a complaint in the court against the peasants. Again I must choose.

Not a single man can get away from the necessity for a solution of this question. I am not speaking of our class of society, almost the whole of whose activity consists in resisting the evil, being warriors, men of the legal profession, administrators; there is no private individual, no matter how modest he may be, who is not confronted with this necessity for a solution between serving God and keeping his commandments, and serving *thohu*, the institutions of state. My personal life is interwoven with the social, political life, and the political life de-

mands of me a non-Christian activity, which is directly opposed to Christ's commandment. Now, with the universal military service and the participation of all in the court in the capacity of jurymen, this dilemma is with striking distinctness placed before all people. Every man has to take up the weapon of murder, the gun, the knife, and, though he does not kill, he must load his gun and whet his knife, that is, be prepared to commit murder. Every citizen must come to court and be a participant in the court and in the punishments, that is, every man has to renounce Christ's commandment of non-resistance to evil, not only in words, but in action as well.

The grenadier's question — the Gospel or the Military Regulation, the law of God, and the law of men — is standing now before humanity as it did in the time of Samuel. It stood also before Christ and before his disciples. It stands before those who want to be Christians in fact; it stood also before me.

Christ's law, with his teaching of love, humility, self-renunciation, had always before touched my heart and attracted me. But on all sides, in history, in the contemporary life which surrounded me, in my own life, I saw the opposite law, which was contrary to my heart, my conscience, my reason, which pampered my animal instincts. I felt that, if I accepted Christ's law, I should be left alone, and I might fare ill: I might be persecuted and have to weep, precisely what Christ said about it. If I accepted the human law, all would approve of me, and I should be quiet and secure, and all the cunning of reason would be at my service, pacifying my conscience. I would laugh and rejoice, precisely what Christ said about it. I felt this, and so not only failed to penetrate Christ's law, but tried to understand it in such a way that it should not keep me from living my animal life. But it was not possible to understand it thus, and I did not understand it at all.

In this lack of comprehension I now reached a remarkable degree of blindness. As an example of such a blindness I will adduce my former comprehension of the words, Judge not, that ye be not judged (Matt. vii. 1). Judge not, and ye shall not be judged; condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned (Luke vi. 37). The institution of the courts, in which I took part, and which protected my property and made me secure, seemed so unquestionably sacred and so far from breaking God's law that it never occurred to me that this utterance could mean anything but that one should not judge his neighbour in words. It did not occur to me that Christ could in these words have spoken of courts, of the provincial court, the criminal court, the circuit and justice of the peace courts, and all kinds of senates and departments. Only when I comprehended the direct meaning of the words about non-resistance to evil, the question presented itself to me as to what Christ's relations were to all these courts and departments. When I saw that he would have rejected them, I asked myself, Does it mean only, Do not judge your neighbour in words? Does it not mean also, Do not sit in judgment, do not judge your neighbour in human institutions?

In Luke, Chapter VI., from Verse 37 to Verse 49, these words are said immediately after the teaching about non-resistance to evil and repaying evil with good. Immediately after the words, Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful, it says, Judge not, and ye shall not be judged. Does not this mean that not only is one not to judge his neighbour, but also not to establish courts and not to judge his neighbours in them? I asked myself. And I need only to put this question to myself, in order that my heart and common sense should immediately answer me in the affirmative.

I know that the comprehension of these words is startling at first. It startled me also. To show how far removed I was from the proper understanding, I will con-

fess a disgraceful stupidity: after I had become a believer and read the Gospel as a divine book, I, upon meeting prosecuting attorneys and judges of my acquaintance, used to say to them in a playful way, And so you still continue to judge, though it says, Judge not, that ye be not judged! I was so sure that these words could not mean anything but a prohibition of gossip, that I did not understand that terrible blasphemy which I was uttering in saying those words. I had reached such a point that, having convinced myself that these clear words did not mean what they meant, I playfully used them in their real meaning.

I will tell in detail how there was destroyed in me every doubt as to this, that the words could not be understood in any other sense than that Christ forbids all human institutions of courts, and could not say anything else with these words.

The first thing that startled me, when I came to understand the commandment about non-resistance to evil in its direct sense, was that the human courts not only failed to agree with it, but were positively opposed to it, and opposed to the meaning of the whole teaching, and that, therefore, Christ must have rejected the courts, if he thought of them.

Christ says, Do not resist evil. The purpose of the courts is to resist evil. Christ prescribes doing good in return for evil. The courts retaliate evil with evil. Christ says, Make no distinction between the good and the bad. All the courts do is to make this distinction. Christ says, Forgive all men; forgive, not once, not seven times, but without end; love your enemies, do good to those who hate you. The courts do not forgive, but punish; they do not do good, but evil, to those whom they call enemies of society. Thus it turns out, according to the meaning, that Christ must have rejected the courts.

But, I thought, maybe Christ had nothing to do with human courts and did not think of them. But I see that

that cannot be assumed: From his very birth until his death, Jesus came in contact with the courts of Herod, of the sanhedrim, and of the high priests. And, indeed, I see that Christ frequently speaks directly of courts as of an evil. He says to his disciples that they will be judged, and tells them how they must bear themselves in court. Of himself he says that he will be condemned, and he shows how we must act toward a human court.

Consequently, Christ thought of those human courts which were to condemn him and his disciples, and which have condemned millions of people. Christ saw this evil and directly pointed to it. In passing judgment on the harlot, he denies the court outright, and shows that a man cannot condemn, because he is himself guilty. The same idea he expresses several times, saying that with a dust-filled eye it is impossible to see the dust in another man's eye, that a blind man cannot guide the blind. He even explains what follows from such a delusion. The pupil will be like the teacher.

But, perhaps, having expressed this in respect to the condemnation of the harlot, and having pointed out the common human weakness in the parable of the mote, he, none the less, does not forbid turning to human justice in order to find defence against evil men; but I see that this can in no way be conceded.

In the sermon on the mount he turns to all men and says, And if a man wants to take away thy coat by suing thee at law, give him thy cloak also. Consequently, he forbids all to go to law.

But, perhaps, Christ is speaking only of the personal relation of each man to the courts, and does not deny the courts of justice themselves, and in Christian society recognizes men who judge others in established institutions? But I see that this, too, cannot be conceded. Christ commands in his prayer all people without exception to forgive others, that their guilt be also forgiven them, and he

repeats this thought several times. Consequently, every man must forgive all, both in his prayer and before he offers a gift. How, then, can a man judge and sentence in court, since, according to the faith which he professes, he must always forgive? And so I see that, according to Christ's teaching, there cannot be such a person as a Christian judge, who punishes men.

But, perhaps, from the connection in which the words stand with other words, Judge not and condemn not, Christ, speaking here, Judge not, did not have in mind human courts? But that is not true, either; on the contrary, it is evident from the context that, saying, Judge not, Christ is speaking of courts as institutions; according to Matthew and Luke, he precedes the words, Judge not, by, Do not resist evil, suffer evil, do good to all men. And before this he, according to Matthew, repeats the words of the Jewish criminal law, An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. And after this reference to the criminal law, he says, But do not do so, do not resist evil, and then only, he says, Do not judge. Consequently Christ is speaking of the criminal law of men, and rejects it with the words, Do not judge.

Besides, according to Luke, he not only says, Do not judge, but, Do not judge and do not condemn. There must be some reason why this word, which has nearly the same meaning, is added. The addition of this word can have but one aim: the explanation of the meaning in which this first word is to be taken.

If he wanted to say, Do not condemn your neighbour, he would have added this word; but he adds a word, which means, Do not sentence. And then he says, And you will not be sentenced; forgive all, and you will be forgiven.

But, perhaps, Christ was still not thinking of the courts, when he said this, and I put my own thought into his words, which have a different significance.

I look to find out how the first disciples of Christ, the apostles, considered the human courts, and whether they recognized and approved them. In Chapter IV., Verses 1–11, Apostle James says, Speak not evil one of another, brethren. He that speaketh evil of his brother, and judgeth his brother, speaketh evil of the law, and judgeth the law: but if thou judge the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge. There is one lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy: who art thou that judgest another?

The word which is rendered by *speak evil* is καταλάλεα. Even without referring to the dictionary, we can see that it must mean *to accuse:* and this it does mean, which any one may verify by looking into the dictionary. It is translated, He that speaketh evil of his brother, speaketh evil of the law. Involuntarily the question arises, Why? No matter how much evil I may speak of my brother, I do not speak evil of the law; but if I accuse and judge my brother in court, it is evident that I thus accuse Christ's law, that is, I consider Christ's law insufficient, and accuse and judge the law. Then it is clear that I no longer execute his law, but am myself a judge. But a judge, says Christ, is he who can save. How, then, can I be a judge, and punish, since I am not able to save?

This whole passage speaks of the human court, and denies it. The whole epistle is permeated by the same idea. In the same epistle (ii. 1–13), it says:

1. My brethren, have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons.

2. For if there come unto your assembly a man with a gold ring, in goodly apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile raiment;

3. And ye have respect to him that weareth the gay clothing, and say unto him, Sit thou here in a good place; and say to the poor, Stand thou there, or sit here under my footstool:

4. Are ye not then partial in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts?

5. Hearken, my beloved brethren, Hath not God chosen the poor of this world rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which he hath promised to them that love him?

6. But ye have despised the poor. Do not rich men oppress you, and draw you before the judgment seats?

7. Do not they blaspheme that worthy name by the which ye are called?

8. If ye fulfil the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself (Lev. xix. 18), ye do well:

9. But if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors.

10. For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all.

11. For he that said, Do not commit adultery, said also, Do not kill. Now if thou commit no adultery, yet if thou kill, thou art become a transgressor of the law. (Deut. xxii. 22; Lev. xviii. 17–25.)

12. So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty.

13. For he shall have judgment without mercy, that hath shewed no mercy; and mercy rejoiceth against judgment.

The last words have frequently been translated by, Mercy is proclaimed at the judgment, so as to mean that there can be a Christian court, but that it must be merciful.

James admonishes the brethren not to make any distinction between men. If you do make a distinction, you διεκρίθητε you are partial, as judges with evil thoughts are in the court. You have decided that the poor man is worse, whereas, in reality, the rich man is worse. He oppresses you and drags you to court. If you live according to the law of love for your neighbour,

according to the law of mercy (which, in distinction from the other, James calls royal), it is well. But if you respect persons, make distinctions among men, you become transgressors of the law of mercy. And, having in view, no doubt, the example of the harlot, who was brought before Christ, in order that she might be stoned to death according to the law, or in general the crime of adultery, James says that he who puts to death the harlot will be guilty of murder, and will break the eternal law, for the same eternal law forbids both fornication and murder. He says, Do as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty, for there will be no mercy to him who is without mercy, and so mercy destroys the court.

How could this be said more clearly and more definitely? Every distinction between men, every judgment as to this man being good, and that one bad, is prohibited; the human court is pointed out as being unquestionably bad, and it is shown that this judgment is criminal, in that it puts to death for crimes, and that, therefore, the courts are naturally destroyed by God's law, — by mercy.

I read the epistles of Apostle Paul, who suffered from the courts, and in the very first chapter of his epistle to the Romans I read an admonition, which the apostle makes to the Romans for all their vices and delusions, and among these for their courts:

I. 32. Who, knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.

II. 1. Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things.

2. But we are sure that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit such things.

3. And thinkest thou this, O man, that judgest them

which do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God?

4. Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and longsuffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?

Apostle Paul says, Knowing the righteous judgment of God, they themselves act unrighteously and teach others to do likewise, and so a man who judges cannot be justified.

Such a relation to the courts I find in the epistles of the apostles; but in their lives, as we all know, the human courts appeared to them as an evil and offence, which it was necessary to bear with firmness and with devotion to the will of God.

If we reconstruct in our imagination the condition of the first Christians amidst the Gentiles, we shall easily understand that it could not have occurred to the Christians, who were persecuted by human courts, to forbid the courts. Only occasionally they could touch on this evil, denying its foundations, even as they did.

I consult the teachers of the church of the first centuries, and I see that they always defined their doctrine, as distinguishing them from all the others, by saying that they never compel others or judge any one (Athenagoras, Origen), nor put to death, but only endure the torments which are imposed upon them by human courts. All the martyrs attested the same by their acts. I see that all Christianity, up to Constantine, never looked differently at the courts than as at an evil which one must patiently endure, and that it never could have occurred to a single Christian of that time that a Christian could take part in a judgment.

I see that Christ's words, Do not judge, and do not condemn, were understood by his first disciples just as I have come to understand them, in their direct sense, Do not judge in courts, and do not take part in them.

Everything incontestably confirmed my conviction that the words, Do not judge, and do not condemn, meant, Do not judge in courts; but the interpretation that it means, Do not calumniate thy neighbour, is so universally accepted, and the courts flourish so boldly and so arrogantly in all Christian countries, basing themselves even on the church, that I for a long time doubted the justice of my comprehension. If all men could interpret in such a way and have established Christian courts, they, no doubt, must have had some foundation for them, and there is something about it which you do not understand, I said to myself. There must be some grounds on which these words are meant to mean calumny, and there must be grounds on which Christian courts are established.

I turned to the interpretations of the church. In all these commentaries, beginning with the fifth century, I found that these words were usually understood to mean a verbal condemnation of one's neighbour, that is, calumny. And since these words are accepted to mean a verbal condemnation of one's neighbour, there arises a difficulty: how can we help condemning? The evil cannot help but be condemned. And so all the interpretations turn about what one may condemn, and what not. They say that for the servants of the church that cannot be taken as a prohibition against judging, and that the apostles themselves judged (Chrysostom and Theophilactes). They say that, in all probability, Christ by these words points to the Jews, who accuse their neighbours of small sins, and themselves commit great sins. But nowhere is there a word said about the human institutions, the courts, about the relation that these courts bear to the prohibition against condemning. Does Christ forbid them, or does he permit them?

To this natural question there is no answer, as though it were too obvious that the moment a Christian sits down

in the judgment-seat, he can not only condemn his neighbour, but also put him to death.

I consult the Greek, Catholic, and Protestant writers and the writers of the Tübingen school and of the historical school. By all these, even the most freethinking interpreters, the words are understood as a prohibition against calumniating. But why these words, contrary to the whole teaching of Christ, are understood in such a narrow sense that into the prohibition against judging there does not enter the prohibition against keeping court; why it is assumed that Christ, in prohibiting the condemnation of one's neighbour which, as a bad deed, accidentally escapes one's mouth, does not consider bad the same kind of a condemnation which is pronounced consciously and is combined with the exertion of violence over the condemned person, — to this there is no answer; and there is not even the slightest hint as to the possibility of understanding by condemnation what takes place in courts and causes millions to suffer. More than that: on the occasion of the words, Do not judge and do not condemn, this same cruel method of legal condemnation is cautiously obviated and even fenced off. The theological commentators mention that courts must exist in Christian countries, and that they are not contrary to Christ's law.

When I noticed this, I doubted the sincerity of these interpretations, and turned to the translation of the words, Judge and condemn, — to that which I ought to have turned to in the start.

In the original these words are *κρίνω* and *καταδικάζω*. The incorrect translation of the word *καταδικάζω* in James's epistle, which is translated by the word *calumniate*, confirmed my doubt in the correctness of the translation.

I investigate how the words *κρίνω* and *καταδικάζω* are translated in the gospels in the different languages, and I

find that in the Vulgate the last is translated by *condamnare*, and similarly in French; in Slavic it is *osuzhdat'*; in Luther, *verdammen*, to curse.

The variability of these translations increases my doubts, and I ask myself, What do the Greek word κρίνω, which is used in both the gospels, and the word καταδικάζω, which is used in Luke, mean, and what can they mean, especially in the case of Luke, an evangelist who, in the opinion of scholars, wrote in fairly good Greek? How would a man translate these words, if he knew nothing of the gospel teaching and its interpretations, and had before him this one utterance?

I consult the general dictionary, and I find that κρίνω has many different meanings, and among them the very usual significance, *to pass sentence*, even *to put to death*, but never *to calumniate*. I consult the dictionary of the New Testament, and I find that in the New Testament it is frequently used in the sense of *to put aside*, but never as *to calumniate*. And so I see that the word κρίνω may be differently translated, but that a translation which would give it the meaning of *to calumniate* is most far-fetched and unexpected.

I investigate the word καταδικάζω, which is attached to the word κρίνω, which has many meanings, apparently in order to define the special meaning which the author had in view with the first word. I look up the word καταδικάζω in the general dictionary, and I find that this word never has any other meaning than *to condemn at a trial to punishments, to sentence*. I consult the dictionary of the New Testament, and I find that this word is used in the epistle of James, v. 6, where it says, Ye have condemned and killed the just. The word *condemned*, the same καταδικάζω, is used in relation to Christ, who is condemned to death. In no other sense is this word ever used in the whole New Testament, or in any Greek language.

What is this? Have I grown so stupid? I, and every one of us, who lives in our society, if he has at all thought of the fate of men, has been terrified before the sufferings and before the evil which the criminal laws of men have introduced into life, — an evil both for the judged and for the judges, — from the executions of Dzhingis-Khan and of the Revolution to the executions of our own day.

No man with a heart has escaped that impression of terror and of doubt in the good, even at the recital, not to speak of the sight, of the executions of men by just such men, by means of rods, the guillotine, the gallows.

In the Gospel, each word of which we consider sacred, it says clearly and outright, You had a criminal code — a tooth for a tooth — and I give you a new one: do not resist evil; you must all keep this commandment, Do not return evil for evil, but always do good to all men, — forgive all men.

And further, it says, Do not judge. And, that no doubt be left as to the meaning of the words which were said, it adds, Do not condemn by trial to punishments.

My heart says clearly and distinctly, Do not put to death; science says, Do not put to death; the more you put to death, the more evil there is; reason says, Do not put to death; you cannot stop an evil with an evil. The Word of God, in which I believe, says the same. And I, reading all the teaching, reading the words, Judge not, and ye shall not be judged; condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned; forgive, and ye shall be forgiven, acknowledge that these are the words of God, and say that what they mean is that we must not busy ourselves with gossiping and calumniating, and must continue to regard the courts as a Christian institution, and me as a judge and Christian.

I was horrified at the grossness of the deception in which I had been living.

IV.

I now understood what Christ meant when he said, You were told an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; and I tell you, Do not resist evil, and endure it. Christ says, You have been impressed with the idea, and you have become accustomed to it, that it is good and rational by force to repel the evil and to pluck an eye out for an eye, to establish criminal courts, the police, the army, to resist the enemy: but I say, Use no violence, do not take part in violence, do no evil to any one, even to those whom you call your enemies.

I now understood not only that in the proposition about non-resistance to evil Christ was telling what would immediately result for each man from non-resistance to evil, but that — in contradistinction to the principle by which humanity lived in his day according to Moses and the Roman law, and now lives according to all kinds of codes — he put the proposition of non-resistance to evil in such a way that, according to his teaching, it was to be the foundation of the joint life of men and was to free humanity from the evil which it inflicted upon itself. He says, You think that your laws mend the evil, but they only increase it. There is one way of cutting off evil, and that is, to do good for evil to all without any distinction. You have tried your principle for a thousand years, try now the reverse.

Here is a remarkable thing. Of late I have frequently had occasion to speak with a large variety of men about this law of Christ concerning non-resistance to evil. Though rarely, I have now and then met people who

agreed with me: but there are two classes of men who never, not even in principle, admit the direct comprehension of this law and who warmly defend the justice of resistance to evil. These men belong to the two extreme poles: they are the patriotic and conservative Christians, who acknowledge that their church is the true one, and the atheistic Revolutionists. Neither the one nor the other will renounce the right of forcibly resisting what they regard as an evil. Not even the wisest and most learned among them want to see the simple, obvious truth that, if we concede to one man the right forcibly to resist what he considers an evil, a second person may with the same right resist what he regards as an evil.

Lately I had in my hands an instructive correspondence of an Orthodox Slavophile with a Christian Revolutionist. One of them defended the violence of war in the name of the oppressed Slavic brothers, and the other defended the revolutions in the name of his oppressed brothers, the Russian peasants. Both demand violence, and both fall back on Christ's teaching.

They all understand Christ's teaching in the most varied manner possible, only not in the direct, simple sense which inevitably flows from his words.

We have established all our life on the very foundations which he denies, do not wish to understand his teaching in its simple and direct sense, and assure ourselves and others, either that we profess his teaching, or that his teaching is not good for us. The so-called believers believe that Christ is God, the second person of the Trinity, who came down upon earth in order to give men an example of life, and they do the most complicated things, which are necessary for the performance of the sacraments, the building of churches, the despatch of missionaries, the establishment of pastors, the government of the congregation, the confession of faith, but forget one small circumstance, — to do what he said.

The unbelievers try to arrange their life in every manner possible, except by Christ's law, having decided in advance that this law is not good for them. No one wants to endeavour to do what he says but, moreover, before attempting to do so, both believers and unbelievers decide in advance that this is impossible.

He says simply and clearly, The law of resisting evil with violence, which you have put at the basis of your life, is false and unnatural; and he gives us another basis, that of non-resistance, which alone according to his teaching, can free humanity from evil. He says, You think that your laws of violence mend the evil; but they only increase it. You have tried for thousands of years to destroy evil by evil, and you have not destroyed it, but have only increased it. Do what I tell you and what I do, and you will see whether it is true.

And he not only speaks of this, but in his whole life and in his death executes his teaching about non-resistance to evil.

The believers hear all this and read it in the churches, calling it divine words, and call him God, but they say, All this is very nice, but it is impossible with our social structure, — it disorganizes our whole life, whereas we are used to our life and love it. And so we believe in all this in the sense of its being an ideal toward which humanity must strive, an ideal which is attained by prayer and faith in the sacraments, in the redemption, and in the resurrection from the dead.

But the others, the unbelievers, the free interpreters of Christ's teaching, the historians of the religions, Strauss, Renan, and others, who have adopted in full the church interpretation as to Christ's teaching not having any direct applicability to life, and being only a visionary teaching which consoles half-witted people, say in a most serious manner that Christ's teaching was good enough to be preached to the savage inhabitants of the backwoods of

Galilee, but that to us, with our culture, it presents itself only as a sweet dream "*du charmant docteur*," as Renan says. According to their opinion, Christ could not rise to the height of comprehending the whole wisdom of our civilization and culture. If he had stood on the same height of education, on which these learned men stand, he would not have mentioned such sweet trifles, as the birds of heaven, the turning of the other cheek, and the care for the present day alone.

These learned historians judge of Christianity from the Christianity which they see in our society; but according to the Christianity of our society and time, our life with all its arrangement is regarded as true and holy, — with its prisons, solitary confinement, Alcazars, factories, periodicals, brothels, and parliaments, and only so much is taken out of Christ's teaching as does not interfere with this life. And since Christ's teaching rejects this whole life, nothing is taken out of Christ's teaching but words. The learned historians see this, and, as they have no need of concealing it, as the so-called believers do, subject this teaching of Christ, after it is bereft of its meaning, to a profound criticism, and reject it in its entirety, and prove that there never was anything in Christianity but visionary ideas.

One would think that, before passing judgment on Christ's teaching, it would be necessary to understand wherein this teaching consists; and, in order to decide whether this teaching is sensible or not, that it would be necessary, above all, to ascertain that he said what he said; but this we, neither the clerical, nor the freethinking interpreters, have done, and we know why we have not done it.

We know very well that Christ's teaching, rejecting them, has always embraced those human delusions, those *thohus*, empty idols, which we, calling them the church, the state, civilization, science, art, culture, imagine we

can segregate from the series of delusions; but Christ speaks against them, without segregating any *thohus*.

Not only Christ, but all the Jewish prophets, John the Baptist, all the true sages of the world, speak of precisely this church, this state, this culture, this civilization, calling them evil and destruction of men.

Let us say a builder says to a householder, Your house is bad, it has to be rebuilt; and then he will proceed to explain in detail what beams are needed, how they are to be cut, and where to be placed. The householder will overhear the statement that the house is bad and needs to be rebuilt, and will with feigned respect listen to the builder's words about the further arrangement and distribution of the house. Apparently all the counsels of the builder will seem inapplicable, and he who pays no attention to the builder will simply call them foolish. Precisely the same takes place in regard to Christ's teaching.

Being unable to find a better comparison, I used this one; and I recalled that Christ, in imparting his teaching, made use of this very comparison. He said, I will destroy your temple, and in three days will I build up a new one. And for this he was crucified; and for the same thing they now crucify his teaching.

The least that can be demanded of men who are judging of a person's teachings is that they should judge of the teacher's teaching, as he himself understood it. Now, he did not understand his teaching as a distant ideal of humanity, the execution of which is impossible, not as visionary, poetical fancies, with which he captivated the simple-minded inhabitants of Galilee, but as a deed which would save humanity. And he did not dream on the cross, but spoke loud, and died for his teaching, and in exactly the same manner many other men have died and will die. We cannot say of such a teaching that it is a dream.

Every teaching of the truth is a dream for those who

have gone astray. We have reached such a point that there are many men (I was among their number) who say that this teaching is visionary because it is not in accord with human nature. It is not in accord with human nature, they say, to offer the other cheek, when a man is struck on one cheek, nor to give up one's property to a stranger, nor to work for another, and not for oneself. It is human nature, they say, to defend one's safety, the safety of one's family, one's property, in other words, it is in accord with human nature to struggle for existence. A learned jurist will prove in a scientific manner that it is man's most sacred duty to defend his rights, that is, to struggle.

But we need but for a moment to renounce the idea that the social structure, which exists and is made by men, is the best, the most sacred social structure, and the objection that Christ's teaching is not in accord with human nature is immediately turned against these who object. Who will deny that it is repulsive and painful to human nature, not only to torture or kill a man, but even to torture a dog, or to kill a chicken or a calf? (I know men living by agricultural labour, who have stopped eating meat only because they had themselves to kill their animals.) And yet the whole structure of our life is such that every personal good of man is gained by the sufferings of other men, which are contrary to human nature. The whole structure of our life, the whole complicated mechanism of our institutions, which have violence for their aim, testify to this, that violence is exceedingly repulsive to human nature.

Not one judge would have the courage to strangle the man whom he has sentenced according to his law. Not one chief would have the courage to take a peasant away from a weeping family and lock him up in prison. Not one general or soldier would, without discipline, oath, or war, kill a hundred Turks or Germans, and lay waste their vil-

lages ; he would not even have the courage to wound a single man. All this is done only thanks to that complicated political and social machine, whose problem it is so to scatter the responsibility of the atrocities which are perpetrated so that no man may feel the unnaturalness of these acts. Some write laws ; others apply them ; others again muster men, educating in them the habit of discipline, that is, of senseless and irresponsible obedience ; others again — these same mustered men — commit every kind of violence, even killing men, without knowing why and for what purpose. But a man need but a moment mentally free himself from this net of the social structure, in which he is caught, and he will know what is not in accord with his nature.

If we will not affirm that the habitual evil, which we practise, is an unchangeable, divine truth, it will be clear to us what is natural and proper for man, — whether it is violence, or Christ's law ; whether to know that my peace and security and that of my family, all my joys and pleasures, are bought by the poverty, debauch, and suffering of millions, — by annual gallows, hundreds of thousands of suffering prisoners and millions of soldiers, policemen, and guards, torn away from their families and dulled by discipline, who with loaded pistols, to be aimed at hungry men, secure the amusements for me ; whether to buy every dainty piece which I put into my mouth, or into the mouths of my children, at the cost of all that suffering of humanity, which is inevitable for the acquisition of these pieces ; or to know that any piece is only then my piece when nobody needs it, and nobody suffers for it.

We need only to understand that it is so, that every joy of mine, every minute of peace, is in our structure of life bought at the cost of the privations and sufferings of thousands who are restrained by violence ; we need but understand this, in order that we may comprehend

what is proper for a man's whole nature, that is, not only for his animal, but both for his rational and his animal nature; we need only understand Christ's law in all its significance, with all its consequences, in order that we may understand that Christ's teaching is in accord with human nature, that it consists even in this, that we reject the visionary teaching of men about resisting evil, which is not in accord with human nature, and which makes their life miserable.

Christ's teaching about non-resistance to evil is a dream! And this, that the life of men, into whose souls pity and love for one another is put, has passed, for some, in providing stakes, knouts, racks, cat-o'-nine-tails, tearing of nostrils, inquisitions, fetters, hard labour, gallows, executions by shooting, solitary confinements, prisons for women and children, in providing slaughter of tens of thousands in war, in providing revolutions and seditions; and for others, in executing all these horrors; and for others again, in avoiding all these sufferings and retaliating for them, — such a life is not a dream!

We need only understand Christ's teaching, in order that we may comprehend that the world, not the one which was given by God for man's joy, but the one which is established by men for their destruction, is a dream, the wildest, most terrible dream, the delirium of an insane man, from which we need only once awaken, in order that we may never again return to this terrible vision.

God came down upon earth; the Son of God, one of the persons of the Holy Trinity, became incarnate and redeemed Adam's sin; this God, so we have been taught to believe, must have said something mysterious and mystical, something which it is hard to understand, which can be understood only by means of faith and grace, and suddenly God's words are so simple, so clear, so rational. God says simply, Do not do evil to one another, and there will be no evil. Is it possible God's revelation is so

simple? Is it possible this is all God said? It seems to us that we know all this, for it is so simple.

Elijah the prophet, running away from men, hid himself in a cave, and he had a revelation that God would appear to him at the entrance of the cave. There was a storm, and the trees were broken by it. Elijah thought that this was God, and he looked out, but God was not there. Then there came a rain-storm; the thunder and lightning were terrible. Elijah went out to see whether God was there, but he was not. Then there was an earthquake; fire rose from the earth, rocks were split, and mountains caved in. Elijah looked out, but God was not there. Then it quieted down, and a light breeze blew from the refreshed fields. Elijah looked out, and God was there. Even so are these simple words, Do not resist evil.

They are very simple, but in them is expressed the law of God and of man, the only and eternal law. This law is to such a degree eternal that, if there is in historical life a movement toward abolishing evil, it exists only thanks to those men who so understood Christ's teaching, and who endured the evil and did not resist it through violence. The movement of humanity toward the good takes place, not thanks to the tormentors, but to the tormented. As fire does not put out fire, so evil does not put out evil. Only the good meeting the evil, and not becoming contaminated by it, vanquishes the evil.

In the world of the human soul there is an immutable law, like the law of Galileo, only more immutable, more clear, and more full. Men may depart from it, concealing it from others, and still the progress of humanity toward the good can take place only on this path. Every step in advance has been made only in the name of non-resistance to evil. And a disciple of Christ may, with greater assurance than Galileo, affirm in view of all possible offences and menaces, And yet the evil has been destroyed

not by violence, but by good. And if this progress is slow, it is so because the clearness, simplicity, rationality, inevitableness, and obligatoriness of Christ's teaching have been concealed from the majority of men in a most cunning and dangerous manner; they have been concealed under a false teaching which falsely calls itself his teaching.

V.

Everything confirmed the correctness of the meaning of Christ's teaching, as it was now revealed to me. For a long time I could not get accustomed to the strange idea that, after the eighteen hundred years that Christ's law had been professed by billions of people, and after the thousands of men who had devoted their lives to the study of this law, I should now have discovered this law as something new. However strange this was, it was so: Christ's teaching of non-resistance to evil arose before me as something entirely new, of which I did not have the least conception. And I asked myself, How could this have happened? I must have had some false idea of the meaning of Christ's teaching, since I was able so to misunderstand it. And there was a false idea.

When I approached the study of the Gospel, I was not in the position of a man who, having never before heard of Christ's teaching, suddenly heard of it for the first time. There was in me already a whole theory of how I must understand it. Christ did not present himself to me as a prophet, who reveals to me a divine law, but as a continuator and elucidator of God's familiar and unquestionable law. I already had a whole, definite, and very complicated teaching about God, the creation of the world and man, and his commandments, given to men through Moses.

In the gospels I came across the words, You have been told, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I tell you, Do not resist evil. The words, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, were Moses' commandment.

The words, I say, Do not resist evil, were a new commandment, which rejected the first.

If I had looked straight at Christ's teaching, without that theological theory which I had imbibed with my mother's milk, I should have understood the simple meaning of Christ's words in a simple manner. I should have understood that Christ rejects the old law and gives a new law. But it had been impressed upon my mind that Christ does not reject Moses' law, but, on the contrary, confirms it down to the smallest point and tittle, and complements it. Verses 17 and 18 of Chap V. of Matthew, in which this is asserted, had always during my former readings startled me by their obscurity, and had provoked doubts. In so far as I then knew the Old Testament, especially the last books of Moses, in which those trifling, senseless, and often cruel rules are laid down, each time with the statement, And God said to Moses, — it seemed strange to me how Christ could have confirmed all this law, and unintelligible why he should have done so. But I then left the question, without trying to solve it. I took on trust the interpretation, with which I had been impressed since childhood, that both these laws were the productions of the Holy Ghost, that these laws were in agreement, and that Christ confirmed the law of Moses and fulfilled and complemented it.

How this complementing was done, how the contradictions were solved that are so startling in the Gospel itself, and in these verses, and in the words, But I say, I never accounted to myself clearly. But now, since I came to understand the simple and direct meaning of Christ's teaching, I comprehended that the two laws were contradictory, and that there could be no such a thing as a harmonization or complementing of one by the other, that it was necessary to accept one of the two, and that the interpretation of Matt. v. 17 and 18, which had startled me before on account of their obscurity, must be incorrect.

When I read these verses again, the verses which heretofore had seemed so obscure to me, I was struck by the simple and clear meaning which was suddenly revealed to me.

This meaning was revealed to me, not because I interpreted something into them, or transposed anything, but only because I rejected the artificial interpretation which has been attached to this passage.

Christ says (Matt. v. 17 and 18): Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled.

And Verse 20 adds, Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter the kingdom of heaven.

Christ says, I have not come to break the eternal law, for the fulfilment of which your books and prophecies have been written, but to teach you to fulfil the eternal law; I am not speaking of the law which the Pharisees, your teachers, call the law of God, but of the eternal law which is less subject to change than heaven and earth.

I express the same idea in other words for the purpose of taking the mind away from the habitual false interpretation. If it were not for this false comprehension, the idea could not be expressed more exactly and better than it is expressed in these verses.

The interpretation that Christ does not reject the law is based on this, that, thanks to the comparison with the jot of the written law, the meaning of written law has here without any foundation and contrary to the meaning been ascribed to the eternal law. But Christ is not speaking of the written law. If Christ were speaking in this passage of the written law, he would use the customary expression, The law and the prophets, which he always uses when he speaks of the written law; but he employs

an entirely different expression, The law or the prophets. If Christ were speaking of the written law, he would in the next verse, which is the continuation of the thought, use the words, The law or the prophets, and not the word, The law, without any addition, as it stands in this verse. Moreover, Christ, according to the Gospel of Luke, uses the same expression in such a context that its meaning becomes indubitable.

In Luke xvi. 16, Christ, speaking to the Pharisees, who see righteousness in the written law, says, Ye justify yourselves before men; but God knoweth your hearts: for that which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God. The law and the prophets were until John: since that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it. And immediately after, in Verse 17, he says, It is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail.

With the words, The law and the prophets until John, Christ nullifies the written law. With the words, It is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail, he confirms the eternal law. In the first words, he says, The law and the prophets, that is, the written law; in the second he says simply, The Law, consequently he means the eternal law. Consequently it is clear that here the eternal law is opposed to the written law,[1] and that precisely the same distinction is made in Matthew, where the eternal law is defined by, The law or the prophets.

The history of the text of Verses 17 and 18 is remark-

[1] Moreover, as though on purpose that there should be no doubt as to what law he is talking about, he, in connection with this, immediately adduces an example, a most glaring example, of the rejection of the law of Moses by means of the eternal law, from which not one jot can be omitted; in quoting the most glaring contradiction to the law of Moses which there is in the Gospel, he says (Luke xvi. 18), Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery, — that is, in the written law divorce is permitted, but according to the eternal law it is a sin. — *Author's Note.*

able from the variants. In the majority of texts we find only the word *law*, without the addition of *prophets*. With such a reading there can be no interpretation which would make it mean the written law. But in the other texts, in Tischendorf's and in the canonical, there is added *the prophets*, not with the conjunction *and*, but with *or*, — the law and the prophets, — which again excludes the meaning of the written law.

But in certain texts, which are not accepted by the church, the word *prophets* is connected by *and*, and not by *or;* and in the same texts, where the word *law* is repeated, *and the prophets* is again added. Thus, with this change the whole utterance is made to mean that Christ is speaking only of the written law.

These variants give the history of the interpretations of this passage. The only clear meaning is, that Christ, as also according to Luke, is speaking of the eternal law; but among the number of the recorders of the gospels there are those who want to acknowledge the obligatoriness of the written law of Moses, and they add *and the prophets* to the word *law*, and change the meaning.

Other Christians, who do not recognize the books of Moses, either exclude the addition, or change the word *and*, *καί*, to *or*, *ἤ*. And with this *or* the passage gets into the canon. But, in spite of the clearness and obviousness of the text in the form in which it has entered the canon, the canonical commentators continue to interpret it in the spirit in which were made the changes that did not enter into the text. This passage has been subjected to innumerable interpretations, which depart the more from the direct meaning, the less the commentator agrees with the directest, simplest meaning of Christ's teaching, and the majority of the commentators retain the apocryphal meaning, the one which is rejected by the text.

To convince ourselves completely that in these verses Christ speaks only of the eternal law, we need only grasp

the meaning of the word which has given rise to the false interpretations. In English law, in Greek *νόμος*, in Hebrew *thorah* has two chief meanings, one, that of law independently of its expression; and the other, the written expression of what certain men regard as the law. The distinction between these two meanings exists in all languages.

In Greek, in the epistles of Paul, this distinction is occasionally defined by the use of the article. Without the article Paul uses this word generally in the sense of the written law; with the article, in the sense of God's eternal law.

With the ancient Jews, in the prophets, in Isaiah, the word *law, thorah,* is always used in the sense of the eternal, only, unexpressed revelation, — God's injunction. The same word, *law, thorah,* is for the first time used by Ezdra, and later in the Talmud, in the sense of the written five books of Moses, over which the general title *Thorah* is written, just as we use the word *Bible,* but with this difference, that we have a word with which to distinguish between the Bible and God's law, while with the Jews the same word is used to express both ideas.

And so Christ, using the word *law, thorah,* employs it, now confirming it, like Isaiah and the other prophets, in the sense of God's law, which is eternal, now rejecting it, in the sense of the written law of the five books. But, to distinguish the two, whenever in rejecting it he employs the word in the sense of the written law, he always adds, *and the prophets,* or the word *your,* adding it to the word *law.*

When he says, Do not unto another what thou wouldst not should be done unto thee, — in this is the law and the prophets, he is speaking of the written law. He says that the whole written law can be reduced to one expression of the eternal law, and with these words he nullifies the written law.

When he says (Luke xvi. 16), The law and the prophets until John the Baptist, he is speaking of the written law, and with these words rejects its obligatoriness.

When he says (John vii. 19), Did not Moses give you the law, and yet none of you keepeth the law, or (John viii. 17), It is also written in your law, or (John xv. 25), That is written in their law, — he is speaking of the written law, of the law which he rejects, of that very law which condemns him to death. John xix. 7: The Jews answered him, We have a law, and by our law he ought to die. It is evident that this law of the Jews, the one by which they put to death, was not the law which Christ taught. But when Christ says, I am not come to destroy the law, but to teach you to fulfil it, for nothing can be changed in the law, but everything must be fulfilled, — he is not speaking of the written law, but of the divine, eternal law, which he is confirming.

But let us assume that all these are formal proofs; let us assume that I have carefully picked out contexts and variants, and have carefully concealed everything which was against my interpretations; let us assume that the interpretations of the church are very clear and convincing, and that Christ really did not destroy the law of Moses, but left it in its full force. Let us assume that this is so. In that case what does Christ teach?

According to the interpretations of the church he taught that he, the second person of the Trinity, the Son of God the Father, came upon earth and with his death redeemed Adam's sin. But every person who has read the Gospel knows that in the gospels Christ either says nothing about this, or speaks in very doubtful terms. But let us assume that we do not know how to read, and that the gospels do speak of it. In any case, Christ's reference to his being the second person of the Trinity and redeeming the sins of humanity occupies a very small and obscure part of the Gospel. In what does the rest of Christ's

teaching consist? It is impossible to deny, and all Christians have always recognized it, that the chief contents of Christ's teaching are the teaching about the life of men, — how men must live among themselves.

If we recognize that Christ taught a new manner of life, we must represent to ourselves certain definite men, among whom he taught.

Let us represent to ourselves Russians, or Englishmen, or Chinamen, or Hindoos, or even savages on some islands, and we shall see that every nation always has its own rules of life, its own law of life, and that, therefore, if a teacher teaches a new law of life, he by this very act destroys the former law; if he does not destroy it, he cannot teach. So it will be in England, in China, and with us. The teacher will inevitably destroy our laws, which we consider dear and almost sacred; but among us it may happen that the preacher, teaching us the new life, will destroy only our civil and political laws, our customs, but will not touch on the laws which we consider divine, though it is hard to suppose so. But among the Jewish nation, who had only one law, — all of it divine and embracing the whole life with all the minutest details, — what could a preacher preach among such a nation, having declared in advance that all the law of the nation to whom he was preaching was inviolable? But let us assume that this, too, is not a proof. Let those who interpret Christ's words as meaning that he confirmed the law of Moses explain to themselves whom Christ arraigned during his whole activity, against whom he rose, calling them Pharisees, lawyers, scribes.

Who are those who did not receive Christ's teaching and with their high priests crucified him? If Christ recognized the law of Moses, where were those real executors of the law, whose actions Christ would have approved of? Was there really not one?

We were told that the Pharisees were a sect. The

Jews do not say so. They say, The Pharisees are the true executors of the law. Let us assume that they are a sect. The Sadducees are a sect, too. Where, then, were the real men, those who were not the sect?

According to the Gospel of John they are all enemies of Christ and are directly called Jews. They do not agree with Christ's teaching and oppose him, only because they are Jews. But in the gospels it is not the Pharisees and Sadducees alone who are pointed out as the enemies of Christ; it is also the lawyers, those who guard the law of Moses, the scribes, those who read the law, the elders, who are always regarded as the representatives of the national wisdom.

Christ says, I have not come to call the righteous to repentance, to a change of life, μετάνοια, but the sinners. Where were those righteous? Who were they? Is it possible it was only Nicodemus? But even Nicodemus is represented to us as a good man gone astray. We are so accustomed to this, to say the least, strange interpretation that the Pharisees and some evil Jews crucified Christ that the simple question as to where the real Jews were, who were not Pharisees and not evil, and who kept the law, does not even occur to us. We need only put this question in order that all may become entirely clear. Christ — be he God or man — brought his teaching into the world amidst a people that kept the law, which determined the whole life of man and which was called God's law. What could Christ's relation to this law be?

Every prophet and teacher of faith, in revealing to men the law of God, always finds among men what they consider to be the law of God, and cannot escape the double use of the word *law*, which signifies what these men falsely call the law of God, *your law*, and what is the true, eternal law of God. Moreover, in addition to not being able to escape the double meaning of this word, the preacher frequently does not wish to escape it, and pur-

posely combines the two conceptions, in order to point out that in the law, which the men profess whom he is converting, and which in its totality is false, there are eternal truths; and every preacher takes these laws, in so far as they are directed toward the truth, for the basis of his sermons. Christ does the same among the Jews, with whom both laws are called by the one name of *thorah*. In relation to Moses' law, and still more in relation to the prophets, especially Isaiah, whose words he quotes all the time, Jesus admits that in the Jewish law and in the prophets there are eternal, divine truths, which agree with the eternal law, and these, like the utterance, Love God and thy neighbour, he takes for the basis of his own teaching.

Christ several times expresses the same idea (Luke x. 26). He says, What is written in the law? How readest thou? — Even in the law it is possible to find an eternal truth, if you know how to read it. And he frequently points out that the commandment of their law about the love of God and of their neighbour is a commandment of the eternal law (Matt. xiii. 52). After all those parables with which he explains to his disciples the meaning of his teaching, at the end of everything, as referring to all that precedes, Christ says, Therefore every scribe, that is, educated man, who is taught the truth, is like a householder, who takes out of his treasure (together, indifferently) things new and old.

St. Irenæus, and with him the whole church, understands these words in the same way, but quite arbitrarily, and, violating the meaning of the discourse, ascribes to these words a meaning as though everything old were sacred. The clear significance is this, that he who needs the good takes not only the new things, but also the old, and that because it is old it cannot be rejected. Christ says with these words that he does not reject that which in the old law is eternal. But when they speak to him of the whole law or of its forms, he says that it is not

possible to put new wine into old bottles. Christ cannot confirm the whole law, neither can he reject the whole law and the prophets, — the law, in which it says, Love thy neighbour as thyself, — and those prophets, in whose words he frequently utters his thoughts. And so, in place of this simple and clear comprehension of the simplest words, as they are said, and as they are confirmed by the whole teaching of Christ, there is substituted a hazy interpretation, which introduces a contradiction where it does not exist, and thus destroys the meaning of the teaching: it reduces the teaching to words, and reëstablishes in fact the teaching of Moses in all its savage cruelty.

According to all church interpretations, especially since the fifth century, Christ did not destroy the written law, but confirmed it. But how did he confirm it? How can the law of Christ be united with that of Moses? To this there is no answer. In all the commentaries they have a play on words, and say that Christ fulfilled the law of Moses in that in him were fulfilled the prophecies, and in that Christ through us, through men's faith in him, fulfilled the law. But the only essential question for every believer as to how we are to unite the two contradictory laws, which determine the life of men, remains without even an attempt at a solution. And the contradiction which exists between the verse in which it says that Christ does not destroy the law, and the verse in which it says, You have been told . . . but I say, — and between the whole spirit of Moses' teaching and that of Christ, remains in full force.

Let any man who is interested in this question himself consult the church interpretations of this passage, from John Chrysostom until our time. Only after reading these long interpretations will he be clearly convinced that an artificial contradiction has been introduced where it did not exist.

The impossible attempts at harmonizing what cannot be united show clearly that this harmonization is not an error of thought, but that it has a clear and definite purpose, — it is necessary, and it is even obvious why it is necessary.

This is what John Chrysostom says, in replying to those who reject the law of Moses (Commentary to the Gospel of Matthew, Vol. I. pp. 320 and 321):

"Investigating further the ancient law, in which we are commanded to pluck out an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, they retort, How can he who says this be good? What shall we say to this? This, that, on the contrary, it is the highest token of God's love of men. He did not establish this law that we might pluck out each other's eyes, but that, fearing lest we should suffer this evil from others, we might not commit this evil against them. Similarly, when he threatened the Ninevites with destruction, he did not wish to destroy them (for if he had wished to do so, he ought to have kept silent); he wished only to make them better through this threat, to leave his anger. Even so he determined a punishment for those who were so bold as to be ready to pluck out their neighbours' eyes, with this purpose in view that, if they should not refrain from their cruelty of their own free will, fear at least should restrain them from depriving their neighbours of their eyesight. If this were a cruelty, then the prohibition against murder and adultery would also be a cruelty. Only insane men, who have reached the last degree of madness, can speak in this manner. But I to such a degree abhor calling these propositions cruel that I should regard the contrary as a lawless deed, as judged in the light of sound human reason. Thou sayest that God is cruel because he has commanded us to pluck an eye out for an eye; but I say that, if he had not given such a command, it would have been more correct for many to consider him such as thou callest him."

John Chrysostom openly recognizes the law, A tooth for a tooth, as being divine, and what is contrary to the law, A tooth for a tooth, that is, Christ's teaching about non-resistance to evil, as a lawless deed.

(Pp. 322 and 323): "Let us suppose that the whole law is destroyed," John Chrysostom continues, "and that no one fears the punishment determined by it, and that all sinful men are allowed fearlessly to live according to their inclinations, whether they be adulterers, murderers, thieves, or perjurers: will then not everything be perverted? and will not the cities, the market-places, the houses, the land, the sea, and the whole universe be filled with innumerable misdeeds and murders? This is obvious to all men. If with the existing laws, with the terror and the threats, the evil intentions are with difficulty restrained, what would prevent men from deciding on evil deeds, if this barrier were removed? What calamities would then encroach upon human life! It is cruel, not only to permit evil men to do what they please, but also to allow a man, who has done no wrong, to suffer, though he be innocent, without any redress. Tell me, — if a man, collecting evil men on all sides, and arming them with swords, ordered them to go through the city and kill all the people they met, — could there be anything more inhuman than that? On the contrary, if another man bound these armed men and locked them up by force in a prison, and snatched those who were threatened with death out of the hands of the lawless men, — could there be anything more humane than this?"

John Chrysostom does not say what this other man will be guided by in determining who is evil. What if he himself is evil and will put good men into prison?

"Now apply these examples to the law: he who commands us to pluck out an eye for an eye imposes this terror, as certain firm fetters, on the souls of the sinful, and is likened unto the man who bound those armed

men: but he who should not have determined any punishment for the transgressors would arm them with fearlessness, and would be likened unto the man who distributed the swords to the malefactors and sent them through the city."

If John Chrysostom recognizes Christ's law, he ought to say, Who will pluck out the eyes and teeth, and put men into prison? If he who commands us to pluck out an eye for an eye, that is, God, plucked them out himself, there would be no contradiction here; but it is men who have to do this, whereas the Son of God told men that they must not do it. God said, Pull out the teeth; but the Son said, Do not pull them out. One or the other has to be accepted, and John Chrysostom, and with him the whole church, recognizes the command of God the Father, that is, of Moses, and rejects the command of the Son, that is, of Christ, whose teaching they claim to profess. Christ rejects the law of Moses, and gives his own.

For a man who believes Christ there is no contradiction. He pays no attention to the law of Moses, but believes in Christ's law, and fulfils it. For a man who believes in the law of Moses there is also no contradiction. The Jews recognize the words of Christ as void, and believe in the law of Moses. The contradiction appears only to those who want to live according to the law of Moses, and yet assure themselves and others that they believe in the law of Christ, — to those whom Christ calls hypocrites, a generation of vipers.

Instead of recognizing one or the other, the law of Moses or the law of Christ, they recognize both as divinely true.

But when the question touches the affairs of life itself, they reject outright the law of Christ and recognize the law of Moses.

If we try to grasp the meaning of this false interpretation, we find in it a terrible, frightful drama of the struggle of evil and darkness with good and light.

Among the Jewish people, entangled by numberless external rules, which are imposed upon them by the Levites in the shape of divine laws, before each of which it says, And God said to Moses, — there appears Christ. Not only man's relation to God, his sacrifices, feasts, fasts, but also man's relations to man, — the national, civil, domestic relations, all the details of his private life, — the circumcision, the cleansing of himself and of his vessels and garments, — all this is determined down to the minutest details, and everything is acknowledged to be a commandment of God, a law of God. Now, what could, I do not say Christ-God, but a prophet, the commonest teacher do, in teaching such people, if he did not destroy the law which had already determined everything down to the minutest details?

Like all other prophets, Christ takes out of what men call the law of God what is really the law of God, the foundations, rejects everything else, and with these foundations connects his revelation of the eternal law. There is no need of destroying everything; but the law which is regarded as equally binding in everything is inevitably destroyed. Christ does this, and he is accused of violating what is regarded as the law of God, and for this he is executed. But his teaching remains with his disciples, and passes into another circle and to the ages. But in the other circle similar strata, interpretations, and explanations grow up on this new teaching; again there is a substitution of base human inventions for the divine revelation; instead of, And God said to Moses, they say, It pleased us and the Holy Ghost. And again the letter covers the spirit. What is most striking is this, that Christ's teaching is connected with that whole *thorah*, in the sense of the written law, which he could not help but reject. This *thorah* is acknowledged to be a production of the revelation of his spirit of truth, that is of the Holy Ghost, and he is himself caught in the snare of his

revelation, and the whole teaching is reduced to nothing.

So this is the reason why, after eighteen hundred years, there happened with me the strange thing that I had to discover the meaning of Christ's teaching, as something new.

I did not have to discover, but to do what all men have done, who seek God and his law, — to find what is the eternal law of God, amidst all that which men call by that name.

VI.

And so, when I understood Christ's law as Christ's law, and not as that of Moses and of Christ, and understood that precept of the law which directly denied the law of Moses, — all the gospels, instead of the former obscurity, disconnectedness, contradictions, united for me into one inseparable whole, and amidst them was segregated the essence of the whole teaching, expressed in the simple, clear, and accessible five commandments of Christ (Matt. v. 21–48), of which I had not known anything heretofore.

All the gospels speak of Christ's commandments and of fulfilling them. All the theologians speak of Christ's commandments; but what these commandments were, I had not known before. It seemed to me that Christ's commandment consisted in loving God and our neighbour as ourselves. And I did not see that this could not be Christ's commandment, because it was a commandment of the ancients (Deut. and Lev.). The words (Matt. v. 19), Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven, — I referred to the commandments of Moses; and it never occurred to me that Christ's new commandments were clearly and definitely expressed in Verses 21–48 of Chap. V. of Matthew. I did not see that where it says, You have been told, but I say unto you, there were expressed the new definite commandments of Christ, namely, according to the number of references to the old law (counting the two references to adultery as one), five new, clear, definite commandments of Christ.

The beatitudes and their number I had heard and seen mentioned and explained, when I was taught religion at school; but I had never heard of Christ's commandments. To my surprise, I had to discover them.

This is the way I discovered them. In Matthew (v. 21–26) it says: Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment (Isaiah xx. 13); But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire. Therefore if thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee; Leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift. Agree with thine adversary quickly, while thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.

When I understood the commandment about non-resistance to evil, it occurred to me that the verses about anger must have a similarly clear meaning, which is applicable to life, as the commandment about non-resistance to evil. The meaning which I formerly ascribed to these words was this, that every man must always avoid anger against men, must never use curses, and must live in peace with all men without exception; but in the text there was an expression which excluded this meaning. It says, Be not angry *without a cause*, so that no unconditional peace followed from this precept. This expression troubled me. To clear my doubts, I turned to the commentaries of the theologians; and, to my surprise, I

found that the interpretations of the fathers were directed mainly to this, when anger is excusable, and when not. All the interpreters of the church, putting special emphasis on the expression *without a cause*, explain this passage to mean that one must not without a cause offend people, or use curses, but that anger is not always unjust, and in confirmation of this interpretation they adduce examples of anger in the apostles and the saints. I could not help acknowledging that the explanation that anger, according to their expression, was not forbidden by the word of God, though it was contrary to the whole meaning of the Gospel, was consistent, and had its foundation in the expression *without a cause*, which stands in Verse 22. This expression changed the meaning of the whole utterance.

Be not angry without a cause. Christ commands us to forgive all men, to forgive without end; he forgives himself, and forbids Peter's being angry with Malchus, when Peter defends his teacher who is being led to the place of the crucifixion, consequently not without a cause. And this same Christ says, instructing all men, Be not angry without a cause, and so permits people to be angry for a good cause. Christ preaches peace to all simple people, and suddenly, as though with a mental reservation, that this does not refer to all cases, as there are cases when one may be angry with a brother, he puts in the expression *without a cause*. In the commentaries it is explained that there is a seasonable anger; but who is the judge, I said, of when it is seasonable? I have never yet seen angry men who did not consider their anger seasonable. All consider their anger legitimate and useful. This expression destroyed the whole meaning of the verse; but it stood in Holy Scripture, and I could not throw it out. This expression was as though to the utterance, Love thy neighbour, there were added, Love thy good neighbour, or the neighbour whom thou likest.

The whole meaning of the passage was for me destroyed by the expression *without a cause*. Even so the verses about being reconciled to him who has anything against thee, before thou prayest, which without the expression *without a cause* would have a direct, obligatory meaning, also received a conditional meaning.

I imagined that Christ ought to forbid all anger, all ill-will, and that, in order that it should not exist, he commanded, Before bringing thy gift to the altar, that is, before getting into communion with God, thou must remember whether there is a man who is angry with thee. And if there is such a one, without a cause or with a cause, go and be reconciled to him, and then only bring thy offering or pray. Thus it seemed to me, but from the interpretations it turned out that this passage had to be taken in a conditional way.

All the interpretations explain that we must make peace with all men; but if this is impossible to do on account of the corruption of men, who are inimical toward thee, it is necessary for thee to be reconciled spiritually, in thought: and then the enmity of the others toward thee will not interfere with thy prayer.

Besides, the words, Whosoever shall say, Raca, and, Thou fool, are terribly guilty, always seemed strange and obscure to me. If this is meant as a prohibition against cursing, why are there chosen such weak, almost innocuous words? Then again, why is such a terrible threat hurled against those who forget themselves with such a weak word as Raca, that is, insignificant? All that was obscure.

I felt that there was here the same kind of a lack of comprehension as in the words, Do not judge; I felt that, as in the other interpretation, everything passed here from what was simple, important, definite, practicable into a hazy and indifferent sphere. I felt that Christ could not have comprehended the words, Go and be reconciled to him, as they

interpret it, Be reconciled in thought. What is meant by, Be reconciled in thought? I thought that Christ was saying what he expressed in the words of the prophet, I do not want sacrifices, but compassion, that is, love for men. And so, if thou wantest to please God, remember who is angry with thee, before praying, in the morning and in the evening, at mass and at vigils; and go and arrange it in such a way that he may not be angry with thee, and then pray, if thou wantest.

But, in thought! I felt that the whole interpretation, which destroyed the direct and clear meaning, was based on the expression *without a cause.* If I could throw it out, the meaning would be clear; but all the interpretations were against my way of understanding it, and so was the canonical Gospel with its expression *without a cause.* If I departed from this, I could arbitrarily depart in another direction, and others could do the same. If it were not for this word, everything would be clear. And so I try philologically to explain this expression *without a cause,* so that it may not break the sense. I consult the general dictionary, and I see that this Greek word εἰκῆ means *without a plan, heedlessly;* I try to give it a significance which would not do violence to the sense, but evidently the word gives the meaning which is ascribed to it. I consult the New Testament dictionary, and I find the meaning which is given to it here. I investigate the context, and I find that the word is but once used in the Gospel, namely in this place. In the epistles it is used several times. In 1 Cor. xv. 2 it is used in precisely this sense. Consequently there is no possibility of explaining it otherwise, and I must assume that Christ said, Be not angry without a cause.

I must confess that assuming that Christ could in this passage have used such indistinct words, making it possible for us to understand them in such a way that nothing is left of them, was the same as renouncing the whole

Gospel. One last hope is left: I will try to find out whether this word is to be found in all the texts. I investigate the variants. I consult Griesbach, who gives all the variants, that is, in what texts and in what fathers a certain expression is used. I consult him, and am at once in raptures, for I find that there are variants to this passage. I look and I find that the variants all refer to the expression *without a cause*. The majority of the Gospel texts and quotations have not the expression *without a cause* at all. Consequently, the majority understood it in the same way as I understand it. I consult Tischendorf, and the word is wanting in the oldest text. I look into Luther's translation, from which I might have found it out in the shortest way, and the word is wanting there, too.

The very word which impaired the whole meaning of Christ's teaching is an interpolation of the fifth century, which has not entered into the best texts of the Gospel.

A man was found who put in this word, and other men were found who approved of this interpolation, and explained it.

Christ could not have said this terrible word, and he did not say it, and that first, simple, straight meaning of the whole passage, which startled me and which startles everybody, is the true one.

But more than this: It was enough for me to understand that Christ's words forbid being angry with anybody at any time, in order that the prohibition, which had troubled me before, of using the words *Raca* and *fool* should also receive a different meaning, and should not be a prohibition against using curses. The strange untranslated Hebrew word *Raca* gave me the new sense. *Raca* means *trampled down, destroyed, non-existing;* the word *raca* is very common, and means *exception, only not. Raca* means *a man who is not to be regarded as a man.* In the plural the word *rekim* is used in the Book of

Judges ix. 4, where it means *lost*. So it is this word that Christ does not permit us to use of any one.

Similarly he does not allow us to use the other word *fool*, like *raca*, which, as it were, would free us from our human obligations to our neighbour. We are angry and do evil to men, and, to justify ourselves, we say that he with whom we are angry is a lost or foolish man. And so it is these two words that Christ tells us not to use in respect to men and toward men. Christ tells us that we must not be angry with any one and justify our anger by considering another person lost or foolish.

And so, in place of the hazy, indefinite, and unimportant expressions, which were subject to interpretations and arbitrariness, there was disclosed to me, from Verse 21 to Verse 28, Christ's clear and definite first commandment: Live in peace with all men, and never consider thy anger against people just. Consider not a man lost or foolish, and do not call him so (Verse 22). Never consider thy anger as being with a cause, and never consider another man's anger against thee as without a cause; and so, if there is a man who is angry with thee, even though it be without a cause, go to him, before thy prayer, and destroy this hostile feeling (Verses 23 and 24). Try in advance to destroy the enmity between thee and other men, so that the enmity may not flame up and destroy thee (Verses 25 and 26).

Immediately after the first commandment the second, which begins with a reference to the ancient law, was disclosed to me with the same clearness. Matt. v. 27–32 says: Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery (Ex. xx. 14–28): But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole

body should be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell. It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement (Deut. xxiv. 1–32): But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of adultery, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.

The meaning of these words presented itself to me as follows: a man must not even admit the idea that he can unite with another woman than the one with whom he has once been united, and he can never, as was the case according to the law of Moses, exchange this woman for another.

As in the first commandment against anger the advice is given that this anger should be put out in the beginning, an advice which is elucidated by the comparison with a man who is led to the judge, even so here Christ says that fornication is due to this, that women and men look upon one another as upon an object of lust. That this may not be, it is necessary to remove everything which can provoke lust, and to avoid all that which provokes lust, and, having united with the wife, under no condition to abandon her, because the abandonment of wives leads to debauch. The abandoned wives tempt other men and introduce debauch into the world.

The wisdom of this commandment startled me. All the evil between men, which arose from the sexual relations, was removed by it. Knowing that the enjoyment of the sexual relations leads to dissensions, men avoid everything which provokes lust, and, knowing that the law of man is to live in pairs, they unite in pairs, never under any condition violating this union, and all the evil of dissensions on account of the sexual relations is destroyed, in that there

are no single men and no single women who are deprived of the marital life.

But the words which always startled me in the reading of the sermon on the mount, Saving for the cause of adultery, which are taken to mean that a man may be divorced from his wife in case of her adultery, now startled me more than ever.

Not to speak of the fact that there would be something unworthy in the form itself in which this thought was expressed, that side by side with what by their significance are the profoundest truths of the sermon, there should, like a note to an article of the code of laws, be this strange exception to the general rule, this exception itself contradicted the fundamental idea.

I consult the commentaries, and all (John Chrysostom, p. 365, and the others), even the learned theological critics, like Reuss, acknowledge that these words mean that Christ permits divorce in the case of the wife's adultery, and that in Chapter XIX., in Christ's discourse, which prohibits divorce, the words, Except it be for adultery, mean the same. I read and re-read Verse 32, and it seems to me that this cannot mean a permission to be divorced. To verify my opinion, I consult the contexts, and I find in Matt. xix., Mark x., Luke xvi., in Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians the explanation of the same doctrine of the inseparableness of marriage, without any exception whatever.

In Luke xvi. 18 it says, Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery.

In Mark x. 4–12 it says, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife; And they twain shall be one

flesh: so then they are no more twain but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together let not man put asunder. And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same matter. And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her. And if a woman shall put away her husband, and be married to another, she committeth adultery.

The same is said in Matt. xix. 4–9.

In Paul's epistle, 1 Cor. vii. 1–12, the idea of preventing debauch is developed in detail. It says there that husband and wife, having once been united, should not put one another away, and should satisfy one another in the sexual relation; and just as directly does it say that one of the married pair can under no condition put away the other for the purpose of having relations with a third party.

According to Mark, Luke, and Paul's epistle divorce is not permitted. From the sense of the interpretation that husband and wife are one body united by God, an interpretation which is repeated in two gospels, it follows that divorce is not permitted. From the meaning of the whole teaching of Christ, who enjoined men to forgive all, not excluding even the fallen wife, it follows that divorce is not permitted. From the sense of the whole passage, which explains that the putting away of the wife, especially one of loose morals, leads to debauch, it follows that divorce is not permitted.

On what, then, is the interpretation based that divorce is permitted in the case of the wife's adultery? On those words of Verse 32 of Chapter V., which startled me so much. These words are interpreted by all to mean that Christ permits divorce in the case of the wife's adultery, and these very words are repeated in Chapter XIX. by many texts of the gospels and by many fathers instead of the words, Except it be for adultery.

I began once more to read these words, but for a long time could not understand them. I saw that there must be some error of translation and interpretation here, but I was unable for a long time to discover where it was. The error was obvious. In opposing his commandment to that of Moses, according to which any man, as it says there, hating his wife, could put her away, and give her a writing of divorcement, Christ says, I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of adultery, causeth her to commit adultery. In these words there is nothing which is opposed, and there is not even any definition whether it is allowable to be divorced, or not. All it says is, that the putting away of the wife causes her to commit adultery.

Suddenly an exception is made here in the case of the wife who is guilty of adultery. This exception, which has reference to the woman guilty of adultery, when the husband is under discussion, is in general strange and unexpected, and in this place simply stupid, because it destroys even that doubtful sense which there was in these words. It says that the putting away of the wife causes her to commit adultery, and then it permits the putting away of a wife who is guilty of adultery, as though a wife who is guilty of adultery will not commit adultery.

But more than this: When I analyzed this passage more attentively, I saw that it had even no grammatical sense. It says: Whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of adultery, causeth her to commit adultery; and the sentence is ended. It speaks of the husband, saying that in putting away his wife he causes her to commit adultery. What has *saving for the cause of adultery* to do with it? If it said that the husband who puts away his wife, except for her adultery, commits adultery, the sentence would be correct. But as it is, for the subject *husband*, who is getting divorced, there is no

other predicate than *causeth.* How can we refer *saving for the cause of adultery* to this predicate? You cannot cause, saving for the cause of adultery of the wife. Even if to the words, Saving for the cause of adultery, there were added the words *of the wife,* or *her,* which are not added, these words could not be referred to the predicate *causeth.* These words, according to the accepted interpretation, refer to the predicate; the main predicate is *causeth.* What, then, has *saving for the cause of adultery* to do here? Whether with the cause of adultery, or without it, the husband, in putting her away, causeth her to commit adultery. This is an expression like the following: he who deprives his son of sustenance, saving for the cause of cruelty, causes him to be cruel. This expression can obviously not have the meaning that the father can deprive his son of sustenance, if the son is cruel. If it makes any sense at all, it means this, that the father, depriving his son of sustenance, in addition to his own guilt of cruelty, causes also his son to be cruel. Even so the evangelical expression would have sense if, instead of the words, Saving for the cause of adultery, we had, For the cause of lechery, debauchery, or something similar, which does not express an act, but a property.

And I asked myself, Does it not say here simply that in getting a divorce a man, in addition to being himself guilty of adultery (for a man gets a divorce in order that he may marry another woman), causes his wife also to commit adultery? If the word adultery in the text could be rendered by such words as to give it the meaning of debauch, the meaning would be clear.

And there was repeated what had so frequently happened to me. The text confirmed my supposition, so that there could not even be any doubt.

The first thing that startled me in reading the text was this, that the word *πορνεία,* which is translated by the same word *adultery,* just like the word *μοιχᾶσθαι,* is in

reality an entirely different word. But, perhaps, these words are synonyms, or in the gospels one word may be used for the other. I consult all the dictionaries, the general and the New Testament dictionaries, and I see that the word *πορνεία*, which corresponds to the Hebrew זנות, the Latin *fornicatio* [as which it is given in the King James Bible], the German *Hurerei*, the Russian *rasputstvo*, has a most definite meaning, and has never, in any dictionary, meant, and could not mean, the act of adultery, *adultère, Ehebruch*, as which it is translated. It means a vicious condition or property, but not an act, and cannot be translated by *adultery*. More than this: I see that the word, *adultery, to commit adultery*, is everywhere in the gospels and even in these verses designated by another word, *μοιχάω*. All I had to do was to correct this obviously intentional mistranslation in order that the meaning ascribed by the commentators to this passage and to the context of Chap. XIX. should become entirely impossible, and that the meaning which makes the word *πορνεία* refer to the husband should become indubitable.

The translation which any man who knows Greek would make would be the following: *παρεκτός* besides, *λόγου* the guilt, *πορνείας* of fornication, *ποιεῖ* causes, *αὐτήν* her, *μοιχᾶσθαι* to commit adultery, and get word for word, He who gets divorced from his wife, besides the guilt of fornication, causes her to commit adultery.

The same sense is got from Chap. XIX. We need only correct the wrong translation of both the word *πορνεία* and the preposition *ἐπί*, which is translated by *for*, and instead of *adultery* put the word *fornication*, and instead of *for* put *for the sake of*, and it becomes clear that the words *εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ* cannot refer to the wife. Thus the words *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* can mean nothing but *besides the guilt of the husband's fornication*, just as the words *εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*, which are given in Chap. XIX., cannot refer to anything but the husband's fornication.

It says, *εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*, word for word, *If not for the sake of fornication*, and not *for fornication*. The sense we get is, that Christ, replying in this place to the thought of the Pharisees, who imagined that a man did not commit adultery if he left his wife, not in order to fornicate, but to live in wedlock with another woman, says that it is none the less adultery. Thus we get a simple meaning, which is in accord with the whole teaching, with the words with which it is connected, and with grammar and logic.

This simple, clear meaning, which results from the words themselves and from the whole teaching, I had to discover after the greatest labour. Indeed, read these words in German, in French, where it says directly *pour cause d'infidélité*, or *à moins que cela ne soit pour cause d'infidélité*, and guess that it means something entirely different. The word *παρεκτός*, which according to all the dictionaries means *excepte*, *ausgenommen*, *except*, is translated by a whole clause, *à moins que cela ne soit*. The word *πορνεία* is translated *infidélité*, *Ehebruch*, *adultery* [but *fornication* in the King James Bible]. And on this intentional distortion of the text they base the interpretation which violates the moral, and religious, and grammatical, and logical sense of Christ's words.

Again there was confirmed for me that terrible and joyous truth that the meaning of Christ's teaching is simple and clear, that its precepts are important and determined, but that its interpretations, which are based on the desire to justify the existing evil, have so obscured it that it can be discovered only with an effort. It became clear to me that if the gospels were discovered half burned or effaced, it would be easier to reconstruct their meaning than is the case at present, when they have been touched by the unscrupulous interpretations, whose direct purpose it is to pervert and conceal the meaning of the teaching. In this case it is even more obvious than in the former how the

special purpose of justifying the divorce of some John the Terrible served as a pretext for obscuring the whole doctrine of marriage.

We need only reject the interpretations, and, instead of what is hazy and indefinite, we get the definite and clear second commandment of Christ.

Make no sport of the lust of sexual relations; every man who is not a eunuch, that is, who is in need of sexual relations, should have a wife, and let a man have one wife, and a woman have one husband, and under no consideration violate the sexual union between yourselves.

Immediately after the second commandment we have again a reference to the ancient law, and the third commandment is expounded. Matt. v. 33–37: Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths (Lev. xix. 12; Deut. xxiii. 21): But I say unto you, swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God's throne: nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black; But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.

This passage used to trouble me very much with my former readings. It troubled me, not by its obscurity, as in the case of the passage on the divorce, not by its contradictions with other passages, like the permission for anger not without cause, not by the difficulty of execution, like the passage about turning the other cheek: it troubled me, on the contrary, by its clearness, simplicity, and ease. By the side of the rules, whose depth and significance frightened and affected me, there suddenly stood such a useless, frivolous, easy rule, which was of no consequence, either for me or for others. I never swore by Jerusalem, or by God, or by anything else, even before

this, and that never gave me any trouble. Besides, it seemed to me that, whether I should swear or not, that could be of no importance. Wishing to find an explanation of this rule, which troubled me by its ease, I turned to the commentaries. In this case the commentators helped me. All the commentators see in these words a confirmation of the third commandment of Moses, which is, that we should not swear by anything divine. They explain these words by saying that Christ, like Moses, forbids us to use the name of God in vain. In addition to this, the commentators explain that this rule of Christ about not swearing is not always obligatory and in no way refers to that oath which every citizen swears to the powers that be. And they pick out texts of Holy Scripture, not in order to confirm the direct meaning of Christ's precept, but in order to prove that it is possible and necessary not to execute it.

They say that Christ himself confirmed the oath in court, when to the words of the high priest, I adjure thee by the living God, he replied, Thou hast said; they say that Paul the apostle invokes God to testify to the truth of his words, which is obviously the same oath; they say that oaths were prescribed by Moses' law, and that the Lord did not abolish them; they say that all that is abolished is the frivolous, Pharisaically hypocritical oaths.

When I comprehended the meaning and the aim of all these explanations, I saw that Christ's precept about the oath was not at all so insignificant, simple, and unimportant as it had seemed to me, when I had not included the political oath among the number prohibited by Christ.

I asked myself: Does it not say here that even that oath is forbidden which the church commentators have so cautiously excluded? Does not the prohibition cover the oath without which the division of men into countries is impossible, or the military cast? The soldiers, those

men who commit all violence, call themselves "the oath." If I asked the grenadier how he solved the contradiction between the Gospel and the Military Regulation, he would tell me that he swore an oath, that is, swore on the Gospel. All the military men have given me such answers. This oath is just as necessary for the formation of that terrible evil which produces violence and war, so that in France, where Christianity is denied, they still stick to the oath.

Indeed, if Christ had not said so, he ought to have said so. He came to destroy the evil, and did not destroy the oath! What an enormous evil is still left in the world! Perhaps, they will say, this evil was not so great in the time of Christ. But that is not true; Epictetus, Seneca, had said that we must not swear to any one; this rule is also in the laws of Manu. How can I say that Christ did not see this evil, especially since he has said so openly, clearly, and in detail?

He said, Do not swear at all. This expression is as simple, clear, and indubitable as the words, Do not judge, and do not condemn, and is as little subject to misinterpretations, the more so since at the end it adds that everything which will be demanded of thee beyond Yes and No is from the principle of evil.

If Christ's teaching consists in doing the will of God, how can a man swear that he will do the will of man? The will of God may not coincide with the will of man. Christ says this very thing in this place. He says, Do not swear by thy head, for not only is thy head not thine, but every hair upon it is in the power of God. The same is said in the Epistle of James.

At the end of his epistle, as though in conclusion of all, Apostle James says (v. 12), But above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath: but let your yea be yea; and your nay, nay; lest ye fall into condemnation.

The apostle says distinctly why we should not swear: the oath does not seem criminal in itself, but from it men fall into condemnation, and so, Do not swear at all. How can that which has been said by Christ and by the apostle be expressed more clearly?

But I was so mixed up that I for a long time asked myself in surprise, Does it really mean what it does? For do we not all swear by the Gospel? It cannot be.

I had already read the commentaries, and I knew how the impossible was done.

What had happened in explaining the words, Do not judge, be not angry with any man, do not sever the union between man and wife, was the case here too. We have established our order of things, we love it and wish to consider it holy. There comes Christ, whom we consider to be God, and he says that this our order of things is not good. We call him God and do not wish to renounce our order of things. What shall we do? Where possible we will put in the expression without a cause, and reduce the rule about anger to nothing; where possible, we will, like the most unscrupulous evil judges, so misinterpret the meaning of the article of the law that the very opposite shall result: so that, instead of saying that you must not be divorced, it may say that you may; and where it is not possible to misinterpret, as in the case of the words, Do not judge and do not condemn, do not swear at all, let us boldly act contrary to the teaching, affirming that we are following it. Indeed, the chief obstacle toward the comprehension of the fact that the Gospel forbids every oath is this, that the pseudo-Christian teachers with extraordinary daring compel men to swear on the Gospel and by the Gospel, that is, compel them to do what is contrary to the Gospel.

How can it occur to a man, who is made to swear by the Gospel and the cross, that the cross is holy for the very reason that on it they crucified him who forbids us

to swear, and that he who is pronouncing the oath is perhaps kissing as a holy thing that very place where it says clearly and definitely, Swear not at all.

But I was not longer troubled by this boldness. I saw clearly that in Verses 33–37 there was expressed the clear, definite, practicable third commandment, Never swear to any one about anything. Every oath is extorted by people for evil.

Immediately after this third commandment we find the fourth reference, and the fourth commandment is expounded. Matt. v. 38–42; Luke vi. 29, 30: Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee, turn not thou away.

I have already said what definite, direct meeting these words have, and how we have no reason to explain them allegorically. The interpretations of these words, from John Chrysostom to our time, are truly wonderful. Everybody likes these words, and all of them utter profound reflections concerning them, except the one that these words have the meaning which they really have.

The church commentators, not in the least embarrassed by the authority of him whom they recognize as God, most calmly limit the meaning of his words. They say: "It is self-understood that all these commandments about enduring insults, about renouncing retaliation, being directed against the Jewish love of revenge, do not exclude the social measures for the limitation of evil and for the punishment of those who commit evil, not even the private, personal efforts and cares of each man concerning

the inviolability of truth, the correction of offenders, the restraining of the evil-minded from doing harm; for else the spiritual laws of the Saviour would in Jewish fashion turn into a letter, which might serve for the success of evil and the suppression of virtue. The love of a Christian must be like the love of God, but the love of God limits and punishes evil in proportion as it remains more or less harmless for the glory of God and the salvation of our neighbour; contrariwise, it is necessary to limit and punish evil, a duty which is especially imposed upon the authorities." (The Interpretation of the Gospel, by Archimandrite Mikhaíl, all based on the interpretation by the holy fathers.)

The learned and freethinking Christians are just as little embarrassed by the meaning of Christ's words, and correct him. They say that these are very exalted utterances, but devoid of every possibility of application to life, because the application of the rule of non-resistance to evil destroys all that order of things which we have arranged so well: so speak Renan, Strauss, and all the freethinking commentators.

But we need only bear ourselves toward the words of Christ as we bear ourselves toward the words of any man we meet, when he speaks to us, that is, assume that he means what he says, and the necessity of all profound reflections is at once removed. Christ says, I find that the method for making your life secure is very stupid and bad. I propose an entirely different one to you,— namely, this; and he goes on to utter his words from Verse 38 to Verse 42. One would think that before correcting these words it would be necessary to understand them; but this no one wants to do, for every one decides in advance that the order in which we live and which is impaired by these words is a sacred law of humanity.

I did not consider our life either good or sacred, and so I understood this commandment before the rest. And

when I understood them just as they are said, I was struck by their truth, accuracy, and clearness. Christ says, You want to destroy evil by evil. That is not sensible. That there be no evil, do no evil. Then Christ counts up all the cases in which we are wont to do evil, and says that in these cases we must not do so.

This fourth commandment of Christ was the first which I comprehended, and which opened to me the meaning of all the rest. The fourth simple, clear, practicable commandment says, Never resist evil with force; never employ force in answer to force: if they beat thee, suffer; if they take away from thee, give it; if they make thee work, work; if they wish to take from thee what thou considerest thy own, give it to them.

Upon this fourth commandment follows the fifth reference and the fifth commandment. Matt. v. 43–48: Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy (Lev. xix. 17, 18): But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the publicans so? Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.

Formerly these words used to present themselves to me as an elucidation, complement, and confirmation, I shall even say exaggeration of the words about non-resistance to evil. But, having found a simple, applicable, definite meaning for every passage which begins with a reference to the ancient law, I anticipated a similar meaning for the present passage. After each reference the command-

ment was expounded, and every verse of the commandment had a meaning, and could not be thrown out, and so the same was to be expected here.

The last words, which are repeated in Luke, about this, that God makes no distinction between men and gives his good to all alike, and that, therefore, you must be like God, making no distinction between men, and must not do as the Gentiles do, but must love all and do good to all alike, — these words were clear: they presented themselves to me as a confirmation and explanation of some clear rule; but wherein this rule consisted, I was for a long time unable to comprehend.

To love our enemies? That was something impossible. That was one of those beautiful expressions upon which one cannot look otherwise than as upon an indication of an inaccessible moral ideal. That was either too much, or nothing. It is possible not to harm our enemy, but to love him, — never. Christ could not have prescribed the impossible. Besides, in the very first words, in the reference to the law of the ancients, You are told, Hate thine enemy, there was something doubtful. In all the former passages Christ quoted the actual, original words of the law of Moses; but here he adduces words which were never said. It is as though he calumniated the law.

The commentaries, as in all my former doubts, explained nothing to me. In all the commentaries they admit that the words, You are told, Hate thine enemy, are not to be found in the law of Moses, but no explanation is given of this incorrectly quoted passage from the law. They speak of how difficult it is to love our enemies, — evil men, — and generally they attempt corrections of the words of Christ; they say that it is impossible to love our enemies, but that it is possible not to wish them any evil or do them any harm. At the same time they impress upon us the permission and necessity of arraigning, that is, resisting evil; they speak of various degrees of attain-

ing this virtue, so that from the interpretations of the church the final deduction is that Christ for some unknown reason misquoted the words of the law of Moses and uttered many beautiful, but really frivolous and inapplicable, words.

It seemed to me that that could not be so. There ought to be here a clear and definite meaning, such as is found in the first four commandments. In order to understand this meaning, I first tried to understand the meaning of the words of the incorrect reference to the law, You are told, Hate thine enemy. There is some reason why Christ with every rule quotes the words of the law, Do not kill, do not commit adultery, and so forth, and to these words opposes his own teaching. If we do not understand what he meant by the words of the law quoted by him, it is impossible to understand what it is he prescribes. In the commentaries it says outright (nor can they help saying it) that he quotes words that were not in the law, but no explanation is given why he does so, and what this incorrect quotation means.

It seemed to me that first of all it ought to be explained what Christ could have meant when he quoted the words which were not in the law. I asked myself, What can the words mean which are incorrectly quoted by Christ from the law? In all the former references to the law, Christ quoted only the mere wording of the ancient law, as, Kill not, Commit no adultery, Keep thy oaths, A tooth for a tooth, and on the ground of this one precept he expounded the corresponding doctrine. But here two opposing precepts are quoted, You have been told, Love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy, so that it is evident that the distinction itself between the two precepts of the old law concerning the neighbour and the enemy is to serve as the basis of the new law. In order that I might understand more clearly wherein this distinction lay, I asked myself, What do the words neighbour and enemy mean in the Gospel language?

Having consulted the dictionaries and the contexts, I convinced myself that *neighbour* in the language of a Jew always means *a Jew* only. Such a definition of *neighbour* is given in the Gospel in the parable of the Samaritan. According to the idea of the lawyer, who asked who was a neighbour, a Samaritan could not be a neighbour. The same definition of *neighbour* is given in Acts vii. 27. *Neighbour* in Gospel language means *a countryman, a man belonging to the same nationality.* And thus, assuming that the contrast which Christ points out in this place, when he quotes the words of the law, You have been told, Love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy, consists in contrasting a countryman with a foreigner, I ask myself, what is an enemy according to the ideas of the Jews, and I find a confirmation of my assumption. The word *enemy* is used in the Gospels almost always, not in the sense of personal, but general, national enemies (Luke i. 71–74; Matt. xxii. 44; Mark xii. 36; Luke xx. 43, and elsewhere). The singular number in which the word *enemy* is used in these verses in the expression, Hate thine enemy, shows me that here the enemy of the nation is meant. In the Old Testament the idea of the nation's enemy is always expressed by the singular.

The moment I understood this, there was at once removed the difficulty as to why and in what manner Christ, who every time quoted the precise words of the law, should have adduced here words which had never been uttered. We need only understand the word *enemy* in the sense of a national enemy, and a *neighbour* in the sense of a countryman, in order that this difficulty should not at all exist. Christ speaks of how, according to the law of Moses, the Jews are to treat their national enemy. All those scattered passages in the various books of the Scripture, where the Jews are enjoined to oppress, and kill, and destroy the other nations, Christ unites into one expression, To hate, to do evil to the enemy. And he says,

You have been told that you must love your neighbours and hate the national enemy; but I tell you, You must love all without distinction as to the nationality, to which any one may belong. And as soon as I comprehended these words, there was also removed the other difficulty as to how I was to understand the words, Love your enemies. It is impossible to love personal enemies; but it is possible to love the men of a hostile nation as your own. And it became clear to me that Christ says that all men are taught to consider the men of their own nation neighbours, and the foreign nations enemies, and that he commanded us not to do this. He says, According to the law of Moses a distinction is made between Jews and non-Jews, the national enemies, but I tell you, You must not make this distinction. And, indeed, according to Matthew and Luke, he says immediately after this rule that all are alike to God, that the sun shines and the rain falls on all men alike; God makes no distinction between nations, and does the same good to all alike; the same ought men to do for all men, without distinction of nationality, and not as the Gentiles do, who divide themselves into separate nations.

Thus there was again confirmed for me from various sides the simple, important, clear and applicable comprehension of Christ's words. Instead of a hazy utterance and indefinite philosophizing there again appeared a clear, definite, important, and practicable rule: not to make any distinction between one's own and a foreign nation, and not to do what results from this distinction, — not to harbour ill-will toward other nations, nor wage war, nor take part in wars, nor arm for war, — but to act toward all men, no matter of what nationality, as though they were of our own.

All this was so simple, so clear, that I wondered how it was I did not understand it at once.

The reason why I did not understand this was the same

as in the case of the prohibition of courts and oaths. It is very hard to understand that all the courts, which are opened with Christian prayers and are blessed by those who consider themselves guardians of Christ's law, are incompatible with the confession of Christ and are directly opposed to him. Still more difficult is it to divine that the oath, to which the guardians of Christ's law lead us, is directly forbidden by this law; and it is terribly difficult to guess that that which in our life is regarded not only as necessary and natural, but also very beautiful and virtuous, — love of country, its defence and glorification, the struggle with the enemy, and so forth, — is not only a transgression of Christ's law, but even an obvious renunciation of the same.

We have closed our ears to what he has told us of our life, or have forgotten that he has told us that we must not kill, and not even be angry with another man, that we must not defend ourselves, but offer the second cheek, and that we must love our enemies, — so that now, since we are accustomed to call men, who have devoted their life to murder, the Christ-loving military, who are used to hear Te Deums addressed to Christ concerning the victory over the enemy, who base their glory and pride on murder, who have advanced the symbol of murder, the sword, to a certain kind of holiness, so that a man without this symbol — without the knife — is a disgraced man, we think that Christ has not forbidden war and that, if he had forbidden it, he would have spoken more clearly.

We forget that Christ could not have imagined that men who believe in his teaching of humility, love, and universal brotherhood would calmly and consciously establish the murder of their brothers.

Christ could not have imagined it, and so he could not have forbidden a Christian to wage war, just as a father who instructs his son how to live honestly, without offending any one and by giving his own to others, would

not think of forbidding him to kill men on the highway.

Nor could one of the apostles, nor one of the disciples of Christ of the first centuries of Christianity, have imagined that it was necessary to forbid murder, called war. This, for example, is what Origen says in his reply to Celsius.

He says (Chap. LXIII.): "Celsius admonishes us that we should with all our strength aid the emperor, take part in his lawful labours, arm ourselves for him, serve under his standards, if necessary, 'lead his armies in war.' To this we must reply that we occasionally offer aid to kings, but, so to speak, divine aid, for we are girded in the mail of God. In this conduct we submit to the voice of the apostle. 'I exhort that first of all,' he says, 'supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for all men, for kings, and for all that are in authority.' Thus, the more a man is pious, the more he is useful to kings, and his use is more efficacious than that of a soldier, who, having enlisted under the standards of the king, kills as many enemies as he can. Besides, to men who, not knowing our religion, demand of us that we should kill people, we can reply that even your priests do not defile their hands, in order that your God may receive their sacrifices. Even so do we."

And, concluding this chapter by an explanation that the Christians are more useful by their peaceful lives than the soldiers, Origen says: "Thus we struggle better than any one for the salvation of the emperor. It is true, we do not serve under his standards. We will not serve, even if he compels us to do so."

Such were the relations of the Christians of the first ages to war, and thus spoke their teachers, turning to the mighty of the world, at a time when the martyrs died by hundreds and by thousands for the confession of Christ's faith.

And now? Now there does not even exist the question as to whether a Christian can participate in wars. All young men, who are brought up in the church law, called Christianity, go every autumn, when their turn has come, to the military enlisting-offices, and with the aid of the church pastors renounce the law of Christ. It was only lately that a peasant refused to enter military service, basing his refusal on the Gospel. The teachers of the church tried to persuade him of his error, but as he believed Christ, and not them, he was put in prison, where he was kept until he renounced Christ. All this is done after our God announced to us Christians eighteen hundred years ago the very clear and definite commandment, Do not consider the men of the other nations thy enemies, but regard all men as thy brothers and treat all men as thou treatest the men of thy own nation, and so not only refrain from killing thy enemies, but love them and do them good.

When I thus understood the simple, definite commandments of Christ, when they were subject to no misinterpretations, I asked myself, What would happen if the Christian world believed in these commandments, not in the sense that they are to be sung or read for the propitiation of God, but in the sense of fulfilling them for the happiness of men? What would happen if men believed in the obligatoriness of these commandments at least as firmly as they believe that we must pray every day, go to church on Sunday, eat fish on Friday, and prepare ourselves every year for communion? What would happen if men believed in these commandments as they believe in the demands of the church?

I imagined the whole Christian society as living and educating the young generations in these commandments. I imagined that all of us and our children were impressed from childhood in word and deed, not by what they are impressed by now, that a man must preserve his dignity,

defend his rights before others (which cannot be done otherwise than by humbling and offending others), but by this, that not one man has any rights and can be higher or lower; that only he is lower and more disgraceful who wants to stand higher than the rest; that there is no more debasing condition for man than the condition of anger against another man; that the seeming insignificance or senselessness of a man cannot justify my anger against him and my dissension with him.

Instead of the whole structure of our life, from the windows of the shops to the theatres, novels, and female apparel, which provoke carnal lusts, I imagined that we all and our children were impressed in word and deed with the idea that the enjoyment of lewd books, theatres, and balls is a very base enjoyment, and that every action which has for its purpose the adornment of the body or its accentuation is a most base and contemptible act.

Instead of the structure of our life, in which it is considered necessary and good for a young man to live in debauch before his marriage; instead of considering a life, which separates husband and wife, a most natural one; instead of legalizing a condition of women who serve for debauch, — instead of all that, I imagined that we were impressed in word and deed by the idea that the single, celibate state of a man, who has matured for sexual relations and has not renounced them, is a monstrosity and a shame, and that the abandonment by a man of a woman, with whom he has come together, and the exchange for another, are not only unnatural acts, like incest, but also cruel, inhuman acts.

Instead of having the whole life based on violence and every joy obtained and guarded by violence; instead of seeing each one of us punished or inflicting punishment from childhood to deepest old age, — I imagined that we were all impressed in word and deed by the idea that vengeance is a very low, animal feeling; that violence

is not only a disgraceful act, but also one which deprives man of true happiness; that only that is the joy of life which need not be protected by violence; that the highest respect is not due to him who takes away and keeps his own from others, and whom others serve, but he who gives away his own and serves others.

Instead of considering it beautiful and legitimate for every man to swear and give everything which is most precious to him, that is, his whole life, to the will of somebody he does not know, I imagined that all were impressed with the idea that man's reasonable will is that highest holiness which man cannot give to any one, and that to promise anything to any one with an oath is a renunciation of one's rational essence, a defilement of the highest holiness.

I imagined that instead of those national hatreds which are impressed on us under the form of patriotism, instead of those glorifications of murder, called wars, which from childhood are represented to us as most valiant deeds, we were impressed with horror and contempt for all those activities, political, diplomatic, military, which serve for the separation of men; that we were impressed with the idea that the recognition of any countries, especial laws, borders, lands, is a sign of the grossest ignorance, and that to wage war, that is, to kill strangers without any cause, is a most terrible misdeed, possible only for an erring and corrupt man, who has fallen to the level of an animal.

I imagined that all men believed in this, and I asked myself what would then be.

Before this I had asked myself what would come of the execution of Christ's teaching, as I understood it, and I had involuntarily replied to myself, Nothing. We shall all pray, make use of the grace of the sacraments, believe in the redemption and salvation of ourselves and of the whole world by Christ, and still the salvation will not

come from us, but from this, that there will be an end of the world. Christ will come in the proper time in his glory to judge the living and the dead, and the kingdom of God will be established independently of our life. But now the teaching of Christ, as it presented itself to me, had also another meaning: the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth depended also on us. The fulfilment of Christ's teaching, as expressed in the five commandments, established this kingdom of God. The kingdom of God on earth is the peace of all men among themselves. Peace among men is the highest accessible good on earth. Thus the kingdom of God had presented itself to all the Jewish prophets, and thus it presents itself to every human heart. All prophecies promise peace to men.

The whole teaching of Christ consists in giving the kingdom of God — peace — to men. In the sermon on the mount, in the discourse with Nicodemus, in the sending forth of the disciples, in all his instructions, he speaks only of what separates men and keeps them from being at peace and entering the kingdom of God. All the parables are only descriptions of what is the kingdom of God, which can be entered only by loving our brothers and living at peace with them. John the Baptist, Christ's precursor, says that the kingdom of God is at hand, and that Jesus Christ gives it to the world.

Christ says that he brought peace upon earth. John xiv. 27: Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, give I unto you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid.

Indeed, these five commandments give this peace to men. All five commandments have no other purpose than that of giving peace to men. Men have only to believe in Christ's teaching and fulfil it, and there will be peace upon earth, not the peace which is established by men, temporary, accidental, private peace, but general, inviolable, eternal peace.

The first commandment says, Live in peace with all men; do not permit thyself to regard another man as insignificant or senseless (Matt. v. 22). If the peace has been broken, use all thy efforts to reëstablish it. The service of God is the annihilation of enmity (23 and 24). Make peace at the least dissension, so that thou mayest not lose the true life. In this commandment everything is said; but Christ foresees the offences of the world, which impair the peace among men, and so he gives a second commandment against the offence of the sexual relations, which impairs the peace. Do not look upon carnal beauty as upon an amusement: avoid this offence in advance (28–30); let a man take one wife, and a wife one man, and do not abandon one another under any considerations (32). Another offence is the oaths, which lead men into sin. Know in advance that it is an evil, and make no promises (34–37). The third offence is vengeance, which is called human justice; wreak no vengeance, and do not find excuses by saying that they will offend thee: bear insult, and do not return evil for evil (38–42). The fourth offence is the discrimination of nationalities, — the enmity of races and governments. Know that all men are brothers and sons of the one God, and do not break the peace with any one in the name of national purposes (43–48). If men shall not fulfil one of these commandments, peace will be broken. If men shall fulfil all the commandments, the kingdom of peace will be on earth. The commandments exclude all evil from the life of men.

Through the fulfilment of these commandments the life of men will be what every human heart seeks and desires. All men will be brothers, and everybody will always be at peace with others, enjoying all the benefits of the world during the term of life which is apportioned to them by God. Men will forge the swords into ploughshares, and spears into sickles. There will be that

kingdom of God, that kingdom of peace, which all the prophets have promised, and which was at hand in the time of John the Baptist, and which Christ announced and proclaimed, speaking with the words of Isaiah, The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the brokenhearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord (Luke iv. 18 and 19; Isaiah lxi. 1 and 2).

The commandments of peace given by Christ are simple and clear; they foresee all cases of possible dissension and provide for them, and disclose this kingdom of God on earth. Consequently, Christ is indeed the Messiah. He has fulfilled the promise. It is we who are not fulfilling what all men have eternally wished, — what we have been praying for.

VII.

Why do men not do what Christ has told them to do, and what gives to them the highest accessible good, for which they have been wishing all the time? And on all sides I hear one and the same answer, expressed in different words, Christ's teaching is very good, and it is true that, if it were executed, the kingdom of God would be established upon earth, but it is hard and so impracticable.

Christ's teaching as to how men should live is divinely good and gives good to men, but it is hard for men to execute it. We repeat and hear this so often that we are not startled by the contradiction which is contained in these words.

It is a characteristic of human nature to do what is better. Every teaching about the life of men is only a teaching of what is better for men. If it is shown to men what is better for them to do, how can they say that they wish to do what is better, but are not able to do so? What men cannot do is that which is worse and they cannot help but do what is better.

Man's rational activity, ever since man has existed, has been directed to finding out what is better among those contradictions with which the life of each individual and of all men together is filled.

Men fight for land, for objects which they need, and then reach a point when they divide everything up and call it property: they find that, though it is difficult to establish this, it is better, and so maintain the property; men fight for wives, abandon their children, and then find

that it is better for every man to have a family, and, although it is hard to support a family, they hold on to property, family, and many other things. The moment men discover something which is better, they act accordingly, however hard it may be. What, then, is meant by saying, "Christ's teaching is beautiful, life according to Christ's teaching is better than the one we now live, but we cannot live as is better, because it is hard?"

If this word *hard* is to be taken as meaning that it is hard to sacrifice the momentary gratification of the appetites to the greater good, why do we not say that it is hard to plough in order that we may have bread, and to set out apple-trees, in order that there may be apples?

Every being which is endowed with incipient reason knows that it is necessary to endure hardships for the sake of the greater good. Suddenly it turns out that we say that Christ's teaching is beautiful, but that it is impracticable, because it is hard: and it is hard, because, in following it, we shall be deprived of what we had not been deprived of before. We act as though we never heard that at times it is more advantageous to suffer and be deprived of something, than not to suffer at all and always to gratify our appetites.

A man may be an animal, and no one will rebuke him for it; but a man cannot reflect that he wishes to be an animal. The moment he reflects, he recognizes himself as a rational being, and, recognizing himself as such, he cannot help recognizing what is rational, and what irrational. Reason does not command anything; it only enlightens.

I have hurt my hands and knees, trying to find the door in the dark. A man comes in with a light, and I see the door. I shall no longer strike against the wall when I see the door, and still less can I affirm that I see the door and that I find that it is better to pass through the door,

but that this is hard, and so I want to continue striking my knees against the wall.

In this marvellous reflection, The Christian teaching is good and gives the good to the world, but men are weak and bad, and want to do what is better, but do what is worse, and so cannot do what is better, there is an obvious misunderstanding.

It is evidently not an error of reasoning, but something else. There must be here some false conception. Only a false conception that what is not exists, and what is does not exist can bring people to that strange denial of the practicability of that which, according to their admission, gives them the good.

The false conception which has led them to this is what is called the dogmatic Christian faith, which is taught from childhood to all those who profess the Christian faith of the church according to all kinds of Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant catechisms.

This faith, according to the definition of the believers, is the recognition of what seems as existing (this is said in Paul and is repeated in all theologies and catechisms, as the best definition of faith). And it is this recognition of what seems as existing which has led men to this strange assertion that Christ's teaching is good for men, but that it is of no use for them.

The doctrine of this faith in its most exact expression is like this: the personal God, who exists for ever, one in three persons, suddenly took it into his head to create the world of spirits. The good God created this world of spirits for their benefit; but it happened that one of the spirits became very bad and, therefore, unhappy. Much time passed, and God created another world, the material world, and man, again for his good. God created man blessed, immortal, and sinless. Man's blessedness consisted in using the good of the world without labour: his immortality consisted in this, that he was to live

so for ever; his sinlessness consisted in his not knowing evil.

This man was tempted in paradise by that spirit of the first creation, who of himself became evil, and then man fell, and there were born just such fallen men, and after that men began to work, be sick, suffer, die, struggle bodily and spiritually, that is, the imaginary man became the real man, such as we know him, and such that we cannot and have no right or reason to imagine him otherwise. The condition of a working, suffering man, who chooses the good and avoids the evil, and who dies, such as it is and outside of which we cannot imagine anything, is, according to the doctrine of the faith, not the real condition of man, but his unreal, accidental, temporary state.

Although this state has, according to this doctrine, lasted since Adam's expulsion from paradise, that is, since the beginning of the world to the birth of Christ, and has been continued the same for all men, it is only an accidental and temporary state. According to this doctrine, the son of God, God himself, the second person of the Trinity, was sent by God upon earth in the shape of a man, that he might save men from this improper, accidental, temporary state, take off of them all the curses which were imposed on them by the same God for Adam's sin, and reëstablish them in their former natural state of bliss, that is, of freedom from disease, of immortality, sinlessness, and idleness. The second person of the Trinity, Christ, according to this teaching, redeemed Adam's sin by the very fact that men executed him, and put a stop to this unnatural condition of man, which had lasted since the beginning of the world. Since then, man, believing in Christ, became once more such as he had been in paradise, that is, immortal, free from disease, sinless, and idle.

On that part of the realization of the redemption, by dint of which after Christ the earth began for the believers everywhere to bear without labour, the diseases

stopped, and children were born of mothers without suffering, this doctrine does not dwell, because it is difficult to impress those who have to work hard and who suffer grievously that it is not hard to work and not painful to suffer. But that part of the doctrine, according to which there is no death and no sin, is affirmed with especial force.

It is affirmed that the dead continue to live, and since the dead are not able in any way to confirm the fact that they are dead, nor that they live, just as a stone cannot confirm that it can speak or not, this absence of any denial is taken as a proof, and it is affirmed that the men who have died are not dead. And with still greater solemnity and confidence it is affirmed that after Christ a man is freed from sin through faith in him, that is, that after Christ a man no longer needs illuminate his life through reason and choose what is best for him. All he has to do is to believe that Christ redeemed him from sin, and then he is sinless, that is, entirely good. According to this teaching, men must imagine that reason is powerless in them, and that, therefore, they are sinless, that is, cannot err.

A true believer must imagine that since the time of Christ the earth has brought forth fruit without labour, children are born without pain, there are no diseases, there is no death and no sin, that is, there are no errors, that is, there is not what is, and there is what is not.

Thus speaks the strictly logical theological theory.

This doctrine is harmless in itself. But the departure from truth is never harmless, and leads to consequences which are the more serious, the more serious the subject is, in respect to which the untruth is said. But here the subject in respect to which the untruth is said is the whole human life.

What according to this doctrine is called the true life, is the personal, blissful, sinless, and eternal life, that is, such as no one ever knew and as does not exist. But the

life which exists, which alone we know, which we live, which all humanity has lived, is according to this doctrine a fallen, bad life, — a sample only of the good life which is due us.

The struggle between the striving after the animal life and that after the rational life, which lies in the soul of each man and forms the essence of the life of each man, is according to this doctrine entirely removed. This struggle is transferred to the incident which took place in paradise with Adam at the creation of the world. The question as to whether I shall eat the apples that tempt me, or not, does not exist for man according to this teaching. This question was once for all solved in paradise by Adam in a negative sense. Adam sinned for me, that is, made a mistake, and all men, all of us, are irretrievably fallen, and all our efforts to live sensibly are useless and even godless. I am incorrigibly bad, and must know this. My salvation is not in this, that I can enlighten life by means of reason and, having learned what is good and bad, do what is best. No, Adam has once for all acted badly for me, and Christ has once for all corrected this evil done by Adam, and so I must, as a spectator, be contrite concerning Adam's fall and rejoice at Christ's salvation.

But all that love of goodness and truth which lies in the soul of man, all his efforts to enlighten the phenomena of life by means of reason, my whole spiritual life, — all that is not only of no importance according to this doctrine, but is also seduction or pride.

Life, such as there is here upon earth, with all its joys and beauties, with all the struggle of reason against darkness, — the life of all men who have lived before my time, my whole life, with my internal struggle and conquests of reason, is not the true life, but a fallen and hopelessly corrupted life : but the true, sinless life is in faith, that is, in imagination, that is, in insanity.

Let a man, renouncing the habit, acquired in childhood,

of admitting this, try and look at this doctrine in a simple and direct manner; let him mentally transfer himself into a fresh man, educated outside this teaching, and imagine how this doctrine will appear to such a man. Why, it is the merest madness!

No matter how strange and terrible it was for me to think so, I could not help but acknowledge this, because this alone explained to me that remarkable contradictory, senseless resort which I hear on all sides against the practicableness of Christ's teaching: It is good and gives happiness to men, but men cannot fulfil it.

Only the conception of what does not exist as existing, and of what exists as not existing, could have brought men to this strange contradiction. And such a false conception I found in the pseudo-Christian faith which has been preached for fifteen hundred years.

But it is not the believers alone who object to Christ's teaching, saying that it is good, but impracticable; this is done also by the unbelievers, by men who do not believe, or think that they do not believe, in the dogma of the fall and the redemption. The objection to Christ's teaching, which consists in its impracticableness, is made by men of science, by philosophers, in general by educated men, who consider themselves free from the superstition of the fall and the redemption. And so it had seemed to me at first. It had also seemed to me that these learned men had other grounds for denying the practicableness of Christ's teaching. But, when I entered deeper into the foundations of their denial, I convinced myself that the unbelievers had the same false conception that our life is not what it is, but what it seems to them, and that this conception is based on the same foundation as the conception of the believers. Those who profess to be unbelievers, it is true, believe neither in God, nor in Christ, nor in Adam; but they believe even more firmly than the theologians in the fundamental false conception

as to man's rights to a blessed life, on which everything is based.

Let privileged science with its philosophy boast as much as it please, assuring us that it is the moderator and guide of the minds, — it is not the guide, but the servant. The world conception is always given to it ready-made by religion, and science only works on the path indicated to it by religion. Religion discloses the meaning of the life of men, and science applies this meaning to the various sides of life. And so, if religion gives a false meaning to life, science, which is educated in this religious world conception, will from various sides apply this false meaning to the life of men. Even so it has happened with our European, Christian science and philosophy.

The church doctrine gave the fundamental meaning of the life of men, asserting that man had a right to a blessed life, and that this blessedness is obtained not by the efforts of man, but by something external, and this world conception has become the foundation of our whole science and philosophy.

Religion, science, public opinion all say in one voice that the life which we lead is bad, but that the teaching as to how we may ourselves try to be better, and thus make life itself better, is impracticable.

Christ's teaching in the sense of improving the life of man by his rational efforts is impracticable, because Adam fell and the world lies in evil, says religion.

This teaching is impracticable, because human life is accomplished according to certain laws which are independent of the will of man, says our philosophy. Philosophy and the whole science says with other words precisely what religion says with its dogma of the first fall and the redemption.

In the doctrine of the redemption there are two fundamental propositions, on which everything is based: (1) the lawful life of man is the blessed life, while the life

of the world is bad and cannot be mended through man's efforts, and (2) the salvation from this life is in faith.

These two propositions became the foundation of the world conception both of the believers and the unbelievers of our pseudo-Christian society. From the second proposition resulted the church with its establishments. From the first proposition result our social opinion and our philosophical and political theories.

All the philosophical and political theories which justify the existing order, Hegelism and its children, are based on this proposition. Pessimism, which demands of life what it cannot give, and which, therefore, denies life, results from the same.

Materialism, with its remarkable rapturous assertion that man is a process and nothing else, is a lawful child of this doctrine, which assumes that the present life is a fallen life. Spiritualism, with its learned followers, is the best proof of this, that the scientific and philosophical conceptions are not free, but are based on the religious doctrine of the blessed eternal life, which is peculiar to man.

The distortion of the meaning of life has distorted the whole rational activity of man. The dogma of man's fall and redemption has screened from men the most important and legitimate sphere of man's activity and has excluded from the whole sphere of the human knowledge the knowledge of what a man must do that he may be happier and better. Science and philosophy, imagining that they act hostilely to the pseudo-Christianity, and priding themselves on it, work only for it. Science and philosophy treat of everything you please, except of how a man can be and live better. What is called ethics — moral teaching — has entirely disappeared in our pseudo-Christian society.

Both believers and unbelievers alike do not ask themselves how we must live and use the reason which is

given to us, but, Why is our human life not such as we imagined it to be, and when will it be such as we want it to be?

Only thanks to this false doctrine, which has entered the flesh and blood of our generations, could there have happened that remarkable phenomenon, which is that man has apparently disgorged that apple of the knowledge of good and evil, which, according to tradition, he ate in paradise, and, forgetting that man's whole history consists only in solving the contradictions of the rational and the animal nature, has begun to use his reason for the purpose of finding the historical laws of his animal nature alone.

The religious and philosophical teachings of all the nations, except the philosophical teachings of the pseudo-Christian world, all which we know, — Judaism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, Greek philosophy, — all the teachings have for their aim the arrangement of the human life and the elucidation of how each must strive to be and live better. The whole Confucianism is in the personal perfection, Judaism — in the personal fulfilment of each covenant with God, Buddhism — in the teaching of how each can save himself from the evil of life. Socrates taught personal perfection in the name of reason; the Stoics recognized rational freedom as the one basis of true life.

Man's whole rational activity could not help but consist, and has always consisted, in the enlightenment by reason of the striving after the good. The freedom of the will, says our philosophy, is an illusion, and it is very proud of the boldness of this assertion. But the freedom of the will is not only an illusion, it is a word which has no meaning whatever. This word is invented by theologians and criminalists, and to oppose this word would be the same as fighting windmills. But reason, which enlightens our life and compels us to change our acts, is not an illusion, and this can in no way be denied. The

following of reason for the purpose of obtaining the good, — in this has always consisted the teaching of all true teachers of humanity, and in this consists the teaching of Christ, and it is impossible to deny reason by means of reason.

Christ's teaching is the teaching about the son of man, common to all men, that is, about the striving after the good, common to all men, about the common reason, which enlightens man in this striving. It is quite superfluous to prove that the son of man means the son of man. If we wish to understand by the son of man something different from what these words mean, it is necessary to prove that, in defining what he wished to say, Christ intentionally used words which had an entirely different significance. But even if, as the church wants it, the son of man means the son of God, the son of man still means man by its essence, because Christ calls all men sons of God.

Christ's teaching about the son of man, the son of God, which forms the foundation of all the gospels, is most clearly expressed in the discourse with Nicodemus. Every man, he says, in addition to recognizing his carnal personal life, proceeding from a male father in the womb of a carnal mother, cannot help but recognize his birth from above (John iii. 5–7). What man recognizes in himself as free is that which is born of the infinite, of that which we call God (11–14). This which is born of God, this son of God in man, we must lift up in ourselves, in order that we may receive the true life (14–17). The son of man is the monogenous (of the same birth, and not the only-begotten) son of God. He who exalts in himself this son of God above everything else, who believes that life is only in this, will not be in disseverance from life. The disseverance from life is due only to this, that men do not believe in the light which is in them (18–21). (That light of which it says in the Gospel of John that in it is life, and that life is the light of men).

Christ taught us to exalt above all else the son of man, that is the son of God and the light of men. He says, When you lift up (exalt) the son of man, you will know that I speak nothing of myself personally (John xii. 32, 44, 49). The Jews do not understand his teaching, and ask, Who is this son of man who is to be lifted up? (John xii. 34). And to this question he replies (John xii. 35), Yet a little while is the light in[1] you. Walk while ye have the light, lest darkness come upon you: for he that walketh in darkness knoweth not whither he goeth. In reply to the question as to what is meant by lifting up the son of man, Christ says, To live in the light which is in men.

The son of man, according to Christ's answer, is the light in which men must walk, while there is light in them.

Luke xi. 35: Take heed, therefore, that the light which is in thee be not darkness.

Matt. vi. 23: If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness! he says, instructing all men.

Before and after Christ, men have said the same, that there is in man a divine light, which came down from heaven, and this light is reason, and that it alone is to be served, and in it alone the good is to be found. Thus spoke the teachers of the Brahmins, and the Jewish prophets, and Confucius, and Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus, and all the true sages, not the composers of philosophical theories, but those men who sought the truth for their own good and for the good of all men.[2]

[1] In all the church translations there is an intentional mistranslation in this place: instead of *in you*, ἐν ὑμῖν, these words are everywhere translated by *with you*. — *Author's Note.*

[2] Marcus Aurelius says: "Revere that which is most powerful in the world, that which makes use of everything and governs everything. Revere also what is in thee: it is like the first, because it makes use of what is in thee, and governs thy life."

Epictetus says: "God sowed his seed not only in my father and grandfather, but also in all beings which live upon earth, especially in

Suddenly we recognize by the dogma of the redemption that we must not even speak or think of this light in man. We must think, say the believers, only of what attributes each person of the Trinity has, and of what sacraments must be performed, and what not, because the salvation of men will be accomplished, not by our efforts, but by the Trinity and the correct performance of the sacraments. We must think, say the unbelievers, of this, by what laws an infinitely small particle of matter accomplishes its motion in infinite space and infinite time; but we must not think of what man's reason needs for its good, because the betterment of man's condition will not come from him, but from general laws, which we shall discover.

I am convinced that in a few centuries the history of the so-called scientific activity of our boasted last centuries of the European humanity will form an inexhaustible subject of laughter and pity for the future generations. For several centuries the learned men of the small western part of the great continent lived in outright madness, imagining that to them belonged eternal, blessed life, and busied themselves with all kinds of lucubrations as to how and by what laws this life would come to them; but they themselves did nothing and never thought of how they might make their life better. And what will appear even more tragic to the future historian is this, that he will find that these men had a teacher who showed them clearly and definitely what they ought to do in order that they might live more happily, and that the words of this

the rational beings, for they alone enter into relation with God through their reason, by which they are united with him."

In the book of Confucius it says: "The law of the great science consists in developing and establishing the principle of the light of reason, which we received from heaven." This proposition is repeated several times and serves as the foundation of the teaching of Confucius. — *Author's Note.*

teacher were explained by some as meaning that he would come to arrange everything in the clouds, and by others, that these words were beautiful, but impracticable, because the life of man is not such as we want it to be, and so it is not worth while to busy ourselves with it, while man's reason ought to be directed to the study of the laws of this life without any reference to the good of man.

The church says: Christ's teaching is impracticable, because the life here is a sample of the real life; it cannot be good, — it is all in evil. The best means for passing this life consists in despising it, and living by faith, that is, by imagining a future, blessed, eternal life, but living here no matter how, and praying.

Philosophy, science, public opinion say: Christ's teaching is impracticable, because man's life does not depend on that light of reason with which he can enlighten life itself, but on general laws, and so it is not necessary to enlighten this life by reason and live in accordance with it, but to live no matter how, believing firmly that according to the laws of historical, sociological, and other laws, after we shall have lived badly for a long time, our life will naturally become very good.

Men come to an estate and find there everything necessary for their life, — a house with all its furnishings, granaries full of grain, cellars, storehouses full of all provisions; in the yard there are agricultural implements, tools, harnesses, horses, cows, sheep, a complete farm outfit, — everything necessary for a life of sufficiency. Men come from all sides to this estate and begin to make use of everything they find there, each for himself, without thinking of leaving anything to those who are now with them in the house, nor to those who will come after. Each wants everything for himself. Each hastens to make use of what he can, and there begins the destruction of everything, — a struggle, a fight for the objects of possession

the milch cow, the unshorn sheep, the sows heavy with young are killed for meat; they make fires with looms and wagons, fight for the milk and the grain, and spill and ruin more than they make use of. No one will eat a thing in peace, but will scowl at the stronger man who comes and takes it away from him, and a third man will take it from the second.

Exhausted and beaten, the men, starved, leave the estate. Again the master prepares everything on the estate so that men may live peacefully on it. Again the estate is a full bowl; and again passers-by stop there, and again there is fighting and jostling, and everything goes to ruin, and the men go away, cursing and reproaching their companions and the master, because he has prepared so poorly and so little. Again the good master fixes the estate in such a way that men may live on it, and again, and again, and again it is the same.

And suddenly among the new arrivals there is a teacher, who says to the others, Brothers, we do not do right. See how many good things there are on this estate, and how well everything is arranged! There is enough for all of us, and there will be something left for those who come after us, if only we shall live according to reason. Let us not take away from one another, but let us help each other. We shall sow and plough and raise cattle, and all will live well.

And it happened so that a few men understood what the teacher was saying, and those who understood began to do so: they stopped quarrelling and taking away from one another, and began to work. But the rest, who had either not heard the teacher's speeches, or had heard, but did not believe them, did not do according to the words of the man, but continued to fight as before, and ruined the estate, and went away. Others came, and the same happened. Those who listened to the teacher kept repeating, Do not fight, do not ruin the master's goods,

and you will be better off. Do as the teacher told you to do.

But still there were many who did not hear, nor believe, and things went for a long time as of old. All this was natural and had to be so, as long as men did not believe what the teacher was saying. But, they say, the time came when all on the estate heard the teacher's words, and all understood them: they did more than understand them, — they acknowledged that it was God himself who was speaking through the teacher, that the teacher himself was God, and all believed in every word of the teacher, as though it were holy. But, they say, instead of living according to the words of the teacher, it turned out that afterward not one man kept from fighting, but they started to belabour one another, and all began to say that now they knew for certain that that was proper and that it could not be otherwise.

What does this mean? Even cattle manage to eat their feed in such a way as not to waste it uselessly, and men have learned how to live better, have come to believe that God himself ordered them to live so, and live even worse, because, they say, it is impossible to live in any other way. These men imagined something else. What could these men on the estate have imagined, that, believing in the words of the teacher, they should continue their life as of old, taking away from one another, fighting, ruining the property and themselves? It is this: the teacher told them, Your life on this estate is bad; live better and your life will be good; but they imagined that the teacher condemned all life on this estate, and promised them another, a good life, not on this estate, but somewhere in another place. And they decided that this was only a hostelry, and that it was not worth while trying to live well in it, but that they must see to it how they might not lose the promised good life in the other place. Only in this way can we explain the strange

conduct of those men on the estate, who believe that the teacher was God, and of those who consider him a wise man and his words just, but continue to live as of old, contrary to the advice of the teacher.

Men have heard and comprehended everything, but have failed to hear that the teacher spoke only of this, that men must find their happiness here, on the estate, on which they have met and which they imagine is a hostelry, while the real estate is somewhere else. And this has led to the remarkable reflection that the words of the teacher are very beautiful and are even the words of God, but that it is difficult to carry them out now.

If men would only stop ruining one another and waiting for some one to come and help them, — Christ in the clouds with the voice of trumpets, or the historical law, or the law of the differentiation and integration of forces! Nobody will help them if they do not help themselves. There is no need of helping them. All they have to do is not to expect anything from heaven, nor from earth, and to stop ruining themselves.

VIII.

But let us suppose that Christ's teaching gives bliss to the world; let us suppose that it is rational, and man on the basis of reason has no right to renounce it. What is one man to do amidst a world of men who do not fulfil the law of Christ? If all men suddenly agreed to fulfil Christ's law, its execution would be possible, but one man alone cannot go against the whole world.

If I alone amidst a world of men who do not fulfil Christ's teaching, they generally say, will fulfil everything, will give away what I have, will offer my cheek, without defending myself, and will not even agree to swearing and making war, I shall be robbed of everything, and if I do not die of hunger, they will beat me to death, and if they do not beat me to death, they will put me in prison or shoot me, and I shall without a cause ruin the happiness of my life and my life itself.

This retort is based on the same misunderstanding on which is based the objection of the impracticableness of Christ's teaching.

Thus people generally speak, and thus thought I before I completely freed myself of the church doctrine, and before I, consequently, understood Christ's teaching about life in its whole significance.

Christ offers his teaching about life as a salvation from that perishable life which men live who do not follow his teaching, and suddenly I say that I should be glad to follow his teaching, but that I am sorry to ruin my life. Christ teaches the salvation from a perishable life, and I pity this perishable life. Consequently, I do not

consider this life at all perishable, but something real, something belonging to me and good. In this assumption of this worldly, personal life as something real and belonging to me, lies the misunderstanding which prevents people from understanding Christ's teaching. Christ knows this delusion of people, by which they regard their personal life as something real and belonging to themselves, and shows them in a whole series of sermons and parables that they have no right to life, and that they have no life until they have obtained the true life, having renounced the phantom of life, of what they call their life.

In order that we may understand Christ's teaching about the salvation of life, we must first of all understand what all the prophets have said, what Solomon said, what Buddha said, what all the sages of the world have said about the personal life of man. It is possible, according to Pascal's utterance, not to think of this, to carry in front of us little screens which should shield from view the abyss of death, toward which we are running; but we need only think what the single personal life of man is, in order that we may be convinced that this whole life, if it is only a personal life, has no meaning whatsoever for each separate man, and that it is even an evil jest on the heart, on the reason of man, on what there is good in man. And so, in order that we may understand Christ's teaching, we must first of all regain our senses, bethink ourselves to have the *μετάνοια* accomplished in us, — of what, preaching his doctrine, Christ's predecessor, John, said to men who were as misled as we are. He says, First of all repent, that is, regain your senses, or else you are lost. He says, The axe is laid unto the root of the tree, to cut it down. Death and destruction are here, near each man. Do not forget this, regain your senses. And Christ, beginning his sermon, says, Bethink yourselves, or else you will all perish.

Luke xiii. 1–5: Christ is told of the destruction of the Galileans killed by Pilate. And he says, Suppose ye that these Galileans were sinners above all the Galileans, because they suffered such things? I tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. Or those eighteen, upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.

If he lived at the present time in Russia, he would say, Do you think that those who were burned in the circus at Berdíchev or who perished on the Kukúev Rampart were more guilty than the rest? You will all perish in the same way, if you do not find in your life that which does not perish. The death of those who were crushed by the tower and who were burned in the circus terrifies you, but your death, just as terrible and just as inevitable, stands just as much before you, and in vain do you try to forget it. When it comes unexpectedly, it will be still more terrible.

He says (Luke xii. 54–57), When ye see a cloud rise out of the west, straightway ye say, There cometh a shower; and so it is. And when ye see the south wind blow, ye say, There will be heat; and it cometh to pass. Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky and of the earth; but how is it that ye do not discern this time? Yea, and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?

By tokens you tell in advance what the weather will be, so how is it that you do not see what will happen with you? Run away from danger, guard thy life as much as thou wilt, and yet either Pilate will kill thee, or the tower crush thee, and if not Pilate and not the tower, thou wilt die in thy bed in worse agony.

Calculate in a simple way, as people do when they undertake something, when they build a tower, go to war,

or build a factory. They undertake and work over that which must have a rational end.

Luke xiv. 28–31: For which of you intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first, and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it? Lest haply after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him, Saying, This man began to build, and was not able to finish. Or what king going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand?

Is it not senseless to work over that which, no matter how much thou mayest try, will never be finished? Death will always come earlier than the tower of thy worldly happiness will be finished. And if thou knowest in advance that, no matter how much thou mayest struggle with death, not thou wilt conquer death, but death will conquer thee, is it not better not to struggle with it and not to put thy soul into what will certainly perish and to seek some work which will not be destroyed by inevitable death?

Luke xii. 22–27: And he said unto his disciples, Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat; neither for the body, what ye shall put on. The life is more than meat, and the body is more than raiment. Consider the ravens: for they neither sow nor reap; which neither have storehouse nor barn; and God feedeth them: how much more are ye better than the fowls? And which of you with taking thought can add to his stature one cubit? If ye then be not able to do that thing which is least, why take ye thought for the rest? Consider the lilies how they grow: they toil not, they spin not; and yet I say unto you, that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.

No matter how much you may care for your body and your food, you cannot add one hour [1] to your life. Is it, then, not senseless to care for what you cannot do?

You know full well that your life will end in death, and you are concerned about securing your life by means of possessions. You must understand that this is a ridiculous deception, with which you deceive yourselves.

There can be no meaning of life, says Christ, in what we possess and what we acquire, in which we are not ourselves; it must be in something else.

He says (Luke xii. 16–21): A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth. And he spake a parable unto them, saying, The ground of a certain rich man brought forth plentifully: and he thought within himself, saying, What shall I do, because I have no room where to bestow my fruits? And he said, This will I do: I will pull down my barns, and build greater; and there will I bestow all my fruits and my goods. And I will say to my soul, Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years; take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry. But God said unto him, Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee: then whose shall those things be, which thou hast provided? So is he that layeth up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God.

Death stands over you every moment, and so (Luke xii. 35, 36, 38–40): Let your loins be girded about, and your lights burning; and ye yourselves like unto men that wait for their lord, when he will return from the wedding; that, when he cometh and knocketh, they may open unto him immediately. And if he shall come in the second watch, or come in the third watch, and find them so, blessed are those servants. And this know, that if the

[1] These words are incorrectly translated: the word ἡλικία means *age, time of life:* and so the whole expression means, You cannot add an hour to your life. — *Author's Note.*

goodman of the house had known what hour the thief would come, he would have watched, and not have suffered his house to be broken through. Be ye therefore ready also: for the Son of man cometh at an hour when ye think not.

The parable of the virgins waiting for the bridegroom, the end of the world, and the terrible judgment, — all those places, according to the opinion of all commentators, have, in addition to the meaning of the end of the world, also the meaning of death which always, at every hour, awaits man.

Death, death, death awaits you every second. Your life is accomplished with death in view. If you work personally for yourself in the future, you know yourself that in the future there is but one thing for you, — death. This death destroys everything which you have worked for. Consequently, life cannot have any meaning in itself. If there is a rational life, it must be different, that is, such that the aim of it is not life for oneself in the future. To live rationally we must live in such a way that death cannot destroy life.

Luke x. 41 and 42: Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things: but one thing is needful.

All those endless deeds which we do for ourselves in the future are not necessary for ourselves: all that is a deception with which we deceive ourselves. Only one thing is needful.

From the day of birth the state of man is such that inevitable ruin, that is, senseless life and senseless death, awaits him, if he does not find that one thing which he needs for the true life. This one thing, which gives the true life, Christ reveals to men. He does not invent it and does not promise to give it by his divine power; he only shows men that together with that personal life, which is an unquestionable deception, there must be that which is the truth, and not a deception.

By the parable of the husbandmen of the vineyard (Matt. xxi. 33–42) Christ elucidates this source of the delusion of men, which conceals this truth from them and compels them to accept the phantom of life, their personal life, for the true life.

Men, living in the master's well-cared garden, have come to imagine that they are the owners of this garden. And from this false representation there results a series of senseless and cruel acts of these men, which ends in their expulsion, their exclusion from life; even so we have imagined that the life of each one of us is our personal possession, and that we have the right to it and may use it as we please, without being under any obligations to any one. And for us, who have imagined this, such a series of senseless and cruel acts and misfortunes and such an exclusion from life are just as inevitable. And as it seems to the husbandmen that the fiercer they are the better they will secure themselves, — and kill the messengers and the master's son, — even so it seems to us that the fiercer we shall be the better we shall secure ourselves.

Just as the husbandmen inevitably fare badly in that the master drives away those who are not giving to any one the fruits of the garden, even so fare people who imagine that the personal life is the real life. Death drives them out of life, putting new men in their place, not as a punishment, but because the first did not understand life. As the inhabitants of the garden either forgot, or did not know, that the garden was turned over to them all dug up, fenced in, and with a good well, and that some one had worked for them and so expected work from them: even so men who live a personal life have forgotten, or wish to forget, everything that was done for them before their birth and that is being done during the whole time of their life, and what, therefore, is expected of them: they wish to forget that all the benefits of life

which they enjoy are given to them, and so must be transferred and given back.

This correction of the view of life, this *μετάνοια*, is the corner-stone of Christ's teaching, as he himself said at the end of this parable. According to Christ's teaching, just as the husbandmen, living in the garden which is not prepared by them, must understand and feel that they are in insolvable indebtedness to their master, so men must understand and feel that, from the day of their birth to their death, they are always in insolvable indebtedness to those who lived before them and now live and will live later, and to that which was and is and will be the beginning of everything. They must understand that by every hour of their life, during which they do not cease this life, they confirm this obligation, and that, therefore, a man who lives for himself and denies this obligation, which binds him with life and its beginning, deprives himself of life; he must understand that, living in this manner, he, though wishing to preserve life, ruins it, — precisely what Christ repeated so many times.

The true life is only the one which continues the past life and which coöperates with the good of the contemporary life and with that of the future life.

To be a participant in this life, a man must renounce his will for the purpose of fulfilling the will of the Father of life, who gave it to the son of man.

The servant, who does his own will and not that of the master, does not live eternally in the house of the master; but the son who does the will of the Father lives for ever. Christ expresses the same idea in another place (John viii. 35).

But the will of the Father of life is not the life of a separate individual, but of the one son of man who lives in men; and so man preserves life only when he looks upon his life as upon a pledge, a talent, given him by the Father, that he may serve the life

of all, when he lives not for himself, but for the son of man.

Matt. xxv. 14–46. A master gave to each of his servants part of his estate and, without saying anything to them, left them alone. Some of the servants, though they had not heard any command from the master as to how to make use of the master's property, understood that the property was not theirs, but the master's, and that the property ought to be increased, and so worked for the master. And the servants who worked for the master became the participants in the master's life, while those who did not work were deprived even of what was given to them.

The life of the son of man is given to all men, and they are not told why it is given to them. Some men understand that the life is not their property, but is given to them as a gift and ought to serve the life of the son of man, and they live accordingly. Others, under the pretext that they do not understand the aim of life, do not serve life. And the men who serve life unite with the source of life, and the men who do not serve life are deprived of it. And so, from Verse 31 to Verse 46, Christ tells about what the serving of the son of man consists in and about what the reward for this service will be. The son of man, according to Christ's expression, will say, like a king, Come, you blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom for having given me drink and meat, and having dressed me, taken me in, and consoled me, for I am one and the same in you and in these little ones, whom you pitied and treated well. You have lived, not the personal life, but the life of the son of man, and so you have the eternal life.

It is only this eternal life that Christ teaches according to all the gospels, and, however strange it may be to say so about Christ, who personally rose from the dead, and promised to raise all from the dead, Christ not only failed

to confirm the personal resurrection and immortality beyond the grave, but even to the reëstablishment of the dead in the kingdom of the Messiah, which the Pharisees had founded, he ascribed a meaning which excludes the conception of a personal resurrection.

The Sadducees disputed the reëstablishment of the dead.

The Pharisees acknowledged it, just as the orthodox Jews recognize it nowadays.

The reëstablishment of the dead (and not the resurrection, as the word is improperly translated), according to the belief of the Jews, will take place at the coming of the time of the Messiah and the establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth. And so Christ, meeting with this belief in the temporal, spatial, and carnal resurrection, denies it, and in its place puts his teaching of the reëstablishment of the eternal life in God.

When the Sadducees, who do not acknowledge the reëstablishment of the dead, ask Christ, assuming that he will share the conception of the Pharisees, Whose will the wife of seven brothers be? he gives a clear and definite answer.

He says (Matt. xxii. 29–32; Mark xii. 24–27; Luke xx. 34–38), You are mistaken, for you do not understand the Scripture and the power of God. And, rejecting the conception of the Pharisees, he says, The reëstablishment from the dead is not carnal and not personal. Those who arrive at the reëstablishment from the dead become the sons of God and live like angels (the power of God) in heaven (that is, with God), and for them there cannot exist personal questions, such as, whose wife she is, for, in uniting with God, they cease being personalities. But as to there existing a reëstablishment from the dead, he says, retorting to the Sadducees, who acknowledge only an earthly existence and nothing but a carnal earthly life, Have you not read what God has told you? In

the Scripture it says that God told Moses in the burning bush, I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob. If God said to Moses that he was the God of Jacob, Jacob is not dead for God, for God is the God of the living only, and not of the dead. For God all are living. And so, if there is a living God, then that man lives who has entered into communion with the eternally living God.

Christ says against the Pharisees that the reëstablishment of life cannot be carnal or personal. Against the Sadducees he says that besides the personal and the temporal life there is also a life in the communion with God.

In denying the personal, carnal resurrection, Christ recognizes the reëstablishment of life in that man transfers his life into God. Christ teaches the salvation from the personal life and assumes this salvation in the exaltation of the son of man and of life in God. Uniting this teaching of his with the doctrine of the Jews about the coming of the Messiah, he speaks to the Jews of the reëstablishment of the son of man from the dead, meaning by this not the carnal and personal reëstablishment of the dead, but the awakening of life in God. But of the carnal, personal resurrection he never spoke. As the best proof that Christ never preached the resurrection of men serve those two only passages which are adduced by the theologians in confirmation of his doctrine of the resurrection. These two passages are: Matt. xxv. 31–46 and John v. 28 and 29. The first speaks of the coming, that is, the reëstablishment, the exaltation of the son of man (just as it is mentioned in Matt. x. 23), and then the greatness and power of the son of man is compared with a king. The second passage speaks of the reëstablishment of the true life here upon earth, as this is expressed in the preceding 24th verse.

We need only try to grasp the meaning of Christ's teaching about the eternal life in God, and to reëstablish

in our imagination the doctrine of the Jewish prophets, in order that we may understand that, if Christ wanted to preach the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, which just then began to enter into the Talmud and was a subject of dispute, he would have expressed this doctrine clearly and definitely; he, on the contrary, not only failed to do so, but even rejected it, and in all the gospels it is impossible to find a single passage which would confirm this doctrine. But the above quoted two passages signify something very different.

Of his own personal resurrection, no matter how strange this may appear to those who have not studied the gospels, Christ has never spoken anywhere. If, as the theologians teach, the foundation of the belief in Christ consists in this, that Christ rose from the dead, — the least we may expect would be that Christ, knowing that he would rise from the dead, and that in this the chief dogma of the faith in him would consist, would say so clearly and definitely at least once. But he not only did not say so clearly and definitely even once; according to the canonical gospels he not even once made any reference to it. Christ's teaching is this, that we should exalt the son of man, that is, the essence of the life of man, — to recognize ourselves as sons of God. Christ personifies in himself the man who has recognized his filial relation to God (Matt. xvi. 13–20). He asks his disciples what men say of him, the son of man. The disciples say that some regard him as John miraculously risen from the dead, or as a prophet, and others, as Elijah who has come down from heaven. And how do you understand me? he asks. And Peter, understanding Christ as he understood himself, replies, Thou art the Messiah, the son of the living God. And Christ says, Not the flesh and blood have revealed this to thee, but our Father in heaven, that is, Thou hast comprehended this, not because thou hast believed the human interpretations, but because, recognizing thyself

as the son of God, thou hast comprehended me. And, having explained to Peter that on this filial relation to God the true faith is based, Christ says to his disciples (20) that they should not henceforth say that he, Jesus, was the Messiah.

After this Christ says that, although they would torture and kill him, the son of God, having acknowledged himself to be a son of God, will none the less be reëstablished and will triumph over everything. And it is these words that are interpreted as a prediction of his resurrection.

John ii. 19–22; Matt. xii. 40; Luke xi. 30; Matt. xvi. 4, 21; Mark viii. 31; Luke ix. 22; Matt. xvii. 23; Mark ix. 31; Matt. xx. 19; Mark x. 34; Luke xviii. 33; Matt. xxvi. 32; Mark xiv. 28. These are all the fourteen places which are understood to mean that Christ predicted his resurrection. In three of these places reference is made to Jonah in the belly of the whale, and in one to the reestablishment of the temple. In the remaining ten places it says that the son of man cannot be destroyed; but nowhere is there one word in respect to the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

In all these passages there is not even the word *resurrection* in the original. Give to a man who does not know the theological interpretations, but who knows Greek, all these passages to translate, and never will one translate them as they are translated. In the original we have here two different words ἀνίστημι and ἐγείρω. One of these words means *to raise up* (reëstablish); the other means *to wake*, and in the middle voice *to wake up, get up.* But neither the one nor the other can under any consideration mean *to raise from the dead.* To convince ourselves fully that these Greek words and the Hebrew *kum*, which corresponds to them, cannot mean to raise from the dead, we need only compare those passages of the Gospel where these words are used: they are used a great num-

ber of times, and not once are they translated by *to raise from the dead, auferstehen, ressusciter:* such words do not exist either in the Greek or the Hebrew language, even as the corresponding conceptions are wanting. In order to express in Greek or in Hebrew the conception of the resurrection, a paraphrase is needed: we have to say rose, or woke, from the dead. Even so it says in Luke xvi. 31, in the parable of Lazarus, that if one rose from the dead, he would not be believed. But where the words *from the dead* are not added to *rise* and *wake,* we have not the idea of the resurrection. Speaking of himself, Christ never, not even once in all the passages which are quoted in proof of his prediction that he would rise from the dead, uses the words *from the dead.*

Our conception of the resurrection is to such a degree foreign to the ideas of Jews about life that we cannot even imagine how Christ could have spoken to the Jews of the resurrection and of the eternal, personal life which is peculiar to each man. The conception of the future personal life did not come to us from the Jewish teaching, nor from Christ's teaching. It has entered the doctrine of the church from an entirely different source. However strange it may appear, we cannot help but say that the belief in the future personal life is a very low and gross conception, which is based on the confusion of sleep with death, and which is peculiar to all savages, and that the Jewish teaching, not to speak of the Christian teaching, stood incomparably higher than that. We are so convinced that this superstition is something very elevated that we most seriously prove the superiority of our teaching over the others by the very fact that we hold to this superstition, while others, like the Chinese and the Hindoos, do not keep it. This is proved not only by the theologians, but also by the freethinking learned historians of religion, by Tiele and Max Müller, and others; in classifying the religions, they acknowledge that those

who share this superstition are higher than those who do not share it. The freethinking Schopenhauer in so many words calls the Jewish religion the most contemptible (*niederträchtigste*) of all religions because there is not in it an idea (*keine Idee*) of the immortality of the soul.

In reality, in the Jewish religion there was not even such a conception or word. The eternal life is in Hebrew *khaye-olam. Olam* means *what is infinite, imperturbable in time;* it means also *the world, cosmos.* Life in general, and so much the more the eternal life, *khaye-olam*, is, according to the teaching of the Jews, peculiar to God alone. God is the God of life, God is alive. Man, according to the conception of the Jews, is always mortal, and God alone lives always. In the Pentateuch the words *eternal life* are used twice, once in Deuteronomy, the other time in Genesis. In Deut. xxxii. 39 and 40 God says, See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no god with me: I kill, and I make alive; I wound, and I heal: neither is there any that can deliver out of my hand. For I lift up my hand to heaven, and say, I live for ever. The second time, in Gen. iii. 22: God says, Man has eaten of the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and has become as one of us; he may stretch out his hands and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever. These are the only two cases of the use of the words eternal life in the Pentateuch and in the whole Old Testament (with the exception of one chapter of the apocryphal Daniel) which clearly define the conception of the Jews concerning life in general and the eternal life. Life in itself is, according to the conception of the Jews, eternal, and such it is in God; but man is always mortal, such being his property.

Nowhere in the Old Testament is there anything said of what we are taught in sacred histories, that God breathed an immortal soul into man, or that the first man was immortal before his fall. God created man,

according to the first account in Gen. i. 26, just like the animals, just like male and female, and just as he enjoined them to fructify and multiply. As it does not say of the animals that they are immortal, so it does not say so of man. In the second chapter we hear how man learned of good and evil; but concerning life it says openly that God drove man out of paradise and barred his way to the tree of life. Man did not get a chance to eat of the tree of life, did not get *khaye-olam*, that is, the eternal life, but remained mortal.

According to the teaching of the Jews man is precisely as he is, that is, mortal. Life is in him only as life which is preserved from generation to generation in the nation. The nation only has in itself the possibility of life. When God says, You shall live and not die, he says that of the nation. The life which God breathed into man is mortal for every individual man: but this life is continued from generation to generation, if men fulfil the covenant with God, that is, the conditions which are laid down for the purpose by God.

After expounding all the laws, and saying that these laws are not in heaven, but in their hearts, Moses says in Deut. xxx. 15 and 16: See, I have set before you this day life and good, and death and evil, commanding you to love God and walk his ways, keeping his law, that you may retain life. And Verses 19 and 20: I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live: That thou mayest love the Lord thy God, and that thou mayest obey his voice, and that thou mayest cleave unto him (for he is thy life, and the length of thy days).

The chief distinction between our conception of the human life and that of the Jews consists in this, that according to our conceptions our mortal life, which passes from generation to generation, is not the real life, but a

fallen life, which for some reason is temporarily corrupted; but according to the conception of the Jews, this life is real, and the highest good is given to man under the condition of fulfilling God's will. From our standpoint the transition of this fallen life from generation to generation is a continuation of the curse. From the standpoint of the Jews it is the highest good which man can obtain, and that, too, only by fulfilling the will of God.

It is on this conception of life that Christ bases his teaching of the true, or eternal, life, which he opposes to the personal and mortal life. Search the Scriptures, Christ says to the Jews (John v. 39), for through them you think you have eternal life.

A young man asks Christ (Matt. xix. 16) how he may have eternal life. In replying to his question about the eternal life, Christ says, If thou wilt enter into life (he does not say *eternal life*, but simply *life*) keep the commandments. The same he says to the lawyer (Luke x. 28): This do, and thou shalt live, and again he says live, and not live for ever. In either case Christ defines what is to be understood by the words *eternal life;* whenever he uses these words, he tells the Jews what is several times said in their law, namely: the fulfilment of the will of God is the eternal life.

In opposition to the temporal, private, personal life Christ teaches that eternal life which God, according to Deuteronomy, promised to Israel, but with this difference that, according to the conception of the Jews, the eternal life was continued only in the chosen people of Israel, and that to obtain this life it was only necessary to keep God's exclusive laws for the Israelites, while, according to Christ's teaching, the eternal life is continued in the son of man, and for its preservation we must observe the laws of Christ, which express the will of God for all humanity.

Christ opposes to the personal life not the life beyond the grave, but the general life, which is united with the

present, past, and future life of all humanity, — the life of the son of man.

The salvation of the personal life from death was, according to the teaching of the Jews, the fulfilment of the will of God, as expressed in the law of Moses according to his commandments. Only under these conditions did the life of the Jews not perish, but passed from generation to generation in the nation chosen by God. The salvation of the personal life from death is, according to Christ's teaching, the same fulfilment of God's will, as expressed in Christ's commandments. Only under this condition, according to Christ's teaching, does the personal life not perish, but become imperturbably eternal in the son of man. The difference is only this, that the service of the God of Moses was the service of God by one nation, while the service of the Father of Christ was the service of God by all men. The continuation of life in the generations of one nation was doubtful, because the nation itself might perish, and, also, because this continuation depended on carnal posterity. The continuation of life, according to Christ's teaching, is transferred into the son of God, who lives according to the will of the Father.

But let us suppose that the words of Christ about the terrible judgment and the end of the world, and the other words in the Gospel of John, have the meaning of promising a life beyond the grave to the souls of dead persons, it is still unquestionable that his teaching concerning the light of life, the kingdom of God, has also this other meaning, intelligible to his hearers and now to us, that the true life is only the life of the son of man according to the will of the Father. This can be admitted the more easily since the teaching concerning the true life according to the will of the Father of life includes the conception of the immortality and the life beyond the grave.

It may be more correct to assume that after this

worldly life, which is lived for the fulfilment of his personal will, man will none the less receive an eternal personal life in heaven with all the possible joys; may be this is more correct, but thinking that it is so, trying to believe that for good deeds I shall be rewarded with eternal bliss, and for bad deeds with eternal torments, — thinking thus does not help me in the comprehension of Christ's teaching; thinking thus means, on the contrary, depriving Christ's teaching of its chief foundation.

The whole teaching of Christ consists in this, that his disciples, having comprehended the phantasmal nature of the personal life, should renounce it and transfer it into the life of all humanity, into the life of the son of man. But the teaching of the immortality of the personal life not only does not call for the renunciation of a man's personal life, but for ever confirms this personality.

According to the conceptions of the Jews, the Chinese, the Hindoos, and all men who do not believe in the dogma of the fall of man and his redemption, life is life, such as it is. Man copulates, begets children, brings them up, grows old, and dies. His children grow up and continue his life, which is carried on without interruption from generation to generation, just as everything in the world is carried on, — stones, earth, metals, plants, animals, the luminaries, and everything in the world. Life is life, and we must make use of it in the best manner possible. It is irrational to live for oneself. And so, ever since men have existed, they have been seeking an aim for life outside themselves: they live for their babe, for their family, for the nation, for humanity, for everything which does not die with the personal life.

On the contrary, according to the teaching of our church, human life, as the highest good known to us, presents itself only as a particle of that life which is kept from us but for a little while. Our life, according to our conception, is not the life which God wanted and ought

to have given us, but a corrupt, bad, fallen life, a "sample" of life, a slur on the real life, the one which we for some reason imagine God ought to have given us. According to this representation the chief problem of our life does not consist in passing the mortal life given to us in the way in which the giver of life wants it passed, not in making it eternal in the generations of men, as the Jews teach, or by uniting it with the will of the Father, as Christ taught, but in assuring ourselves that after this life the real life will begin.

Christ does not speak of this our putative life, which God ought to have given to men, but for some reason failed to give. The theory of the fall of Adam and of the eternal life in paradise and of the immortal soul breathed by God into Adam, was unknown to Christ, and he did not mention it and did not hint at its existence with even one word.

Christ speaks of life, such as it is and as it will always be; but we speak of the life which we imagine, and which has never existed: how can we help understanding Christ's teaching?

Christ could not even have imagined such a strange conception in his disciples. He assumes that all men understand the inevitableness of the destruction of the personal life, and reveals the imperishable life. He gives the good to those who are in evil; but to those who are persuaded that they have much more than what Christ can give them, his teaching can give nothing. I will admonish a man to work, assuring him that he will receive food and raiment for it, and suddenly this man will persuade himself that he is a millionaire as it is; it is evident that he will not accept my admonition. The same takes place with Christ's teaching. Why should I work, since I can be a rich man as it is? Why should I try to live this life in godly fashion, since I am convinced that without it I shall live a personal life for ever?

We are taught that Christ saved men by this, that he is the second person of the Trinity, that he is God and became incarnate, and that, having taken upon himself the sin of Adam and of all men, he redeemed the sin of men before the first person of the Trinity and established the church and the sacraments for our salvation. If we believe in this, we are saved and receive an eternal personal life beyond the grave. But it cannot be denied that he has saved men also by this, that, by pointing out their inevitable destruction, he, according to his words, I am the way, the life, and the truth, gave us the true way of life, in lieu of that false way of the personal life on which we travelled before.

Though men may be found who will have their doubts in the life beyond the grave and in the salvation which is based on the redemption, there can be no doubt in the salvation of men, of all together and each separately, in the indication of the inevitable destruction of the personal life and of the true way of salvation in the union of our will with the will of the Father. Let every rational man ask himself what his life and death are? And let him ascribe to this life and death any other meaning than the one which Christ has pointed out.

All theorizing on the meaning of the personal life which is not based on the renunciation of self for the purpose of serving men, humanity, the son of man, is a phantom which is dispersed at the first touch of reason. I can no longer doubt that my personal life perishes, but the life of the whole world according to the will of the Father does not perish, and only a union with it gives me the possibility of salvation. But this is so little in comparison with those exalted religious beliefs in a future life! Though it is little, it is correct.

I have lost my way in a snow-storm. One assures me, and he actually thinks so, that there they are, lights and a village; but this only seems so to him and to me, be-

cause we want it; we walked in the direction of the lights, but there were none. Another man walked over the snow; he came out on a road, and shouted to us: "Do not go anywhere, for the lights are only in your eyes; you will be lost everywhere and will perish, but here is a firm road, and I am standing on it: it will take us somewhere." That is very little. When we believed the lights which glimmered in our inflamed eyes, the village was oh! so near, and there was a warm hut, and salvation, and rest; but now there is only a firm road. But if we listen to the first man, we shall certainly freeze to death, and if we listen to the second man, we shall certainly come out all right.

So what must I do, if I am the only one who understands Christ's teaching and believe in it, I alone amidst those who do not understand it or fulfil it?

What shall I do? Shall I live like all the rest, or according to Christ's teaching? I understand Christ's teaching in its commandments, and I see that their observance gives bliss to me and to all men of the world. I understand that the keeping of these commandments is the will of that beginning of all, from which my life also comes.

I understand, besides, that no matter what I may do, I shall inevitably perish in a senseless life and death, together with all that surrounds me, if I shall not fulfil this will of the Father, and that the only possibility of salvation lies only in its execution.

If I do like all men, I certainly counteract the good of all men, certainly do what is contrary to the will of the Father of life, certainly deprive myself of the only possibility of improving my desperate condition. In doing what Christ teaches me I continue to do what men have done for me: I coöperate with the good of all men who live now and who will live after me, and I do what he who has produced me wants me to do, and what alone can save me.

The circus in Berdíchev is on fire; all crowd and choke each other, pressing against the door which opens inward. A saviour appears, saying: "Step aside from the door: Go back! The more you crowd, the less hope of salvation you have. Turn back, and you will find an exit and salvation." Whether many or I alone heard it, what difference does it make? But having heard it and believing it, I can do nothing but go back and call out loud in the name of the saviour. They will, perhaps, choke me to death, or kill me; but my salvation still lies in going where there is the only exit. I cannot help but go there. The saviour must indeed be a saviour, that is, he must indeed save. And the salvation of Christ is indeed a salvation. He made his appearance and spoke, and humanity is saved.

The circus has been on fire for an hour, and we have to be in a hurry, and men may fail to be saved. But the world has been burning for eighteen hundred years, ever since Christ said, I have brought the fire down upon earth, and how my soul pines until it burns up, — and it will burn until men will be saved. Are there not men, and does it not burn, in order that men may have the bliss of salvation?

Having comprehended this, I understood and believed that Jesus was not only the Messiah, Christ, but also indeed the saviour of the world.

I know that there is no other way out for me, or for all those who with me are tormented in this life. I know that for all, and for me with them, there is no other salvation than by keeping the commandments of Christ, which give to all humanity a good which is most accessible to my understanding.

I am not terrified by the reflection that I may have more unpleasantnesses, or shall die earlier, by fulfilling Christ's teaching. This may be terrible to him who does not see how senseless and pernicious his own personal

single life is, and who thinks that he will not die. But I know that my life for a personal lonely life is the greatest foolishness, and that after this foolish life I shall certainly die as foolishly. And so I cannot be terrified at all. I shall die like all men, even like those who do not fulfil the teaching: but my life and death will have a meaning for me and for all men. My life and my death will serve the salvation and the life of all men, and it is this that Christ taught.

IX.

If all men were to fulfil Christ's teaching, there would be the kingdom of God upon earth: if I alone fulfil it, I shall do the best for all and for myself. Without the fulfilment of Christ's teaching there is no salvation.

But where shall I take faith to fulfil it, always to follow it, and never to renounce it? I believe, O Lord, help my unbelief.

The disciples asked Christ to confirm faith in them. I want to do good, and I do evil, says Paul the Apostle.

It is hard to be saved, — so people generally speak and think.

A man is drowning, and he asks to be saved. A rope is thrown out to him, and he may save himself by it; but the drowning man says, Confirm the faith in me that the rope will save me. I believe, says the man, that the rope will save me, but help my unbelief.

What does this mean? If a man does not grasp that which saves him, it means only that the man has not comprehended his situation.

How can a Christian, who professes the divinity of Christ and of his teaching, no matter how he may understand it, say that he wants to believe, and cannot? God himself, coming down upon earth, said, Eternal torments, fire, eternal outer darkness await you, and your salvation is in my teaching and its fulfilment. Such a Christian cannot help but believe in the salvation offered him, and fulfil it, saying, Help my unbelief.

In order that a man may be able to say so, he must not only refrain from believing in his destruction, but must also believe that he will not perish.

Children jump from a ship into the water. The current, their dry clothes, and their feeble motions still bear them up, and they do not understand their ruin. A rope is thrown out to them from the fleeing ship. They are told that they will certainly drown, and the people on the ship implore them (parables of the woman who found a farthing, of the shepherd who found the sheep gone astray, of the prodigal son, speak of the same); but the children do not believe them. They fail to believe, not in the rope, but in their destruction. Just such frivolous children, as they are, convince them that they would have a pleasant swim, even if the ship got away from them. The children do not believe that soon their clothes will be soaked through, their arms get tired of swimming, and they will strangle and drown and go to the bottom. They do not believe in this, and for this reason alone do not believe in the rope of salvation.

Just as the children who fell down from the ship are convinced that they will not perish, and so do not take hold of the rope, so people who profess the immortality of the soul are convinced that they will not perish, and so do not fulfil the teaching of Christ the God. They do not believe in what one cannot fail to believe, only because they believe in what one cannot believe.

And so they call out to some one, Confirm in us our faith that we shall not perish.

But that cannot be done. In order that they may have faith in this, that they will not perish, they must cease doing what destroys them, and must begin to do what saves them: they must take hold of the rope of salvation. They do not wish to do so, but want to convince themselves that they will not perish, despite the fact that their companions are perishing one after the other in their sight. This desire to assure themselves of what does not exist they call faith. Naturally they have always too little faith and want to have more.

When I comprehended Christ's teaching, I understood also that that which these people called faith was not faith, and that it was that same false faith that James the Apostle rejected in his epistle. (This epistle was for a long time not accepted by the church, and when it was accepted, it was subjected to some distortions: certain words were thrown out and others transposed or wrongly translated. I leave the accepted translation, correcting a few inexactnesses according to Tischendorf's text.)

James ii. 14-24, 26. What doth it profit, my brethren, though a man thinks he hath faith, and have not works? Faith cannot save him. If a brother or sister be naked, and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye warmed and filled; notwithstanding ye give them not those things which are needful to the body; what doth it profit? Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone. Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works. Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble. But wilt thou know, O vain man, that faith without works is dead? Was not Abraham our father justified by works, when he had offered Isaac his son upon the altar? Seest thou how faith wrought with his works, and by works was faith made perfect? Ye see then how that by works a man becomes righteous and not by faith only. For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also.

James says that the only sign of faith is works which result from it, and that, therefore, faith from which works do not result is only words with which one can no more become righteous and save oneself, than one can feed on them. And so faith from which works do not result is not faith: it is only a desire to believe in something; it

is only a faulty affirmation in words that I believe in that in which I do not believe.

Faith, according to this definition, is that which co-operates with works, and work is that which makes faith perfect, that is, which makes faith to be faith.

The Jews say to Christ (John vi. 30): What sign shewest thou then, that we may see, and believe thee? what dost thou work?

The same he was told when he was on the cross (Mark xv. 32): Let him descend from the cross, that we may see and believe.

Matt. xxvii. 42. He saved others: himself he cannot save. If he be the King of Israel, let him now come down from the cross, and we will believe him.

To such a demand for the increasing of their faith Christ replies only that their wish is vain, and that it is impossible to make them believe in what they do not believe. He says (Luke xxii. 67), If I tell you, ye will not believe. John x. 25–26: I told you, and ye believed not; but ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you.

The Jews ask the same that the church Christians ask, something that will make them in an external way believe in Christ's teaching. And he replies to them that this is impossible, and explains to them why it is impossible. He says that they cannot believe, because they are not of his sheep, that is, do not follow the way of life which he showed his sheep. He explains (John v. 44) wherein the difference is between his sheep and others, why some believe, and others not, and on what faith is based. How can ye believe, he says, when you receive δόξα,[1] the teaching, from one another, but seek not the teaching that cometh from God only?

[1] As in many other places, δόξα is quite incorrectly translated by the word *honour* or *glory*; δόξα, from δοκέω, means *conception*, *judgment*, *teaching*. — *Author's Note.*

To believe, says Christ, we must seek the teaching which is from God only. He that speaketh of himself seeketh his personal teaching (δόξαν τὴν ἴδιαν): but he that seeketh his teaching that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him (John vii. 18).

The teaching concerning life (δόξα) is the foundation of faith. All acts result from faith: but all faiths result from the meaning (δόξα) which we ascribe to life. There can be an endless number of acts, and so there can be a very large number of faiths; but there can be but two teachings concerning life (δόξα): one of them rejects, the other accepts Christ. One teaching, the one which Christ denies, consists in this, that the personal life is something actually existing and belonging to man. It is the teaching to which the majority of men have adhered, and from which result all the various beliefs of men and all their acts. The other teaching is the one which all the prophets and Christ preached, namely, that our personal life receives a meaning only in the execution of God's will.

If a man has that δόξα that his personality is more important than anything, he will think that his personal good is the most important and desirable thing in life, and, according to whether he will assume his good to be in the acquisition of property, or in reputation, or glory, or the gratification of his lust, and so forth, he will have a faith corresponding to this view, and all his acts will be in conformity with it.

If man has another δόξα, if he understands life in such a way that its meaning is only in the execution of God's will, as Abraham understood it and Christ taught, then, according to what he will put the will of God in, he will have a faith in conformity with this view, and all his acts will always harmonize with it.

This is the reason why believers in the good of the personal life cannot believe in Christ's teaching. All their attempts at believing this will ever remain vain. In order

that they may believe, they must change their view of life. So long as they have not changed it, their works will always coincide with their faith, and not with their wishes and words.

The desire to believe in Christ's teaching, expressed by those who asked him for signs, and by our believers, does not coincide, and cannot coincide, with their lives, no matter how much they may try. They may pray to Christ the God, go to communion, do works of philanthropy, build churches, convert others, — they do all that, — but they cannot do the works of Christ, because these spring from faith, which is based on an entirely different doctrine (δόξα) than the one which they profess. They cannot sacrifice their only son, as Abraham did, who did not even stop to think whether he should sacrifice his son or not to God, to that God who alone gave a meaning and the good to his life. Even so Christ and his disciples could not help but sacrifice their lives to others, because in this alone did the meaning and the good of their lives lie. From this lack of comprehension of the essence of faith springs that strange wish of people, which is, that they may believe that it is better to live according to the teaching of Christ, whereas with all the powers of their soul they wish, in harmony with their faith in the good of the personal lives, to live contrary to this teaching.

The foundation of faith is the meaning of life, from which flows the valuation of what is important and good in life, and of what is not important and bad. The valuation of all the phenomena of life is faith. And as now people, having faith which is based on their teaching, are positively unable to harmonize it with the faith which springs from Christ's teaching, even so his disciples were unable to do so. This perplexity is several times sharply and clearly expressed in the Gospel. Christ's disciples several times begged him to confirm their faith in what he said: Matt. xx. 20–28 and Mark x. 35–45. According to

either gospel, after the words which are terrible for every believer in the personal life, who assumes the good to lie in the riches of the world, and after the words that the rich man will not enter into the kingdom of God, and after the words, which are still more terrible for those who believe in nothing but the personal life, about this, that he who will not give up everything and his life for the sake of Christ's teaching will not be saved, Peter asks, What shall we have for having followed thee, and given up everything? Then, according to Mark, James and John themselves, and according to Matthew their mother, ask him to grant them that they may sit on both sides of him when he shall be in his glory. They ask him to confirm their faith by a promise of a reward.

To Peter's question Jesus replies with a parable about the labourers of the vineyard who are hired at different times (Matt. xx. 1–16); but in reply to James's request he says, Ye know not what ye ask, that is, you ask for the impossible. The teaching is in the renunciation of the personal life, and you ask for personal glory, personal reward. You can drink the same cup (pass your life) that I drink, but no one can make you sit on the right and on the left of me, that is, equal with me. And then Christ says, Only in the worldly life do the strong of the world enjoy and acclaim the glory and power of the personal life; but you, my disciples, must know that the meaning of human life is not in personal happiness, but in serving all, in the humiliation in the sight of all. Man does not live to be ministered unto, but to minister and lay down his personal life, as a ransom for all. In reply to the demand of the disciples, which showed him their entire lack of comprehension of his teaching, Christ does not command them to believe, that is, to change that valuation of the goods and evils of life, which results from their teaching (he knows that this is impossible), but explains to them that meaning of life on which faith is

based, that is, the true valuation of what is good and what bad, what important and what not.

In reply to Peter's question (Mark x. 28), What shall we get for our sacrifices? Christ tells the parable of the labourers who were hired at different times and yet received the same reward. Christ explains to Peter his wrong comprehension of the teaching, on which depends the absence of his faith. Christ says, Only in the personal and senseless life do people esteem and treasure the reward for work in proportion with the work. The faith in the reward for the work in proportion with the work springs from the teaching about the personal life. This faith is based on the assumption of certain rights which we are supposed to have to something; but man has no rights to anything, and he can have none; he has only obligations in return for the good which is given him, and so he cannot measure himself with any one. Even if he gives his whole life, he is unable to give back that which is given him, and so the master cannot be unjust to him. But if a man proclaims his rights to his life and asserts them in respect to the beginning of everything which has given him life, he only shows by this that he does not understand the meaning of life.

Having received their happiness, men demand something more. These men were standing without work in the market-place, and were unhappy, — they did not live. The master took them and gave them the highest happiness of life, — work. They accepted the master's kindness, and then remained dissatisfied. They are dissatisfied because they lack a clear comprehension of their situation. They came to their work with their false teaching as to their having a right to their life and their labour, and that, therefore, their labour ought to be rewarded. They do not understand that this labour is the highest good which is given them and for which they must only try to return a similar good, and cannot demand any reward.

And so people who have the same perverse opinion of life that these labourers have cannot possess the correct and true faith.

The parable of the master and the labourer who came from the field, which is told in reply to the direct request of the disciples that he confirm and increase their faith, more clearly defines the foundation of that faith which Christ teaches.

(Luke xvii. 3–10). In reply to Christ's words that we must forgive our brother not once but seventy times seven times, the disciples, frightened at the difficulty of executing this rule, say, Yes, but it is necessary to believe in order to execute this: so confirm and increase our faith. As before they asked what they would get for it, so now they ask the same that all so-called Christians ask: I want to believe, but I cannot; confirm our faith that the rope of salvation will save us. Some say, Grant us that we should believe, — precisely what the Jews said to him when they demanded miracles of him. Make it possible for us, by means of miracles and promises of rewards, to believe in our salvation.

The disciples speak as we speak, It would be nice, if we, living that lonely, peculiar life which we are living, could be made to believe also this, that if we shall fulfil God's teaching, it will be better for us. We all utter this demand, which is contrary to the whole meaning of Christ's teaching, and wonder why we cannot believe.

And to this radical misconception, which existed then even as it exists now, he answers with a parable, in which he shows what the true faith is. Faith cannot result from a trust in what he may say; faith results only from the consciousness of one's position. Faith is based only on the rational consciousness of what it is better to do when one finds oneself in a certain position. He shows that it is not possible to rouse this faith in other people by the promise of rewards and by the threat of punish-

ment; that this would be a very weak trust, which would be destroyed with the first temptation; that the faith which moves mountains, which no one can shake, is based on the consciousness of the inevitable ruin and on that one salvation which is possible in this situation.

In order that we may have faith, we do not need any promise of rewards. It must be understood that the only salvation from the inevitable destruction of life is that which in the will of the master is the common life. Every one who has come to understand this will not seek a confirmation, but will be saved without any admonitions.

In reply to the request of the disciples to confirm them in their faith, Christ says, When the master comes with the servant from the field, he does not tell him to sit down to eat, but orders him to put away the cattle and serve him, and then only does the labourer sit down at the table and eat his dinner. The labourer does all this and does not consider himself offended, and he does not boast and ask thanks or a reward, but knows that it has to be so, and that he is only doing what is necessary, and that it is a necessary condition of his service and at the same time the true good of his life. Even so you, says Christ, when you do everything which you are commanded, must consider that you have done only what you ought to do. He who will understand his relation to the master, will understand that only by submitting to the will of the master is he able to have life, and will know in what his good lies, and will have faith for which there will be nothing impossible. It is this faith that Christ teaches. Faith, according to Christ's teaching, is based on the rational cognition of the meaning of one's life.

The foundation of faith, according to Christ's teaching, is the light.

John i. 9–12: That was the true Light, which lighteth

every man that cometh into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. He came unto his own, and his own received him not. But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.

John iii. 19–21: And this is the condemnation,[1] that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved. But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. For him who understands Christ's teaching there can be no question about confirming his faith. Faith, according to Christ's teaching, is based on the light, on truth. Christ nowhere appeals to people to believe in him; he only appeals to them to believe in the truth.

He says to the Jews (John viii. 40), But now you seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth, which I have heard of God. (46) Which of you convinces me of sin? And if I say the truth, why do ye not believe me? John xviii. 37: To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice. John xiv. 6: He saith, I am the way, the truth, and the life.

In another place of the same chapter (16 and 17) he says: The Father shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever: even the Spirit of truth; whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: but ye know him; for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you.

He says that his whole teaching, he himself, is the truth.

[1] Κρίσις does not mean *condemnation*, but *division*. — *Author's Note.*

Christ's teaching is the teaching of the truth, and so Christ's faith is not trust in anything, as referring to Jesus, but the knowledge of the truth. It is impossible to assure one of Christ's teaching, — it is impossible to bribe one to fulfil it. He who understands Christ's teaching will have faith in him, because his teaching is the truth. He who knows the truth which is necessary for his good cannot help but believe in it, and so a man who understands that he is actually drowning cannot help but take hold of the rope of salvation. The question as to how one should do in order that one may be able to believe is a question which only expresses the lack of conception of the teaching of Jesus Christ.

X.

We say that it is hard to live according to Christ's teaching. How can it help being hard since we ourselves with all our life cautiously conceal from ourselves our situation, and carefully confirm in ourselves the confidence in this, that our situation is not what it is, but something quite different? And this confidence, by calling it faith, we exalt to something sacred, and with all possible means — with force, with acting upon the feelings, with threats, with flattery, with deceit — entice men to this false trust. In this demand of a trust in what is impossible and irrational we reach a point where the very irrationality of that which we demand shall be trusted is taken by us as a sign of its truth. A man was found who, being a Christian, said, *Credo quia absurdum*, and all the other Christians repeat this with raptures, assuming that insipidity is the best means for teaching the truth to men. Lately, in a conversation with me, a learned and clever man said to me that the Christian teaching as a moral teaching about life was not important. "All this," he said to me, "will be found with the Stoics, with the Brahmins, in the Talmud. The essence of the Christian teaching is not in this, but in the theosophical teaching which is expressed in the dogmas." That is, not that is of any value to the Christian teaching which is eternal and universally human, which is needed for life and is rational, but that is important and precious in Christianity which is entirely incomprehensible and, therefore, unnecessary, and that in the name of which millions of men have been killed.

We have formed for ourselves a false representation of

our life and of that of the world, and this is based on nothing but our malice and personal lusts; and the faith in this false representation, which is externally connected with the teaching of Christ, we consider most necessary and important for life. If it were not for this trust in the lie, which men have maintained through the ages, the lie of our conception of life and the truth of Christ's teaching would have been made manifest long ago.

It is terrible to say so (it so seems to me at times), but, if the teaching of Christ with the ecclesiastical teaching which has grown up on it did not exist at all, those who are now called Christians would be much nearer to the teaching of Christ, that is, to the rational teaching about the good of life, than they are now. The moral teachings of the prophets of all humanity would not be concealed from them. They would have their little prophets of truth, whom they would believe. But as it is, the whole truth is revealed, and this truth has appeared so terrible to those whose deeds are evil, that they have transformed it into a lie, and men have lost confidence in the truth. In our European society, Christ's declaration that he came into the world to bear witness of the truth, and that, therefore, every one who is of the truth hears him, has long ago been met with Pilate's words, What is the truth? These words, which express such a sad and deep irony against one Roman, we have taken as the truth and have made them our faith. All in our society live, not only without the truth, not only without any desire to know it, but even with the firm assurance that of all vain occupations the vainest is the seeking of the truth that determines human life.

The teaching about life — what with all the nations previous to our European society was always regarded as most important, what Christ declared to be the one thing needed — is the only one to be excluded from our life and from all human activity. This is the business of the

institution which is called the church, and no one, not even those who form this institution, has believed in it for a long time.

The one window for the light, toward which the eyes of all thinking and suffering people are directed, is screened. To the question, What am I? what shall I do? can I not alleviate my life in accordance with the teaching of that God who, as you say, came to save us? I am told: Execute the injunctions of the authorities, and believe in the church. But why do we live so wretchedly in this world? asks a despairing voice: What is all this evil for? Is it possible I cannot avoid participating with my body in this evil? The answer is, No, your desire to pass your life well and to help others to do so is pride. There is one thing you can do, and that is, to save yourself, your soul, for the future life. But if you do not wish to take part in the evil of the world, go out of it. This way is open to all, says the teaching of the church, but know that, in choosing this path, you must no longer take part in the life of the world, but must stop living and slowly kill yourself. There are but two ways, our teachers tell us, and those are, to believe and obey us and the authorities, and to participate in the evil which we have instituted, or to go out of the world and into a monastery, to watch and to fast; or to let your flesh rot on a pillar, to bend and unbend your body and do nothing for men; or to acknowledge Christ's teaching impracticable and so to acknowledge the lawlessness of life as sanctified by religion; or to renounce life, which is tantamount to a slow suicide.

No matter how remarkable to a man who understands the teaching of Christ appears the error which assumes that Christ's teaching is very good for men, but impracticable, — the error which assumes that a man who wishes to fulfil Christ's teaching with works, and not with words, must go out of the world, seems more remarkable still.

The delusion that it is better for a man to retire from

the world than to subject himself to the temptations of the world is an old error which has been long known to the Jews, but which is entirely foreign, not only to the spirit of Christianity, but even to Judaism. Against this delusion the story of the prophet Jonah, which Christ liked so much and adduced so often, was written long before his time. The thought of this story is the same from beginning to end: Jonah the prophet wants himself to be just and removes himself from the corrupt people. But God shows him that he is a prophet and is wanted for nothing else than that he should announce his knowledge of the truth to people who have gone astray, and so must not run away from these erring people, but must live in communion with them. Jonah has contempt for the corrupt Ninevites and runs away from them; but, no matter how much Jonah runs away from his vocation, God brings him back to the Ninevites by means of the whale, and what God wishes is accomplished, that is, the Ninevites receive through Jonah God's teaching, and their life is improved. But Jonah is by no means glad to be the tool of God's will: he is annoyed, he is jealous of God in respect to the Ninevites, — he would like to be the only rational and good man. He retires to the wilderness, laments his fate, and murmurs against God. Then a gourd grows out in one night, to defend him against the sun, and the following night a worm devours this gourd. Jonah rebukes God more than ever, because his precious gourd has perished. Then God says to him, Thou art sorry for the gourd, which thou callest thy own, and which grew up in one night and disappeared in one night, and am I not sorry for the great multitude that perished, that multitude that live like animals, and are unable to discern between their right hand and their left hand? Thy knowledge of the truth was wanted even for this, that thou mightest transmit it to those who did not have it.

Christ knew this story and frequently quoted it, but, in addition to this, it tells in the gospels how, after the visit of John the Baptist, who retired to the wilderness, Christ, before the beginning of his preaching, was subjected to the same temptation, and how he was led by the devil (deception) into the wilderness in order to be tempted, and how he vanquished this deception and returned to Galilee in the strength of his spirit, and how, no longer contemning corrupt people, he after that passed his life among publicans, Pharisees, and sinners, teaching them the truth.[1]

According to the church teaching Christ the God-man has given us an example of life. All his known life Christ passes in the whirlpool of life, — with publicans, with harlots, in Jerusalem, with the Pharisees. The chief commandments of Christ are the love of one's neighbour and the preaching of his teaching to others. Both demand a constant communion with the world. Suddenly the conclusion is drawn from this, that, according to Christ's teaching, it is necessary to go away from all men, not to have anything to do with any one, and to stand on a pillar. To follow Christ's example, it turns out that we have to do the very opposite of what he taught and did.

[1] Luke iv. 1, 2 : Christ is led by the deception into the wilderness, in order that he may be tempted there. Matt. iv. 3, 4 : The deception says to Christ that he is not the Son of God, if he cannot make bread out of stones. Christ says, I can live without bread, — I live by what is breathed into me by God. Then the deception says, If thou livest by what is breathed into thee by God, throw thyself down from a height ; thou wilt kill the flesh, but the spirit which is breathed into thee by God will not die. Christ answers, My life in the flesh is the will of God. To kill the flesh is to go against the will of God, to tempt God. Matt. iv. 8-11 : Then the deception says, If that is so, serve the flesh, like all men, and the flesh will reward thee. Christ answers, I am powerless over the flesh, — my life is in the spirit ; but I cannot destroy the flesh, because the spirit was put into me by the will of God, and so, living in the flesh, I can serve only my Father, God. And Christ goes from the wilderness back to the world. — *Author's Note.*

Christ's teaching, according to the church interpretations, presents itself, both to laymen and to the monastic orders, not as a teaching about life, — how it is to be made better for ourselves and for others, — but as a teaching of what worldly people are to believe in, in order that, living badly, they may none the less save themselves in the next world ; and to the monastic orders, as to how they can make life worse than what it is.

But Christ does not teach this.

Christ teaches the truth, and if an abstract truth is a truth, it will be true even in reality. If the life in God is the one true life, blissful in itself, it is true and blissful here upon earth under all possible accidents of life. If the life here on earth did not confirm Christ's teaching about life, this teaching would be untrue.

Christ does not call people away from what is good to what is worse, but, on the contrary, to something better from what is bad. He is sorry for people, who represent themselves to him as lost sheep that are perishing without a shepherd, and promises them a shepherd and good pasturage. He says that his disciples will be persecuted for his teaching and must suffer and bear the persecutions of the world with firmness. But he does not say that, following his teaching, they will suffer more than if they followed the teaching of the world ; on the contrary, he says that those who will follow the teaching of the world will be unhappy, while those who will follow his teaching will be blessed.

Christ does not teach salvation through faith, nor asceticism, that is, the deception of the imagination, nor self-imposed sufferings in this life ; but he teaches that kind of a life which, in addition to the salvation from the destruction of the personal life, would offer even here, in this world, less suffering and more pleasure than in the case of the personal life.

In disclosing his teaching, Christ says to men that, by

fulfilling his teaching even among those who do not fulfil it, they will not be more unfortunate thereby than they were before, but, on the contrary, happier than those who will not fulfil this. Christ says that there is a safe worldly calculation why they should not trouble themselves about the life of the world.

Then Peter began to say unto him, Lo, we have left all, and have followed thee. And Jesus answered and said, Verily I say unto you, There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake, and the gospel's, but he shall receive an hundred-fold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come, eternal life. Matt. xix. 27–29; Mark x. 28–30: Luke xviii. 28–30.

It is true, Christ mentions the fact that those who will obey him will be subjected to persecutions by those who will not obey him; but he does not say that the disciples will lose anything by it. On the contrary, he says that his disciples will have here, in this world, more joys than those who are not his disciples.

There can be no doubt as to Christ's saying and thinking this, both on account of the lucidity of his words and the meaning of the whole teaching, and also from the way he lived and from the way his disciples lived. But is it the truth?

In analyzing the abstract question as to whose position will be better, that of Christ's disciples or that of the disciples of the world, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the position of Christ's disciples must be better, because Christ's disciples, doing good to all men, will not provoke enmity in men. Christ's disciples, doing no one any evil, may be persecuted by evil men only; but the disciples of the world must be persecuted by all, since the law of life of the disciples of the world is a law of struggle, that is, a

persecution of one another. The accidents of suffering are indeed the same for both, but with this difference, that Christ's disciples will be prepared for them, while the disciples of the world will employ all the forces of their souls in order to avoid them, and that Christ's disciples, suffering, will think that their sufferings are needed for the world, while the disciples of the world, suffering, will not know what they are suffering for. Considering the matter in the abstract, the condition of Christ's disciples must be more advantageous than the condition of the disciples of the world. But is this so in practice?

In order to verify this, let each man recall all the difficult minutes of his life, all the bodily and spiritual sufferings which he has endured and still endures, and let him ask himself in the name of what he is enduring all these misfortunes, whether in the name of the world, or in that of Christ. Let each sincere man try and recall his whole past life, and he will see that not once did he suffer from the execution of Christ's teaching, but that the majority of the misfortunes of his life have been due to this, that, in opposition to his bent, he has followed the compulsory teaching of the world.

In my life, which is exceptionally happy from the worldly point of view, I can think of enough sufferings borne by me in the name of the teachings of the world to suffice for a good martyr in the name of Christ. All the most oppressive minutes of my life, beginning with student sprees and debauches and ending with duels, war, and that malaise and those unnatural and agonizing conditions of life, in which I now live, — all this is a torment in the name of the teaching of the world.

Yes, I am speaking only of my life, which is exceptionally happy from a worldly point of view. And how many martyrs there are who have suffered for the teaching of the world in a manner which I am not even able to present to myself!

We do not see all the difficulty and all the peril of the fulfilment of the teaching of the world simply because we think that everything we suffer for it is necessary.

We have convinced ourselves that all those misfortunes which we inflict upon ourselves are necessary conditions of our life, and so we cannot understand that Christ is teaching us precisely how we are to free ourselves from our misfortunes and live peacefully.

To be able to consider the question as to what life is happier, we must at least mentally renounce this false conception and without any preconceived notion look at ourselves and all about us.

Walk through a large crowd of people, especially in the city, and scan those emaciated, troubled, sickly faces, and then recall your own life and those men's lives the details of which you happen to have found out; recall all those violent deaths, all those suicides, which have come to your ears, and ask yourself in the name of what all these sufferings, deaths, and despairs, that lead people to commit suicide, take place. You will see, no matter how strange it may seem to you at first, that nine-tenths of the sufferings of men are borne by them in the name of the teaching of the world, that all these sufferings are unnecessary and avoidable, that the majority of men are the martyrs of the teaching of the world.

The other day, which was a rainy autumnal Sunday, I crossed the market-place of the Sukhárev Tower in a horse-car. For the distance of half a verst the car had to push aside a solid mass of people, who immediately came together again behind us. From morning until evening these thousands of people, of whom the majority are hungry and in tatters, crowd here in the mud, cursing, cheating, and despising one another. The same takes place in all the market-places of Moscow. The evening is passed by these people in inns and restaurants, and the night in their dens and corners. Sunday is their best day of the

week. On Monday they will again go about their hateful work in their infected dens.

Consider the lives of all these men, the condition which they have left in order to choose the one in which they have placed themselves; consider that unceasing labour which these people — these men and these women — do wilfully, and you will see that they are true martyrs.

All these people have left their homes, their fathers, brothers, frequently wives and children, have renounced everything, even life itself, and have come to town in order to obtain that which according to the teaching of the world is considered necessary for each of them. All of these, not to speak of those tens of thousands of unfortunate men who have lost everything and live on tripes and vódka in their doss-houses, — all, from the factory hand, cab-drivers, sewing-girls, prostitutes, to the rich merchant and the minister, and their wives, — live a most oppressive and unnatural life and yet have not acquired what for them is necessary according to the teaching of the world.

Hunt among these people, and find, from a beggar to a rich man, one who has enough, with what he earns, for everything which he considers necessary according to the teaching of the world, and you will see that you will not find one in a thousand. Every one of them struggles with all his might to gain what he does not need, but what is demanded of him according to the teaching of the world and the absence of which forms his misfortune. The moment he earns what he needs, a second and a third thing will be demanded of him, and thus proceeds this endless Sisyphean labour, which ruins the lives of men.

Take the scale of incomes of people, from those who spend three hundred roubles to those who spend fifty thousand roubles a year, and you will rarely find a man who is not worn out and exhausted from working to earn four hundred roubles, when he has three hundred roubles.

and five hundred roubles, when he has four hundred roubles, and so on; and there is not one who, having five hundred roubles, would of his free will go back to the condition of him who has only four hundred roubles. If there are such examples, a man makes this change, not in order to make his life easier, but in order to collect money and put it away. They all want to burden their lives, which are heavy as it is, and to give their souls completely to the teaching of the world. To-day a man earns a coat and a pair of overshoes, to-morrow a watch with a chain, the next day an apartment with a sofa and a lamp, then carpets for the drawing-room and velvet dresses, then a house, fast horses, pictures in gold frames, then he grows sick from the work above his strength, and dies. Another continues the same work and also gives his life to that Moloch, and he, too, dies, not knowing himself why he did all this.

But, perhaps, this life itself, during which a man does all this, is happy in itself. Measure this life by what men have called happiness, and you will see that this life is dreadfully unfortunate. Indeed, what are the chief conditions of the earthly happiness, which no one would dispute?

One of the first universally acknowledged conditions of happiness is that life in which there is no violation of men's connection with Nature, that is, a life under the open sky, in the light of the sun, in the fresh air: a communion with the soil, with plants, and with animals. Men have at all times considered the deprivation of this as a great misfortune. Those who are locked up in prisons feel this deprivation most keenly.

Now, let us look at the lives of people who live according to the teaching of the world: the more success they have obtained according to the teaching of the world, the more are they deprived of this condition of happiness; the higher the worldly happiness is which they have

obtained, the less do they see the sunlight, fields and forests, wild and domestic animals. Many of them — nearly all the women — live to an old age, without having seen the sun rise and the morning more than once or twice in their lifetime and without ever having seen fields and forests otherwise than from a carriage or car window, and not only without ever having sowed or planted anything, or fed and reared cows, horses, chickens, but without having even a conception as to how animals are born, grow up, and live. These people see only stuffs, stones, wood, which are worked by human labour, and that, too, not in the sunlight, but under an artificial illumination; they hear only the sounds of machines, carriages, guns, musical instruments; they smell perfumes and tobacco smoke; under their feet and hands are nothing but stuffs, stones, and wood; on account of the weakness of their stomachs they generally eat what is not fresh, and what stinks. Their migrations from place to place do not save them from this deprivation. They travel in closed boxes. In the country and abroad, whither they journey, they have the same stuffs and the same wood under their feet, the same curtains which conceal from them the sunlight, the same lackeys, coachmen, janitors, who do not permit them to commune with the soil, the plants, and the animals. No matter where they may be, they are like prisoners, deprived of this condition of happiness. As prisoners take delight in the grass which sprouts in the prison yard, or in a spider, in a mouse, so these people now and then take delight in sickly house-plants, a parrot, a little dog, a monkey, whom, however, somebody else looks after.

Another unquestionable condition of happiness is work, in the first place, favourite and free work, in the second, physical work, which gives appetite and sound, soothing sleep. Again, the greater the happiness, as they understand it, which people have obtained according to the teaching

of the world, the more they are deprived of this second condition of happiness. All the fortunate people of the world — dignitaries and rich people — are either, like prisoners, entirely deprived of work and unsuccessfully struggle against diseases which are the result of an absence of physical labour, and still more unsuccessfully against ennui which assails them (I say unsuccessfully, because work is a joy only when it is absolutely necessary, whereas nothing is necessary to them), or work at some hateful work, as is the case with bankers, prosecuting attorneys, governors, ministers, and their wives, who fix up drawing-rooms, china, and dresses for themselves and their children. (I say hateful, because I have never yet met one among them who praised his work and did it with the same pleasure with which a janitor cleans the snow away in front of a house.) All these happy people are either deprived of work, or are made to do work they do not like, that is, they find themselves in the condition in which criminals at hard labour are.

A third unquestionable condition of happiness is the family. And here again, this happiness is the less accessible to them the more they advance in worldly success. The majority are adulterers and consciously renounce the domestic joys, submitting to their inconveniences alone. If they are not adulterers, children are not a joy to them, but an impediment, and they of their own free will deprive themselves of them, trying in every way possible, sometimes by most painful means, to make their cohabitation sterile. And if they have children, they are deprived of the pleasure of communing with them. According to their laws, they must give them in charge of others, for the most part entire strangers, at first foreigners, and then state educators, so that a family causes them nothing but sorrow, — the children become just as unfortunate, from their childhood, as their parents are,

and the children have but one wish toward them, and that is, that they may die soon and leave them an inheritance.[1] They are not locked up in a prison; but the consequences to their life in relation to the family is more tormenting than the deprivation of family, to which prisoners are subjected.

A fourth condition of happiness is a free and amicable communion with all the various men of the world. Here, again, the higher the level which people have reached in the world, the more they are deprived of this chief condition of happiness. The higher, the narrower that circle of men is with whom communion is possible, the lower is the mental and moral development of those few men who form the magic circle, from which there is no way out. For a peasant and his wife social intercourse is open with the whole world, and if one million of people do not want to have anything to do with him, he still has eighty millions of men working like him, from Arkhángelsk to Ástrakhan, with whom he enters at once into close, brotherly relations, without waiting for an introduction or a visit. For an official and his wife there are hundreds like him, but his superiors do not admit him, and his inferiors are cut off from him. For a worldly rich man and his wife there are dozens of worldly families. Everything else is cut off from them. For a minister and a nabob and their families there exists a dozen such families as they are.

[1] Very strange is the justification of life which one frequently hears from parents. "I need nothing," says a parent, "life is a burden to me, but, as I love my children I do this for their sake." That is, I know indubitably from experience that our life is unhappy, and so — I educate my children in such a way that they may be just as unhappy as I am. And so, loving them, I inoculate them with the physical and moral infection of the cities, give them into the hands of strangers, who have only a selfish purpose in education, and carefully ruin my children physically and morally. This reflection is to serve as a justification of the insensate life of the parents themselves! — *Author's Note.*

For emperors and kings the circle becomes narrower still. Is not this an imprisonment, where the incarcerated person has social intercourse with but two or three fellow prisoners?

Finally, a fifth condition of happiness is health and painless death. Here again the higher men stand on the social ladder, the more they are deprived of this condition of happiness. Take an average rich man and his wife and an average peasant and his wife, in spite of all the starvation and the labour beyond their strength, which the peasant people endure not through their fault, but through the cruelty of men, and compare them. You will see that the lower the men and women stand, the healthier they are, and the higher, the more sickly they are.

Pass in review all those rich men and their wives whom you have known, and you will find that the majority of them are sick. Among them a healthy man, who is not undergoing some cure all the time, or periodically in the summer, is as much an exception as a sick person among the labouring classes. All these fortunate people, without exception, begin with onanism, which in their existence has become a natural condition of development: they all become toothless and gray and bald-headed in those years when a working person enters into full power. Nearly all of them are a prey to nervous, stomachic, or sexual diseases from gluttony, drunkenness, debauch, and doctoring, and those who do not die young pass half their life in undergoing some cures, in having morphine injected into them, or as puffed-up cripples who are incapable of living on their means, but can exist only as parasites, or as those ants whom their slaves feed. Pass their manner of dying in review: one committed suicide, another rotted away from syphilis, a third died as an old man from a tonic, a fourth died young from flagellation to which he subjected himself for the sake of excitation;

one was eaten up alive by lice or by worms, another drank himself or ate himself to death, still another was killed by morphine, or from an artificial abortion. One after the other they perish in the name of the teaching of the world. And the crowds pack after them, and, like martyrs, they seek sufferings and ruin.

One life after another is thrown under the chariot of this god: the chariot passes along, lacerating these lives, and new, ever new, victims throw themselves under it with groans, and sighs, and curses!

The execution of Christ's teaching is difficult. Christ says, Let those who want to follow leave house, fields, and brothers, and follow me, the God, and they will receive a hundred times more houses, fields, and brothers, and, besides, the eternal life. And nobody follows him. But in the teaching of the world it says: Abandon house, field, and brothers, leave the village for the rotten city, live all your life as a naked bath-house attendant, lathering other people's backs in the hot steam; or as a huckster, all your life counting other people's money in a basement; or as a prosecuting attorney, passing all your life in court and over papers, busy making worse the fate of unfortunates; or as a minister, all your life in a hurry to sign useless documents; or as a general, all your life killing people, — live this monstrous life, which always ends in agonizing death, and you will receive nothing in this world, and you will have no eternal life. And all go after them. Christ said, Take thy cross, and follow me, that is, humbly bear the fate which has befallen thee, and obey me, the God; and no one follows him. But the first useless man in epaulettes, who is no good except to commit murder, need only take it into his head to say, Take, not the cross, but the knapsack and the gun, and follow me to all kinds of suffering and eternal death, — and all follow him.

They leave their families, parents, wives, children, dress

themselves in fools' clothes, subject themselves to the power of the first man they meet, who is higher in rank, and, hungry, cold, and worn out from exhausting marches, follow him somewhere like a herd of oxen going to the slaughter-house; but they are not oxen, — they are men. They cannot help but know that they are driven to a slaughter-house; with the unsolved question, "What for?" and with despair in their hearts they march, dying from cold and hunger and infectious diseases, until they are placed under bullets and shells and are commanded to kill strangers. They kill and are killed, and none of those who kill know why or for what. The Turks roast them alive over a fire, flay them, and pull out their entrails. And to-morrow some one will whistle again, and again they will all go to meet terrible sufferings, and death, and obvious evil. And nobody finds this hard. Not only those who suffer, but even fathers and mothers do not find this hard. They go so far as to advise their children to do it. It seems to them not only that this is necessary and cannot be otherwise, but even that it is good and moral.

It would be easy to believe that the execution of Christ's teaching is hard and terrible and painful, if the execution of the teaching of the world were very easy and harmless and agreeable. But the teaching of the world is much harder, much more dangerous and painful of execution than Christ's teaching.

At one time, they say, there existed martyrs of Christ, but they were the exception: with us they are counted to the number of 380,000, — both voluntary and involuntary martyrs, — for the period of eighteen hundred years. Count up the martyrs of the world, and for each martyr of Christ you will find one thousand martyrs of the teaching of the world, whose sufferings were one hundred times more terrible. For the present century alone they figure thirty millions of men killed in wars.

All these are martyrs of the teaching of the world, who needed, not to follow Christ's teaching, but only to refuse to follow the teaching of the world, and they would have been freed from suffering and death.

A man need but do what he wants to, — refuse to go to war, — and he will be sent to dig ditches, and will not be tortured to death at Sevastopol or Plevna. A man need but refuse to believe in the teaching of the world, that it is necessary to put on galoshes and a chain and to have a useless drawing-room, and that it is necessary to do all those foolish things which the teaching of the world demands of him, and he will not know that tantalizing labour, and those sufferings and eternal cares and work without rest and without aim; he will not be deprived of communion with Nature, of his favourite work, of his family, of his health, and will not senselessly die an agonizing death.

We need not be martyrs in the name of Christ, — Christ does not teach this. He teaches us to stop tormenting ourselves in the name of the false teaching of the world.

Christ's teaching has a deep metaphysical meaning; Christ's teaching has a universally human meaning; Christ's teaching has a very simple, clear, practical meaning for the life of each individual man. This meaning may be expressed as follows: Christ teaches people not to do anything foolish. In this consists the very simple, universally accessible meaning of Christ's teaching.

Christ says, Be not angry, consider no one beneath thee, — for it is foolish. If thou shalt be angry, and offend people, it will be worse for thee. Again Christ says, Do not run after women, but come together with one woman, — for that will be better for thee. Again he says, Make no promises to any one about anything, or else they will compel thee to do foolish and criminal things. Again he says, Do not repay evil with evil, or else the

evil will come back to thee as a greater evil than before, like the poised beam above the honey, which kills the bear. And again he says, Do not regard people as strangers, simply because they live in another country and speak another language. If thou shalt consider them enemies, and they shall consider thee an enemy, it will only be worse for thee. And so, do none of these foolish things, and thou wilt be better off.

"Yes," people reply to this, "but the world is so constructed that it is more painful to oppose this order than to live in accordance with it. If a man should decline to do military service, he would be put into prison and perhaps be shot. If a man were not to secure his life by obtaining what is necessary for him and for his family, he and his family would starve."

Thus people speak, trying to defend the structure of the world, but they themselves do not think in this manner. They speak so only because they cannot deny the justice of the teaching of Christ, whom they profess to believe, and they have to justify themselves in some way for not fulfilling this teaching. But they do not think so, and have never thought so. They believe in the teaching of the world, and only use the excuse which the church has taught them, that in fulfilling Christ's teaching it is necessary to suffer much, and so they never even try to carry out Christ's teaching. We see endless sufferings which people endure in the name of the teaching of the world, but we never see in our time any sufferings for the sake of Christ's teaching. Thirty millions have perished in wars for the sake of the teaching of the world; thousands of millions have perished in an agonizing life in the name of the teaching of the world; but no millions, not even thousands, nor dozens, nor even one man is known to me, who died or lived an agonizing life, starving and freezing, for the sake of Christ's teaching. This is only a ridiculous excuse, which proves to what

degree Christ's teaching is unknown to us. Not only do we fail to share it, but we have never taken it seriously. The church has troubled itself to explain to us Christ's teaching in such a way that it presents itself, not as a teaching of life, but as a scarecrow.

Christ calls men to the spring of water, which is here, near them. People are tormented by thirst: they eat mud and drink the blood of one another, but the teachers have told them that they will perish, if they go to the spring to which Christ is calling them. And the people believe them, and are tormented, and die of thirst within two steps of the water, without daring to approach them. But we need only believe Christ, that he brought the good down upon earth, that he gives us, who are thirsty, a spring of living water; we need only come to him, in order that we may see how tricky the deception of the church is and how senseless our sufferings are, while salvation is so near. We need only accept Christ's teaching in a straight and simple manner, in order that we may see clearly the terrible deception in which we all live.

Generation after generation we labour to provide for our life by means of violence and of property security. The happiness of our life presents itself to us as consisting of the greatest possible power and the largest amount of possessions. We are so used to this that Christ's teaching, which says that man's happiness cannot depend on power and possessions and that a rich man cannot be happy, presents itself to us as a demand for a sacrifice in the name of future benefits. But it does not even occur to Christ to demand sacrifices of us; on the contrary, he teaches us not to do what is worse, but to do what is best for us here, in this life. Christ, who loves men, teaches them to refrain from securing their lives by means of violence and of property, even as men, loving their neighbours, teach them to refrain from fighting and getting drunk. He says that, living without offering resistance to

others and without possessions, men will be happier, and this he confirms by his example of life. He says that a man who lives according to his teaching must be prepared to die any moment at the hands of those who offer violence, and from cold and hunger, and cannot count on one hour of his life. And this seems to us to be a terrible demand for some sacrifices; but it is only a confirmation of those conditions under which every man lives inevitably at all times. A disciple of Christ must any minute be prepared for sufferings and death. Is not a disciple of the world in the same state?

We are so used to our deception that everything we do for the supposed security of our life — our armies, our fortresses, our supplies, our garments, our cures, all our property, our money — seems to us to be something real, which seriously secures our life. We forget what is obvious to every one, what happened to him who took it into his head to build granaries in order to secure himself for a long time: he died that very night. Everything we do to make our life secure is precisely what the ostrich does, when it stops to hide its head, in order that it may not see how it is being killed. We do worse than an ostrich: in order doubtfully to provide for a doubtful life in the doubtful future, we certainly ruin our certain life in the certain present.

The deception consists in the fallacious conviction that our life can be made secure by our struggle with other people. We are so accustomed to this deception of this supposed security of our life and of our property that we do not notice what we are losing for the sake of it. And we are losing everything, — our whole life. Our whole life is swallowed by the care of making our life secure and of preparing for it, so that nothing of life is left.

We need but for a moment renounce our habit and look at life from one side, in order that we may see that everything we do for the supposed security of our life we do

not at all do in order to make our life secure, but only in order to forget, while we are busy with it, that life is never secure and cannot be made secure. And we not only deceive ourselves and lose our present life for an imaginary one, but in this striving after security we most frequently lose precisely what we want to make secure. The French armed themselves in the year 1870 in order to make their life secure, and caused the destruction of hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen; the same thing is done by all nations that arm themselves. A rich man makes his life secure by the possession of money, but this same money attracts the robber, who kills him. A suspicious man secures his life by means of a cure, and this very cure kills him slowly, or, if it does not kill him, it certainly deprives him of life, as it did that sick man who had failed to live for thirty-eight years, waiting for the angel at the pool.

Christ's teaching about this, that it is impossible to make life secure, but that one must be ready to die at any moment, is unquestionably better than the teaching of the world about the necessity of making life secure; it is better by this, that the inevitableness of death and the insecurity of life remain the same with either the teaching of the world or that of Christ, but that life itself, according to Christ's teaching, is no longer entirely absorbed without any residue in the idle occupation of an imaginary attempt at securing it: it becomes free, and can be devoted to its one proper aim, — its own good and the good of others.

A disciple of Christ will be poor. Yes, that is, he will always make use of all that good which God has given him. He will not ruin his life. We have expressed by the word "poverty" what is happiness, but the matter itself has not changed from it. When we say he will be poor, we mean that he will not be in the city, but in the country; he will not sleep at home, but will work in

the woods and in the fields, and will see the sunlight, the earth, the sky, the animals; he will not trouble himself with the thought as to what he will eat in order to whet his appetite, and what to do to pass an hour, but will be hungry three times a day; he will not toss on soft pillows and wonder how he may save himself from insomnia, but will sleep; he will have children and will live with them; he will live in free communion with all people, and, above all else, will do nothing he does not like; he will not be afraid of what will become of him. He will be sick, and suffer, and die like all men (better than the rich, if we are to judge from the way the poor suffer and die), but he will live more happily. To be poor, to be a mendicant, to be a vagrant (πτωχός means a vagrant), is precisely what Christ taught, without which it is impossible to enter the kingdom of God, without which it is impossible to be happy here upon earth.

"But no one will feed you, and you will starve," people reply to this. To the retort that, living according to Christ's teaching, a man will starve, Christ replied with one short utterance (which is interpreted as a justification of the idleness of the clergy) (Matt. x. 10, Luke x. 7).

He said, Take no scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, nor yet staves: for the workman is worthy of his meat. And in the same house remain, eating and drinking such things as they give: for the labourer is worthy of his hire.

The labourer is worthy ἄξιός ἐστι, — word for word it means, he can and shall have his meat. This is a very brief utterance, but for him who understands it as Christ understood it there can no longer be any discussion as to this, that a man who has no property will starve. To understand this word in its actual significance, it is necessary first to reject the idea about man's bliss consisting in idleness, which, in consequence of the dogma of redemption, has become so natural to us. It is necessary

to reëstablish that conception, which is characteristic of all uncorrupted people, that it is not idleness, but labour, that forms a necessary condition of man's happiness; that man cannot help but work; that it is hard and tiresome not to work, just as it is hard and tiresome for an ant, a horse, and any animal. It is necessary to forget our wild superstition that the condition of a man who has an inexhaustible dollar, that is, a government position, or the right to some land, or bonds with coupons, which make it possible for him to do nothing, is a natural, happy condition. We must reconstruct in our conception that view of labour which is held by all uncorrupted people, and which was held by Christ, when he said that the labourer was worthy of his meat. Christ could not imagine any people who would look upon work as a curse, and so he could not imagine a man who did not work, or did not want to work. He always takes it for granted that his disciple works. And so he says: If a man works, his labour supports him; and if another man takes this work to himself, he will support the labourer, even because he makes use of the labourer's work. Consequently the labourer will always have his meat. He will have no property, but there can be no question as to his support. The difference between Christ's teaching and that of our world as relating to work consists in this, that, according to the world's teaching, work is man's especial desert, in which he vies with others, and assumes that he has a right to a proportionately better support, the greater his work is; while, according to Christ's teaching, work, labour, is a necessary condition of man's life, and the support is its inevitable consequence. Work produces food, food produces work, — such is the eternal circle: one is a result and a cause of the other. No matter how evil a master may be, he will feed the labourer, even as he feeds the horse which works for him; he will feed the labourer in such a way that he can do as much work as possible,

that is, he will contribute to that which forms man's good.

The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many. According to Christ's teaching every individual man will have the best life, independently of what the world is, if he understands his calling, which is not to demand any work from others, but to devote his own life to work for others, to lay down his life, a ransom for many. A man who acts in this manner, says Christ, is worthy of meat, that is, he cannot help but receive it. With the words, "Man does not live to be worked for, but to work for others," Christ establishes that foundation which unquestionably secures man's material existence; and with the words, "The workman is worthy of his meat," Christ removes that usual objection to the possibility of fulfilling his teaching, which consists in this, that a man who fulfils Christ's teaching, amidst those who do not fulfil it, will perish of hunger and cold. Christ shows that a man secures his sustenance, not by taking it away from others, but by becoming useful and necessary to others. The more necessary he is to others, the more will his existence be made secure.

With the present order of things, people who do not fulfil Christ's laws, but work for their neighbour, though they have no possessions, do not starve. How, then, can one object to Christ's teaching, saying that those who fulfil his teaching, that is, who work for their neighbour, will starve? A man cannot starve so long as the rich have bread. In Russia there are millions of people, at any given moment of time, who live without any possessions, supporting themselves by their work alone.

Among the Gentiles a Christian will be as secure as among Christians. He works for others, consequently he is needed by them, and they will feed him. Even a dog that is needed is fed and taken care of; how, then,

will they not feed and guard a man who is needed by all men?

But a sick man, a man with a family, with children, is not wanted, — he cannot work, — and they will stop feeding him, those will say who are bound to prove the justice of the beastly life. This they will say, this they say now, and they do not see that they themselves who say this would like to act thus, but are unable to do so, and act quite differently. These very people, who do not acknowledge the applicability of Christ's teaching, none the less fulfil it. They all the time feed a sheep, an ox, a dog, which gets sick. They even do not kill an old horse, but give it work to do according to its strength; they feed their family, the lambs, the young pigs, the puppies, in expectation of profit from them; how, then, will they refuse to feed a useful man, when he gets sick, and how will they fail to find appropriate work for the old and the young, and how will they refuse to support people who will be able later on to do some work for them?

Not only will they do so, but they are doing so even now. Nine-tenths of men, the masses, are fed by one-tenth, by the rich and the strong, as though the masses were beasts of burden. And, no matter how dark the delusion in which this one-tenth lives, no matter how much it despises the remaining nine-tenths of people, this one-tenth of the mighty never takes the necessary sustenance away from the nine-tenths, however much they may wish to do so. The rich leave to the poor as much as is necessary for them to multiply and work for the rich. Of late this one-tenth has been working consciously for the purpose of feeding regularly the nine-tenths, that is, in order to get as much work out of them as possible, and to have them multiply and rear new workmen. Even the ants attend to the increase and rearing of their milch-cows, so how can men help doing the same, — attend-

ing to the increase of those who work for them? Workmen are needed, and those who make use of the work will always see to it that these workmen should not decrease in numbers.

The objection to the practicability of Christ's teaching, which is, that if I do not earn anything for myself and do not retain what I earn, no one will feed my family, is just, but only in respect to idle, useless, and, therefore, harmful people, such as are the majority of our rich classes. No one will bring up the idle, unless it be senseless parents, because idle people are of no use to any one, not even to themselves; but even the worst of people will feed and rear working people. Calves are brought up, but a man is a more useful working animal than an ox, and so he has always been valued in the slave market.

This is the reason why the children will never be left without any cares.

Man does not live to have others work for him, but himself to work for others. He who will work will be fed.

These are truths that are confirmed by the life of the whole world.

Wherever man has worked he has always and everywhere received his sustenance, just as a horse receives its feed. The worker has received such a sustenance unwillingly, against his will, for the worker has wished but for this, — to be freed from work, to earn as much as possible, and to sit down on the shoulders of him who is now sitting on his. Such an unwilling worker, an envious and poor labourer, was not left without his sustenance, and has been even happier than the one who has not worked and has lived on the labours of other men. How much more happy will the workman according to Christ's teaching be, if his aim shall consist in doing as much work as possible and in receiving as little as possible for it! And how much more happy still will his situation be, when

around him there will be a few, and perhaps many, like him, who will serve him!

Christ's teaching about work and its fruits is expressed in the narrative of the feeding of five and seven thousand persons with two fishes and five loaves. Humanity will have the highest accessible good on earth, when men will not try to swallow and use up everything for themselves, but will do as Christ taught them at the shore of the sea.

It was necessary to feed thousands of people. One of Christ's disciples told him that he had seen several fishes in the possession of one man; the disciples had also several loaves of bread. Jesus knew that not all the people, who had come from a distance, had brought food with them. (That many had provisions is proved by the fact that all four gospels say that at the end of the feast there were gathered twelve baskets. If none but the boy had had anything, there could not have been twelve baskets in the field.) If Christ had not done what he did, that is, the miracle of feeding thousands with five loaves, there would have happened what is now taking place in the world. Those who had provisions would have eaten up everything, even with an effort, that nothing might be left. The stingy might have carried home anything that was left. Those who had nothing would have remained hungry, and would have looked with malicious envy at those who were eating; some of them might, indeed, have taken away some food by force from those who were provident, and there would have ensued quarrels and fights, and some would have gone home satiated, while others would have been hungry and angry: there would have taken place what happens in our life.

But Christ knew what he wanted to do (as it says in the Gospel); he taught all to sit round about him, and taught his disciples to offer to others what they had, and to tell the others to do likewise. And then it hap-

pened that, when all those who had provisions did what Christ's disciples had done, that is, offered their own food to others, all ate with moderation, and when they went around in the circle, even those who had had nothing at first got something to eat. And all were fed, and much bread was left, so much of it that twelve baskets of it were collected.

Christ teaches men that they must consciously act in this manner in their lives, for such is the law of man and of all humanity. Work is a necessary condition of man's life, and work gives the good to man; consequently the detention from other men of the fruits of one's own or of another's labour interferes with the good of man. The giving up of one's labours to another contributes to the good of man.

"If men do not take away from one another, they will starve," we say. It seems that the very opposite ought to be said: if men take things from one another, there will be people who will starve, as is actually the case.

Every man, no matter how he may live, — whether in accordance with Christ's teaching or with that of the world, — lives only by the work of other men. Other men have guarded him and given him food and drink, and guard and feed him now; but, according to the world's teaching, a man compels others by force and threats to continue to feed him and his family. According to Christ's teaching, a man is just as much taken care of and given food and drink by others; but, in order that other people may continue to guard and feed him, he does not compel any one to do so; he tries himself to serve others and to be useful to all, and thus becomes necessary for all. The people of this world will always desire to stop feeding a useless man who compels them by force to feed him, and with the first opportunity not only stop feeding him, but also kill him as a useless man. But all men, no matter how mean they may be,

will carefully feed and guard him who is working for them.

Which, then, is more correct, more sensible, and more joyful? To live according to the teaching of the world, or according to that of Christ?

XI.

Christ's teaching establishes God's kingdom upon earth. It is not true that the carrying out of this teaching is difficult: it is not only not difficult, but is even inevitable for a man who has become acquainted with it. This teaching gives the one possible salvation from the inevitably imminent danger of the perdition of the personal life. Finally, the fulfilment of this teaching not only does not invite to sufferings and deprivations in this life, but also frees us from nine-tenths of the sufferings which we endure in the name of the teaching of the world.

When I understood this, I asked myself: Why have I not fulfilled this teaching, which gives me what is good, salvation and joy, but have fulfilled something quite different, — that which has made me unhappy? There could be but one answer: I did not know the truth, — it was concealed from me.

When the meaning of Christ's teaching was for the first time revealed to me, I did not think that the elucidation of this meaning would ever bring me to the negation of the church teaching. It only seemed to me that the church had not yet reached those deductions which result from Christ's teaching, but I did not think in the least that the newly revealed meaning of Christ's teaching and its deductions would bring discord between me and the church teaching. I was afraid of it, and so, during my investigations, I not only avoided finding any fault with the church doctrine, but, on the contrary, intentionally shut my eyes to those propositions which seemed

obscure and strange to me, but did not contradict that which I regarded as the essence of the Christian teaching.

But the farther I went in the study of the Gospel, the more clearly was there revealed to me the meaning of Christ's teaching and the more inevitable became for me the choice between Christ's teaching, which was rational, clear, and in harmony with my conscience, and which gave me salvation, and the diametrically opposite teaching, which was not in harmony with my reason and my conscience, and which gave me nothing but the consciousness of my perdition together with all the others. I could not help but reject one after another the tenets of the church. I did this unwillingly, with a struggle, with a desire to soften as much as possible my dissension with the church, to keep from separating from it, from being deprived of the most joyous support in faith, — of my communion with many. But when I finished my work, I saw that, no matter how much I tried to retain as much of the church doctrine as possible, nothing was left of it. Not only was there nothing left, but I convinced myself that nothing could be left.

Just as I was finishing my work the following incident occurred: my young son told me that between two of our servants, uneducated men who could scarcely read, there was going on a dispute in regard to an article in a religious book, in which it said that it was not sinful to kill criminals or to kill in a war. I did not believe it was possible for such a thing to be printed, and so asked for the book. The book under dispute is called "Expository Prayer-book, Third Edition, Eightieth Thousand. Moscow, 1879." On p. 163 of this book it says:

"What is the sixth commandment of God? — Thou shalt not kill. — What does God forbid by this commandment? — He forbids killing, that is, depriving a man of life. — Is it sinful legally to put to death a criminal and to kill an enemy in war? — It is not. A criminal is de-

prived of life in order to put a stop to the great evil which he is doing: the enemy is killed in war, because in a war we fight for our emperor and our country." To these words is limited the explanation of why the commandment of God is put aside. I did not believe my eyes.

The disputants asked for my opinion in the matter of their dispute. I told the one who acknowledged the justice of what was printed, that the explanation was not correct.

"But how do they print incorrectly against the law?" he asked me.

I could not answer him. I kept the book and glanced it through. The book contains: (1) thirty-one prayers with instructions as to genuflexions and the putting together of fingers; (2) an exposition of the Symbol of Faith; (3) unexplained extracts from the fifth chapter of Matthew, which for some reason are called commandments for the attainment of blessedness; (4) the ten commandments of Moses with explanations, which for the most part make them void, and (5) troparia for holidays.

As I have said, I tried not only to avoid judging the ecclesiastic faith, but also to see it from its best side, and so did not hunt for its weak sides; though I well knew its academic literature, I was absolutely unacquainted with its didactic literature. The prayer-book, which was disseminated in such an enormous number of copies as late as 1879, and which called forth the doubts of the simplest kind of men, startled me.

I could not believe that the purely pagan contents of the prayer-book, which had nothing Christian in it, could be a doctrine which the church consciously disseminated among the masses. In order to verify it, I bought all the books published by the Synod, or "under its auspices," which contained brief expositions of the church's faith for children and for the masses and read them all.

Their contents were almost new to me. When I had

studied religion, these books had not yet existed. So far as I remember, there did not exist the commandments of the beatitudes, nor the doctrine that it was not sinful to kill. It does not exist in any of the old Russian Catechisms. It is not to be found in the Catechism of Peter Mogíla, nor in those of Platón, nor in that of Byelyakóv, nor in the short Catholic Catechisms. This innovation was made by Filarét, who also composed a Catechism for the military profession. The Expository Catechism is based on it. The basal book is the "Extensive Christian Catechism of the Orthodox Church for the Use of All Orthodox Christians," published by order of his Imperial Majesty.

The book is divided into three parts: on faith, on hope, and on charity. In the first there is an analysis of the Nicene Symbol of Faith. In the second there is an analysis of the Lord's Prayer and of the eight verses of the fifth chapter of Matthew, which form the introduction to the sermon on the mount and which for some reason are called the commandments for the attainment of blessedness. (These two parts treat of the dogmas of the church, of prayers and sacraments, but there is no teaching about life.) In the third part there is an exposition of the duties of a Christian. In this part, which is entitled "On Charity," there is an exposition of the ten commandments of Moses, and not of the commandments of Christ. The commandments of Moses seem to be expounded merely in order to teach people not to fulfil them and to act in a contrary manner. After each commandment there is a provisory clause which destroys the commandment.

In reference to the first commandment, which enjoins us to worship the one God, the Catechism teaches us to worship angels and saints, not to speak of the Mother of God and the three persons of God (Explan. Cat. pp. 107–108). In reference to the second commandment, — about making no idols, — the Catechism teaches us to worship

the icons (p. 108). In reference to the third commandment, — about swearing in vain, — the Catechism teaches men to swear at every command of the *legal* power (p. iii). In reference to the fourth commandment, — about keeping the Sabbath, — the Catechism teaches us to celebrate the Sunday, and not the Sabbath, and thirteen great and a multitude of minor holidays, and to fast at all fasts, Wednesdays, and Fridays (pp. 112–115). In reference to the fifth commandment, — about honouring father and mother, — the Catechism teaches us "to honour the emperor, the country, the spiritual pastors, *who command in various relations*" (*sic*); and about the honouring of the commanders there are three pages with a list of all kinds of commanders: "commanders in schools, civil commanders, judges, military commanders, masters (*sic*) in relation to those who serve them and whom they own" (*sic*) (pp. 116–119). I am quoting from the Catechism of the year 1864. Twenty years have passed since the abolition of servitude, and no one has taken the trouble even of casting out this phrase which, on the occasion of God's commandment to honour our parents, was introduced into the Catechism for the purpose of supporting and justifying slavery.

In reference to the sixth commandment, thou shalt not kill, — men are taught from the very first lines to kill others.

"Q. What is forbidden in the sixth commandment?

"A. The killing of our neighbour in any manner whatsoever.

"Q. Is every killing a murder against the law?

"A. It is not illegal murder, when the killing is done *as a duty*, such as: (1) when a criminal is *put to death* according to legal process; (2) when an enemy is killed *in a war* waged for the emperor and the country." (The italics are in the original.) And further on:

"Q. What cases may be referred to illegal murder?

"A. . . . when one *conceals or frees* a murderer."

And this is printed and forcibly impressed in hundreds of thousands of copies and under the threat of punishment upon all Russians in the form of a Christian doctrine. The whole Russian nation is taught this. This is taught to all innocent angel-children, whom Christ asks not to have driven away from him, because theirs is the kingdom of God, — those children whom we must resemble in order that we may enter into the kingdom of God, whom we must resemble in order that we may not know it, — those children of whom Christ, defending them, said, Woe unto him that offendeth one of these little ones. And it is these children that are taught by force that this is the one sacred law of God.

These are not proclamations that are secretly distributed at the peril of hard labour, but such that a failure to agree with them is punished by hard labour. As I am writing these words I feel a creeping sensation, because I permit myself to say that it is impossible to change the chief commandment of God, which is written down in all laws and in all hearts, with meaningless words, such as *as a duty, for the emperor and the country,* and that people ought not to be taught this.

Yes, there has happened what Christ warned people against, when he said (Luke xi. 33–36 and Matt. vi. 23): If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!

The light that is in us has become darkness, and the darkness in which we live has become terrible.

Woe unto you, said Christ, woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men: for ye neither go in yourselves, neither suffer ye them that are entering to go in. Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye devour widows' houses, and for a pretence make long prayer: therefore ye are the more guilty. Woe unto you, scribes

and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him worse than he was. Woe unto you, ye blind guides!

Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous, and assume that if ye had lived in the days when the prophets were killed, you would not have been partakers with them in their blood. Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that ye are like them that killed the prophets. Fill ye up then the measure which was begun by those that are like you. And I will send you prophets, and wise men, and scribes: and some of them ye shall kill and crucify; and some of them shall ye scourge in your assemblies and persecute from city to city: that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth from Abel.

All blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men.

This sounds as though it had been written but yesterday against those men who now no longer compass sea and land, blaspheming against the Holy Ghost and guiding people to a faith which makes them worse, but outright force them to receive this faith and persecute and ruin all those prophets and righteous men who try to destroy their deception.

I became convinced that the church doctrine, even though it has called itself Christian, is that same darkness against which Christ fought and commanded his disciples to fight.

Christ's teaching, like every religious teaching, contains two sides: (1) the teaching about the life of men, — how each individually and all together have to live, — the ethical teaching, and (2) an explanation why men must live in this and not that way, — the metaphysical teach-

ing. One is the consequence and at the same time the cause of the other. A man must live thus because such is his destination, or, the destination of man is such, and so he must live accordingly. These two sides of every teaching are to be found in all the religions of the world. Such is the religion of the Brahmins, of Confucius, of Buddha, of Moses, and such also is Christ's religion. It teaches life, how to live, and explains why you must live in this manner and not otherwise.

But what has happened with all the teachings, with Brahmanism, Judaism, Buddhism, has also happened with Christ's teaching. Men depart from the teaching about life, and among the number of men there appear such as undertake to justify this departure. These men, who, according to Christ's expression, seat themselves in Moses' seat, explain the metaphysical side of the teaching in such a way that the ethical demands of the teaching become non-obligatory and give way to external worship, to rites. This phenomenon is common to all religions, but never, it seems to me, has this phenomenon been expressed with such lucidity as in Christianity. It found here such a lucid expression, because Christ's teaching is the most exalted teaching; and it is most exalted, because the metaphysics and the ethics of Christ's teaching are to such a degree inseparably connected and defined by one another that it is impossible to separate one from the other, without depriving the whole teaching of its meaning and also because Christ's teaching is in itself a protestantism, that is, a negation not only of the ritual precepts of Judaism, but also of every external worship; and so this rupture could not help but completely pervert the teaching and deprive it of every sense. And so it happened.

The rupture between the teaching about life and the explanation of life began with the preaching of Paul, who did not know the ethical teaching which is expressed in

the Gospel of Matthew, and who preached a metaphysico-cabalistic theory, which was foreign to Christ; it was fully accomplished in the time of Constantine, when it was found possible to clothe the whole pagan structure of life, without changing it, in Christian garments and then pronounce it Christian.

From the time of Constantine, a pagan of the pagans, whom the church for all his crimes and vices counts among the number of the saints, there begin the councils, and the centre of gravity of Christianity is transferred entirely to the metaphysical side of the teaching. This metaphysical teaching, with its concomitant rites, departs more and more from its fundamental meaning and arrives at what it has arrived at now, at a teaching which explains the mysteries of the heavenly life, which are most inaccessible to the human understanding, and offers the most complicated divine rites, but gives no religious teaching whatever about the earthly life.

All religions, except the Christianity of the churches, demand of those who confess them not only certain rites, but also the execution of certain good acts and the refraining from evil acts. Judaism demands circumcision, the observance of the Saturday, of almsgiving, of the year of the jubilee, and many other things. Mohammedanism demands circumcision, daily fivefold prayers, a tithe for the poor, worshipping before the grave of the prophet, and many other things. The same is true of all other religions. Whether these demands be good or bad, they are demands for acts. Pseudo-Christianity is the only one which demands nothing. There is nothing which a Christian is obliged to do, and nothing from which he is obliged to abstain, unless we consider fasts and prayers, which the church itself regards as not of an obligatory nature. All a pseudo-Christian has to do is to attend to the sacraments; but the sacraments are not performed by the believer himself, but by some one else. A pseudo-Chris-

tian is not obliged to do anything, nor to abstain from anything, in order that he may be saved, for the church performs over him everything necessary: he will be baptized and anointed with chrism, and will receive his communion and extreme unction, and give his confession, even though it be a dumb confession, and will be prayed for, — and he is saved. Since the days of Constantine, the Christian church has demanded no acts from its members; it even never asserted any demands for abstaining from anything. The Christian church has recognized and sanctified everything there was in the pagan world. It has recognized and sanctified divorce, and slavery, and courts, and all those powers which existed before, and wars, and capital punishment, and at baptism has demanded only a verbal renunciation of evil, and that only in the beginning; later, when they began to baptize children, they stopped asking even for that.

The church, which in words recognized Christ's teaching, in life directly denied it.

Instead of guiding the world in its life, the church, to please the world, so interpreted Christ's metaphysical teaching that from it there resulted no demands for life, and thus it did not keep people from living as they had lived. The church made a concession to the world, and, having made this concession to the world, it followed it. The world did everything which it wished, leaving it to the church to keep up with it as best it could in its explanations of the meaning of life. The world arranged its life, which in everything ran counter to Christ's teaching, and the church invented allegories to prove that men, though living contrary to Christ's law, in reality were living in harmony with it; and thus it ended by this, that the world began to live a life which was worse than the pagan life, and the church began not only to justify this life, but also to assert that Christ's teaching consisted in nothing but this.

But there came a time when the light of Christ's true teaching, as it was in the gospels, despite the fact that the church, feeling its unrighteousness, tried to conceal it (by forbidding translations of the Bible), — there came a time when this light through the so-called sectarians, even through the free-thinkers of the world, penetrated among the people, and the incorrectness of the church doctrine became manifest to men, and they began to change their former life, which the church justified, on the basis of this teaching of Christ, which came down to us in spite of the church.

Thus men, in spite of the church, have abolished slavery, which the church had justified, and religious inquisitions, and the power of emperors and popes, which the church sanctifies, and have now begun the next abolition in order, that of property and of states. The church has never asserted itself, and even now cannot assert itself, because the abolition of these injustices of life has taken place on the basis of that very Christian teaching which the church has preached, though trying to pervert it.

The teaching about the life of men has been emancipated from the church, and has established itself independently of it.

The church still possesses the explanations, but the explanations of what? A metaphysical explanation of a teaching has a meaning only when that teaching of life exists which it explains; but the church no longer possesses any explanation of life. It has only an explanation of that life which it once established, and which no longer exists. If the church still has some explanations of that life which existed before, such as the explanations of the Catechism that it is permissible to kill in the exercise of a duty, no one now believes in it. All the church has left now is temples, icons, gold stuffs, and words.

The church has carried the light of the Christian teach-

ing about life through eighteen centuries and, wishing to conceal it in its garments, has burned herself in its flame. The world with its structure, which was sanctified by the church, has rejected the church in the name of those foundations of Christianity which the church has brought through in spite of itself, and is getting along without it. The fact is accomplished, and it is impossible to conceal it. Everything which lives and does not flabbily rankle, not living, but being only in everybody's way, everything which lives in our European world has defected from the church and from all churches and lives its own life independently of the church. Let not people say that this is so in the rotten Western Europe; our Russia, with its millions of rationalistic Christians, both educated and uneducated, who have rejected the church doctrine, shows conclusively that, in the sense of the defection from the church, it is, thank God, more rotten than Europe.

Everything which is alive is independent of the church.

The power of the state is based on tradition, on science, on popular election, on rude force, on anything you please but the church.

Wars and the relations of states among themselves are established on the principle of nationality, equilibrium, on anything you please but the principles of the church.

The institutions of the state directly ignore the church; the idea that the church can be the foundation of the court, of property, is only ridiculous in our time.

Science not only does not coöperate with the church doctrine, but even involuntarily, without wishing it, is in its development always inimical to the church.

Art, which formerly served the church alone, has now departed from it.

Not only has all life been emancipating itself from the church, but this life has no other relation to the church than that of contempt, so long as the church does not

meddle with the affairs of life, and nothing but hatred, the moment the church endeavours to remind it of its former rights. If the form which we call the church still exists, it is so because people are afraid of breaking the vessel which once held such precious contents; only in this way it is possible to explain the present existence of Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and various Protestant churches.

All the churches, the Catholic, the Orthodox, and the Protestant, resemble guards who carefully guard a prisoner who has long ago left the prison and is walking among the guards and even fighting with them. Everything the world now lives by, socialism, communism, politico-economic questions, utilitarianism, the freedom and equality of men and classes of women, all the moral concepts of men, the sanctity of labour, the sanctity of reason, the sciences, the arts, everything which moves the world and appears inimical to the church, — all those parts of the teaching which, without knowing it, the church has brought down together with Christ's teaching, which is concealed by it.

In our time the life of the world proceeds in its own way, quite independently of the teaching of the church. This teaching has remained so far behind that the men of the world no longer hear the voices of the teachers of the church. Indeed, there is nothing to hear, because the church gives explanations only of that structure of life which the world has outgrown, or which no longer exists at all, or which is irrevocably being destroyed.

People were out in a boat and rowing it, while the steersman was at the helm. The people entrusted themselves to the steersman, and he guided them well; but there came a time when another steersman took his place, and he did not steer the boat. The boat moved fast and with ease. At first they did not notice that the new steersman did not steer, and they were glad that the boat moved so easily. But later, when they convinced them-

selves that the new steersman was not needed, they began to laugh at him, and drove him away.

All this would be nothing, but the trouble is that, under the influence of their annoyance with the useless steersman, people have forgotten that it is impossible to know whither one is sailing, if there is no steersman. The same thing has happened with Christian society. The church does not steer, and it is easy to sail, and we have sailed a distance away, and all the successes of science, of which our nineteenth century is so proud, are simply this, that we are sailing without a helm. We are sailing, without knowing whither. We are living, and forming this our life, and absolutely fail to know for what purpose. But it is impossible to sail and row, without knowing whither, and it is impossible to live and form our life, without knowing for what purpose.

If people did nothing themselves, but were by an external force placed in that position in which they are, they would be able to answer the question as to why we are in this position in a very rational manner, by saying: We do not know, but we got into this position, and we are in it. But men create their own position for themselves, for others, and especially for their children, and so you cannot help but answer such questions as: why you collect millions of soldiers and join them yourselves, in order to kill and mutilate one another; why you have wasted enormous human forces, which are expressed in billions, in building up useless and harmful cities; why you establish your toy courts and send men whom you consider criminal from France to Cayenne, from Russia to Siberia, from England to Australia, when you yourselves know that this is senseless; why you abandon your favourite farming occupation, and labour in factories and plants which you dislike; why you educate your children that they may continue this life of which you do not approve; why you do all this. If all these were pleas-

ant occupations, of which you were fond, you would still have to say why you were doing this or that; but when these are terribly difficult occupations, and you do them with an effort and with murmuring, you cannot help wondering why you are doing it all. We either must stop doing all this, or we must answer why we are doing it. Men have never lived without an answer to this question, and they cannot live without it. And men have always had an answer for it.

A Jew lived as he did, that is, he waged war, put people to death, built a temple, arranged all his life this way or that, because all this was prescribed in the law, which, in his conviction, came down from God himself. The same is true of a Hindoo, a Chinaman; the same was the case with a Roman, and is now the case with a Mohammedan; the same was true of a Christian a hundred years ago; the same is true now of the ignorant mass of Christians. To these questions an ignorant Christian now answers as follows: The military, the wars, the courts, the executions, all that exists according to God's law as transmitted to us by the church. The present world is a fallen world. All the evil that exists exists by the will of God, as a punishment for the sins of the world, and so we cannot mend this evil. All we can do is to save our souls by faith, sacraments, prayers, and submission to the will of God as transmitted to us through the church. But the church teaches us that every Christian must without opposition obey the kings, the anointed of the Lord, and the chiefs appointed by them, forcibly defend his own property and that of others, wage war, put to death, and suffer punishments by the will of the powers which are appointed by God.

No matter whether these explanations are good or bad, — to a believing Christian, as to a Jew, a Buddhist, a Mohammedan, they explained all the peculiarities of life, and a man did not renounce reason when he lived accord-

ing to the law which he took to be divine. But now the time has come when only the most ignorant believe in these things, and the number of such men is diminishing with every day and hour. There is no possibility of arresting this motion. All men irrepressibly follow those who are walking in front, and all will arrive where the men of the front are standing. Now the men of the front are standing over an abyss: they are in a terrible condition, — they create their own lives and prepare life for all those who follow them, and find themselves in complete ignorance of why they are doing that which they are doing. Not one cultured leader is now able to give an answer to the direct question: "Why do you live the life you live? Why are you doing all you do?" I have tried to ask hundreds of people, and never have received any direct answer. Instead of a direct answer to a personal question as to why one lives and does so and so, I have always received an answer, not to my question, but to one which I had not put.

A believing Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox, when asked why he lives as he does, that is, contrary to that teaching of Christ which he professes, will always avoid a direct answer and will begin to talk of the lamentable condition of unbelief of our present generation, of bad men who cause this unbelief, and of the significance and the future of the true church. But he does not answer why he himself does not do what his faith commands him to do. Instead of an answer about himself he talks of the general condition of humanity and of the church, as though his own life had no meaning for him and he were occupied only with the salvation of the whole of humanity and with what he calls the church.

A philosopher, no matter to what school he may belong, — whether he be an idealist, spiritualist, pessimist, positivist, — when asked why he lives as he does, that is, out of harmony with his philosophical teaching, will, instead of

answering this question, talk of the progress of humanity, of that historic law of this progress which he has found and by which humanity strives after the good. But he will never give a direct answer to the question why he himself does not do in his life what he considers rational. A philosopher, like a believer, does not seem to be occupied with his own personal life, but only with the observation of the universal laws of humanity.

The average man, the vast majority of half-believing, half-unbelieving cultured men, of those who always, without exception, complain of their life and of the whole structure of our life, and foresee the ruin of everything, when asked why he lives this life which he condemns, and does nothing to improve it, will, instead of giving a direct answer, always begin to talk, not of himself, but of some general topic, — of justice, of commerce, of the state, of civilization. If he is a policeman or a prosecuting attorney, he will say, "How will the affairs of the government proceed, if, to improve my life, I shall stop taking part in it?" "And how about commerce?" he will say if he is a business man. "How about civilization, if I shall not take part in it, in order to improve my life?" He will always say so, as though the problem of his life did not consist in doing that good toward which he always strives, but in serving his country, or commerce, or civilization. The average man answers precisely like the believer or philosopher. In place of a personal question he puts a general one, and all three put it because they have no answer whatever to the personal question of life, because they have absolutely no real teaching about life, and they feel ashamed.

He feels ashamed, because he feels himself in the humiliating position of a man who has no teaching about life, whereas no man has ever lived, or ever can live, without it. Only in our Christian world the teaching about life and the explanations why life should be such

and no other, that is, religion, have given place to the mere explanation as to why life ought to be such as it has been before, and religion has come to mean something which no one wants; but life itself has become independent of every teaching, that is, without any definition.

More than this: as is always the case, science has acknowledged precisely this accidental, monstrous condition of our society to be the law of all humanity. Savants, Tiele, Spencer, and others, most seriously treat of religion, understanding by it the metaphysical doctrines of the beginning of everything, without suspecting that they are not speaking of religion as a whole, but only of parts of it.

This has led to the remarkable phenomenon that in our day we see clever and learned men who are most naïvely convinced that they are free from all religion, merely because they do not acknowledge the metaphysical explanations of the beginning of everything, which at one time served somebody as an explanation of life. It does not occur to them that they must live somehow and that they do live somehow, and that that, on the basis of which they live one way, and not another, is religion. These people are convinced that they have very exalted convictions and no religion. But, no matter what their conversations may be, they have faith, so long as they do some rational acts, because all rational acts are determined by faith. Now the acts of these men are determined by the faith that they must always do only what they are commanded to do. The religion of men who do not acknowledge religion is a religion of submission to everything which the vast majority does, that is, more briefly, the religion of obedience to the existing power.

It is possible to live according to the teaching of the world, that is, an animal life, without acknowledging anything higher and more obligatory than the prescriptions of the existing power. But he who lives in this manner cannot affirm that he lives rationally. Before affirming that

we live rationally we must answer the question as to what teaching about life we consider rational. We unfortunate people not only have no such teaching, but we have even lost the consciousness of the necessity of any rational teaching of life.

Ask the people of our time, both believers and unbelievers, what teaching they follow in life. They will have to confess that they follow the one teaching, the laws which are written by the officials of the Second Division or the legislative assemblies, and which are put in execution by the police. This is the only teaching which our European people acknowledge. They know that this teaching is not from heaven, not from the prophets, and not from wise men; they constantly condemn the decrees of these officials or legislative assemblies, but none the less acknowledge this teaching and obey its executors, the police, and obey them without opposition in its most terrible demands. The officials or assemblies write a law that every young man must be prepared to insult, suffer death, and kill others, and all fathers and mothers who have reared sons hasten to obey such a law, which was written but yesterday by a venal official and which to-morrow may be abolished.

The conception of a law as unquestionably rational and from the inner consciousness obligatory for all is to such a degree lost in our society, that the existence of a law, as held by the Jewish nation, which determines all their life, of a law which is obligatory, not from compulsion, but from the inner consciousness of each, is considered an exclusive property of the Jewish nation alone. The fact that the Jews obeyed only what in the depth of their souls they regarded as an indisputable truth which was received directly from God, that is, what was in conformity with their conscience, is considered a peculiarity of the Jews. But they consider that condition normal and proper for an educated man, which demands his obe-

dience to what is admittedly written by despised men and is carried into execution by a policeman with a pistol, although each of them, or at least the majority of these men, considers it irregular, that is, contrary to his conscience.

I have looked in vain in our civilized world for some clearly expressed bases of life. There are none. There does not even exist the consciousness of their being necessary. There exists, on the contrary, a strange conviction that they are useless; that religion is nothing but a series of words about the future life, about God, and a series of rites, which, in the opinion of some, are very useful for the salvation of the soul and, in the opinion of others, quite useless; that life goes on of itself, and that no bases and no rules are wanted for it: all that is necessary is to do what one is commanded to do. Of that which forms the essence of faith, that is, the teaching of life and the explanation of its meaning, — the first is considered of no importance and not belonging to faith, and the second, that is, the explanation of a former life, or the discussions and divinations about the historical progress of life, is considered most important and serious. In everything which forms man's life, — how to live, whether one should go out to kill people, or not, whether to go and judge people, or not, whether to educate children in one way rather than in another, — men of our world unflinchingly entrust themselves to other men, who, like themselves, do not know why they live or why they cause others to live thus and not thus.

And such a life men regard as rational, and they are not ashamed of it!

The discord between the explanation of faith, which is called religion, and faith itself, which is called the social, political life, has now reached its highest degree, and the whole civilized majority of men are left for life with nothing but the faith in the policeman and the gendarme.

This state would be terrible, if it were absolutely such. But, fortunately, there are men in our day, the best men of our day, who are not satisfied with such a faith, and who have their own faith as to how men ought to live.

These people are considered very harmful, dangerous, and, above all, unbelieving, and yet these are the only believers of our time, not merely believers in general, but more particularly believers in Christ's teaching, if not in the whole teaching, at least in a small part of it.

These men frequently do not know Christ's teaching at all and do not understand it, and frequently, like their enemies, do not accept the chief basis of Christ's faith, the non-resistance to evil, and often even hate Christ; but their whole faith as to what life ought to be is based on Christ's teaching. No matter how these men may be persecuted, no matter how much they may be maligned, they are the only men who do not submit without a murmur to everything that is demanded of them, and so they are the only men of our time who do not live an animal, but a rational life, — the only true believers.

The thread which unites the world with the church that gave a meaning to the world became weaker and weaker in proportion as the contents, the sap of life, infiltrated more and more into the world. Now that the sap is all infiltrated, the connecting thread has become a mere impediment.

It is the mysterious process of birth, and it takes place in our full sight. At one and the same time the last tie with the church is broken, and the independent process of life is established.

The teaching of the church, with its dogmas, its councils, its hierarchy, is indisputably connected with Christ's teaching. This connection is as manifest as the connection of the new-born fœtus with the mother's womb. But, as the umbilical cord and the placenta after birth

become useless pieces of flesh, which, out of respect for what was contained in them, must carefully be buried in the ground, so the church has become a useless, obsolete organ, which, out of respect for what it once was, ought to be put out of sight. The moment respiration and the circulation of the blood are established, the connection, which before was a source of nutrition, has become an impediment, and senseless are the efforts to retain this connection and to compel the child that has come out into the world to receive its nutriment through the umbilical cord, and not through the mouth and lungs.

But the liberation of the babe from the mother's womb is not yet life. The babe's life depends on the establishment of a new connection of nutrition with the mother. The same thing must happen with our Christian world. Christ's teaching has carried our world and has given it birth. The church — one of the organs of Christ's teaching — has done its work, and is now useless, and an impediment. The world cannot be guided by the church, but the liberation of the world from the church is not yet life. Its life will ensue when it shall recognize its impotence and shall feel the necessity for a new way of nutrition. It is this that must take place in our Christian world; it has to start crying from the consciousness of its helplessness, and only the consciousness of its helplessness, the consciousness of the impossibility of the former nutrition and of the impossibility of any other nutrition than the mother's milk, will bring it to the mother's breast, which is swollen with milk.

With our externally so self-confident, bold, determined, and in the depth of its consciousness so frightened and confused, European world there is taking place the same that happens with a new-born babe: it tosses about, stretches, cries, pushes, as though it were angry, and cannot understand what it should do. It feels that the

source of its former nutrition has gone dry, but does not yet know where to look for a new one.

A newly born lamb rolls its eyes and turns its ears, and shakes its tail, and jumps about, and kicks. From its determined movements we judge that it knows everything, but the poor little animal knows nothing. All this determination and energy is the fruit of the mother's fluids, the transmission of which has just come to an end and can no longer be renewed. It is in a blessed and at the same time desperate state. It is full of freshness and vigour; but it will perish if it does not take hold of its mother's teats.

The same thing is happening in our European world. See what complicated, what apparently rational, what energetic life is boiling in the European world. It is as though all men knew everything they do and why they do it all. See with what determination, with what youthful strength, the men of our world do all which they do. The arts, the sciences, the industry, the social and the political activities, — everything is full of life. But all this is alive only because but lately it fed on the mother's fluids through the umbilical cord. There was the church which transmitted the rational teaching of Christ to the life of the world. Every phenomenon of the world was fed and strengthened by it. But the church has done its work, and has dried up. All the organs of the world are alive; the source of its former nutrition is stopped, and they have not yet found a new one; they are looking for it everywhere except with the mother, from whom they have just been liberated. Like a lamb, they are still making use of their former nutriment, but they have not yet reached a point where they can understand that this food is in the mother alone, but that it can be transmitted to them only in a different way from what it was before.

The work which the world has now to do is to understand that the process of the former unconscious nutrition

has been outlived and that a new, conscious process of nutrition is wanted.

This new process consists in consciously accepting those truths of the Christian teaching which formerly were infiltrated in humanity through the organ of the church and by which even now humanity lives. Men must again raise up the light by which they lived, but which has been concealed from them, and place it high before themselves and before others, and consciously live by this light.

Christ's teaching, as a religion which defines life and gives an explanation of the life of men, stands now as it stood before men eighteen hundred years ago. But formerly the world possessed the explanations of the church, which, while shielding the teaching from it, none the less seemed sufficient for its old life, whereas now the time has come when the church has revived, and the world has no explanations for its new life and cannot help but feel its helplessness, and so cannot help but receive Christ's teaching.

Christ teaches above everything else that men must believe in the light, while the light is in them. Christ teaches men to place this light of reason higher than anything else and to live in accordance with it, without doing what they themselves regard as senseless. If you consider it irrational to go out to kill the Turks or the Germans, — do not go; if you consider it irrational forcibly to deprive poor people of the result of their labour, in order to don a silk hat, or lace yourself in a corset, or fix up a drawing-room, which only embarrasses you, — do not do it; if you consider it irrational to imprison those who are corrupted by idleness and harmful company, that is, to put them where the company is most harmful and the idleness most complete, — do not do it; if you consider it irrational to live in the infected air of the cities, when it is possible for you to live in the open, do not do it; if you consider it irrational to teach the children first of all and more

than anything else the grammars of the dead languages, do not do it. Do not do what our European world is doing now: living and not considering life rational, working and not considering the works rational, not believing in one's own reason, not living in accordance with it.

Christ's teaching is the light. The light shineth, and the darkness comprehendeth it not. It is impossible not to receive the light when it shines. It is impossible to dispute with it, impossible not to agree with it. It is impossible not to agree with Christ's teaching, because it comprehends all errors, in which men live, and does not come in contact with them, but penetrates them all like the ether, of which the physicists speak. Christ's teaching is equally inevitable for every man of our world, no matter what his position may be. Christ's teaching cannot fail to be accepted by men, not because it is impossible to deny that metaphysical explanation which it gives (everything can be denied), but because it alone gives those rules of life without which humanity has not lived and cannot live, and not one man has lived or can live, if he wants to live like a man, that is, a rational life.

The force of Christ's teaching is not in its explanation of the meaning of life, but in what results from it, — in the teaching about life. Christ's metaphysical teaching is not new. It is still the same teaching of humanity which is written in the hearts of men, and which all the true sages of the world have professed. But the force of Christ's teaching is in the application of this metaphysical teaching to life.

The metaphysical foundation of the ancient teaching of the Jews and of Christ is one and the same, — the love of God and of our neighbour. But, for the application of this teaching to life according to Moses, as the Jews understood it, there was demanded the fulfilment of 613 commandments, which often are senseless and cruel, and all of which are based on the authority of the Scripture.

Christ's teaching about life, which results from the same metaphysical basis, is expressed in five commandments, which are rational and good, and bear in themselves their meaning and their justification, and comprehend the whole life of men.

Christ's teaching cannot help but be accepted by all believing Jews, Buddhists, Mohammedans, and others, who may have any doubts as to the truth of their own law; still less can it be rejected by those people of our Christian world who now have no moral law whatever.

Christ's teaching has no quarrel with the men of our world about their conception of the world; it agrees with them in advance and, including their conception in itself, gives them what they lack, what they need, and what they are looking for: it gives them the path of life, and at that not a new one, but one they have long known and which is familiar to them.

You are a believing Christian of some sect or creed. You believe in the creation of the world, in the Trinity, in the fall and redemption of man, in the sacraments, in prayers, and in the church. Christ's teaching not only does not quarrel with you, but even fully agrees with your world conception; it only gives you what you lack. While preserving your present faith, you feel that the life of the world and your own life are full of evil, and you do not know how to avoid it. Christ's teaching (which is obligatory for you, because it is the teaching of your God) gives you simple, practicable rules of life, which will free you and other people from the evil which torments you. Believe in the resurrection, in Paradise, in hell, in the Pope, in the church, in the sacraments, in redemption; pray, as your faith demands of you, go to communion, sing psalms, — all that does not hinder you from fulfilling what was revealed by Christ for your good: be not angry, commit no debauch, do not swear, do not defend yourself by force, wage no war.

It may be that you will not fulfil some one of these rules, and will be carried away, and you will break one of these, even as you now, in moments of infatuation, break the rules of your faith, the rules of civil law, or the laws of decency. Even so you will, perhaps, in moments of infatuation depart from Christ's rules; but in calm minutes you must not do what you are doing now, — do not arrange life in such a way that it is hard not to be angry, not to commit debauch, not to swear, not to defend yourself, not to wage war, but in such a way that it will be hard to do this. You cannot help but acknowledge this, because God has ordered you to do so.

You are an unbelieving philosopher of some school or other. You say that everything in the world takes place according to a law which you have discovered. Christ's teaching does not quarrel with you and recognizes in full the law which you have discovered. But despite this law of yours, according to which the good which you wish and have prepared for humanity will come to pass in a thousand years, there is also your personal life, which you can live either in conformity with reason, or contrary to it; but for your personal life you now have no rules but those which are written by men you do not respect and which are executed by policemen. Christ's teaching gives you rules which certainly agree with your law, because your law of altruism or of the one will is nothing but another paraphrase of the same teaching of Christ.

You are an average man, half believing, half not believing, who have no time to reflect on the meaning of human life, and you have no definite world conception: you do everything which everybody else does, Christ's teaching does not quarrel with you. It says: very well, you are not able to reflect, or to believe in the truth of the teaching which is imparted to you: it is easier for you to do precisely as everybody else does; but, no matter how modest you may be, you none the less feel in yourself that

inward judge who at times approves of your deeds, which are in harmony with everybody, and at times does not approve of them. No matter how modest your lot may be, you have to reflect, and to ask yourself whether you should act like everybody else, or in your own way. Precisely in such cases, that is, when the necessity arises for you to solve such a question, Christ's rules will stand out before you in all their force. These rules will certainly give you an answer to your question, because they comprehend your whole life, and they will answer you in conformity with your reason and your conscience. If you are nearer to faith than to unbelief, you, by acting in this manner, will act according to God's will; if you are nearer to free thought, you, by acting in this manner, act according to the most sensible rules that exist in the world, of which you will convince yourself, because Christ's rules bear in themselves their meaning and their justification.

Christ said (John xii. 31), Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out.

Again he said (John xvi. 33), These things I have spoken unto you, that in me ye might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world.

Indeed, the world, that is, the evil of the world, is vanquished.

If there still exists a world of evil, it exists only as something dead, it lives only by inertia: it no longer has the foundations of life. It does not exist for him who believes in Christ's commandments. It is vanquished in the rational consciousness of the son of man. A train at full speed, though with steam shut off, will continue running forward in a straight direction, but all the rational work has for some time been going on for the opposite direction.

For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world:

and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith (1 John v. 4).

The faith which is overcoming the world is the faith in Christ's teaching.

XII.

I BELIEVE in Christ's teaching, and my faith consists in the following:

I believe that my good is possible on earth only when all people will fulfil Christ's teaching.

I believe that the fulfilment of this teaching is possible, easy, and joyful.

I believe that even so long as the teaching is not being fulfilled, and I am one among all the unbelievers, I still can do nothing for the salvation of my life from inevitable perdition but fulfil this teaching, even as he can do nothing else who in a burning house has found a door of salvation.

I believe that my life according to the teaching of the world has been agonizing, and that only the life according to Christ's teaching gives me the good which the Father of life has intended for me.

I believe that this teaching gives the good to the whole of humanity, saves me from inevitable perdition, and gives me here the greatest good, and so I cannot help but fulfil it.

The law was given by Moses, but the good and truth through Jesus Christ (John i. 17). Christ's teaching is the good and truth. Formerly, when I did not know the truth, I did not know even the good. Taking the evil to be the good, I fell into this evil and doubted the legality of my striving after the good; but now I understand and believe that the good after which I strive is the will of the Father and the most legitimate essence of my life.

Christ told me, Live for the good, but do not believe

those traps, those temptations (*σκάνδαλον*), which, enticing you by the semblance of the good, deprive you of the good and inveigle you into evil. Your good is your union with all men, the evil is a violation of the union with the son of man. Do not deprive yourself of the good which is given you.

Christ has shown me that the union with the son of man, the love of men among themselves, is not, as I used to think, an aim toward which men must strive, but that this union, this love of men among themselves, is their natural condition, the one in which, according to his words, children are born, and the one in which all men live until this condition is impaired by deceit, error, and offences.

But Christ has not only shown me this: he has clearly, without the possibility of an error, counted out to me in his commandments all the offences, without an exception, which have deprived me of this natural condition of unity, love, and the good, and which have inveigled me into evil. Christ's commandments give me a means for saving myself from the temptations which have deprived me of my good, and so I cannot help but believe in these commandments.

The good of life was given to me, and I myself ruined it. Christ by his commandments has shown me those temptations by which I am ruining my good, and so I cannot do that which ruins my good. In this, and in this alone, does my faith consist.

Christ has shown me that the first offence which ruins my good is my enmity with men, my anger at them. I cannot help believing it, and so can no longer consciously be inimical toward other people; I can no longer, as I used to do, be glad of my anger, pride myself on it, fan and justify it by acknowledging myself to be important and clever, and other people insignificant, lost, and senseless; I can no longer, at the first suggestion of my submitting to anger, fail to acknowledge myself guilty and

try to make peace with those who are inimical toward me.

But this is not enough. If now I know that my anger is an unnatural, harmful, morbid condition for me, I also know what offence has brought me to it. This offence consisted in this, that I separated myself from other people, recognizing but a few of them as my equals, and all others as insignificant, not men (*ρακά*), or stupid and uneducated (senseless). Now I see that this separating myself from other men and recognizing others as "raca" and senseless has been the chief cause of my enmity with men. As I recall my former life, I now see that I never permitted my hostile feeling to be fanned against those men whom I considered above myself, and that I never offended them; but, on the other hand, the slightest disagreeable action of a man whom I considered below me provoked my anger at him and my indignation, and the higher I considered myself above such a man, the more easily did I offend him; at times a mere imagined baseness of a man's position provoked my desire to offend him. Now I understand that only he will stand higher than other men who will humble himself before others, who will be a servant of all men. Now I understand why that which is high before men is an abomination before God, and why it is woe to the rich and the glorified, and why the poor and the humble are blessed.

Only now do I understand it and believe in it, and my faith has changed my whole valuation of what is good and high, bad and low in life. Everything which heretofore had appeared good and high to me, — honours, glory, culture, riches, the complexity and refinement of life, of the appointments, the food, the apparel, the external ways, — all this became low and bad for me, and the peasant existence, the ingloriousness, poverty, coarseness, simplicity of the surroundings, of the food, the apparel, and ways, — all this became good and high for me. And so,

although even now, when I know this, I may in moments of forgetfulness abandon myself to anger and offend my brother, I can no longer in my calm mood serve this offence, which, raising me above other men, deprived me of my true good, — of union and love, — even as a man cannot lay a trap for himself, if he fell into it before and came very near perishing through it. Now I can no longer coöperate with what externally raises me above other men, and separates me from them; I cannot, as I used to do before, in my own case, nor in that of any other person, acknowledge any distinctions, ranks, and honours, except the name and dignity of man; I cannot seek glory and praise; I cannot seek any knowledge which would separate me from the rest; I cannot help but try to free myself from my wealth, which separates me from men; I cannot help but in my life, in its circumstance, in food, in apparel, in external ways, look for everything which unites me with the majority of men, and does not separate me from them.

Christ has shown me that another offence which ruins my good is the lust of fornication, that is the lust for another woman than the one with whom I came together. I cannot help but believe this, and so I cannot, as I used to do before, acknowledge the lust of fornication as a natural and exalted quality of man; I cannot justify it to myself by my love of beauty, by infatuation, or by defects in my wife; even at the first suggestion of submitting to the lust of fornication I cannot help but acknowledge myself in a morbid and unnatural condition, and search for every means which could liberate me from this evil.

Now that I know that the lust of fornication is an evil for me, I know also the offence which formerly used to lead me into it, and so I can no longer serve it. I know now that the chief cause of the offence does not lie in the fact that men cannot abstain from fornication, but

in the fact that the majority of men and of women have been abandoned by those with whom they have come together at first. Now I know that every abandonment of a man or a woman after they have come together for the first time is that very divorce which is forbidden by Christ, because husbands and wives who are abandoned by their mates bring all debauch into the world.

Recalling what it was that led me to commit fornication, I now see that, besides that savage education, which caused the lust of fornication to be fanned in me physically and mentally, and caused me to justify it with all the cunning of reason, the chief offence which caught me consisted in my abandoning the woman with whom I had come together for the first time, and in the condition of the abandoned women, who surrounded me on all sides. Now I see that the chief force of the offence was not in my lust, but in the ungratified state of my lust and of the lust of those abandoned women who surrounded me on all sides. Now I understand Christ's words. In the beginning God created woman and man so that the two should be one, and therefore man cannot and must not sever what God has united. Now I understand that monogamy is a natural law of humanity, which cannot be violated. Now I fully appreciate the words about this, that he who is divorced from his wife, that is, from the woman with whom he came together for the first time, in order to take up another, causes her to commit debauch, and introduces against himself a new evil into the world.

I believe in this, and this faith changes all my former valuation of what is good and high, bad and low in life. What formerly used to appear to me as very good, — the refined and elegant life, the passionate and poetic love, which is extolled by all poets and artists, — all this appeared bad and disgusting to me. On the contrary, what appeared to me as good was this, — a coarse, scant life of labour, which moderates lust; what appeared to me

exalted and important was not so much the human institution of marriage, which imposed the external stamp of legality on a certain union of a man and a woman, as the union of any man with any woman, which, having once been accomplished, can no longer be violated without violating the will of God. If I even now, in a minute of forgetfulness, can fall a prey to the lust of fornication, I, knowing the offence which has led me into this evil, can no longer serve it, as I did before.

I cannot wish and seek that physical idleness and fat living which fanned in me inordinate lust; I cannot seek those amusements which fanned the amatory lust in me, such as novels, verses, music, theatres, balls, which formerly appeared to me not only harmless, but even as amusements of a very high order; I cannot abandon my wife, knowing that the abandonment of her is the first trap for me, for her, and for others; I cannot contribute to the idle and fat living of other men, and cannot take part in and arrange those lustful amusements — novels, theatres, operas, balls, and so forth — which serve as a trap for me and for other people; I cannot encourage the celibate life of those who are ripe for marriage; I cannot take part in the separation of husband and wife; I cannot make any distinctions between cohabitations which are called marriages and those which are not called so; I cannot help but regard as holy and obligatory that marital union in which a man happens to be.

Christ has revealed to me that a third offence which is ruining my good is the offence of swearing. I cannot help but believe this, and so I can no longer, as I used to do, promise a person anything under oath, and I can no longer, as I used to do, justify myself in my oath by saying that there is nothing bad in it for people; that all men do so; that it is necessary for the state; that I or others will fare worse if we decline to comply with this demand.

Now I know that this is an evil for me and for men, and I cannot do it.

This is not all; now I know also the offence which inveigled me into this evil, and I can no longer serve it. I know that the offence consists in this, that the deception is sanctified in the name of God. Now the deception consists in this, that men promise in advance that they will obey the command of a man or of a set of men, though a man can never obey any one but God. Now I know that the most terrible evil of the world, so far as its consequences are concerned, — murder in wars, incarcerations, capital punishments, tortures of men, — is committed only thanks to this offence in the name of which the responsibility is taken away from the people who commit the wrong. As I now recall many an evil which used to cause my condemnation and dislike of people, I now see that it was all called forth by an oath, by the recognition of the necessity of submitting oneself to the will of other people. Now I understand the meaning of the words, Everything which is above the simple affirmation or denial, above "yes" and "no," every promise given in advance, is an evil.

Understanding this, I believe that the oath ruins my good and the good of other men; and my faith changes the valuation of what is good and bad, high and low. Everything which heretofore has seemed good and high, — the obligation of loyalty to a government, which is confirmed by an oath, the extortion of this oath from men, and all acts which are contrary to conscience and are performed in the name of this oath, — all this now appears bad and low to me. And so I can no longer recede from Christ's commandment, which forbids swearing; I can no longer swear to another, nor cause others to swear, nor in any way be instrumental in this, that men should swear or cause others to swear, and should consider the oath important and necessary, or even not harmful, as many think.

Christ has revealed to me that a fourth offence which deprives me of my good is the resistance to evil by offering violence to other people. I cannot help but believe that this is an evil for me and for other people, and so I cannot consciously do it, and I cannot, as I used to do before, justify this evil by saying that it is necessary for my defence and for the defence of other people, for the defence of my property and for that of other people; at the first suggestion that I am offering violence I can no longer help renouncing and stopping it.

But I not only know this, I now know also the offence which has brought me to this evil. Now I know that this offence consists in the delusion that my life can be made secure by defending myself and my property against other people. Now I know that a great part of mens' evil is due to this, that, instead of giving their labour to others, they not only do not give it, but even deprive themselves of all labour and forcibly take away the labour of others. As I now recall all the evil which I did to myself and to others, and all the evil which others did, I see that a great part of the evil is due to this, that we considered it possible by means of defence to secure and improve our life. Now I understand also these words, Man is not born to be worked for, but to work for others, and the meaning of the words, The workman is worthy of his meat. Now I believe that my good and the good of others is possible only when each will work, not for himself, but for another, and not only will not keep his labour from another, but will give it to every one who needs it.

This faith changed my valuation of what is good and high, bad and low. Everything which heretofore had seemed to me good and high, — wealth, property of every kind, honour, the consciousness of one's own dignity, rights, — everything now became bad and low; and everything which had seemed to me to be bad and low, —

working for others, poverty, humiliation, renunciation of all property and of all rights, — became good and high in my eyes. If in a moment of forgetfulness I can still be carried away to exercise force in order to defend myself and others, or my property and that of others, I can no longer calmly and conscientiously serve that offence which ruins me and others, —I cannot acquire possessions; I cannot exercise any violence against any man whatsoever, unless it be a child, and in his case only in order to save him from an imminent evil; I cannot take part in any activity of power, which has for its aim the protection of men and of their property by the exercise of violence; I cannot be a judge, or a participant in any court, or a chief, or a participant in any official capacity; nor can I contribute to this, that others should take part in courts and offices.

Christ has revealed to me that a fifth offence which deprives me of my good is the division which we make between our own nation and another. I cannot help but believe in this, and so, if in a minute of forgetfulness there may arise in me a hostile feeling toward a man of another nation, I cannot help, in a calm moment, but recognize this sentiment as false; I cannot justify myself, as I used to do before, by recognizing the superiority of my nation over another, and by the delusions, cruelty, or barbarism of another nation; at the first reminder of it I cannot help but try to be more friendly to a man of another nation than to a countryman of mine.

But I not only know now that my separation from other nations is an evil which ruins my good, I know also the offence which has led me into this evil, and I can no longer, as I used to before, serve it calmly and consciously. I know that this offence consists in the delusion that my good is connected only with the good of my nation and not with the good of the whole world. Now I know that my union with other men cannot be impaired by a bor-

der line and by governmental decisions as to my belonging to this nation or to that. Now I know that all men are everywhere equal and brothers.

As I now recall the evil which I did, experienced, and saw in consequence of the enmity of nations, it is clear to me that the cause of everything was the gross deception called patriotism and love of country. As I recall my education, I now see that the feeling of enmity with other nations, the feeling of separation from them, never existed in me, and that all these evil sentiments were artificially inoculated in me by a senseless education. I now understand the meaning of the words, Do good to your enemies; do to them what you would do to your own people. You are all the children of one Father, and be like your Father, that is, make no division between your nation and another, — be alike to all. Now I understand that the good is possible for me only when I recognize the union with all men of the world without any exception.

I believe in this, and this faith has changed my whole valuation of what is good and bad, high and low. What before presented itself to me as good and high, — the love of country, of my nation, of my government, the serving of them to the disadvantage of the good of other people, the military exploits of men, — all this appeared disgusting and miserable to me. Everything which had seemed bad and disgraceful, — renunciation of one's own country, cosmopolitanism, — now, on the contrary, seemed good and high to me. If now, in a minute of forgetfulness, I may coöperate more with a Russian than with a foreigner, and wish success to the Russian empire or nation, I can no longer, in a calm minute, serve the offence which ruins me and other people. I cannot acknowledge any countries or nations, I cannot participate in any disputes between nations and countries, neither by my writings, nor, indeed, by serving any country. I cannot take part in all those affairs which are based on the distinction of countries,—

neither in custom-houses and collections of taxes, nor in the preparation of projectiles or ordnance, nor in any activity of arming, nor in military service, nor, indeed, in any war itself with other nations, — and I cannot contribute to this, that men should do so.

I understand wherein my good consists, I believe in it, and so I cannot do what unquestionably deprives me of my good.

But I not only believe in this, that I must live so, — I believe that if I live so my life will receive the only possible rational, joyous meaning which is not destroyed by death.

I believe that the rational life — my light — is given me for no other purpose than that I may shine before men, not with words, but with good deeds, in order that men may glorify the Father (Matt. v. 16). I believe that my life and my knowledge of the truth is the talent given me to work on, and that this talent is the fire which is a fire only when it burns. I believe that I am Nineveh in relation to other Jonahs, from whom I have learned the truth, and that I am also Jonah in relation to other Ninevites, to whom I must transmit the truth. I believe that the only meaning of my life consists in living in the light which is within me, and in not putting it under a bushel, but holding it high before all men, so that all men may see it. And this faith gives me new strength in the execution of Christ's teaching, and destroys all those obstacles which formerly stood before me.

What formerly vitiated in me the truth and practicableness of Christ's teaching, what repelled me from it, — the possibility of deprivations, sufferings, and death at the hands of people who did not know Christ's teaching, — now confirmed for me the truth of the teaching and led me to it.

Christ said, When you raise up the son of man, you will all of you be attracted to me, and I felt that I was

irrepressibly attracted to him. He also said, The truth will free you, and I felt myself absolutely free.

An enemy will come to make war, or simply bad people will attack me, I used to think, and if I shall not defend myself, they will rob us, and will disgrace, torture, and kill me and my neighbours, and that seemed terrible to me; but now everything which formerly used to trouble me appeared to me joyful and confirmed the truth. Now I know that the enemies and so-called malefactors and robbers are all men, just such sons of man as I am; that they love the good and hate the evil just like me, and that like me they seek salvation and will find it only in Christ's teaching. Every evil which they will do me will be an evil for themselves as well, and so they must do me good. But if the truth is not known to them and they do evil, considering it good, then I know the truth for the very purpose that I may show it to those who do not know it; but I cannot show it to them otherwise than by renouncing participation in the evil, and by confessing the truth through deeds.

The enemies will come, — Germans, Turks, savages, — and if we shall not fight, they will kill us all. That is not true. If there existed a society of Christians who did no wrong to any one, and who gave the whole surplus of their labour to other people, no enemies, — neither Germans, nor Turks, nor savages, — would kill or torture such people. They would take everything which these would give them anyway, since they know no distinction between a Russian, a German, a Turk, and a savage. But if Christians find themselves amidst a non-Christian society, which defends itself by means of war, there appears here for the Christian the possibility of aiding the men who do not know the truth. A Christian knows the truth for the very reason that he may bear witness to it before those who do not know it; but he cannot bear witness to it in any other way than by acts, and his acts consist in

renouncing war and doing good to people, without the distinction between so-called enemies and his own people.

But it is not the enemies, but evil men from among his neighbours, who will attack the Christian's family, and if he does not defend himself, they will rob, torture, and kill him and his family. That again is not true. If all the members of the family are Christians, and so put all their lives in the service of others, there will not be found a man so senseless as to deprive of sustenance or kill the people who serve him. Miklúkho-Makláy settled among the most beastly of savages, as they say, and the savages not only did not kill him, but loved him and submitted to him for no other reason than that he was not afraid of them, asked nothing of them, and did them good. But if a Christian lives among a non-Christian family and relatives, who defend themselves and their property by the exercise of force, and the Christian is called to take part in this defence, this call is for him a call for the exercise of his life's work. A Christian knows the truth for the very purpose that he may show it to others and most of all to his nearest friends who are connected with him by ties of family relationship and of friendship; and a Christian cannot show the truth otherwise than by avoiding to fall into the error into which others have fallen, by avoiding to side either with the attackers or with the defenders, and giving everything to others and showing by his life that he needs nothing but the execution of God's will, and that he fears nothing but the departure from it.

But the government cannot permit a member of society to decline to recognize the foundations of the political order and to refuse to execute the obligations of all citizens. The government will ask a Christian to take an oath, to participate in the court and in military service, and for a refusal will subject him to punishment, exile, incarceration, and even capital punishment. Again, this demand of the government will be for the Christian nothing but a call

for him to execute his life's work. For a Christian the demand of the government is a demand of men who do not know the truth, and so a Christian, who knows it, cannot help but bear witness to it before men, who do not know it. The violence, imprisonment, capital punishment, to which a Christian is subject in consequence of it, give him the possibility of bearing witness, not in words, but in deeds. All violence, — war, rapine, executions, — is caused, not by the irrational forces of Nature, but by men who err and are deprived of the knowledge of the truth. And so, the more wrong these men do to a Christian, the farther are they removed from the truth, the unhappier they are, and the more do they need the knowledge of the truth. Now a Christian cannot transmit the knowledge of the truth to others in any other way than by refraining from that error in which men are when they do evil to him, and by paying good for evil. In this alone does all the work of a Christian's life and its whole meaning consist, and this is not destroyed by death.

Men who are united with one another through deception form, as it were, a solid mass. The solidarity of this mass is the evil of the world. All rational activity of humanity is directed to the destruction of this cohesive force of deceit.

All revolutions are attempts at a violent cleavage of this mass. People imagine that if they can break up this mass, it will no longer be a mass, and so they strike at it; but in their attempt to break it, they only forge it more solidly; the cohesion of the particles will not be destroyed so long as the internal force is not communicated to the particles of the mass, causing them to be separated from it.

The force of the cohesion of men is the lie, the deception. The force which liberates each particle of the human cohesion is truth. Truth is not communicated to people except by works of truth.

Tolstóy's house at Moscow.

Nothing but works of truth, by introducing the light into the consciousness of each man, destroy the cohesion of the deceit, tear men one after another away from the mass which is connected through the cohesion of deceit.

This work has been going on for eighteen hundred years. Ever since Christ's commandments were placed before humanity, this work has been, and it will not end till all be fulfilled, as Christ says (Matt. v. 18).

The church, which was formed from those who wanted to unite men by affirming with oaths that they were in the truth, has long been dead. But the church which is formed of men, not by promises, nor by anointment, but by deeds of truth and of the good united into one, has always lived and will always live. This church, as before, so even now, is formed, not of men who exclaim, Lord, Lord! and do unrighteousness (Matt. vii. 21, 22), but of men who hear these words and do them.

The men of this church know that their life is good when they do not violate the union with the son of man, and that this good is violated only by the non-observance of Christ's commandments, and so the men of this church cannot help but do these commandments and teach others to do them.

Whether there be few such men, or many, this is the church, which no one can overcome and which all men will join.

Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom (Luke xii. 32).

Moscow, *January 22, 1884.*

ON LIFE

1888

ON LIFE

L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature, mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser. Une vapeur, une goutte d'eau suffit pour le tuer. Mais quand l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, parce qu'il sait qu'il meurt : et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien. Ainsi, toute notre dignité consiste dans la pensée. C'est de là qu'il faut nous relever, non de l'espace et de la durée. Travaillons donc a bien penser : voilà le principe de la morale. —*Pascal.*

Zwei Dinge erfüllen mir das Gemüth mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt : der bestirnte Himmel über mir, uud das moralische Gesetz in mir. . . . Das erste fängt von dem Platze an, den ich in der äussern Sinnenwelt einuehme, und erweitert die Verknüpfung, darin ich stehe, ins unabschlich Grosse mit Welten über Welten und Systemen von Systemen, überdem noch in grenzenlose Zeiten ihrer periodischen Bewegung, deren Anfang und Fortdauer. Das zweite fängt von meinem unsichtbaren Selbst, meiner Persönlichkeit, an, und stellt mich in einer Welt dar, die wahre Unendlichkeit hat, aber nur dem Verstande spürbar ist, und mit welcher ich mich, nicht wie dort in bloss zufälliger, sondern allgemeiner und nothwendiger Verknüpfung erkenne. — *Kant* (*Krit. der pract. Vern. Beschluss*).

A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another. — *John xiii. 34.*

INTRODUCTION

Let us imagine a man, whose only means of support is a mill. He is the son and the grandson of a miller, and knows well by tradition how to manage the mill in all its details, so that it may grind properly. Not know-

ing any mechanics, this man fixed, the best way he could, the various parts of the mill, so as to have it grind well, and he lived and earned his sustenance.

But this man happened to reflect on the construction of the mill, having heard some indistinct talks about mechanics, and began to observe what made the different parts move.

From the rynd to the millstone, from the millstone to the axletree, from the axletree to the wheel, from the wheel to the sluice, the dam, and the water, he reached a point when he saw clearly that the whole matter was in the dam and the river. And he rejoiced so much at this discovery that, instead of testing the quality of the milling, as he had done before, and accordingly raising or lowering the millstones and clamping them, and tightening and releasing the belt, he began to study the river. And so the mill began to run down. He was told that he was not doing right, but he disputed with such men, and continued to reflect on the river. And he busied himself so long and so assiduously with this, and so warmly and continually disputed with those who showed him the irregularity of his method of reasoning, that at last he convinced himself that the river was the mill.

To all the proofs of the incorrectness of his reflections such a miller will reply: "No mill grinds without water; consequently, in order that we may know the mill, we must know how to regulate the water, and what the force of its motion is, and whence it comes, — consequently, in order that we may know the mill, we must be acquainted with the river."

Logically the miller's reflection is unanswerable. The only means of bringing him out of his error is to show him that in all reasoning it is not so much the reasoning that is of importance, as the place occupied by the reasoning, that is, that for fruitful reasoning it is first of all necessary to know what to reason about at first,

and what later; to show him that a rational activity differs from an irrational one only in this, that the rational activity classifies its reflections in the order of their importance, as to which is to be the first, the second, the third, the tenth, and so forth, while an irrational activity consists in reasoning without this order. It is necessary to show him this also that the determination of this order is not accidental, but depends on the end for which this process of reasoning is taking place.

The end of the reasoning determines the order in which the separate reflections are to be grouped in order that they may be sensible; and a reflection which is not connected with the general aim of all the reflections is irrational, no matter how logical it may be.

The end of the miller is to have good milling, and this end, if he does not lose sight of it, will determine for him the unquestionable order and the consecutiveness of his reflections about the millstones, the wheel, the dam, and the river.

But without this relation to the end of the reflections, the reflections of the miller, no matter how logical and beautiful they may be, will in themselves be irregular and, above all, void: they will be similar to the reflections of Kífa Mokiévich, who tried to reason out what the shell of an elephant's egg would be, if elephants were hatched out of eggs, like birds.

Precisely such, in my opinion, are the reflections of our contemporary science about life.

Life is the mill which a man wants to investigate. The mill is needed that it may grind well, and life is needed only that it may be good. This end of the investigation a man cannot for a minute abandon with impunity. If he abandons it, his reflections will inevitably lose their place and become like Kífa Mokiévich's reflections as to what kind of powder is needed in order to crack the shell of an elephant egg.

A man investigates life only to make it better, and thus has life been investigated by those who have advanced humanity on the path of science. But, by the side of these true teachers and benefactors of humanity, there have always been reasoners who abandon the end of the reflections, and instead trouble themselves with the question as to what causes life, what makes the mill go. Some say it is the water; others, that it is the construction. The dispute waxes hot, and the subject under discussion is removed farther and farther, and gives way entirely to foreign matters.

There is an ancient jest about the dispute of a Jew and a Christian. The story tells how the Christian, replying to the intricate cunning of the Jew, struck the Jew's bald spot with the palm of his hand, so as to produce a smacking sound, and then put the question: "What made it smack? The hand or the bald spot?" And so the dispute about faith gave way to a new, insoluble question.

Something similar has since the most ancient times taken place in relation to the question about life, by the side of the real knowledge of men.

Since the most ancient times there have been known the reflections as to whence life comes, whether from an immaterial principle or from various combinations of matter. These reflections have been continued up to the present time, so that no end of them can be foreseen, because the end of all these reflections has been abandoned, and they discuss life independently of its end, and by the word life no longer understand life, but only that from which it comes, or that which accompanies it.

Speaking now of life, not only in scientific books, but also in private conversations, they do not speak of the life which we all know, of which I am conscious through those sufferings which I fear and hate, and through those joys and pleasures which I wish, but of something which may have originated from the play of accident according

to some physical laws, or, perhaps, because it has some mysterious cause.

Now they ascribe the word *life* to something disputable, which has not in itself the chief symptoms of life, the consciousness of suffering and enjoyment, the striving after the good.

"La vie est l'ensemble des fonctions, qui resistent à la mort. La vie est l'ensemble des phénomènes, qui se succèdent pendant un temps limité dans un être organisé."

"Life is a double process of decomposition and composition, general and at the same time uninterrupted. Life is a certain combination of heterogeneous modifications taking place consecutively. Life is an organism in action. Life is an especial activity of an organic substance. Life is an adaptation of internal to external relations."

Not to speak of the inaccuracies and tautologies in which all these definitions teem, their essence is always the same, namely, what is defined is not what all men alike indisputably understand by the word *life*, but certain processes, which accompany life and other phenomena.

The majority of these definitions are applicable to the forming crystal; some of these definitions are applicable to the activity of fermentation and decomposition, and all of them apply equally to the life of each separate cell of my body, for which there exists nothing, — neither good nor bad. A few processes, which take place in the crystals, in the protoplasm, in the nucleus of the protoplasm, in the cells of my body and of other bodies, are called by the name which in me is inseparably connected with the consciousness of striving after my good.

The discussion of certain conditions of life as of life is like the discussion of the river as of the mill. These discussions may be very necessary for some purposes, but they do not touch the subject which they are to discuss. Thus, all the conclusions about life which are deduced from these discussions, cannot help but be false.

The word *life* is very short and very clear, and everybody knows what it means; but even because all know what it means, we are obliged always to use it in this universally intelligible significance. This word is intelligible to all, not because it is very accurately defined by other words and concepts, but, on the contrary, because this word signifies a fundamental concept, from which many other, if not all, concepts are deduced, and so, to make our deductions from this concept, we are obliged above all else to accept it in its central, indubitable meaning. But this, it seems to me, has been overlooked by the disputants in relation to the concept of life. What has happened is, that the fundamental concept of life, which in the beginning was not taken in its central meaning, on account of the disputes departed more and more from the accepted central meaning, finally lost its fundamental meaning, and received another, improper meaning. What has happened is that the centre, from which the figure was described, has been abandoned and transferred to a new point.

They dispute whether there is life in a cell or a protoplasm, or even lower down, in inorganic matter. But, before disputing, we ought to ask ourselves whether we have the right to ascribe the concept of life to the cell.

We say, for example, that there is life in the cell, that the cell is a living being, whereas the fundamental concept of human life and that of the life which is found in the cell are two concepts which are not only quite distinct, but which cannot in any way be connected. One concept excludes the other. I discover that my body, without a residue, is all composed of cells. These cells, I am told, have also the property of life like myself, and are just such a living being as I am; but I recognize myself as living only because I am conscious of myself with all my cells, of which I am composed, as of one inseparable living being. Now I am told that all of me, without any

residue, is composed of cells. To what do I ascribe the property of life, to the cells, or to myself? If I admit that the cells have life, I must from the concept of life abstract the chief symptom of my life, — the consciousness of self as one living being; but if I admit that I have life as a separate being, it is obvious that I can in no way ascribe the same properties to the cells, of which my whole body is composed, and of the consciousness of which I know nothing.

Either I live, and there are in me non-living particles, called cells, or there is in me a conglomeration of living cells, and my consciousness of life is not life, but an illusion.

We do not say that in the cell there is something which is called *trife*, but say that it is life. We say life, because by this word we do not mean some X, but a well-defined quantity, which we all call by the same name and know only from within ourselves, as a consciousness of ourselves with our one, inseparable body, — and so such a concept is not applicable to those cells of which my body is composed.

No matter with what investigations and observations a man may busy himself, — he is obliged, for the expression of his observations, to understand by each word what is indisputably understood in the same way by all men, and not employ a concept, which he needs, but which in no way coincides with the fundamental, universally intelligible concept. If it is possible so to employ the word life that it expresses indiscriminately the quality of the whole subject and entirely different qualities of all its component parts, as is the case with the cell and the animal consisting of cells, then it is possible so to employ other words as well: for example, it is possible to say that, since all thoughts consist of words, and words of letters, and letters of strokes, the drawing of strokes is the same as an exposition of ideas, and so strokes may be called ideas.

It is, for example, a most common phenomenon in the scientific world to hear and read reflections about the origin of life from the play of physical, mechanical forces.

Almost the majority of scientific men hold to this — I find it hard to express myself — opinion, no, not opinion, paradox, to this joke or riddle, I might say.

They affirm that life is due to the play of physical and mechanical forces, — those physical forces, which we called physical and mechanical only in contradistinction to the concept of life.

It is obvious that the word *life*, incorrectly applied to concepts foreign to it, by departing more and more from its fundamental meaning has in this significance been removed from its centre to such an extent that life is assumed to be where, according to our conceptions, life cannot be. It is as though they asserted that there is a circle or sphere whose centre is outside its periphery.

Indeed, life, which I cannot present to myself otherwise than as a striving from bad to good, takes place in a territory where I can see neither bad nor good. Obviously the centre of the concept of life has been entirely transposed. Moreover, following the investigations of this something, called life, I see that these investigations touch on concepts which are scarcely known to me. I see a whole series of new concepts and words, which have their conventional significance in scientific language, but which have nothing in common with existing concepts.

The concept of life, as I understand it, is not understood in the same way in which all understand it, and the concepts deduced from it also fail to agree with the customary concepts; there appear instead new, conventional concepts, which receive corresponding invented appellations.

Human language is more and more pushed out from scientific investigations, and instead of the word, as a means of expressing existing objects, they enthrone a scientific Volapük, which differs from the real Volapük in

that the latter has general words for existing objects and concepts, whereas the first, the scientific Volapük, applies non-existing words to non-existing concepts.

The only means for the mental intercourse of men is the word, and, to make this intercourse possible, words have to be used in such a way as to evoke in all men corresponding and exact concepts. But if it is possible to use words at random, and to understand by them anything we may think of, it is better not to speak at all, but to indicate everything by signs.

I will admit that to define the laws of the world from mere deductions of the mind, without experience and observation, is a false and unscientific way, that is, one that cannot give any true knowledge; but if we were to study the phenomena of the world by experiment and observation, and yet were guided in these experiments and observations by concepts which are neither fundamental nor common to all, but by conventional ones, and were to describe the results of these experiments with words to which different meanings may be attached, would not that be still worse? The best apothecary shop would be productive of the greatest harm, if the labels were pasted on the bottles, not according to their contents, but as the apothecary might choose.

But I shall be told: "Science does not propose to investigate the whole totality of life (including in it will, the desire of good, and the spiritual world); it abstracts from the concept of life such phenomena only as are subject to its experimental investigations."

This would be beautiful and legitimate. But we know that this is not at all the case in the conception of the men of science of our time. If they first recognized the concept of life in its central meaning, in the way all understand it, and if then it were clearly shown that science, having abstracted from this concept all sides but one, which is subject to external observation, views the phe-

nomena from this one side alone, for which it has methods of investigation peculiar to it, then it would be beautiful, and an entirely different matter: in that case the place which science would occupy and the results at which we should arrive on the basis of science would be quite different. They ought to say what is, and not conceal what we all know. Do we not know that the majority of the experimental scientific investigators of life are fully convinced that they are not studying one side of life alone, but all life?

Astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry, and all the other sciences taken together, and each separately, work out the particular side of life subject to them, without arriving at any results about life in general. Only in the times of their crudity, that is, of their obscurity and indefiniteness, some of these sciences endeavoured from their point of view to embrace all the phenomena of life, and went astray in their attempts at inventing new concepts and words. Thus it was with astronomy, when it was astrology, and thus it was with chemistry, when it was alchemy. The same is now taking place with that experimental evolutionary science which, analyzing one side or several sides of life, makes pretensions that it is studying the whole of life.

Men with such a false view of their science will not recognize that only a few sides of life are subject to their investigations; they affirm that the whole of life with all its manifestations will be investigated by them by means of external experiment.

"If," they say, "psychics" (they are fond of this indefinite word of their Volapük) "is still unknown to us, it will be known some day. By investigating one or several sides of vital phenomena we learn all sides, that is, in other words, if we shall for a very long time and very assiduously look at an object from one side, we shall see the object from all sides, and even from the middle."

However surprising this strange doctrine is, which can be explained only by the fanaticism of superstition, it exists and, like any fanatical doctrine, produces its disastrous effect in that it directs the activity of the human mind upon a false and useless path. It is the ruin of conscientious workers, who devote their life to the study of what is almost unnecessary; it is the ruin of the material forces of men, in that they are turned into the wrong direction; it is the ruin of the young generations, which are directed upon the most useless activity of a Kífa Mokiévich, advanced to the degree of the highest service of humanity.

They usually say that science studies life from all its sides; but the trouble is that every object has as many sides as there are radii in a sphere, that is, an endless number, and that it is not possible to study it from all sides, but we must know from which side it is more important and necessary, and from which it is less important and less necessary. Just as it is impossible to approach an object from all sides at once, so it is impossible to study all the phenomena of life from all sides at once. The consecutiveness establishes itself in a natural manner, and in this lies the whole matter. This consecutiveness presents itself only through the comprehension of life.

Nothing but a correct comprehension of life gives the proper meaning and direction to science in general and each science in particular, distributing them according to the importance of their significance in respect to life. But if the comprehension of life is not such as is inherent in us, the science itself will be false.

Not what we shall call science will define life, but our conception of life will determine what must be regarded as science; and so, in order that science may be science, we must first solve the question as to what is science, and what not; but, to do this, the concept of life must be made clear.

I will frankly express my idea: we all know the fundamental dogma of faith of this false experimental science. There exists matter and its energy. Energy moves; the mechanical motion passes into molecular motion, and is expressed by heat, electricity, and nerve and brain activity. All phenomena of life without any exception are explained as relations of energies. Everything is so beautiful, simple, clear, and, above all, convenient. And so, if what you desire so much and what so simplifies your whole life does not exist, it has all to be invented in some way.

And so here is my whole bold idea: the chief portion of energy, of the impassioned activity of experimental science, is based on the desire to invent all that is needed for the confirmation of so convenient a conception.

In the whole activity of this science one sees not so much the desire to investigate the phenomena of life, as the one, ever present anxiety to prove the correctness of one's fundamental dogma. What energy has been wasted on the attempts to prove the origin of the organic from the inorganic and of the psychical activity from the progresses of the organism!

The inorganic does not pass into the organic: let us search at the bottom of the sea, — we shall find there a thing which we shall call a nucleus, a moneron. It is not there either: let us believe that it will be found, the more so since we have at our service a whole infinitude of ages, whither we can cram down everything which ought to exist according to our belief, but does not exist in reality.

The same is true of the transition from the organic activity into the psychic. We haven't it? We believe that it will be, and all the efforts of the mind are directed toward proving at least the possibility of it.

The discussions of what has no reference to life, namely whence life comes, — whether it is animism, or vitalism,

or the concept of some special force, — have concealed from men the chief question of life, that question without which the concept of life loses its meaning, and have slowly brought the men of science, — those who ought to lead others, — to the condition of a man who is walking, and is even in a hurry, but has forgotten whither he is going.

But, maybe, I intentionally try not to see those enormous results which science gives in its present direction. However, no results whatever can change its false direction. Let us assume the impossible: that that which modern science wishes to find out about life, of which it asserts (though it does not believe so) that it will all be revealed, — let us assume that it is all revealed and as clear as day. It is clear how through adaptation the organic is born out of inorganic matter, and how physical energies pass into feelings, will, thought, and all this is known not only to gymnasiasts, but also to village schoolboys.

I know that certain thoughts and feelings are due to such and such motions. What of it? Can I guide these motions, or not, in order that I may evoke in myself a given series of thoughts? But the question as to what thoughts and feelings I must evoke in myself and in others remains not only unsolved, but even untouched.

I know that the men of science find no difficulty in answering this question. The solution of this question seems very simple to them, as simple as the solution of a difficult question appears to a man who does not understand it. The solution of the question as to how life is to be arranged, when it is in our power, seems very simple to the men of science. They say: "Arrange it in such a way that men may be able to gratify their needs; science works out the means, in the first place, for regularly distributing the gratification of needs, and in the second, for

producing so much and so easily that all needs may be easily gratified, and then all men will be happy."

But if you ask what is meant by need, and what the limits of needs are, they reply to this simply: "That is what science is for, — to classify the needs into physical, mental, æsthetical, even moral needs, and clearly to define what needs are legitimate, and to what extent, and what are illegitimate, and to what extent. Some day it will determine all that."

But if you ask what one is to be guided by in the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these needs, they answer boldly: "By the study of the needs."

But the word *need* has only two meanings, — either that of a condition of existence, and of conditions of existence of any object there is an endless number, and so all conditions cannot be studied; or that of the living being's demand of the good, which is cognized and determined by consciousness alone, and so can still less be studied by experimental science.

There is an institution, a corporation, or an assemblage of men or minds, which is infallible and is called science. This science will determine all that at some future time.

Is it not evident that all this solution of the question is only a paraphrased kingdom of the Messiah, in which science plays the rôle of the Messiah, and that, in order that such an explanation may explain anything, it is necessary to believe in the dogmas of science as unconditionally as the Jews believe in the Messiah, which the orthodox men of science actually do, — but with this difference: an orthodox Jew, who sees in the Messiah a messenger of God, can believe that he will arrange everything excellently by dint of his power, while an orthodox man of science by the nature of the thing cannot believe that it is possible by means of an external study of the needs to solve the chief and only question of life.

I.

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF HUMAN LIFE

EVERY man lives only that he may feel well, — for his own good. If he does not feel the desire of good for himself, he does not feel himself living. Man cannot present to himself life without the desire of good for himself. To live is for every man the same as to wish and obtain the good; to wish and obtain the good is the same as to live.

Man feels life only in himself, in his personality, and so man imagines at first that the good which he wishes is only the good of his personality. At first it seems to him that only he lives, lives truly. The life of other beings does not at all present itself to him like his own, — it presents itself to him only as a semblance of life; the life of other beings man knows only from observation, and only through observation does he know that they live. Of the life of other beings man knows when he wants to think of them; but of himself he knows at all times, and so each man sees his own life only as the real life. The life of other beings, which surround him, presents itself to him only as one of the conditions of his existence. If he does not wish others any evil, he refrains from doing so because the sight of the sufferings of others impairs his welfare. If he wishes others well, he does not do so in the same way as to himself, — not that he whom he wishes well may fare well, but that the good of the other beings may increase the good of his own life. What is important and necessary for man is the good in that life which he feels his own, that is, his good.

Now, while striving to attain his good, man observes that this good depends on other beings, and, observing these other beings, he sees that all of them — both men and animals — have precisely the same conception of life which he has. Each of these beings, like him, feels only its own life and its own good, and regards only its own life as important and real, and the life of all the other beings only as a means for its own good. Man sees that each of the living beings must be prepared, like himself, for the sake of its little good, to deprive of a greater good and even of life all the other beings, and among them him, as a reasoning man. Having comprehended this, man involuntarily reflects that if this is so, — and he knows that it is indubitably so, — not one being, and not a dozen beings, but all the endless creatures of the world are prepared, each for the attainment of its own good, at any moment to destroy him, for whom alone life exists. Having comprehended this, man sees that his personal good, in which alone he understands his life, is not only not easy of acquisition, but will certainly be taken from him.

The longer a man lives, the more this reflection is confirmed by experience, and he sees that the life of the world, in which he takes part, and which is composed of interrelated individuals that wish to destroy and devour one another, not only cannot be a good for him, but certainly is a great evil.

More than this: even if a man is placed in such favourable conditions that he can successfully struggle against other individuals, without fearing for himself, reason and experience will show him very soon that even those semblances of good which he snatches away from life, in the form of enjoyments of personality, are not any good, but, as it were, only samples of good, given to him solely that he may the more sensibly feel the sufferings which are always connected with the enjoyments. The

longer a man lives, the more clearly does he see that the enjoyments grow less and less, and the ennui, satiety, labours, and sufferings more and more.

More than this: as he begins to experience a weakening of his forces and diseases, and contemplates the sickness, old age, and death of other men, he cannot fail to observe that his own existence, in which alone he feels real, full life, is with every hour, with every motion approaching debility, old age, and death; that his life, in addition to being subject to thousands of casualties of destruction by other beings that are struggling with him, and to ever increasing sufferings, by its very essence is only an unceasing approach to death, to that condition in which, together with the life of the individual, there will certainly be destroyed every possibility of any good of personality whatsoever. Man sees that he, his personality, — that in which alone he feels life, — does nothing but struggle against what it is impossible to struggle against, against the whole world; that he is seeking enjoyments which give only a semblance of good and always end in suffering, and wishes to retain life, which it is impossible to retain. He sees that he himself, his personality, — that for which alone he wishes the good and life, — can have neither good nor life. And that which he wishes to have, the good and life, is possessed only by those beings, foreign to him, whom he does not feel and cannot feel, and of whose existence he neither can nor wishes to know.

What is most important to him and what alone he needs, what, as he thinks, lives the only real life, his personality, will perish and be bones and worms, — not he; and what he does not need and is of no importance to him, what he does not feel as living, all that world of struggling and alternating beings, is the real life, and will remain and live for ever. Thus the only life of which man is conscious, for which all his activity takes place, turns out to be delusive and impossible, while the life outside him, which

he does not love or feel, and which is unknown to him, is the one true life.

Only what he does not feel has those properties which he would like to have. And this is not something which so presents itself to man in the bad moments of his gloomy mood, it is not a conception without which one can get along, but, on the contrary, such an obvious, indubitable truth that, as soon as this thought strikes a man, or is explained to him by others, he never gets rid of it, and will never eradicate it from his consciousness.

II.

THE CONTRADICTION OF LIFE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY MEN SINCE REMOTE ANTIQUITY. THE ENLIGHTENERS OF HUMANITY HAVE REVEALED TO MEN THE DEFINITIONS OF LIFE, WHICH SOLVE THIS INTERNAL CONTRADICTION, BUT THE PHARISEES AND THE SCRIBES CONCEAL THEM FROM MEN

The sole aim of life, as it first presents itself to man, is the good of his personality, but there can be no good for the personality; even if there were anything in life that resembled the good, life, in which alone the good would be possible, the life of the personality, by every motion, every breath, is irresistibly drawn to sufferings, to evil, to death, to annihilation.

This is so obvious and so clear that every thinking man, whether he be young or old, cultured or uneducated, sees it. This reflection is so simple and so natural that it presents itself to every rational man, and has been known to humanity since remote antiquity.

"The life of man, as an individual striving only after its good, amidst an endless number of similar individuals, which destroy one another and themselves, is evil and senseless, and the true life cannot be such." Thus has man said to himself since antiquity, and this internal contradiction of man's life has with extraordinary force and clearness been expressed by Hindoo, Chinese, Egyptian, Greek, and Hebrew sages; and since antiquity man's mind has been directed to the cognition of such a good as would not be destroyed by the struggle of the beings among them-

selves, by sufferings, and by death. The whole progress of humanity, ever since we know its life, consists in the ever growing elucidation of this good of man, which is not impaired by struggle, suffering, and death.

Since most remote times and among the different nations, the great teachers of humanity have revealed to men ever clearer definitions of life, which solve its internal contradiction, and have pointed out to them the true good and the true life that are proper for man. Since the position of men in the world is the same for all men, and, therefore, the contradiction between his striving after his personal good and the consciousness of its impossibility is the same also, all the definitions of the true good and, therefore, of the true life, as revealed to men by the greatest minds of humanity, are by their essence the same.

"Life is the dissemination of that light which came down from heaven for the good of men," Confucius said, six hundred years before Christ.

"Life is a wandering and perfecting of the souls attaining a greater and ever greater good," said the Brahmins of about the same time.

"Life is self-renunciation for the sake of attaining blissful Nirvana," said Buddha, a contemporary of Confucius.

"Life is the path of humility and abasement for the sake of attaining the good," said Lao-tse, another contemporary of Confucius.

"Life is that which God blew into the nostrils of man, in order that he, fulfilling the law, might attain the good," says the Jewish wisdom.

"Life is subjection to reason, which gives men the good," said the Stoics.

"Life is love of God and of our neighbour, which gives man the good," said Christ, including all the former definitions into his own.

Such are the definitions of life, which, pointing out to men the true, indestructible good in the place of the false

and impossible good of personality, have thousands of years before us solved the contradiction of human life, and given a rational meaning to it. We may fail to agree with these definitions of life; we may assume that these definitions can be expressed more exactly and more clearly, but we cannot help seeing that these definitions are such that the recognition of them, destroying the contradiction of life and putting in place of the striving after the unattainable good of personality another striving, — after the good which is not destroyed by suffering and death, — gives a rational meaning to life. We cannot help seeing that these definitions, being theoretically correct, are also confirmed by the experience of life, and that millions and millions of people, who have recognized such definitions of life, have in fact shown the possibility of substituting for the striving after the good of the personality the other striving after the good which is not impaired by suffering and by death.

But besides these men, who have comprehended the definitions of life, as revealed to men by the great enlighteners of humanity, and who have lived by it, there has always existed a large majority of men, who at a given period of life, and at times during their whole life, have lived nothing but an animal life, not only failing to understand those definitions which serve as a solution of the contradiction of human life, but not even seeing that contradiction which they solve. There have always been men among them who, on account of their external, exclusive position, have considered themselves called to guide humanity, and, themselves failing to comprehend the meaning of human life, have taught other men the life which they do not understand, namely, that human life is nothing but personal existence.

Such false teachers have existed at all times and exist even at present. They profess in words the teachings of those enlighteners of humanity, in whose traditions they

have been educated, but, failing to comprehend their rational meaning, they turn these doctrines into supernatural revelations of the past and the future life of men and demand only the execution of rites. This is the teaching of the Pharisees in the broadest sense, that is, of men who teach that the life which is in itself irrational may be mended by faith in another life, which is obtained by the execution of external rites.

Others, who do not recognize the possibility of any other than the visible life, deny all miracles and everything supernatural, and boldly assert that man's life is nothing but his animal existence from his birth to his death. It is the teaching of the scribes, of men who teach that in the life of man, as of an animal, there is nothing irrational.

The two classes of false teachers have always waged war among themselves, though the doctrines of either class are based on the same gross understanding of the fundamental contradiction of human life. Both doctrines hold sway in our world and, making war on one another, fill the world with their disputes, thus concealing from men those definitions of life which reveal the path to the true good of men, which were given humanity thousands of years ago.

The Pharisees, by not understanding the definition of life which is given to men by those teachers in the traditions in which they are brought up, substitute for it their false interpretations of the future life, and at the same time try to conceal from men the definitions of life of the other enlighteners of humanity, by presenting them to their disciples in their grossest and most cruel distortion, hoping in this way to support the exclusive authority of the teaching on which they base their interpretations.[1]

[1] The unity of the rational meaning of the definition of life by the other enlighteners of humanity does not present itself to them as the best proof of the truth of their teaching, since it shatters the trust in those irrational false interpretations which they substitute for the essence of the teaching. — *Author's Note.*

But the scribes, who do not even suspect in the Pharisaical teachings those rational foundations from which they arose, deny outright all the doctrines of the future life, and boldly affirm that all these doctrines have no foundation whatever, and are only survivals of coarse customs of ignorance, and that the progress of humanity consists in putting no questions of life which exceed the limits of the animal existence of man.

III.

THE DELUSIONS OF THE SCRIBES

How wonderful! The fact that all the teachings of the great minds of humanity so awed men by their greatness that rude people generally ascribed to them a supernatural character and recognized their founders as demigods, — which serves as the chief token of the importance of these teachings, — serves for the scribes, so they think, as the best proof of the irregularity and obsoleteness of these teachings. The fact that the unimportant teachings of Aristotle, Bacon, Comte, and others have always remained the possession of a small number of their readers and admirers, and on account of their falseness never could have influenced the masses, and so were not subjected to superstitious distortions and increments, is taken as a proof of their truth. But the teachings of the Brahmins, of Buddha, Zoroaster, Lao-tse, Confucius, Isaiah, Christ, are regarded as superstitions and delusions, only because these teachings have transformed the lives of millions.

They are not in the least troubled by the fact that billions of people have lived according to these superstitions, because even in their distorted form they give men answers to the questions as to the true good of life, and that these teachings are divided up, but even thus serve as the basis of reasoning of the best men of all ages, while the theories which are acknowledged by the scribes are divided by them alone, are always subjects of dispute, and often do not survive a decade, and are forgotten as quickly as they rise.

In nothing is the false direction of the science which modern society follows expressed with such clearness as in the place which in society is given to the teachings of those great teachers of life, by which humanity has lived and formed itself, and continues to live and form itself. In the almanacs it says, in the department of statistical data, that there are a thousand different creeds, which are now professed by the inhabitants of the globe. In these creeds are included Brahminism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and Christianity. There are a thousand creeds, and men of our time believe this statement quite sincerely. There are a thousand creeds, and they are all nonsense, so what need is there of studying them? And the men of our time consider it a shame if they do not know the last utterances of wisdom of Spencer, Helmholtz, and others, but of the Brahmins, of Buddha, Confucius, Lao-tse, Epictetus, Isaiah, they sometimes know the names, and sometimes they do not know even that. It does not even occur to them that there are not at all one thousand creeds in our day, but only three, — the Chinese, the Hindoo, and the Judæo-Christian (with its outgrowth, Mohammedanism), and that the books of these religions may be bought for five roubles and read in two weeks, and that in these books, by which all humanity, with the exception of seven per cent. of almost unknown people, has lived, is contained all the wisdom of man, all that which has made humanity such as it is.

But it is not merely the masses that do not know these teachings: the learned do not know them, if they do not happen to be their specialty; philosophers by profession do not consider it necessary to look inside these books. What sense is there in studying those men who have solved that which to a rational man is a contradiction of his life, and who have determined the true good and life of men? The scribes, who do not understand the contradiction which forms the principle of a rational life, affirm

boldly that, since they do not see it, there is no contradiction, and that the life of man is only his animal existence.

Men who see understand and define what they see before themselves: a blind man pokes his cane in front of him, and affirms that there is nothing but what the feel of his cane tells him.

IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SCRIBES SUBSTITUTES THE VISIBLE PHENOMENA OF HIS ANIMAL EXISTENCE FOR THE CONCEPT OF THE WHOLE LIFE OF MAN, AND FROM THESE MAKES HIS DEDUCTIONS AS TO THE AIM OF HIS LIFE

"LIFE is what is going on in the living being from its birth to its death. A man, a dog, a horse, is born; each of them has his individual body; this individual body lives, and then dies; the body will be decomposed, will enter into other beings, and the former being will be no more. There was life, and life has come to an end; the heart beats, the lungs breathe, the body does not fall apart, — consequently the man, the dog, the horse, lives; the heart stops beating, the breath ceases, the body begins to decompose, — death has come, and there is no life. Life, then, is that which takes place in the body of man, just as in that of an animal, in the interval between birth and death. What can be clearer?"

Thus the grossest, most ignorant people, who have just issued from the animal state, have always looked upon life. In our day the teaching of the scribes, which calls itself science, recognizes this same gross, primitive concept of life as the only true one. Making use of all those weapons of external knowledge, which humanity has acquired, this false teaching wants systematically to lead men back into that darkness of ignorance, from which it has for a thousand years tried with so much effort and labour to escape.

"We cannot define life in our consciousness," says this doctrine. "We lose ourselves, if we analyze it in ourselves. That concept of good, the striving after which in our consciousness forms our life, is an illusive phantom, and life cannot be understood in this consciousness. To understand life, we must observe its manifestations, as the motion of matter. Only from these observations and from the laws deduced from them shall we find the law of life itself and the law of the life of man."[1]

And so the false teaching, by substituting for the concept of the whole life of man, as known to him in his consciousness, its visible part, — animal existence, — begins to study these visible phenomena, at first in animal man, then in the animals in general, then in the plants, then in matter, asserting all the time that it is not certain manifestations of life that are studied, but life itself. The observations are so complex, so diversified, so mixed, and so much time and effort is wasted on them, that men by degrees forget their original mistake of assuming part of the subject as being the whole subject, and are fully convinced that the study of the visible properties of

[1] The true science, which knows its place and, therefore, its subject, is modest and, therefore, powerful, and has never spoken in this way.

The science of physics speaks of the laws and relations of forces, without troubling itself with the question as to what force is, or trying to explain the essence of force. The science of chemistry speaks of the relations of matter, without troubling itself with the question what matter is, or trying to define its essence. The science of biology speaks of the forms of life, without troubling itself with the question as to what life is, or trying to define its essence. Force and matter and life are accepted by the true sciences not as objects of investigation, but as axiomatic points of support, which are taken from other fields of knowledge, and on which the structure of each separate science is reared. Thus true science looks upon the subject, and this science cannot have a deleterious influence upon the masses, turning them toward ignorance. But not thus does the falsely reasoning science look upon its subject. "We study matter and force and life; and since we study them, we can know them," they say, failing to consider that they are not studying matter, or force, or life, but only their relations and forms. — *Author's Note.*

matter, of plants, and of animals is the study of life itself, which is cognized by man only in his consciousness.

What takes place is very much like what a man does who points to a shadow, wishing to sustain the delusion in which his spectators are.

"Look nowhere," says the demonstrator, "except where the reflections appear, and, above all, do not look at the object itself: there is no object, — there is only its reflection."

The same is done by the science of the scribes of our time, which pampers the vulgar crowd, when it views life without its chief definition, the striving after the good, which is revealed only in the consciousness of man.[1] Starting directly from the definition of life independently of the striving after the good, the false science observes the ends of the living beings, and, finding in them ends which are foreign to man, ascribe them to him.

As the end of the living beings there presents itself, with such an external observation, the preservation of one's personality, the preservation of species, the reproduction of one's like, and the struggle for existence, and this imaginary end of life is foisted upon man.

The false science, taking for its starting-point the obsolete conception of life, with which one cannot see that contradiction of human life, which forms its chief property, — this so-called science in its last deductions arrives at what the vulgar majority of humanity demands, — at the recognition of the possibility of good for the individual life alone, at the recognition of the animal existence alone as man's good.

The false science goes even beyond the demands of the vulgar crowd, for which it wants to find an explanation, — it arrives at the affirmation of what the rational consciousness of man rejects with its first gleam of

[1] See first appendix.

intelligence, — it arrives at the conclusion that the life of man, as of any animal, consists in the struggle for the existence of personality, of the race, and of the species.[1]

[1] See second appendix.

V.

THE FALSE TEACHINGS OF THE PHARISEES AND OF THE SCRIBES DO NOT GIVE ANY EXPLANATIONS OF THE MEANING OF ACTUAL LIFE, NOR ANY GUIDANCE IN IT; AS THE ONLY GUIDE OF LIFE THERE APPEARS THE INERTIA OF LIFE, WHICH HAS NO RATIONAL EXPLANATION

"THERE is no need of defining life: everybody knows it. That is all, and so let us live!" say men in their delusion, being supported by the false teachings. And, as they do not know what life and its good is, they think that they live, as a man who is borne by the waves without any special direction may think that he is swimming whither he has to and wishes to swim.

A child is born in need or in luxury, and receives an education either of the Pharisees or of the scribes. For the child, for the youth, there does not yet exist the contradiction of life and the question about it, and so he needs neither the explanation of the Pharisees, nor that of the scribes, and they cannot guide his life. He learns only by the example of men who live about him, and this example, both of the Pharisees and of the scribes, is the same: both live only for the good of the personal life, and teach him the same.

If his parents are in need, he learns from them that the aim of life is the acquisition of more bread and money, and as little work as possible, so that the animal personality may fare as well as possible. If he was born in luxury, he learns that the aim of life is wealth and hon-

ours, so that one may pass the time with as much pleasure and jollity as possible.

All the knowledge which the poor man acquires is necessary for him, so that he may be able to improve the welfare of his personality. All the knowledge of science and of the arts which the rich man acquires is necessary for him only that he may be able to vanquish ennui and pass the time pleasantly. The longer each of them lives, the more strongly does the reigning view of the men of the world enter his flesh. They marry and raise a family, and the eagerness for acquiring the benefits of an animal existence is intensified by the justification of the family: the struggle with others becomes more acute, and there is established the habit (inertia) of life only for the good of the personality.

Even if a doubt as to the rationality of such a life should assail either the poor or the rich man; if either shall be confronted with the question, For what purpose is this aimless struggle for existence, which my children will continue, or for what purpose is this illusive chase after enjoyments, which end in suffering both for me and my children? there is hardly any possibility that he will find out those definitions of life which have long ago been given to humanity by its great teachers, who thousands of years ago were in the same condition as he. The teaching of the Pharisees and of the scribes screen them so firmly that only very few succeed in seeing them.

Some, the Pharisees, in reply to the question, "What is this miserable life for?" say, "Life is miserable and has always been so, and must always be so; the good of life is not in its present, but in its past, before life, and in its future, after life." The Brahmin, and the Buddhist, and the Taoist, and the Jewish, and the Christian Pharisees always say the same. "The present life is an evil, and the explanation of this evil is in the past, — in the appearance of the world and of man; but the correction of the

existing evil is in the future, beyond the grave. Everything which man can do for the acquisition of the good is not in this life, but in the future: believe in the teaching which we impart to you, — fulfil the rites which we prescribe."

And the doubter, seeing in the lives of all men who live for their personal good, and in the lives of the Pharisees who live in the same way, the untruth of this explanation, and not grasping the meaning of their answer, simply does not believe them, and turns to the scribes.

"All the teachings about another life than the one which we see in the animal life is the fruit of ignorance," say the scribes. "All thy doubts in the rationality of thy life are idle dreams. The life of the worlds, the earth, the man, the animal, the plant has its laws, and we study them and investigate the origin of the worlds and of man, of the animals and plants, and of all matter; we also investigate what is in store for the worlds, when the sun cools off, and so forth, and what has been and will be with man and with every animal and plant. We can show and prove that everything has been and will be, as we say; our investigations, besides this, coöperate with the improvement of man's welfare. But of thy life, with thy striving after the good, we cannot tell thee anything, except what thou knowest without us: since thou livest, live in the best manner possible."

And the doubter, having received no answer whatsoever to his question, neither from the one nor from the other, remains, as he has been, without any guidance in life except the impulses of his personality.

Some of the doubters, saying to themselves, according to Pascal's reflection, "What if there is truth in that with which the Pharisees threaten us for the non-performance of their injunctions?" carry out, in their leisure time, all the injunctions of the Pharisees ("There will be no loss, and the gain may be great"), while others, agreeing with

the scribes, deny outright any other life and all religious rites, and say to themselves, "Not I alone, but all men have lived in this manner, — what will be, will be." And this discrimination gives no advantage to either of them: they all remain without an explanation as to the meaning of the present life.

But one has to live.

Human life is a series of acts from rising to going to bed; every day a man has to choose out of hundreds of possible acts those which he will perform. Neither the teaching of the Pharisees, which explains the mysteries of the heavenly life, nor the teaching of the scribes, which investigates the origin of the worlds and of man, and which draws its conclusions as to their future fate, furnishes such a guide for his acts. And yet man cannot live without a guide in the choice of his acts, and so he involuntarily submits, not to reason, but to that external guide of life, which has always existed in every society of men.

This guide has no reasonable explanation, but yet it moves an enormous majority of the acts of all men. This guide is the habit of life of societies of men, which governs men the more powerfully the less men have the comprehension of the meaning of life. This guide cannot be expressed definitely, because it is composed of the greatest variety of acts and works, widely different in time and place. It is candles on the little boards of the parents for the Chinese; it is pilgrimages to certain places for a Mohammedan; it is a certain number of words in a prayer for a Hindoo; it is loyalty to his flag and the honour of the uniform for a soldier, the duel for a man of the world, the vendetta for the mountaineer; it is certain food for certain days, a certain education of one's children; it is visits, a certain furnishing of the apartments, a certain celebration of funerals, births, and weddings; it is an endless number of deeds and acts, which fill the whole life.

It is what is called decency, custom, but most frequently duty, and even sacred duty.

And it is to this guidance that the majority of men submit, in spite of the explanations of the Pharisees and the scribes. All about him and ever since childhood a man sees people who perform these acts with full assurance and external solemnity, and, as he has no rational explanation of his life, he not only begins to perform such acts, but tries to ascribe a rational meaning to these acts. He wants to believe that the men who perform these acts have an explanation as to why and for what purpose they do what they do. And so he begins to convince himself that these acts have a rational meaning and that the explanation of their meaning, though not known to him, is known to others. But the majority of other men, who themselves lack an explanation of life, are in precisely the same state in which he is. The only reason they perform the acts is that they think that others, having an explanation of these acts, demand them from them. Thus, involuntarily deceiving one another, men get more and more accustomed to performing acts which have no rational explanation, and even to ascribing to these acts a certain mysterious, incomprehensible meaning. The less they comprehend the meaning of the acts to be performed by them and the more doubtful these acts are in themselves, the more importance do they ascribe to them, and the more solemnly do they perform them.

The rich man and the poor perform what they see others around them do, and these acts they call their duty, their sacred duty, quieting themselves with the thought that that which has been done for so long a time, by so great a number of men, and is so highly esteemed by them, cannot help but be the real work of life. And up to a good old age, up to death, men live, trying to assure themselves that, if they themselves do not know what they live for, others do know it, — those

others who know it just as little as those who depend on them.

New men come into existence, are born, grow up, and, looking at this hubbub of existence, called life, in which gray-haired, respected, revered old men take part, assure themselves that this senseless bustle is life, and that there is no other, and go away, having crowded a bit at its gate. Even so a man who has never seen an assembly, upon noticing a crowding, noisy, animated throng at the entrance, and deciding that this is that assembly, allows himself to be jostled at the door and returns home with crushed sides, and with the full assurance that he was in the assembly.

We cut through mountains, fly around the world; electricity, microscopes, telephones, wars, parliament, philanthropy, the struggle of parties, universities, learned societies, museums, — is not all that life ?

All the complex seething activity of men, with their commerce, wars, roads of communication, science, arts, is for the greater part only a crush of a senseless crowd at the gate of life.

VI.

THE DOUBLING OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MEN OF OUR WORLD

"But verily, verily, I say unto you, The time is coming and is already at hand when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God and hearing shall come to life." And this time is coming. No matter how much a man may assure himself, and no matter how much others may assure him, that life can be good and rational only beyond the grave, or that nothing but the personal life can be good and rational, — man cannot believe this. Man has in the depth of his soul an ineffaceable demand that his life should be a good and should have a rational meaning, and life, which has before itself no other aim than the life after the grave or the impossible good of the personality, is an evil and an absurdity.

"To live for the future life?" man says to himself. "But if that life, that only sample of life which I know, my present life, is to be meaningless, this not only fails to confirm me in the belief that another, rational life is possible, but, on the contrary, convinces me that life is in its essence meaningless, and that there can be no other life but the meaningless.

"To live for myself? But my personal life is an evil and an absurdity. To live for my family? For the common weal, for my country, for humanity even? But if the life of my personality is wretched and meaningless, the life of every other human personality is also meaningless, and so an endless number of collected absurd and irrational personalities will not form one single blessed

and rational life. To live for myself, not knowing why, and doing what others are doing ? But I know that others, like myself, do not know themselves why they do what they do."

The time comes when the rational consciousness outgrows the false teachings, and man stops amidst life and demands an explanation.[1]

Only such rare person as has no relations with men of other manners of life, or a man who is constantly occupied in a tense battle with Nature for the purpose of supporting his bodily existence, can believe in this, that the execution of those senseless deeds, which he calls his duty, can be a duty of life peculiar to him.

The time is at hand and already here, when the deception which proclaims as life the verbal negation of this life for the purpose of preparing for oneself a future life and the acknowledgment of the personal animal existence, and which calls the so-called duty the work of life, — when this deception shall become clear for the majority of men, and it is only people who are crushed by want or dulled by a life of lust that can exist, without feeling the senselessness and wretchedness of their existence.

Men awake ever more frequently to the rational consciousness, come to life in their graves, and the fundamental contradiction of the human life, in spite of all the efforts of men to conceal this from themselves, stands out before the majority of men with terrible force and clearness.

" My whole life is a desire for good for myself," says the awakened man, " but my reason tells me that this good cannot exist for me, and that, no matter what I may do and what I may attain, everything will end in one and the same, in sufferings and death, — in destruction. I want the good, I want life, I want a rational meaning, but in me and in everything which surrounds me there is

[1] See third appendix.

evil, death, absurdity. What shall I do? How can I live?" And there is no answer.

A man looks about him and seeks an answer for his question, and does not find it. He will find about him teachings that will answer questions which he has not put to himself, but in the world that surrounds him there is no answer to the question which he has put to himself. There is but the bustle of men, who, without knowing why, are performing acts which others are performing, themselves not knowing why.

All live as though they were not conscious of the wretchedness of their situation and the absurdity of their activity. "Either *they* are senseless, or *I* am," the awakened man says to himself. "But all men cannot be senseless, consequently it is I who am senseless. But no, — that rational ego which tells me this cannot be senseless. Let it be one against the whole world, I cannot help but believe it."

And man recognizes himself alone in the whole world with those terrible questions which tear his soul asunder. And one has to live.

One ego, his personality, commands him to live.

The other ego, his reason, says: "You cannot live."

Man feels that he has doubled. And this doubling lacerates his heart in an agonizing manner.

And it seems to him that his reason is the cause of this doubling and suffering.

Reason, that highest quality of man, which is necessary for his life, which, amidst the forces of Nature that destroy him, gives him, the naked and helpless man, the means both for existence and for enjoyment, — that same quality poisons his life.

In all the surrounding world, amidst living creatures, the qualities that are peculiar to these beings are necessary for them, are common to them all, and coöperate with their good. Plants, insects, animals, submitting to their law,

live a blessed, joyful, calm life. And suddenly this highest quality of man's nature produces in him such a painful state that frequently — more and more frequently of late — man cuts the Gordian knot of his life, and kills himself, only to free himself from the painful internal contradiction which is produced by a rational consciousness, and which in our time has been carried to the highest degree of tension.

VII.

THE DOUBLING OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS IS DUE TO CONFUSING THE ANIMAL LIFE WITH THE HUMAN LIFE

It seems to man that the rational consciousness awakened in him breaks and arrests his life only because he recognizes that to be his life which has not been, and cannot be, his life.

Having been educated and brought up in the false teachings of our world, which confirm him in his conviction that his life is nothing but his personal existence, which began with his birth, it seems to man that he lived when he was a babe, a child; then it seems to him that he lived without a break, as a youth and a full-grown man. He lived, as it seems to him, a very long time ago, and has lived all the time without a break, and suddenly reached the time when it became indubitably clear to him that it was impossible to live as he had lived before, and that his life has been arrested and is breaking up.

The false teaching has confirmed him in the idea that his life is the period of time from his birth to his death, and, looking at the visible life of the animals, he confused the idea of the visible life with his consciousness, and came to the absolute conviction that this visible life is his life.

The awakened rational consciousness, in making demands on him which cannot be satisfied for the animal life, shows him the faultiness of his concept of life; but the false teaching which has penetrated him keeps him

from recognizing his mistake: he cannot renounce his concept of life as an animal existence, and it seems to him that his life has come to a stop through the awakening of his rational consciousness. But that which he calls his life, which to him seems to be arrested, has never existed. What he calls his life, his existence from birth, never was his life; his idea that he has lived all the time from his birth to the present moment is a deception of consciousness, similar to the deception of consciousness in a dream: up to the waking there were no dreams, — they arose all at the moment of waking. Up to the waking of the rational consciousness there was no life: the concept of the past life formed itself at the waking of the rational consciousness.

Man lived like an animal during his childhood, and knew nothing of life. If a man lived ten months, he would not know anything of his own, nor of any other life: he would know as little as if he died in his mother's womb. And not only a babe, but also a demented grown man and a complete idiot cannot know that they live and that other beings live. And so they have no human life.

Human life begins only with the manifestation of rational consciousness, which at the same time reveals to a man his life, in the present and in the past, and the lives of other entities, and everything which inevitably results from the relations of these entities, — sufferings and death, — precisely what produces in him the negation of the good of the personal life and the contradiction which, as he thinks, arrests his life.

Man wants to define his life in time, as he defines all visible existence outside of him, and suddenly there awakens in him life, which does not coincide with the time of his carnal birth, and he does not want to believe that that which is not defined in time can be life. But no matter how much man may seek in time that point

from which he may count the beginning of his rational life, he will never find it.[1]

In his recollections he will never find this point, this beginning of his rational consciousness. It seems to him that the rational consciousness has always existed in him. If he does find something resembling a beginning of consciousness, he does not find it in his carnal birth, but in a sphere which has nothing in common with his carnal birth. He cognizes his rational consciousness quite differently from what his carnal birth appears to him to be. Asking himself about the origin of his rational consciousness, man never imagines that, as a rational being, he is the son of his father and mother, the grandson of his grandparents, who were born in such and such a year; he is conscious, not exactly of being a son, but of being united in one with the consciousness of rational beings most foreign to him in time and space, who may have lived thousands of years before and at the other end of the world. In his rational consciousness man does not even see any origin of himself, but is conscious of his extra-temporal and extra-spatial union with other rational beings, so that they enter into him and he into them. This rational

[1] Nothing is more common than to hear discussions about the inception and evolution of human life and of life in general in time. People who discuss in this manner imagine that they are standing on the firmest ground of reality, and yet there is nothing more fantastic than the discussions about the evolution of life in time. These discussions are like what a man would do, who, wishing to measure a line, would not lay off the measure from the one known point on which he is standing, but would select imaginary points at various indefinite distances from himself, and would begin to measure from them toward himself. Do not people do the same, when they discuss the inception and evolution of life in man? Indeed, where on that endless line, which represents the evolution of human life in the past, are we to take that arbitrary point from which we may begin the fantastic history of the evolution of this life? Is it in the birth or inception of the child, or of his parents, or still farther back, in the primeval animal and protoplasm, in the first bit broken loose from the sun? All these discussions will be most arbitrary fancies, — mensuration without a measure. — *Author's Note.*

consciousness, which is awakened in man, arrests, as it were, that semblance of life which erring men regard as life: to the erring men it seems that their life is arrested at the very moment when it awakens.

VIII.

THERE IS NO DOUBLING AND NO CONTRADICTION: THEY APPEAR ONLY WITH THE FALSE TEACHING

It is only the false teaching about the human life being the animal existence from birth to death, in which men are brought up and maintained, that produces the agonizing condition of doubling, into which men enter at the manifestation of their rational consciousness in them.

To a man who is under this delusion it appears that life is doubled in him.

Man knows that his life is one, and yet he feels it as two. Rolling a small ball with the two fingers crossed over one another, one feels it to be two. Something similar takes place with a man who has acquired a wrong concept of life.

Man's reason is falsely directed: he has been taught to recognize as life nothing but his carnal personal existence, which cannot be life.

With such a false concept of an imaginary life he has looked upon life, and has come to see two lives: the one, as he has imagined it to be, and the other which really is.

To such a man it seems that the negation by the rational consciousness of the good of the personal existence and the demand of another good is something morbid and unnatural.

But to a man, as a rational being, the negation of the possibility of the personal good and of life is the inevitable consequence of the conditions of the personal life and of the quality of the rational consciousness, which is

connected with it. The negation of the good and of the life of personality is for the rational being just as natural a quality of his life as it is natural for a bird to fly with its wings, and not to run with its feet. But if a feathered fledgeling runs with its feet, it does not prove that flying is not peculiar to it. If we see outside of ourselves men with a dormant consciousness, who assume that their life lies in the good of personality, this does not prove that it is improper for a man to live a rational life. The awakening of man to his true life, peculiar to him, takes place in our world with such painful tension, only because the false teaching of the world tries to convince men that the phantom of life is life itself, and that the manifestation of the true life is a violation of it.

What happens with men in our world who enter into the true life is very much like what would happen with a girl, from whom the properties of a woman should be concealed. Feeling the symptoms of sexual maturity, such a girl would consider the condition which calls her to the future family life, with the obligations and joys of a mother, a morbid and unnatural condition, which would bring her to despair.

Similar despair is experienced by the men of our world at the first signs of the awakening to the true human life.

A man in whom the rational consciousness is awakened, but who at the same time understands his life only as being personal, is in the same agonizing condition in which an animal would be, which, recognizing the motion of matter as its life, would not recognize the law of personality, but would only see its life in the subjection of self to the laws of matter, which take place without its effort. Such an animal would experience an agonizing internal contradiction and doubling. In submitting only to the laws of matter, it would see its life in nothing but lying and breathing, but its personality would demand something different of it, — nutrition of self, continuation

of species, — and then the animal would imagine that it experienced a doubling and contradiction. "Life," it would think, "lies in submitting to the laws of gravity, that is, in not moving, and lying still, and in submitting to the chemical processes which take place in the body; I am doing all this, and yet I have, in addition, to move, and feed, and seek a male or female."

The animal would be suffering, and would see an agonizing contradiction and doubling in this condition. The same takes place with a man who is taught to regard the baser law of his life, the animal personality, as the law of his life. The higher law of life, the law of his rational consciousness, demands something different of him; but all the surrounding life and the false teachings keep him in a deceptive consciousness, and he feels a contradiction and doubling.

But, as the animal, to stop suffering, must recognize as its law not the baser law of matter, but the law of its personality, and, fulfilling it, makes use of the laws of matter for the gratification of the purposes of its personality, — even so a man has to recognize his life not in the baser law of personality, but in the higher law, which includes the first law, — in the law revealed to him in his rational consciousness, — and the contradiction will be destroyed, and the personality will be freely submitted to the rational consciousness and will serve it.

IX.

THE BIRTH OF THE TRUE LIFE IN MAN

As we analyze in time and observe the manifestation of life in the human being, we see that the true life is always preserved in man, as it is in the seed, and the time comes when this life is made manifest. The manifestation of the true life consists in this, that the animal personality draws him toward its own good, while the rational consciousness shows him the impossibility of the personal good and points out a certain other good. Man strains his vision toward this good, which is pointed out to him in the distance, and he is not able to see it; at first he does not believe in this good and returns to the personal good; but the rational consciousness, which points so indefinitely at its good, shows so indubitably and so convincingly the impossibility of the personal good that man again renounces his personal good and again scans this new good, which is pointed out to him. The rational good is not visible, but the personal good is so thoroughly destroyed that it is impossible to continue the personal existence; and in man there is being established a new relation of his animal to his rational consciousness. He is being born to the new human life.

What takes place is similar to what happens in the material world at every birth. The fruit is not born because it wants to be born, because it is better for it to be born, and because it knows that it is good to be born, but because it is mature, and it cannot continue its former existence; it is compelled to surrender to the new life.

not so much because the new life calls it, as because the possibility of the former existence is destroyed.

The rational consciousness, growing imperceptibly up in his personality, reaches a point when the life in the personality becomes impossible.

What takes place is precisely what happens at the inception of everything: the same destruction of the seed, of the previous form of life, and the appearance of a new growth; the same seeming struggle of the older form of the decomposing seed and the increase of the new growth, and the same nutrition of the new growth at the expense of the decomposing seed. The difference between the birth of the rational consciousness and the visible carnal inception consists for us in this, that while in the carnal birth we see in time and in space out of what, and how, and when a being is born of the germ, know that the seed is the fruit, that from the seed under certain conditions the plant will come, that it will have a flower and then a fruit, like the seed (the circle of life takes place under our very eyes), — we do not see the growth of the rational consciousness in time, we do not see the completion of its circle. We do not see this growth of the rational consciousness and the completion of its circle, because we ourselves complete it: our life is nothing but the birth of that invisible essence which is born in us, and so we can never see it.

We cannot see the birth of this new essence, the new relation of the rational consciousness to the animal, just as the seed cannot see the growth of its stalk. When the rational consciousness comes out of its concealed position and is made manifest for us, it seems to us that we are experiencing a contradiction. But there is no contradiction, just as there is none in the sprouting seed. In the sprouting seed, we see only that life, which before was in the integument of the seed, is now in its sprout. Even so there is no contradiction in man with his awakened

rational consciousness, but only the birth of a new being, of a new relation of the rational consciousness to the animal.

If a man exists, without knowing that other entities exist and that enjoyments will not satisfy him, — that he will die, — he does not even know that he lives, and there is no contradiction in him.

But if a man has come to see that other entities are just such as he himself is, that sufferings await him, that his existence is a slow death; if his rational consciousness has begun to decompose the existence of his personality, he no longer can put his life in this decomposing personality, but inevitably must place it in that new life which is revealed to him. And so there is again no contradiction, as there is no contradiction in the seed which has sent forth a sprout and, therefore, is decomposing.

X.

REASON IS THAT LAW COGNIZED BY MAN, BY WHICH HIS LIFE IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED

MAN'S true life, which is manifested in the relation of his rational consciousness to his animal personality, begins only when there begins the negation of his animal personality; but the negation of the good of the animal personality begins when the rational consciousness is awakened.

But what is the rational consciousness? The Gospel of John begins with this, that the word λόγος (reason, wisdom, word) is the beginning, and that in it is everything, and everything from it; and that, therefore, reason, that which defines everything else, cannot be defined by anything.

Reason cannot be defined, and there is no reason for defining it, because we all not merely know it, but know nothing else. In communing with one another, we are convinced in advance — more than in anything else — of the equal obligatoriness of this reason which is common to us all. Reason we know more correctly and earlier than anything else, so that everything which we know in the world we know only because what is cognized by us agrees with the laws of this reason, which is incontestably known to us. We know reason, and cannot help knowing it. We cannot help it, because reason is that law according to which the rational beings — men — must inevitably live. Reason is for man that law according to which his life is accomplished, just such a

law as the one for which the animal, according to which it feeds and multiplies, — as that law for the plant, according to which it grows, and the grass, the tree blooms, as the law for the heavenly body, according to which the earth and the luminaries move.

The law which we know in ourselves as the law of our life is the same law according to which all the external phenomena of the world are accomplished, but with this difference, that in us we know this law as that which we ourselves must accomplish, while in the external phenomena we know it as that which takes place according to this law without our participation. Everything which we know of the world is only the visible submission to reason, which is taking place outside us, in the heavenly bodies, in the animals, the plants, the whole world. In the external world we see this submission to the law of reason; but in ourselves we know this law as that which we must ourselves accomplish.

The habitual delusion about life consists in this, that the subjection of our animal body to its law, which is not accomplished by us, but is only seen by us, is taken for the human life, while this law of our animal body, with which our rational consciousness is connected, is in our animal body accomplished as unconsciously as it is accomplished in the tree, the crystal, the heavenly body. But the law of our life — the subjection of our animal body to reason — is that law which we see nowhere, and cannot see, because it has not yet been accomplished, and is being accomplished by us in our life. In the accomplishment of this law, in the subjection of the animal personality to the law of reason, for the purpose of obtaining the good, does our life consist. By failing to understand this, that our good and our life consist in the subjection of our animal personality to the law of reason, by accepting the good and the existence of our animal personality as our whole life and renouncing the task of

life, which is set for us, we deprive ourselves of our true good and of our true life, and in its place put that visible existence of our animal activity, which is accomplished independently of us, and so cannot be our life.

XI.

THE FALSE DIRECTION OF KNOWLEDGE

The delusion that the visible law, which operates on our animal personality, is the law of our life is an old delusion, into which men have fallen at all times. This delusion, by concealing from men the chief object of their cognition, the subjection of the animal personality to reason for the purpose of obtaining the good of life, puts in its place the study of the existence of men, which is independent of the good of life.

Instead of studying the law, to which, for the purpose of obtaining its good, man's animal personality must be subjected, and instead of studying all the other phenomena of the world on the basis of the cognition of this law, the false knowledge directs its efforts only to the study of the good and of the existence of man's animal personality, without the least reference to the chief subject of knowledge, — the subjection of this animal personality of man to the law of reason, for the purpose of obtaining the good of the true life.

The false cognition, by not having in view this chief object of knowledge, directs its forces to the study of the animal existence of men past and present and to the study of the conditions of man's existence in general, as an animal. It appears to him that from these studies may be found the guidance for the good of the human life.

The false knowledge judges as follows: Men have existed heretofore, — so let us see how they existed, through what changes they passed in their existence both

in time and space, and whither these changes tend. From these historical changes of their existence we shall find the law of their life.

By not having in view the chief aim of knowledge, — the study of that rational law to which man's personality ought to be subjected for the sake of his good, — the so-called learned men of this category, by the very aim which they set for their investigation, pass sentence on the vanity of all study. Indeed, if the existence of men changes only in consequence of the general laws of their animal existence, the study of those laws to which it is subject anyway is quite useless and void. Whether men know about the law of the change of their existence, or not, this law is accomplished just as the change in the life of moles and beavers is accomplished in consequence of those conditions under which they live. But if the knowledge of that rational law to which man's life must be subjected is possible for him, it is evident that he can not find the knowledge of this law of reason anywhere except where it has been revealed to him, — in his rational consciousness. And so, no matter how much men may study how men have existed as animals, they will never find out anything about the existence of men, which does not take place in them even without this knowledge; and never, no matter how much they may study man's animal existence, will they find out that law to which, for the good of his life, this animal existence of man must be subjected.

This is one category of barren human reflections on life, which are called historical and political sciences.

Another category of reflections, which are especially common in our time, and with which the only object of knowledge is entirely lost sight of, is this: In viewing man as an object of observation, we see, say the learned, that he feeds, grows, multiplies, ages, and dies, like any other animal; but certain psychic phenomena (so they call them)

interfere with the exactness of the observations and offer too great a complexity, and so, in order that we may better understand man, we shall view his life first in simpler manifestations, such as resemble those which we see in the animals and plants, which are deprived of this psychic activity. But, when we view the animals and plants, we see that in all of them there are manifested still simpler laws of matter, which are common to them all. And since the laws of the animals are simpler than the laws of man, and the laws of plants are still simpler, and the laws of matter still simpler, we must base the investigations on the very simplest, — on the laws of matter. We see that what takes place in the plants and animals takes place in the same way in man, they say, and so we conclude that everything which takes place in man will be explained to us from what takes place in the simplest visible inanimate matter which is subject to our experiments, — the more so since all the peculiarities of man's activity are in a constant dependence on the forces which are active in matter. Every modification in the matter which forms man's body changes and impairs his activity. And so, they conclude, the laws of matter are the causes of man's activity. They are not troubled by the reflection that in man there is something which we do not see in the animals, nor in the plants, nor in the dead matter, and that this something is the only object of knowledge, without which every other is useless.

It does not occur to them that, if the modification of matter in man's body impairs his activity, this proves only that the modification of matter is one of the causes which impair man's activity, and not that the motion of matter is the cause of man's activity. Just so the damage done to a plant by the removal of the earth beneath its roots proves only that the earth may be everywhere, or not, but not that the plant is the product of earth. And so they study in man what takes place in the dead matter,

and in the plant, and in the animal, assuming that the elucidation of the laws of the phenomena which correspond to man's life make clear to them man's very life.

In order that we may understand man's life, that is, that law to which, for the sake of man's good, his animal personality is to be subjected, men view either man's historical existence, and not his life, or the uncognizable and merely visible subjection of the animal, the plant, and the dead matter to various laws, that is, they do the same which men do who study the condition of unknown objects, in order that they might find that unknown aim which they ought to follow.

It is quite true that the knowledge of the visible manifestation of men's existence in history may be instructive for us, and that the study of the laws of the animal personality of man and of other animals, and the study of the laws to which matter itself is subject, may be just as instructive to us. The study of all that is important for man, showing him, as in a reflection, what necessarily takes place in his life; but it is evident that the knowledge of what has already taken place and is visible to us, no matter how full it may be, cannot give us the chief knowledge which we need, — the knowledge of the law to which our animal personality must be subjected for the sake of our good. The knowledge of the laws which are operating is instructive for us, but only when we recognize that law of reason to which our animal personality must be subordinated, and not when this law is not at all recognized.

No matter how well a tree may study (if it could study) all the chemical and physical phenomena which takes place in it, it could not from these observations and this knowledge in any way arrive at the necessity of collecting sap and distributing it for the growth of its trunk to the leaf, the flower, and the fruit.

Even so is man: no matter how well he may know

the law governing his animal personality, and the laws governing matter, these laws do not give him the least indications as to how he is to act with that piece of bread which he has in his hands, — whether to give it to his wife, a stranger, his dog, or eat it himself; whether to defend this piece, or give it to him who asks him for it. But the life of man consists only in the solution of these and similar questions.

The study of the laws governing the existence of animals, plants, and matter is not only useful, but even necessary for the elucidation of the law of man's life, but only when this study has for its aim the chief object of human knowledge, — the elucidation of the law of reason.

But with the supposition that man's life is only his animal existence, and that the good, as pointed out by the rational consciousness, is impossible, and that the law of reason is only a phantom, such a study becomes not only void, but also pernicious, in that it conceals from man his only object of cognition and supports him in that error that by studying the reflection of an object he may know the object itself. Such a study is like what a man would do if he carefully studied all the changes and movements of the shadow of a living being, thinking that the cause of the motion of the living being is to be sought in the changes and movements of his shadow.

XII.

THE CAUSE OF THE FALSE KNOWLEDGE IS THE FALSE PERSPECTIVE IN WHICH OBJECTS PRESENT THEMSELVES

"TRUE knowledge consists in knowing that we know what we know, and do not know what we do not know," said Confucius; "but false knowledge consists in thinking that we know what we do not know, and do not know what we know." It is impossible to give a more exact definition of that false knowledge which reigns among us. The false knowledge of our time assumes that we know what we cannot know, and that we cannot know what alone we know. To a man with false knowledge it appears that he knows everything which appears to him in space and time, and that he does not know what is known to him in his rational consciousness.

To such a man it appears that the good in general and his good in particular are for him a subject of which he can know least. Just as unknowable appears to him his reason, his rational consciousness; he himself, as an animal, appears to himself as a little more knowable object; still more knowable objects are for him the animals and plants, and most knowable appears to him the dead, infinitely distributed matter.

Something similar takes place with man's vision. A man always unconsciously directs his vision preferably to most distant objects, which, consequently, appear to him most simple in colour and contour, — to the sky, the horizon, the distant fields, the woods. These objects present themselves the more clearly defined and simple,

the farther they are removed, and, on the other hand, the nearer an object is, the more complicated are its outlines and colour.

If a man were not able to define the distance of objects, if he did not in looking arrange the objects in perspective, but recognized the greater simplicity and definiteness of the outlines and the colour of the objects as a greater degree of visibility, the simplest and most visible would to him appear the endless heaven, then less visible the more complex outlines of the horizon, then still less visible the houses and trees, which are more complex in colour and outline, and still less visible the hand which is moving in front of his eyes, and least visible of all, the light.

Is not the same true of the false knowledge of man? What is indubitably known to him, his rational consciousness, seems to him unknowable, because it is not simple, while what is incomprehensible for him, the infinite and eternal matter, seems to him most knowable, because on account of its distance from him it appears to him simple.

But the reverse is true. First of all and with the greatest certainty every man may know and does know that good toward which he is striving; then he knows with the same certainty that reason which shows him this good; then only he knows his animal personality, which is subjected to this reason, and then only he sees, but does not know, all the other phenomena, which present themselves to him in space and time.

It is only to a man with the false concept of life that it appears that he knows the objects better the more they are determined in space and time; but in reality we know fully only that which is not determined in space, or time, — the good and the law of reason; but the external objects we know less, in proportion as our consciousness takes less part in the cognition, in consequence of which an object is defined only by its place in space and time.

And so, the more exclusively an object is defined by space and time, the less it is knowable for man.

Man's true knowledge ends with the cognition of his personality, of his animal. This animal of his, which strives after the good and is subject to the law of reason, man knows quite distinctly from the knowledge of everything which is not his personality. He really knows himself in this animal, and knows himself not because he is something spatial and temporal (on the contrary,— he can never know himself as a temporal and spatial manifestation), but because he is something which for the sake of its good must be subjected to the law of reason. He knows himself in this animal as something independent of time and space. When he asks himself about his place in time and space, it appears to him first of all that he is standing in the midst of time which is infinite on either side, and that he is the centre of a globe, whose periphery is everywhere and nowhere. And it is this extra-temporal and extra-spatial self that man knows in reality, and with this ego of his ends his real knowledge. Everything which is outside this ego man does not know, and can only observe and define in an external, conditional manner.

By renouncing for a time the knowledge of himself as a rational centre which is striving after the good, that is, as an extra-temporal and extra-spatial being, man may for a time admit conditionally that he is a part of the visible universe, which manifests itself in space and time. By viewing himself thus, in space and time, in connection with other beings, man unites his true inner knowledge of himself with an external observation of himself, and receives the notion of himself as of a man in general, resembling all other men; from this conditional knowledge of himself man gets a certain external notion of other men as well, but he does not know them.

The impossibility for man of getting a true knowledge of

men is due even to this, that he sees not merely one such man, but hundreds and thousands of them, and knows that there are, have been, and will be such men, whom he has never seen and never will see.

Beyond men, at a still greater distance from himself, man sees in space and time animals which differ from men and from one another. These beings would be entirely incomprehensible to him, if he did not have any knowledge of man in general; but, since he has this knowledge and abstracts from the concept of man his rational consciousness, he gets a certain notion also about the animals; but this notion still less resembles knowledge for him than his notion of men in general. Of animals he sees the greatest variety and in enormous numbers, and the greater their numbers, the less possible can his knowledge of them obviously be.

Still farther away from himself, he sees the plants, and the distribution of these phenomena is still greater in the world, and so the knowledge of them is still more impossible.

Still farther away from himself, beyond the animals and plants, in space and time, man sees the dead bodies and the feebly, or not at all, differentiated forms of matter. Matter he understands least of all. The knowledge of the forms of matter is for him quite indifferent, and he not only fails to know it, but merely imagines it, — the more so since matter presents itself to him as infinite in space and time.

XIII.

THE KNOWABLENESS OF OBJECTS DOES NOT INCREASE IN CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR MANIFESTATION IN SPACE AND TIME, BUT IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNITY OF THE LAW TO WHICH WE AND ALL THE OBJECTS WHICH WE STUDY ARE SUBJECT

What can be more intelligible than the words: the dog has a pain; the calf is gentle, — it loves me; the bird is glad, the horse is afraid, a good man, a bad animal? Now all these most important and intelligible words are not defined in space and time; on the contrary: the less intelligible the law is to which the phenomenon is subject, the more exactly is the phenomenon defined in time and space. Who can say that he understands that law of gravitation according to which the motion of the earth and the sun takes place? And yet the eclipse of the sun is most exactly defined in space and time.

We know completely only our life, our striving after the good, and reason, which points this good out to us. Next in certainty is the knowledge of our animal personality, which strives toward the good and is subject to the law of reason. In the knowledge of our animal personality there appear already spatial and temporal conditions, visible, sensible, observable, but inaccessible to our understanding. Next in certainty is the knowledge of just such animal personalities as we are, in whom we recognize a common striving toward the good and a common rational consciousness. We know them to the extent to which the life of these personalities approximates the laws of

our life, of the striving after the good, and of the subjection to the law of reason; we do not know them to the extent to which their life is manifested in spatial and temporal conditions. Thus we know men most. Next in certitude is our knowledge of animals, in which we see a personality striving, like our own, after the good; but we here barely recognize a semblance of our rational consciousness, and with them we can no longer commune by means of this our rational consciousness. Next after the animals we see the plants, in which we with difficulty recognize a personality, like our own, striving after the good. These beings present themselves to us mainly as temporal and spatial phenomena, and so are still less accessible to our knowledge.

We know them, only because in them we see a personality, resembling our animal personality, which, like our own, strives after the good and subjects matter to the law of reason manifested in it, in the conditions of space and time.

Still less accessible to our knowledge are impersonal, material objects; in these we no longer find a similitude of our personality, no longer see a striving after the good, but only temporal and spatial manifestations of the laws of reason, to which they are subject.

The correctness of our knowledge does not depend on the observableness of objects in space and time; on the contrary, the more observable a manifestation of an object is in space and time, the less comprehensible it is for us.

Our knowledge of the world results from the consciousness of our striving after the good, and from the necessity, for the sake of obtaining this good, of subjecting our animal to reason. If we know the life of an animal, we know it only because we see in the animal also a striving after the good and a necessity of submitting to the law of reason, which in the animal presents itself as the law of the organism.

If we know matter, we know it only because, though its good is not comprehensible to us, we none the less see in it the same phenomenon as in ourselves, — the necessity of submitting to the law of reason which governs it.

The knowledge of anything is for us the transference to other objects of our knowledge of the fact that life is a striving after the good, which is obtained by submitting to the law of reason.

Everything which a man knows of the external world he knows only because he knows himself and in himself finds three different relations to the world: one — the relation of his rational consciousness, the second — the relation of his animal, and the third — the relation of matter which enters the body of his animal. He knows in himself these three different relations, and so everything which he sees in the world is always distributed before him in the perspective of three distinct plans: (1) rational beings; (2) animals and plants, and (3) inanimate matter.

Man always sees these three categories of objects in the world, because he embraces in himself these three objects of cognition. He knows himself: (1) as rational consciousness, subordinating the animal; (2) as an animal, subject to rational consciousness, and (3) as matter, subject to the animal.

It is not from the cognition of the laws of matter, as is generally believed, that we can know the laws of the organisms, and not from the cognition of the laws of the organisms that we can know ourselves as rational beings, but vice versa. First of all, we can and must know ourselves, that is, that law of reason to which, for the sake of our good, our personality has to be subordinated, and then only can we and must we know the law of our animal personality and of entities similar to it, and, at a still more remote distance from ourselves, the laws of matter.

We must know and do know only ourselves. The world of animals is for us only a reflection of what we know in ourselves. The material world is, as it were, a reflection of a reflection.

The laws of matter seem especially clear to us, only because they are uniform for us; and they are uniform for us, only because they are particularly remote from the cognizable law of our life.

The laws of the organisms seem to us simpler than the law of our life, again on account of their remoteness from us. But in them we merely observe the laws: we do not know them, as we know the law of our rational consciousness, which has to be fulfilled by us.

We know neither the one existence, nor the other: we only see and observe it outside ourselves. What we know beyond any doubt is the law of our rational consciousness, because it is needed for our good, because we live by this consciousness; and we do not see it, because we are not in possession of that higher point from which we may observe it.

But, if there existed higher beings which would subordinate our rational consciousness in the same way in which we subordinate our animal personality, and in which the animal personality (the organism) subordinates matter, these higher beings could see our rational life, just as we see our animal existence and the existence of matter.

Man's life presents itself as insolubly connected with two forms of existence, which it embraces: the existence of animals and plants (organisms) and the existence of matter.

Man produces his own true life, — he lives through it; but in those two forms of existence which are connected with his life man cannot be a participant. The body and matter, which form him, exist in themselves.

These forms of existence present themselves to man as

lives passed through at some former time and embraced by his life, — as recollections of former lives.

In man's true life these two forms of existence represent to him the instrument and material of his labour, but not the labour itself.

It is useful for man to study both the material and instrument of his labour. The better he knows them, the better he will be able to work. The study of these forms of existence which are included in his life — of his animal and of the matter forming the animal — shows to man, as though in a reflection, the general law of everything in existence, — the submission to the law of reason, and so confirms him in the necessity of the submission of his animal to this law; but man cannot and must not mistake the material and the instrument of his labour for the labour itself.

No matter how much man may study life which is visible, sensible, observable in himself and in others, — life which is accomplished without his efforts, this life always remains a mystery to him; from these observations he will never comprehend this unknowable life, and by means of observations on this mysterious life, which is always concealed from him in the infinitude of space and time, he will never illuminate his true life, which is revealed to him in his consciousness, and which consists in the subjection of his unique and most familiar animal personality to the unique and most familiar law of reason, for the purpose of obtaining his unique and most familiar good for himself.

XIV.

MAN'S TRUE LIFE IS NOT WHAT TAKES PLACE IN SPACE AND TIME

MAN knows his life in him as a striving after the good, which is obtainable by the submission of his animal personality to the law of reason.

Another human life he does not know and cannot know. Indeed, man only then acknowledges an animal to be alive, when its composing matter is subject not only to its own laws, but also to the higher law of the organism.

If in a certain combination of matter there is a subjection to the higher law of the organism, we recognize life in this combination of matter; if this subjection does not exist, — if it has not yet begun, or has come to an end, — and if that no longer exists which separates this matter from all the other matter, in which nothing but mechanical, chemical, physical laws act, we do not recognize in it any animal life.

Even so we only then recognize ourselves and similar beings as living, when our animal personality, in addition to the subjection of the organism to its law, is also subjected to the higher law of rational consciousness.

As long as this subjection of the personality to the law of reason does not exist, as long as in man acts only the law of personality, subduing the matter which composes it, we do not know and do not see the human life either in others or in ourselves, as we do not see the animal life in the matter which submits only to its own laws.

No matter how strong or quick the movements of

man may be in delirium, in insanity, or in agony, in intoxication, and even in an outburst of passion, we do not recognize man as living, do not treat him as a living man, and recognize in him only the possibility of life. But no matter how feeble or immovable a man may be, — if we see that his animal personality is subject to reason, we recognize him as living and treat him accordingly.

Human life we cannot understand otherwise than as subjection of the animal personality to the law of reason.

This life is manifested in time and space, but is not determined by temporal or spatial conditions, but only by the degree of the subjection of the animal personality to reason. To determine life by temporal and spatial conditions is the same as defining the height of an object by its length and breadth.

The upward motion of an object, which at the same time moves on a plane, will be an exact similitude of the relation of man's true life to the life of the animal personality, or of the true life to the temporal and spatial life. The upward motion of the object does not depend on the motion on the plane, and cannot be increased or diminished by it. The same is true of the determination of man's life. The true life is always made manifest in the personality, but does not depend on this or that existence of the personality, and cannot be increased or diminished by it.

The temporal and spatial conditions, in which man's animal personality happens to be, cannot influence the true life, which consists in the subjection of the animal personality to the rational consciousness.

It is beyond the power of man, who wants to live, to destroy or arrest the spatial and temporal motion of his existence; but his true life is the attainment of the good by means of subjection to reason, independently of these visible spatial and temporal motions. In this greater and ever greater attainment of the good by means of the sub-

jection to reason lies that which forms the human life. If this increase in the subjection be wanting, the human life goes in the two visible directions of space and of time, and is nothing but existence. If this upward motion exists, — this greater and ever greater submission to reason, a relation is established between the two forces and the one, and a greater or lesser motion along the resultant takes place and raises existence into the sphere of life.

The spatial and temporal forces are definite, final forces, which are incompatible with the concept of life; but the force of striving after the good through submission to reason is a force which raises upward, — it is the force of life itself, for which there are no temporal, no spatial limitations.

Man imagines that his life is arrested or doubled, but these arrests and perturbations are only an illusion of consciousness (like the illusion of the external sensations). There are no arrests and perturbations of the true life, and there can be none: they only seem so to us with our false view of life.

A man begins to live a true life, that is, rises to a certain height above the animal life, and from this height sees the phantasmal condition of his animal existence, which inevitably ends in death, and that his existence on the plane is on all sides limited by abysses, and, as he does not acknowledge that this upward tendency is life, he is terrified at what is revealed to him from his height, and purposely descends and lies down as low as possible, in order that he may not see the precipices that are open to him. But the force of his rational consciousness lifts him up again, and again he sees, again he is terrified, and again he descends to earth, in order that he may not see. This lasts until he finally recognizes that, in order to save himself from the terror before the precipitous motion of perishable life, he must understand that his motion in the plane — his spatial and temporal existence — is not his

life, that his life is only in the upward motion, and that only in the subjection of his personality to the law of reason does the possibility of the good and of life consist. He must understand that he has wings which raise him above the precipice, that, if he did not possess these wings, he would never have risen to the height and have seen the precipice. He must have faith in his wings and fly whither they carry him.

Only from this want of assurance arise those perturbations of the true life, its arrests and the doubling of consciousness, which at first appear so strange.

Only to a man who understands his life in the animal existence as defined by space and by time does it appear that the rational consciousness has been manifested at times in the animal existence. Looking thus upon the manifestation in himself of the rational consciousness, man asks himself when and under what conditions his rational consciousness appeared in him. But no matter how much a man may investigate his past, he will never discover these times of the manifestation of his rational consciousness: it always seems to him that either it has never existed, or has existed at all times. If it appears to him that there have been intervals of his rational consciousness, this is due to the fact that he does not recognize the life of the rational consciousness as life. By understanding his life only as animal existence, as defined by spatial and temporal conditions, man wants to measure the awakening and the activity of the rational consciousness with the same measure: he asks himself, "When, how long, under what conditions have I been in possession of the rational consciousness?" but the intervals between the awakenings of the rational life exist only for a man who understands his life as the life of the animal personality. For a man who understands his life to be in what it is, — in the activity of the rational consciousness, — these intervals do not exist.

The rational life exists. It alone exists. Intervals of time, whether of one minute or of fifty thousand years, are immaterial for it, because time does not exist for it. Man's true life — from which he forms for himself a concept of any other life — is a striving after the good, obtainable by the subjection of his personality to the law of reason. Neither reason, nor the degree of subjection to reason, are defined by space or by time. Man's true life takes place outside space and time.

XV.

THE RENUNCIATION OF THE GOOD OF ANIMAL PERSONALITY IS THE LAW OF HUMAN LIFE

Life is the striving after the good. The striving after the good is life. Thus all men have always understood life, and thus they will always understand it. Consequently man's life is a striving after the human good, and the striving after the human good is human life. The crowd, the unthinking people, understand man's good to lie in the good of his animal personality.

The false science, by excluding the concept of the good from the definition of life, understands life to be in the animal existence, and so it sees the good of life only in the animal good and coincides with the errors of the crowd.

In either case the error is due to the confusion of the personality, of the individuality, as science calls it, with the rational consciousness. Rational consciousness includes personality; but personality does not include rational consciousness. Personality is a property of an animal, and of man as an animal. Rational consciousness is the property of man alone.

An animal can live for its body only, — nothing prevents it from living so; it gratifies its personality, and unconsciously serves its species, and does not know that it is a personality; but rational man cannot live for his body alone. He cannot live so, because he knows that he is a personality, and so he knows that other beings are just such personalities as he, and he knows what must happen from the relations of these personalities.

If man strove only after the good of his personality and loved only himself, his personality, he would not know that other beings love themselves, just as animals do not know it; but if man knows that he is a personality striving after the same that all the beings surrounding him strive after, he can no longer strive after the good which is visible to his rational consciousness as evil, and his life can no longer consist in the striving after the good of personality. It only seems at times to man that his striving after the good has for its object the gratification of the demands of his animal personality. This deception is due to this, that man takes what he sees to be going on in his animal as the aim of the activity of his rational consciousness. What takes place is like what a man would do if he were guided in his wakeful state by what he sees in his dream.

And then, if this deception is maintained by the false teachings, there takes place in man the confusion of the personality with the rational consciousness.

But the rational consciousness always shows man that the gratification of the demands of his animal personality cannot be his good, and, therefore, his life, and irrepressibly draws him toward that good and, therefore, toward that life, which is peculiar to him and is not contained in his animal personality.

People generally think and say that the renunciation of the good of personality is a heroic deed, a praiseworthy quality in man. The renunciation of the good of personality is not a praiseworthy quality, a heroic deed, but an inevitable condition of man's life. At the same time that man recognizes himself as a personality distinct from the whole world he recognizes also other personalities as distinct from the whole world, and their mutual connection, and the phantasm of the good of his personality, and the actuality of only such a good as can satisfy his rational consciousness.

For an animal an activity which has not for its aim the good of personality, but is directly opposed to this good, is a negation of life: but for man it is the very opposite. Man's activity which is directed only to the acquisition of the good of personality is a full negation of human life.

For an animal, which has no rational consciousness that shows to it the wretchedness and finality of its existence, the good of personality and the resulting continuation of the species of the personality are the highest aim of life. But for man personality is only that stage of his existence from which the true good of his life, which does not coincide with the good of his personality, is revealed to him.

The consciousness of the personality is for man not life, but that limit at which his life begins, that life which consists in a greater and ever greater attainment of the good which is peculiar to him, and which is independent of the good of the animal personality.

According to the current conception of life, man's life is a piece of time from the birth to the death of his animal. But this is not man's life; it is only man's existence as an animal personality. Man's life is something which is manifested only in animal existence, just as organic life is something which is manifested only in the existence of matter.

The visible aims of man's personality at first appear to him as the aims of his life. These aims are visible and so seem intelligible.

But the aims which are indicated to him by his rational consciousness seem unintelligible, because they are invisible. At first it is hard for a man to renounce the visible and abandon himself to the invisible.

To a man who is corrupted by the false teachings of the world, the demands of the animal, which are accomplished of themselves and are visible, both in himself and

in others, seem simple and clear, while the new, invisible demands of the rational consciousness appear as contradictory; their gratification, which is not accomplished of itself, but is the action of the person, appears complex and obscure. One feels terribly and ill at ease in renouncing the visible conception of life and abandoning oneself to its invisible consciousness, just as a child would feel terribly and ill at ease when it is born, if it could feel its birth; — but what is to be done, since it is obvious that the visible conception leads to death, and the invisible consciousness alone gives life?

XVI.

THE ANIMAL PERSONALITY IS AN INSTRUMENT OF LIFE

No reflections can conceal from man that obvious, undoubted truth that his personal existence is something constantly perishing, tending toward death, and that, therefore, there can be no life in his animal personality.

Man cannot help but see that the existence of his personality from birth and childhood to old age and death is nothing but a constant waste and diminution of this animal personality, which ends in inevitable death; and so the consciousness of his life in the personality, which includes the desire for the increase and indestructibleness of the personality, cannot help but be a constant contradiction, and the suffering cannot help but be an evil, whereas the only meaning of his life is a striving after the good.

No matter what the true good of man may consist in, his renunciation of the good of his animal personality is inevitable for him.

The renunciation of the good of the animal personality is a law of human life. If it is not accomplished freely, finding its expression in the subjection to the rational consciousness, it is accomplished in each man violently at the carnal death of his animal, when under the burden of his suffering he wishes this much: to be freed from the agonizing consciousness of the perishing personality, and to pass over to another kind of existence.

Man's entrance into life and life itself are like what takes place with a horse which the master takes out of the

stable and hitches to a wagon. The horse, upon coming out of the stable and seeing the light and feeling its freedom, imagines that life lies in this freedom, but it is hitched to the wagon and the reins are pulled. It feels a load at its back, and if it thinks that its life consists in running at large, it struggles, and falls, and at times is killed. If it is not killed, it has but two ways out: either it will pull the load, and will find out that the load is not so heavy and the pulling not a torture, but a pleasure, or it will become unmanageable, and then the master will take it to the treadmill, will tie it with a rope to the wall, and the wheel will begin to turn under it, and it will walk in the darkness in one spot and suffer, but its strength will not be lost in vain: it will do its unwilling labour, and the law will be accomplished upon it. The only difference will be, that the first will work cheerfully, and the second unwillingly and painfully.

"But what is this personality for, whose good I, the man, must renounce, in order that I may obtain life?" say people who recognize their animal existence as life. "Why is this consciousness of personality given to man, if it is opposed to the manifestation of the true life?"

This question may be answered by a similar question, which an animal striving after its aims of preserving its life and species might put.

For what purpose, it would ask, are this matter and its laws, mechanical, physical, chemical, and other laws, with which it has to struggle, in order that it may attain its ends? "If it is my vocation," the animal would say, "to materialize the life of the animal, why are there so many barriers which I must overcome?"

It is clear to us that all matter and its laws, with which the animal struggles, and which it subjects to itself for the existence of its animal personality, are not barriers, but means for the attainment of its ends. The animal lives by nothing but the transformation of matter and by

its laws. Even so it is in the life of man. The animal personality, in which man finds himself and which he is called to submit to his rational consciousness, is not a barrier, but a means for attaining the aims of his good: the animal personality is for man that tool with which he works. The animal personality is for man that spade which is given to the rational being that it may dig with it and, digging, dull it and sharpen it again, and waste it away, but not to clean it and put it away. It is the talent given him for increase, and not to be hid in the ground.

"He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." In these words it says that it is impossible to keep what must perish and perishes without cessation, and that only by renouncing what perishes and must perish, — our animal personality, do we get our true life, which does not perish and cannot perish. It says that our true life begins only when we cease regarding as life what has not been and could not be life for us, — our animal existence. It says that he who will keep the spade, which he has for the purpose of obtaining by it food for the sustenance of his life, will, by saving the spade, lose both his food and his life.

XVII.

BIRTH BY THE SPIRIT

"You must be born again," says Christ. Not that man is ordered by any one to be born anew, but that man is inevitably brought to it. To have life, he must be born again in this existence through his rational consciousness.

The rational consciousness is given to man in order that he may place his life in that good which is revealed to him through his rational consciousness. He who places his life in this good, has life; but he who does not place his life in it, but in the good of the animal personality, by this very fact deprives himself of life. In this consists the definition of life as given by Christ.

Men who recognize as life their striving after the good of personality, hear these words and, not that they do not acknowledge them, — they do not understand them, and cannot understand them. These words appear to them either meaningless, or meaning very little, — designating a certain turgidly sentimental and mystical mood, as they like to call it. They cannot understand the meaning of these words, which express an explanation of a condition which is incomprehensible to them, just as a dry, intact seed could not comprehend the condition of a moist and germinating seed. For the dry kernels the sun, which with its beams shines on the seed springing into life, is only a meaningless incident, — a little more heat and light; but for the germinating seed it is the cause of birth to life. Even so for men, who have not reached the inner contradiction of the animal personality and the rational

consciousness, the light of the sun of reason is only a meaningless incident and sentimental, mystical words. The sun brings only those to life in whom life has already begun to germinate.

No one has ever found out how it germinates, why, when, where, not only in man, but also in the animal and the plant. Of its germination in man Christ has said that no one knows this, nor ever can know.

Indeed, what can man know of how life is germinating in him? Life is the light of men, life is life, — the beginning of everything; how, then, can man know how it germinates? What germinates and perishes for man is that which does not live, which is manifested in time and space; but the true life *is*, and so, as far as man is concerned, it can neither germinate nor perish.

XVIII.

THE DEMANDS OF THE RATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Yes, the rational consciousness tells man indubitably and incontrovertibly that with that structure of the world which he knows out of his personality, there can be no good for him, for his personality. His life is a desire for the good for himself, yes, for himself, and he sees that this good is impossible. But, strange to say, though he sees unquestionably that this good is impossible for him, he none the less lives with the one desire for this impossible good, — the good for himself alone.

A man with an awakened (only an awakened) rational consciousness, which has not yet subdued the animal personality, if he does not kill himself, lives only in order that he may realize this impossible good: he lives and acts that only he himself may obtain the good, that all men and even all beings may live and work so as to furnish him with comfort and pleasure, and that he shall experience no suffering and no death.

Strange to say, though experience, and the observation of the lives of all who surround him, and reason show incontestably to each man that it is unattainable and that it is impossible to compel other living beings to stop loving themselves, and to love only him, — in spite of this, the life of each man consists only in this, that by wealth, power, honour, glory, flattery, deceit, in one way or another, he may compel other beings to live, not for themselves, but for him alone, — to compel all beings to love not themselves, but him alone.

Men have done all they can with this aim in view, and at the same time they see that they do the impossible. "My life is a striving after the good," man says to himself. "The good is possible for me only when all will love me more than themselves; but all beings love themselves only, — consequently, all I do in order to compel them to love me is useless. It is useless, but I can do nothing else."

Ages pass: men find out the distance from the luminaries, determine their weight, find out the composition of the sun and the stars, but the question as to how the demands of the personal good are to be harmonized with the life of the world, which excludes the possibility of this good, remains for the majority of men just as insoluble a question as it was for men five thousand years ago.

The rational consciousness says to each man: "Yes, you can have the good, but only when all will love you more than themselves." And the same rational consciousness shows man that it cannot be, because they all love themselves alone. And so the only good, which is revealed to man by his rational consciousness, is again concealed by it.

Ages pass, and the riddle about the good of man's life remains the same insoluble riddle for the majority of men. Meanwhile the riddle has been solved long ago, and all those who learn the answer to the riddle always marvel how it is they did not themselves solve it: it seems to them that they knew it long ago, but only forgot it, — so simple and so obtrusive is the solution of the riddle, which has seemed so difficult amidst the false teachings of our world.

Do you want all to live for you, and all to love you more than themselves? There is but one condition under which your wish may be fulfilled. It is that condition when all beings shall live for the good of others and shall

love others more than themselves. Only then you and all beings would be loved by all, and you would among their number receive the good which you desire. But if the good is possible for you only when all beings love you more than themselves, you also, as a living being, must love other beings more than yourself.

Only with such conditions are the good and the life of man possible, and only with this condition is that destroyed which poisoned man's life, — the struggle of the beings, the agony of sufferings, and the terror of death.

Indeed, what is it that formed the impossibility of the personal existence? In the first place, the struggle among themselves of the beings seeking their personal good. In the second place, the deception of pleasures, which leads to waste of life, to satiety, and to sufferings, and, in the third place, death. But we need only admit mentally that man may exchange the striving after the good of his personality for the striving after the good of other beings, in order that the impossibility of the good be destroyed, and that the good appear to man as accessible. Looking at the world from his notion of life as a striving after the personal good, man saw in the world an irrational struggle of beings destroying one another. But he needs only acknowledge his life to consist in the striving after the good of others, in order that he may see something quite different in the world: by the side of the incidental phenomena of the struggle of the beings — a constant mutual service of these beings, a service without which the existence of the world is unthinkable.

We need only admit this, and all our former senseless activity which is directed upon the unattainable good of personality gives way to another activity, which is in harmony with the law of the world and is directed upon the attainment of the greatest possible good for oneself and for the world.

Another cause of the wretchedness of the personal life

and of the impossibility of man's good was this, — the illusoriness of the pleasures of personality, which wasted life and led to satiety and suffering. Man need only recognize his life as consisting in the striving after the good of others, and the illusory thirst of enjoyments is destroyed; but the idle and agonizing activity, which is directed to the filling of the bottomless barrel of the animal activity, gives way to an activity, in accord with the laws of reason, directed toward sustaining the life of other beings, an activity necessary for his good; and the agony of the personal suffering, which destroys the activity of man, gives way to the feeling of compassion for others, which calls to life an unquestionably fruitful and most joyful activity.

The third cause of the wretchedness of the personal life was the dread of death. Man needs only recognize his life as not consisting in the good of his animal personality, but in the good of other beings, and the scarecrow of death for ever disappears from his eyes.

The dread of death is due only to the fear of losing the good of life at its carnal death. But if man could place his good in the good of other beings, that is, if he loved them more than himself, death would not present itself to him as that cessation of the good and of life, as which it presents itself to a man who lives only for himself. To a man living for others death could not present itself as a cessation of the good and of life, because the good and life of other beings is not only not destroyed by the life of a man who serves them, but very frequently is increased and strengthened by the sacrifice of his life.

XIX.

THE CONFIRMATION OF THE DEMANDS OF THE RATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

"But this is not life," replies the provoked erring human consciousness. "This is a renunciation of life, suicide." "I know nothing of the kind," replies the rational consciousness: "I know that such is man's life, and that there is no other and can be no other. I know more than this: I know that such a life is both life and the good for man and for the whole world. I know that with the former view of the world, my life and the life of everything existing was evil and absurd; but with this view it appears as a realization of that law of reason which is implanted in man. I know that the greatest, infinitely increasable good of the life of each being may be obtained only by this law of each man serving all, and all men each."

"But if this may be a thinkable law, it is not a law of reality," replies the provoked erring consciousness of man. "Others do not love me more than themselves, and so I cannot love them more than myself and for their sake deprive myself of pleasures and submit to sufferings. I have no business with the law of reason; I want enjoyments for myself and liberation from sufferings for myself. Now there exists a struggle of the beings among themselves, and if I alone will not struggle, others will crush me. It makes no difference to me by what road the greatest welfare of all is mentally attained, — I now need the actual good for myself," says the false consciousness.

"I know nothing about this," replies the rational consciousness. "All I know is that that which you call your enjoyments will be a good for you only when you will not take them yourself, but others will give them to you; and your enjoyments will be superfluous and a source of suffering, as they now are, when you shall seize them yourself. You will be freed from actual sufferings only when others shall free you from them, and not you yourself, as you now do, when for fear of imaginary sufferings you deprive yourself of life itself.

"I know that the life of personality, a life which demands that all should love me alone, and that I should love myself only, and which would offer me the greatest number of enjoyments and would liberate me from sufferings and death, is the greatest unceasing suffering. The more I shall love myself and struggle with others, the more they will hate me and the more fiercely will they struggle with me; the more I shall defend myself against suffering, the more painful will they be; the more I shall defend myself against death, the more terrible will it be.

"I know that, no matter what a man may do, he will not receive any good unless he will live in conformity with the law of his life. But the law of his life is not struggle, but, on the contrary, a mutual service of the beings."

"But I know life only in my personality. It is impossible for me to assume my life in the good of other beings."

"I know nothing of the kind," says the rational consciousness: "I know only this much, that my life and the life of the world, which heretofore presented themselves to me as an evil absurdity, now present themselves to me as one rational whole, living and striving after one and the same good, through subjection to one and the same law of reason, which I know in myself."

"But this is impossible for me!" says the erring con-

sciousness. And yet there is no man who has not done this very impossible thing, who has not looked for the best good of his life in this very impossible thing.

"It is impossible to seek one's good in the good of other beings," — and yet there is no man who does not know a state in which the good of the beings outside of him becomes his good. "It is impossible to seek the good in labours and sufferings for another person," — but let a man abandon himself to this feeling of compassion, and the enjoyments of personality lose all meaning for him, and the force of his life passes into labours and sufferings for the good of others; and the sufferings and labours become a good for him. "It is impossible to sacrifice one's life for the good of others," but a man need only experience this feeling, and death is not only not visible and terrible to him, but appears to him as the highest accessible good.

A rational man cannot help but see that, if he admits mentally the possibility of an exchange of his striving after his own good for the striving after the good of other beings, his life, instead of its former senselessness and wretchedness, becomes rational and good. Nor can he help seeing that, by admitting the same comprehension of life in other men and beings as well, the life of the whole world, instead of what before appeared as madness and cruelty, now becomes the highest rational good which man can at all wish for: instead of the former meaninglessness and aimlessness, it now acquires for him a rational meaning. To such a man the aim of the world's life appears in an endless enlightenment and union of the beings of the world, toward which life proceeds, and in which at first men, and then all beings, submitting more and more to the law of reason, will understand (what now is given to man alone to understand) that the good of life is attained not by the striving of each being after its personal good, but by the striving, in conformity with

the law of reason, of each being after the good of all others.

More than this: if man only admits the possibility of an exchange of the striving after one's own good for the striving after the good of other beings, he cannot help but see this also, that this same gradual, increasing renunciation of his personality and the transference of the aim of his activity from himself into other beings is the forward movement of humanity and of those living beings which are nearest to man. Man cannot help but see in history that the movement of the general life does not consist in the intensification and increase of the struggle of the beings among themselves, but, on the contrary, in the diminution of the discord and the weakening of the struggle: that the movement of life consists in this alone, that the world, from hostility and discord, through subjection to reason, passes more and more to concord and union. Admitting this, man cannot help but see that those who devoured one another no longer devour one another; that those who killed captives and their own children no longer kill them; that the military who used to pride themselves on murder no longer boast of it; that those who established slavery now abolish it; that men who used to kill animals are beginning to tame them and kill them less; that instead of feeding on the flesh of animals men now begin to feed on their eggs and milk; and that the destruction in the world of plants is growing less. Man sees that the best men of humanity condemn the search after enjoyments and admonish people to be temperate, while the best men, who are extolled by posterity, show examples of sacrifices of their existence for the good of others. Man sees that what he has admitted only on account of the demands of reason is taking place in reality in the world and is confirmed by the past life of humanity.

More than this: more powerfully and more convinc-

ingly than by reason and history, this same thing, as though from another source, is pointed out to man by the striving of his heart, which, as to an immediate good, is drawing him on to the same activity which reason points out to him, and which in his heart is expressed by love.

XX.

THE DEMAND OF PERSONALITY SEEMS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DEMAND OF THE RATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Reason, and reflection, and history, and the inner feeling, — everything, it seems, convinces man of the correctness of such a comprehension of life: but to a man who is brought up in the teaching of the world it none the less appears that the gratification of the demands of his rational consciousness and of his feeling cannot be the law of his life.

"Not to struggle with others for one's own good, not to seek enjoyments, not to ward off suffering, and not to fear death! But this is impossible: it is the renunciation of all life! And how can I renounce life, since I feel the demands of my personality and with my reason recognize the legality of these demands," the cultured people say with full assurance.

Now here is a remarkable phenomenon. Simple working people, who have exercised their reasoning capacity but a little, hardly ever defend the demands of personality and always feel in themselves the demands which are contrary to the demands of personality; but the full negation of the demands of the rational consciousness and, above all, the rejection of the legality of these demands and the defence of the rights of personality are to be found only among rich and refined men, who are trained in reasoning.

An intellectual, pampered, idle person will always prove that personality has its inalienable rights; but a hungry

man will not prove that a man must eat, — he knows that all men know that, and that it is impossible to prove or disprove it: he will simply eat.

This is due to the fact that a simple, a so-called uncultured, man, who has worked with his body all his life, has not distorted his reason and has retained it in its purity and force.

But a man who has all his life thought not merely of insignificant, trifling matters, but also of such as are improper for a man to think of, has distorted his reason: it is not free in him. His reason is occupied with improper matters, with the consideration of the needs of his personality, — with their development and increase, and with the invention of means for their gratification.

"But I feel the demands of my personality, and so these demands are legitimate," say the so-called cultured people, who are educated by the worldly teaching.

Nor can they help feeling the demands of their personality. The whole life of these people is directed upon the supposed increase of the good of personality, and the good of personality appears to them to be in the gratification of needs. By the needs of personality they mean those conditions of the existence of personality toward which they have directed their reason. Now these cognized needs, — such as their reason is directed upon, — in consequence of this cognition grow infinitely, and the gratification of these increasing needs shields from them the demands of their true life.

The so-called social science puts at the basis of its investigations the study of the needs of man, forgetting the circumstance, so inconvenient for this teaching, that either a man has no needs whatsoever, as in the case of a man who commits suicide or starves himself, or there is literally an infinite number of them.

There are as many needs of the existence of the animal man as there are sides of this existence; and there are as

many sides as there are radii in the globe: there are the needs of food, drink, breathing, and the exercise of all the muscles and nerves; the needs of labour, rest, pleasure, and domestic life; the needs of science, art, religion, and their diversity; the needs in all these relations of the child, the youth, the adult, the old man, the girl, the mature woman, the old woman; the needs of the Chinaman, the Parisian, the Russian, the Laplander; the needs which correspond to the habits of races, to the diseases. . . .

We may count them up to the end of time, without mentioning all those in which the needs of man's personal existence consists. All the conditions of existence may be needs, and of conditions of existence there is an infinite number.

However, by needs we mean only those conditions which are cognized; but the cognized conditions, the moment they are cognized, lose their actual meaning and receive that exaggerated significance given to them by the reason which is directed upon them, and conceal the true life.

What is called needs, that is, the conditions of man's animal conditions, may be compared with an endless number of expansible globules, of which we may imagine a body to consist. All the globules are equal and occupy their own places, without exerting any pressure on one another as long as the globules are not expanded: even so all needs are equal and have their place, and they are not felt morbidly as long as they are not cognized. But it is enough to expand one globule until it occupies more place than the rest taken together, and it will press against them and be pressed against. The same is true of the needs: the rational consciousness need but be directed upon one of them, and this cognized need occupies all life and causes man's whole being to suffer.

XXI.

WHAT IS DEMANDED IS NOT A RENUNCIATION OF PERSONALITY, BUT ITS SUBJECTION TO THE RATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

YES, the affirmation that man does not feel the demands of his rational consciousness, but only the needs of personality, is nothing but an assertion that our animal appetites, to the intensification of which we have directed our whole reason, have taken possession of us and conceal from us our true human life. The weeds of the rankly growing vices have choked the sprouts of the true life.

How can it be otherwise in our world, since it has been asserted outright by those who regard themselves as the teachers of others that the highest perfection of the individual is an all-sided development of the refined needs of his personality; that the good of the masses consists in this, that they should have as many needs as possible and should be able to gratify them; that the good of men consists in the gratification of their needs.

How can people who are brought up in such a teaching help affirming that they do not feel the demands of the rational consciousness, but only the needs of personality? How can they feel the demands of reason, when all their reason has gone without a residue on the intensification of their appetites? And how can they renounce the demands of their appetites, when these appetites have swallowed their whole life?

"The renunciation of personality is impossible," these men generally say, intentionally trying to distort the

question and substituting the idea of renunciation for the idea of the subjection of personality to the law of reason.

"It is unnatural," they say, "and so impossible."

But no one is saying anything about the renunciation of personality. Personality is for a rational man the same that breathing and the circulation of the blood are for the animal personality. How can the animal personality renounce the circulation of the blood? It is impossible even to speak of this. Even so it is impossible for a rational man to speak of the renunciation of personality. Personality is for a rational man just as important a condition of his life as the circulation of the blood is a condition of the existence of his animal personality.

Personality, as an animal personality, cannot even put forth any demands, and it never does. These demands are put forth by the falsely directed reason, which is directed, not upon guiding life, not upon illuminating it, but on fanning the appetites of personality.

The demands of the animal personality can always be gratified. A man cannot say: "What shall I eat? or what shall I put on?" All these needs are secured to man as much as they are to a bird or a flower, if he lives a rational life. Indeed, what thinking man can believe that he can diminish the wretchedness of his existence by provisions for his personality?

The wretchedness of man's existence is not due to the fact that he is a personality, but to the fact that he recognizes the existence of his personality as life and a good. Only in this case do there appear a contradiction, a doubling, and suffering for man.

Man's sufferings begin only when he uses the force of his reason for the intensification and enlargement of the endlessly expanding demands of personality, in order that he may conceal from himself the demands of reason.

It is impossible and unnecessary to renounce personality,

or any of the conditions in which man exists; but what one can and must do is not to recognize these conditions as life itself. One can and must make use of the given conditions of life, but one cannot and must not look upon these conditions as upon an aim of life. Not to renounce personality, but to renounce the good of personality and to cease recognizing personality as life, this is what a man must do in order that he may return to the oneness, and in order that the good, the striving after which forms his life, may be accessible to him.

Ever since remote antiquity the teaching that the recognition of the life in the personality is a destruction of life, and that the renunciation of the good of personality is the only way for obtaining life, has been preached by the great teachers of humanity.

"Yes, but what is this? It is Buddhism," men of our time generally reply to this. "It is Nirvana, it is standing on a pillar."

And, having said this, it appears to the men of our time that they have in the most successful manner possible rebutted what all know very well, and what cannot be concealed from any one, — that the personal life is wretched and has no meaning whatever.

"This is Buddhism, Nirvana," they say, and it seems to them that with these words they have rebutted everything that has been accepted by billions of people, and that each of us knows full well in the depth of his heart, — namely, that the life for the purposes of personality is destructive and meaningless, and that, if there is any way out of this destructiveness and meaninglessness, it unquestionably leads through the renunciation of the good of personality.

They are not in the least troubled by the facts that the greater half of humanity has always understood life in this manner, that the greatest minds have comprehended life in the same way, and that it cannot be compre-

hended otherwise. They are so convinced that if all the questions of life are not solved in the most satisfactory manner, they are removed by telephones, operettas, bacteriology, electric light, roburite, etc., that the idea of the renunciation of the good of the personal life presents itself to them only as an echo of ancient ignorance.

In the meantime the unfortunate people do not suspect that the grossest Hindoo, who for years stands on one leg in the name of renouncing the good of personality for the sake of Nirvana, is incomparably more of a live man than they, the bestialized men of our contemporary European society, who fly over the whole world on railroads and in the electric light show their bestial condition to the whole world. This Hindoo has come to understand that there is a contradiction between the life of personality and the rational life, and he solves it the best he knows how; but the men of our cultured class not only fail to understand this contradiction, but even do not believe that it exists.

The proposition that human life is not the existence of man's personality, acquired by the millennial spiritual labour of all humanity, has become for man (not the animal) in the moral world an even more undoubted and indestructible truth than the motion of the earth and the laws of gravitation. Every thinking person, whether he be a learned man, an ignoramus, an old man, a child, understands and knows this: it is concealed only from the most savage people in Africa and Australia, and from the brutalized men of leisure in the European cities and capitals. This truth has become the possession of humanity and if humanity does not retrograde in its auxiliary knowledge of mechanics, algebra, astronomy, it will still less retrograde in its fundamental and chief knowledge of the determination of its life. It is impossible to forget and wipe out from the consciousness of humanity what it has carried away from its life of many millenniums, — the

conviction of the vanity, meaninglessness, and wretchedness of the personal life. The attempt at reëstablishing the antediluvial savage conception of life as personal existence, with which the so-called science of our European world is occupied, shows only more obviously the growth of the rational consciousness of humanity, and makes it palpably clear that humanity has outgrown its baby clothes. Both the philosophical theories of self-destruction and the practice of suicides, increasing in a terrible proportion, show how impossible it is for humanity to return to the defunct stage of consciousness.

Life as personal existence has been outlived by humanity, and it is impossible to return to it and to forget that man's personal existence has no meaning. No matter what we may write, or say, or discover, no matter how our personal life may be perfected, the negation of the possibility of the good of personality remains an imperturbable truth for every rational man of our time.

"And yet it moves!" It is not a question of rejecting the propositions of a Galileo and a Copernicus, and inventing some Ptolemaic circles, — they can no longer be invented, — but of going on and making further deductions from the proposition which has already entered into the consciousness of humanity. The same is true of the proposition about the impossibility of the good of personality, as expressed by the Brahmins, and Buddha, and Lao-tse, and Solomon, and the Stoics, and all the true thinkers of humanity. This proposition must not be concealed from ourselves, nor must it be obviated in every manner possible, but we should clearly and boldly recognize it and make the further deductions from it.

XXII.

THE SENTIMENT OF LOVE IS THE MANIFESTATION OF THE ACTIVITY OF PERSONALITY SUBJECTED TO THE RATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

A RATIONAL being cannot live for the purposes of personality. This is impossible, because all ways are barred for it: all the aims toward which man's animal personality is striving are obviously inaccessible. Rational consciousness points out other aims, and these aims are not only accessible, but also give full satisfaction to man's rational consciousness; at first, however, under the influence of the false teaching of the world, it appears to man that these aims are contrary to his personality.

No matter how much a man, educated in our modern world, with developed, exaggerated appetites of personality, may try to regard himself as being in his rational ego, he does not feel in this ego any striving after life, such as he feels in his animal personality. The rational ego, as it were, contemplates life, but does not live itself and has no impulse to live. The rational ego does not experience any striving after life, but the animal ego must suffer, and so there is but one thing left to do, — to be liberated from life.

Thus the question is unscrupulously solved by those negative philosophers of our time (Schopenhauer, Hartmann), who negate life and yet remain in it, instead of utilizing the opportunity to leave it. And thus this question is conscientiously solved by the suicides, when they step out of life, which presents to them nothing but

evil. Suicide appears to them as the only way out from the misapprehension of the human life of our time.

The reasoning of pessimistic philosophy and of the commonest suicides is as follows: "There is an animal ego, in which there is a striving after life; this ego with my striving cannot be gratified; there is another, a rational ego, in which there is no striving at all after life, and which critically contemplates the whole false love of life and the passion of the animal ego, and negates it altogether.

"If I abandon myself to the first, I see that I live senselessly and walk toward wretchedness, sinking deeper and deeper into it. If I abandon myself to the second, the rational ego, there is left in me no striving after life. I see that it is absurd and impossible to live for what alone I want to live for, that is, for the happiness of personality; for the rational consciousness it is, indeed, possible to live, but I see no cause why I should, and I do not want to. To serve that principle from which I originate, God? What for? God, if there is one, will find enough servants without me. And of what good is it to me? One can look at all this play of life as long as one does not get tired of it; and when one gets tired of it one can go away, and kill oneself, — and so I will do."

Such is the contradictory notion of life, which humanity had arrived at before Solomon and before Buddha, and to which its false teachers of our time want to return.

The demands of personality have been carried to the extreme limits of madness. The awakening reason rejects them; but the demands of personalities have branched out to such an extent, have so clogged man's consciousness, that it seems to him that reason negates the whole life. It seems to him that nothing will be left, if he rejects from the consciousness of life everything which his reason negates. He no longer sees what is left. The

residue — that residue in which there is life — seems to him as nothing.

But the light shines in darkness, and the darkness cannot comprehend it!

The teaching of truth knows this dilemma, — either senseless existence, or the negation of it, — and solves it.

The teaching, which has always been called the teaching of the good, the teaching of the truth, has shown to people that instead of their deceptive good, which they seek for their animal personality, they not only can at some time, somewhere receive, but always, immediately, here, have an inalienable, real good, which is always accessible to them.

This good is not merely something deduced by reasoning, something which has to be sought somewhere, a good promised somewhere and at some time, but that familiar good after which every uncorrupted human soul strives directly.

All men know from their first years of childhood that, in addition to the good of the animal personality, there is another, better good of life, which is not only independent of the gratification of the appetites of the animal personality, but, on the contrary, is the greater, the greater the renunciation of the good of the animal personality.

This feeling, which solves all the contradictions of the human life and gives the greatest good to man, is known to all men. This feeling is *love*.

Life is the activity of the animal personality, subjected to the law of reason. Reason is that law to which, for its own good, man's animal personality must be submitted. Love is the only rational activity of man.

The animal personality tends toward the good; reason points out to man that deceptiveness of the personal good and leaves one path. The activity on this path is love.

Man's animal personality demands the good; the ra-

tional consciousness shows man the wretchedness of all the warring beings: it shows him that there can be no good for his animal personality, and that the one good, which is possible for him, is one with which there is no struggle with other beings, nor a cessation of the good, nor satiety, nor the vision and terror of death.

And as though it were a key specially made for this lock, man finds in his soul a feeling which gives him that very good, which, as the only possible one, reason points out to him. This feeling not only solves the former contradiction of life, but also, as it were, in this very contradiction finds the possibility of its manifestation.

The animal personalities want to make use of man's personality for their own purposes; but the feeling of love draws him on to give his existence for the benefit of other beings.

The animal personality suffers, and these sufferings and their alleviation form the chief subject of the activity of love. The animal personality, striving after the good, with its every breath tends toward evil, — toward death, — the vision of which has impaired every good of personality. But the feeling of love not only destroys this terror, but draws man toward the last sacrifice of his carnal existence for the good of others.

XXIII.

THE MANIFESTATION OF THE FEELING OF LOVE IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR MEN WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF THEIR LIFE

Every man knows that in the feeling of love there is something especial, which is capable of solving all the contradictions of life and of giving to man that full measure of the good in the striving after which his life consists.

"But this feeling, which comes but rarely, does not last long, and its consequence is worse sufferings," say people who do not understand life.

To these men love presents itself, not as that one legitimate manifestation of life, as which it appears to rational consciousness, but only as one of a thousand different casualties of life, — it presents itself as one of those thousand divers moods in which a man happens to be during his existence: it happens that a man plays the dandy, or that he is infatuated with science or with art, or that he is infatuated with his service, with ambition, with acquisition, or that he loves some one. The mood of love presents itself to men who do not comprehend life, not as the essence of human life, but as an accidental mood, — which is as independent of his will as all the others to which man is subject during his life. Frequently we have occasion to read or hear reflections as to love being a certain irregular, agonizing mood which impairs the regular current of life, — something like what must appear to an owl when the sun comes out.

These people, it is true, feel that in the mood of love

there is something special, something more important than in all the other moods. But, as they do not understand life, they also fail to understand love, and the condition of love appears to them as wretched and deceptive as all other conditions.

> "To love? But whom?
> It is not worth while for a time,
> And you cannot love one for ever . . ."

These words correctly express the dim consciousness of men that in love there is salvation from the calamities of life, and that something which alone resembles the true good, and at the same time a confession that for men who do not understand life love cannot be an anchor of salvation. There is no one to love, and every love is unenduring. And so love could be a good only if there were any one to love, and if there were one who could be loved for ever. But as such a one does not exist, there is no salvation in love, and love is just such deception and such suffering as everything else.

So, and not otherwise, love can be understood by those who teach and themselves are taught to believe that life is nothing but animal existence.

For such people love does not even correspond to the conception which we all involuntarily connect with the word love. It is not a good activity, which gives the good to the lover and to him who is loved. Love is frequently, in the conception of men who recognize life to be in the animal personality, the same feeling, in consequence of which one mother, for the sake of the good of her babe, takes the milk away from the mother of another hungry infant and suffers from anxiety for the success of the nursing; that feeling, according to which a father, tormenting himself, takes the last piece of bread away from starving people, in order to provide for his own

children; that feeling, according to which he who loves a woman suffers from this love and causes her to suffer, when he seduces her, or out of jealousy ruins himself and her; that feeling, which sometimes leads a man to rape a woman; that feeling, by dint of which men, in order to defend the rights of their society, cause harm to others; that feeling, which causes a man to torment himself over some favourite occupation, and by this very occupation to inflict sorrow and suffering on those who surround him; that feeling, by dint of which men will not bear any insult offered to their beloved country, and strew the fields with killed and wounded, both of their own and of strangers.

More than this: the activity of love presents such difficulties for men who recognize life to consist in the good of the animal personality, that its manifestations become not only agonizing, but frequently even impossible. "We must not reflect on love," people who do not understand life generally say, "but abandon ourselves to the immediate feeling of predilection and bias toward people, which we experience, and this is true love."

They are right that we must not reflect on love, that every reflection on love destroys love. But the point is, that only those people can keep from reflecting on love who have already used their reason for the comprehension of life and have renounced the good of the personal life; but those people who do not comprehend life, and exist for the good of the animal personality, cannot help but reflect on it. They must reflect, in order that they may abandon themselves to the feeling which they call love. Every manifestation of this feeling is impossible for them without reflection, without the solution of insoluble questions.

Indeed, men prefer their babes, their friends, their wives, their children, their country, to all other children, wives, friends, countries, and call this sentiment love.

To love means in general to wish to do good. Even so we all understand love, and cannot help but understand it thus. And so I love my child, my wife, my country, that is, I wish my child, my wife, my country, more good than other children, wives, and countries. It never happens, and it cannot happen, that a man loves his child only, or his wife, or his country only. Every man loves at the same time his babe, his wife, his children, his country, and men in general. Meanwhile the conditions of the good, which in his love he wishes various beloved beings, are so connected among themselves that every love activity of a man for one of his beloved beings not only interferes with his activity for others, but even injures others.

And there arise the questions as to how one is to act and in the name of what love. In the name of what love are we to sacrifice another love? Whom shall we love more, to whom do more good, — to the wife or to the children, to the wife and to the children or to the friends? How are we to serve our beloved country, without impairing the love for wife, children, and friends? How, finally, am I to decide the question how much I may sacrifice of my personality which is needed in the service of others? How much must I care for myself, in order that, loving others, I may be able to serve them? All these questions seem very simple for men who do not attempt to give themselves an account of the feeling which they call love; but, far from being simple, they are completely insoluble.

There was good reason why the lawyer put this question to Christ: "Who is my neighbour?" Answers to these questions appear very easy to such people only as forget the true conditions of human life.

Only if men were gods, such as we imagine them to be, would they be able to love certain chosen people, and then only could the preference of some to others be true love. But men are not gods: they exist under those conditions of existence under which all living beings always

live on one another, devouring one another, both in the direct and the transferred sense; and man, as a rational being, must know and see it. He must know that every carnal good is obtained by one being only at the expense of another.

No matter how much religious and scientific superstitions may assure people of a future golden age, in which there will be plenty of everything for all men, a rational man sees and knows that the law of his temporal and spatial existence is a struggle of all against each, of each against each and against all.

In this pressure and struggle of animal interests, which form the life of the world, man cannot love chosen ones, as people imagine who do not understand life. Even if a man loves chosen ones, he never loves just one. Every man loves his mother, his wife, his babe, his friends, his country, and even all men. And love is not a mere word (all agree to this), but an activity which is directed upon the good of others. Now this activity does not take place in any definite order, so that at first man becomes aware of the demands of his strongest love, then of his less strong love, and so forth. The demands of love are constantly made manifest and all at once, without any order. A hungry old man, whom I love a little, has just come and asks me to give him the food which I am keeping for a supper for my beloved children; how am I to weigh the demands of my present, less strong love with the future demands of a stronger love?

The same questions were put by the lawyer to Christ: "Who is my neighbour?" Indeed, how shall it be decided whom I must serve, and to what extent? — whether men or my country, whether my country or my friends? whether my friends or my wife? whether my wife or my father? whether my father or my children? whether my children or myself (so that I may be able to serve others, when any need for it shall arise)?

All these certainly are demands of love, and they are all intertwined, so that the gratification of the demands of some deprives man of the possibility of satisfying the others. If I admit that a frozen child may not be clothed, because the garment which they ask of me may some day be of use for my children, I can also refuse to abandon myself to other demands of love in the name of my future children.

The same is true in relation to love of country, of favourite occupations, and of all men. If a man is capable of renouncing the demands of the smallest love of the present, in the name of the demand of the greater love of the future, it is clear that such a man, even though he wished it with all his might, will never be able to weigh in how far he can renounce the demands of the present in the name of the future; and so, being unable to decide the question, he will always choose that manifestation of love which will be agreeable to him, that is, he will not act in the name of love, but in the name of his personality. If a man decides that it is better for him to refrain from the demands of the present, smaller love in the name of another, a future manifestation of a greater love, he is deceiving either himself or others, and loves no one but himself.

There is no love in the future: love is only an activity in the present. A man who does not manifest love in the present has no love.

What takes place is the same as in the conception of life held by men who have no life. If men were animals and had no reason, they would exist like animals, without reflecting on life, and their animal existence would be legitimate and happy. The same is true of love: if men were animals without reason, they would love those whom they love, — their whelps and their flock, — and would not know that they love their whelps and their flock, nor that other wolves love their whelps, and other flocks the

members of their flocks, and their love would be that love and that life which would be possible on that stage of consciousness which they occupy.

But men are rational beings and cannot help seeing that other beings have the same love for their own, and that, therefore, these sentiments of love must come into conflict and cause something which is not good and the very opposite to the concept of love.

But if men use their reason for the purpose of justifying and strengthening that animal, unpropitious sentiment, which they call love, by ascribing monstrous proportions to this feeling, it not only fails to be good, but also makes of man — this is an old truth — a very evil and terrible animal. What takes place is like what is said in the Gospel: "If the light which be in thee is darkness, how great is the darkness?" If there were nothing in man but love for himself and for his children, there would not be even one hundredth part of that evil which now exists among men. Ninety-nine hundredths of the evil among men is due to that false feeling which they, extolling it, call love, and which resembles love as much as the life of an animal resembles that of a man.

What people, who do not know life, call love, is only certain preferences of one set of conditions of the good of personality over another. When a man, who does not understand life, says that he loves his wife, or babe, or friend, he merely says that the presence of his wife, his child, his friend, in his life increases the good of his personal life.

These preferences have the same relation to love that existence has to life. And as people who do not understand life call existence life, so these people mean by love the preference of certain conditions of their personal existence over others.

These sentiments, the preferences for certain beings, for example, for one's children or even for certain occupations,

for example, for science, or art, we call love; but such sentiments of preference, infinitely diversified, form the whole complexity of the visible and palpable animal life of men and cannot be called love, because they lack the chief sign of love, — an activity which has the good both for its aim and consequence.

The passionateness of the manifestation of these preferences only shows the energy of the animal personality. The passionateness of the preference of one set of men to others, which is incorrectly called love, is only a wild tree on which true love may be grafted and may bring forth its fruits. But as the wild tree is not an apple-tree and brings forth no fruit, or only bitter fruit instead of sweet, so bias is not love and does no good to men, or produces a still greater evil. Consequently the greatest evil is caused the world by the much lauded love of woman, of children, of friends, not to speak of the love of science, of art, of country, which is nothing but a temporary preference of certain conditions of animal life over others.

XXIV.

TRUE LOVE IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE RENUNCIATION OF THE GOOD OF PERSONALITY

True love becomes possible only with the renunciation of the good of the animal personality.

The possibility of true love begins only when man has come to understand that there does not exist for him the good of his animal personality. Only then all the sap of his life passes into the one ennobled graft of true love, which is growing with the full vigour of the wild trunk of the animal personality. Christ's teaching is a grafting of this love, as he himself said. He said that he, his love, is the one vine which can bear fruit, and that every branch which does not bear fruit will be cut off.

Only he who has not merely understood, but comprehends with his whole life that "he that loveth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake shall save it," only he who has come to understand that he who loves his life will lose it, and he who hates his life in this world will save it for the eternal life, only he will know true love.

"He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me. If you love those who love you, it is not love; love your enemies, love those who hate you."

Not in consequence of their love of father, son, wife, friends, good and dear people, as is generally believed, do people renounce their personality, but only in consequence

of the consciousness of the vanity of the existence of personality, of the consciousness of the impossibility of its good, and so man, in consequence of the renunciation of the life of personality, learns to know true love, and can truly love his father, son, wife, children, and friends.

Love is the preference of other beings over oneself, over one's animal personality.

The oblivion of the nearest interests of personality for the purpose of attaining the more distant aims of the same personality, as happens in the case of so-called love, which has not grown out of self-renunciation, is only the preference of some beings over others for the purpose of one's personal good. True love, before becoming an active feeling, must be a certain condition. The beginning of love, its root, is not an outburst of feeling which dims reason, as it is generally imagined to be, but a very rational, bright, and so calm and joyful state, which is peculiar to children and rational people.

This state is one of good-will toward all men, which is inherent in children, but which in adults comes only with renunciation and is strengthened proportionately with the renunciation of the good of personality. How often we may hear the words, "It is all the same to me, I need nothing," and with these words to see a loveless relation to men! But let any man even once, in a moment of ill-will toward men, say sincerely, from his soul, "It is all the same to me, I need nothing," and really not wish anything, even though for a short time, and he will find out through this simple internal experience how, in proportion with the sincerity of his renunciation, all ill-will disappears at once, and how good-will toward all men, which heretofore was locked up in his heart, will burst forth in a torrent.

Indeed love is a preference of other beings over oneself, — this is the way we all understand love, and cannot understand otherwise. The magnitude of love is the

magnitude of a fraction, the numerator of which, my bias, my sympathy for others is not in my power; but the denominator, my love of myself, may be indefinitely increased or diminished by me, in accordance with the meaning which I shall ascribe to my animal personality; but the reflections of our world on love and its degrees are reflections on the magnitude of fractions judged by their numerators alone, without any reference to their denominators.

True love has always for its basis the renunciation of the good of personality and the consequent good-will toward all men. Only on this universal good-will can true love for certain persons grow, — the love for friends and for strangers, and only such love gives the true good of life and solves the seeming contradiction between the animal and the rational consciousness.

Love which has not for its basis the renunciation of personality and the consequent good-will toward all men, is only an animal life and is subject to the same and even greater calamities and even greater misunderstanding than the life without this apparent love. The sentiment of bias, called love, not only fails to remove the struggle of existence, to free the personality from the chase after enjoyments, and to save from death, but also obscures life, embitters the struggle, intensifies the eagerness for enjoyments for oneself and for others, and increases the terror of death for oneself and for others.

A man who assumes all his life to lie in the existence of the animal personality cannot love, because love must present itself to him as an activity which is directly opposed to his life. The life of such a man lies only in the good of the animal existence, whereas love first of all demands a sacrifice of this good. Even if a man who does not understand life wanted sincerely to abandon himself to the activity of love, he would not be able to do so until he understood life and changed all his relation

to it. A man who has put all his life into the good of the animal personality, all his life increases the means of his animal good, acquiring wealth and preserving it, makes others serve his animal good, and distributes this good among those persons who are most needed for the good of his personality. How can he give up his life, since his life is not supported by himself, but by other men? Still harder it is for him to choose to whom of the persons he prefers he is to transmit the accumulated good and whom to serve.

To be able to give up his life, he must first give up that surplus which he takes from others for the good of his life, and then do the impossible: he must solve the question which men he is to serve with his life. Before he will be able to love, that is, to do good by sacrificing himself, he must stop hating, that is, doing evil, and stop preferring some people to others for the good of his personality.

The activity of man's love, which always satisfies him and others, is possible only for him who does not recognize any good in the personal life and so does not trouble himself about this false good, and in this way has freed in himself the good-will for all men, which is peculiar to man. The good of life for such a man is in love, as the good of a plant is in the light, and so, as a plant that is not covered by anything cannot and does not ask in what direction it shall grow, whether the light is good, and whether it had not better wait for another, more favourable light, but takes that one light which there is in the world and tends toward it, — so a man who has renounced the good of personality does not discuss what he must give back of what he has taken from other people and to what beloved beings, and whether there is not some better love than the one which prefers demands, — but gives himself and his existence to that love which is accessible to him and is before him. Only such a love gives full satisfaction to man's rational nature

XXV.

LOVE IS THE ONLY FULL ACTIVITY OF THE TRUE LIFE

There is no other love than the one which makes us lay down our life for our friends. Love is then only love when it is a self-sacrifice. Only when a man gives to another his time, his forces, when he sacrifices his body for a beloved object, gives his life to it, — only that we all recognize as love, and only in such love do we all find the good, the reward of love. And the world exists by nothing else than that there is such love in men. A mother who nurses her babe gives herself, her body, outright as food for her children, who without it would not be living. And this is love. Even so every labourer gives himself, his body, as food for another, when he wears away his body in work for the good of others and approaches death. Such love is possible for such a man only for whom between the possibility of self-sacrifice and those beings whom he loves there is no obstacle for the sacrifice. A mother who turns her child away to a wet-nurse cannot love it; a man who acquires and keeps his money cannot love.

"He that saith he is in the light, and hateth his brother, is in darkness even until now. He that loveth his brother abideth in the light, and there is none occasion of stumbling in him. But he that hateth his brother is in darkness, and walketh in darkness, and knoweth not whither he goeth, because that darkness hath blinded his eyes. . . . Let us not love in word, neither in tongue; but in deed and in truth. And hereby we know that we

are of the truth, and shall assure our hearts before him. . . . Herein is our love made perfect, that we may have boldness in the day of judgment: because as he is, so are we in this world. There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear: because fear hath torment. He that feareth, is not made perfect in love."

Only such love gives the true life to men.

"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment."

"And the second is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," the lawyer said to Christ. And to this Christ replied: "Thou hast said the truth, do like that, that is, love God and thy neighbour, and thou shalt live."

True love is life itself.

"We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren," says Christ's disciple. "He that loveth not his brother abideth in death."

Only he who loves lives.

Love is according to Christ's teaching life itself, not irrational, suffering, perishable, but blessed and infinite life. And we all know it. Love is not a deduction of reason, not the consequence of a certain activity; it is the most joyous activity of life, which surrounds us on all sides, and which we all know in ourselves from the very first recollections of childhood until the false teachings of the world have muddled it in our soul and have deprived us of the possibility of experiencing it.

Love is not a bias for what increases the temporal good of man's personality, as the love for chosen persons or objects, but that striving after the good of what is outside of man, which remains in man after the renunciation of the good of the animal personality.

Who of living men does not know that blessed feeling, which is experienced at least once, most frequently only in

earliest childhood, when the soul is not yet muddled by that lie, which drowns life in us, — that blessed feeling of meekness of spirit, when one wants to love all, — relatives, father, mother, brothers, and evil men, and enemies, and the dog, and the horse, and the grass; one wishes only this much, — that all should be happy and comfortable, and one wishes still more that one may be the cause of the happiness of all, and may give one's whole life for the purpose of making all happy and comfortable for ever. This alone is that love in which man's life consists.

This love, in which alone there is life, manifests itself in man's soul as a barely perceptible, tender shoot amidst coarse shoots of weeds, which resemble it, amidst man's various lusts, which we call love. At first it seems to men, and to that man as well, that this shoot, — from which there is to grow a tree for the birds to hide in, — and all the other shoots are one and the same. Men at first even prefer the shoots of the weeds, which grow more rankly, and the only shoot of life is crowded, and dies. But still worse is what happens more frequently: men have heard that among these shoots there is one real, vital shoot, called love, and they tramp it down and in its place begin to raise up another shoot of a weed, calling it love. Worse still: men grasp the shoot itself with their gross hands, and shout, "Here it is, — we have found it; now we know it, and will foster it, — love, love! O highest sentiment, here it is!" And they begin to transplant it and to improve it, and they handle it so roughly and crush it so much that it dies without growing up, and then these people, or others, say: "All this is nonsense, foolishness, sentimentality." The shoot of love, which at its appearance is tender and brooks no touch, is powerful only when full grown. Everything which people will do with it is only worse for it. It needs but one thing, — that nothing should conceal from it the sun of reason, which alone causes it to grow.

XXVI.

THE ENDEAVOURS OF MEN, DIRECTED UPON THE IMPOSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR EXISTENCE, DEPRIVE THEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ONLY, TRUE LIFE

Nothing but the recognition of the illusion and deceptiveness of the animal existence and the liberation of the only, true life of love within man gives him the good. Now, what do men do in order to obtain this good? Men, whose existence consists in the slow annihilation of personality and approximation to the inevitable death of this personality, and who cannot help knowing this, during the whole time of their existence try with their might and main — this is all they busy themselves with — to strengthen this perishable personality, to satisfy its appetites, and thus to deprive themselves of the possibility of their only good of life, — of love.

The activity of men who do not understand life is during the whole time of their existence directed to the struggle for their existence, to the acquisition of pleasures, to the liberation from suffering, and to the removal from themselves of inevitable death.

But the increase of enjoyments increases the tension of the struggle and the sensitiveness to sufferings, and brings death nearer to them. To conceal this approach of death there is but one means, — to increase the enjoyments. But the increase of enjoyments reaches its limit, the enjoyments cannot be increased and pass into sufferings, and all there is left is a sensitiveness to sufferings,

and the terror of death coming nearer and nearer amidst nothing but sufferings. There appears the vicious circle: one is the cause of the other, and one intensifies the other. The chief horror of the life of men who do not understand life consists in this, that that which by them is regarded as pleasures (all the pleasures of wealthy people), being such as cannot be evenly distributed among all men, must be taken from others and acquired by force, by evil, which destroys the possibility of that good-will toward men from which love grows. Thus the pleasures are always directly opposed to love, and the greater, the more so; thus, the stronger, the more tense the activity is for the attainment of pleasures, the more impossible becomes the only good accessible to man, — love.

Life is not understood as it is cognized by the rational consciousness, as an invisible, but unquestionable subjection of one's animal personality to the law of reason at every moment of the present, as a liberating good-will toward all men, which is characteristic of man, and as an activity of love resulting from it, but only as a carnal existence in the course of a given interval of time, under definite conditions created by us, which exclude the possibility of good-will toward all men.

To men of the worldly teaching, who have directed their reason to the establishment of certain conditions of existence, it seems that the increase of the good of life is due to a better external arrangement of their existence; but the better external arrangement of their existence depends on greater violence being exerted against people, which is directly opposed to love. Thus, the better the arrangement, the less there is left of the possibility of love, of the possibility of life.

Not having employed their reason for the comprehension of the good of the animal existence, which for all men alike is equal to zero, men recognize this zero as a magnitude which is capable of increase and diminution,

and employ as much of their unapplied reason as they have left to this increase and multiplication of the zero.

These men do not see that nothing, zero, no matter by what it be multiplied, remains equal to any other zero; they do not see that the existence of the animal personality of each man is equally wretched and cannot be made happy by any external conditions. These men do not wish to see that not one existence, as a carnal existence, can be happier than another, — that it is a law like this other law, according to which water cannot be raised on a lake above a given general level. The men who have distorted their reason do not see this, and use their distorted reason in this impossible work, and their whole existence passes in this impossible raising of the water at different places on the surface of the lake, — something like what children do in bathing, calling it "brewing beer."

It seems to them that the existences of men may be more and less good and happy. The existence of a poor labourer or a sick man, they say, is bad and unhappy; the existence of a rich or healthy man is good and happy; and they strain all the powers of their reason for the purpose of avoiding a bad, unhappy, poor, and sickly existence and arranging for themselves one which is good, rich, healthy and happy.

The methods of arranging and maintaining these various most happy lives are worked out by generations, and the programmes of these imaginary best lives, as they call their animal existence, are transmitted by inheritance. People vie with each other in the endeavour to maintain that happy *life* which they have inherited from the arrangement of their parents, or try to prepare a new, still happier life for themselves. It seems to these people that maintaining their inherited arrangement of existence or a new existence, which in their opinion is better, they are doing something.

Supporting one another in this deception, men are often so sincerely convinced that life consists in this senseless stamping of the water, the insipidity of which is evident to them, — they convince themselves so much of it, that they contemptuously turn away from the appeal to the true life which they hear all the time in the teaching of the truth, and in the examples of the lives of living men, and in their deadened souls, in which the voice of reason and of love is never fully drowned.

A remarkable thing takes place: men, an enormous majority of men, who have the possibility for a rational life of love, are in the same condition that sheep are in, when they are being dragged out of a burning building; imagining that they are to be thrown into the fire, they employ all their forces for the purpose of struggling with those who want to save them.

Out of the fear of death men do not want to come away from it; out of the fear of suffering men torment themselves and deprive themselves of the good and the life which alone is impossible for them.

XXVII.

THE DREAD OF DEATH IS ONLY THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNSOLVED CONTRADICTION OF LIFE

"THERE is no death," the voice of truth tells people. "I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die. Believest thou this?"

"There is no death," all the great teachers of the world have said, and millions of people, who have comprehended the meaning of life, have borne witness to it with their lives. The same is felt in his soul by every living man, in a moment of enlightenment of his consciousness. But men who do not understand life cannot help but fear death. They see it and believe in it.

"What, there is no death?" these men cry, with indignation and malice. "This is a piece of sophistry. Death is before us: it has mowed down millions, and it will mow us down, too. No matter how you may insist that it is not, it will remain. Here it is!"

They are speaking of what they see, just as a deranged person sees the vision which terrifies him. He cannot feel the vision, for the vision has never touched him; he knows nothing of its intention, but he is so afraid of this imaginary vision and suffers from it so much that he is deprived of the possibility of life. The same is true of death. Man does not know his death and can never know it: it has never touched him, and of its intentions he knows nothing. So what is he afraid of?

"It has never seized me yet; but it will seize me, I am sure of that, — it will seize me, and will destroy me. And that is terrible," say people who do not understand life.

If men with a false conception of life were able to reflect calmly, and reasoned correctly on the basis of that conception which they have of life, they would have to come to the conclusion that there is nothing disagreeable or terrible in this, that in my carnal existence there will take place that change which, I see, unceasingly takes place in all beings, and which I call death.

I shall die. Where is the terror in this? Have not very many changes taken place in my carnal existence without causing me fear? Why, then, am I afraid of this change, which has not yet taken place and in which there is not only nothing contrary to my reason and experience, but which is so intelligible, familiar, and natural to me that in the course of my life I have constantly made combinations, in which the death both of animals and men has been accepted by me as a necessary and often as an agreeable condition of life? Where is here the terror?

There are only two strictly logical views of life: one, the false view, by which life is understood as those visible phenomena which take place in my body from birth to death, and the other, the true view, by which life is understood as that invisible consciousness of life which I bear in myself. One view is false, the other true, but both are logical, and men may have the one or the other, but with neither is the dread of death possible.

The first, the false view, which understands life as the visible phenomena in the body from birth until death, is as old as the world. It is not, as many think, a view of life which has been worked out by the materialistic science and philosophy of our time: the science and philosophy of our time have only carried this conception to its farthest limits, where it has become more obvious than

ever that this view is not compatible with the fundamental demands of human nature; this is an old, primitive view of those people who stood on a lower level of development: it is expressed by the Chinese, by the Buddhists, by the Jews, in the book of Job, and in the expression, "Dust thou art, and to dust returnest."

This view, in its present expression, is as follows: life is an accidental play of forces in matter, as manifested in time and space. But that which we call our consciousness is not life: it is a certain deception of the sensations, which makes us believe that life consists in this consciousness. Consciousness is a spark which under certain conditions bursts into fire on the matter. This spark bursts into fire, flames up, goes out, and finally is no more. This spark, that is, consciousness, which is experienced by matter in the course of a definite period of time between two infinities, is nothing. And although consciousness sees itself and all the infinite world and all the play of accidents of this world, and, what is most important, in contradistinction to something not accidental, calls this game accidental, this consciousness is in itself nothing but the product of dead matter, a phantom, which rises and disappears without any residue or meaning. Everything is the product of endlessly changing matter, and what is called life is only a certain condition of dead matter.

Such is one view of life. This view is quite logical. According to this view, man's rational consciousness is only an accident which is concomitant with a certain condition of matter; and so that which in our consciousness we call life is a phantom. There exists nothing but what is dead. What we call life is the play of death. With such a view of life, it is not death that ought to be terrible, but life, as something unnatural and irrational, as is the case with the Buddhists and the modern pessimists, Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

The other view of life is as follows: life is only what I

am conscious of in myself. Now, I do not cognize my life as that I was or shall be (thus I reflect on life), but as that I am, — never beginning anywhere and never ending anywhere. With the consciousness of my life the concept of time and space is not compatible. My life is manifested in time and space, but that is only its manifestation. Life itself, as cognized by me, is cognized by me outside time and space. Thus, with this view it turns out, on the contrary, that it is not the consciousness of life which is a phantom, but that everything spatial and temporal is phantasmal. Consequently, the temporal and spatial cessation of bodily existence has with this view nothing that is real, and so cannot cut off, nor even impair, my true life. With this view death does not exist.

Neither with the one view of life nor with the other could there be any dread of death, if men strictly adhered to one of these two views.

Neither as an animal nor as a rational being can man fear death: the animal, having no consciousness of life, does not see death, and a rational being, having the consciousness of life, cannot see in animal death anything but the natural, never ceasing motion of matter. But if man is afraid, he is not afraid of death, which he does not know, but of life, which alone his animal and his rational being know. The feeling which in men is expressed as the fear of death is only the consciousness of the inner contradiction of life, even as the dread of visions is only the consciousness of a diseased state of the mind.

"I shall cease to exist, — I shall die, and everything in which I take my life to be will die," one voice says to man. "I am," says another voice, "and cannot and must not die. I must not die, and yet I am dying."

Not in death but in this contradiction is the cause of all that terror which seizes man at the thought of carnal death: the dread of death does not consist in this, that a man is afraid of the cessation of the existence of his ani-

mal, but in this, that he supposes that that which cannot and must not die is dying. The thought of future death is only a transference into the future of death which is accomplished in the present. The phantom of the future carnal death is not an awakening of thought in regard to death, but, on the contrary, an awakening of thought in regard to the life which man ought to have, but has not. This feeling is similar to what a man must experience who awakens to life in the grave, underground. There is life, and I am in death, there it is, death! It appears to him that what is and ought to be is being destroyed. And the human mind is beside itself and terrified. The best proof that the terror of death is not the terror of death, but of the false life, is this, that people frequently kill themselves out of the terror of death.

Men are not terrified at the thought of the carnal death because they are afraid lest their life may end with it, but because the carnal death shows them clearly the necessity for the true life, which they have not. And for this reason people who do not understand life do not like to mention death. To think of death is for them the same as admitting that they do not live as the rational consciousness demands that they shall.

People who are afraid of death fear it, because it appears to them as emptiness and darkness; but they see emptiness and darkness, because they do not see life.

XXVIII.

THE CARNAL DEATH DESTROYS THE SPATIAL BODY AND THE TEMPORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT CANNOT DESTROY WHAT FORMS THE FOUNDATION OF LIFE, — THE SPECIAL RELATION WHICH EACH BEING BEARS TO THE WORLD

But if the people who do not see life only came nearer to those visions which frighten them, and touched them, they would see that even for them the vision is only a vision, and not reality.

The dread of death is in men always due to the fact that they are afraid that with their carnal death they will lose their individual ego, which, they feel, constitutes their life. I shall die, the body will decompose, and my ego will be destroyed. My ego is that which has lived so many years in my body.

Men esteem this their ego, and, supposing that this ego coincides with their carnal life, they conclude that it must be destroyed with the destruction of the carnal life.

This is a very usual conclusion, and it rarely occurs to one to doubt it, and yet this conclusion is quite arbitrary. People, both those who regard themselves as materialists, and those who regard themselves as spiritualists, are so accustomed to the notion that their ego is that consciousness of their bodies which has lived so and so many years, that it even does not occur to them to verify the truth of such an assertion.

I have lived for fifty-nine years, and all this time I have been conscious of myself in my body, and this conscious-

ness of myself by myself, it seems to me, has been my life. But that only seems so to me. I have not lived fifty-nine years, nor fifty-nine thousand years, nor fifty-nine seconds. Neither my body nor the time of its existence in any way determines the life of my ego. If at each minute of my life I shall ask myself what I am, I shall reply: something thinking and feeling, that is, something which bears its own peculiar relation to the world. Only this I recognize as my ego, and nothing else. I am positively not conscious of when and where I was born, when and where I began to feel and think as I am feeling and thinking now. All that my consciousness tells me is this: I am; I am with that relation of mine to the world in which I find myself now.

Of my birth, my childhood, my many periods of life, my adult years, of very recent times, I frequently do not remember anything. And if I do remember something, or I am reminded of something out of my past, I remember and recall these things like something told of others. How, then, on what ground, do I assert that during all the time of my existence I have been the same ego? I have certainly not had the same body: my body has all been matter, constantly flowing through something invisible and immaterial which recognizes this matter flowing through it as its body. My body has changed completely dozens of times; nothing old has remained: the muscles, the entrails, the bones, the brain — everything has changed.

My body is one only because there is something immaterial which recognizes all this changing body as one and its own. This immaterial something is what we call consciousness: it alone holds the body together and recognizes it as one and its own. Without this consciousness of self as apart from everything else, I should not know anything about my own nor about any other life. And so it would appear at first thought that the foundation of everything, consciousness, must be something constant.

During our whole life we have had repeated the phenomenon of sleep, which seems very simple to us because we all sleep every day, but which is positively incomprehensible if we admit, what we cannot help but admit, that during sleep consciousness is frequently interrupted.

Every twenty-four hours, during full sleep, consciousness comes to a sudden stop and is later renewed. And yet this consciousness is the only foundation which holds the whole body together and recognizes it as its own. It would seem that with the cessation of consciousness the body ought to fall to pieces and lose its entity; but this is not the case, either in natural or in artificial sleep.

But not only is the consciousness, which holds the whole body together, periodically disrupted, and the body does not fall to pieces, but this consciousness, in addition, changes as much as the body. As there is nothing in common between the matter of my present body and what it was ten years ago, as there has not been one body, so there has not been in me one consciousness. My consciousness when I was a child of three years of age and now are as different as the matter of my present body and that of my body thirty years ago. There is not one consciousness, but only a series of consecutive consciousnesses, which may be broken up to infinity.

Thus, the consciousness which holds the whole body together and recognizes it as its own is not a unit but something which is interrupted and transformed. There is not in man the one consciousness of self, as we generally imagine it to be in us, any more than there is one body. There is not in man one and the same body, nor that one something which separates this body from everything else, — there is not the consciousness of constantly one man, one during his whole life; but there is only a series of consecutive consciousnesses, which are held together by something, — and man still feels himself to be one.

Our body is not one; and that which recognizes this changeable body as one and our own is not continuous in time, but only a series of varying consciousnesses, and we have many times lost our body and these consciousnesses; we lose the body constantly and we lose consciousness every day, when we fall asleep, and every day and hour we feel in ourselves the changes of this consciousness, and are not in the least afraid of it. Consequently, if there is such an ego, which we are afraid we shall lose at death, this ego cannot be in the body which we call our own, or in the consciousness which we call our own at a given time, but in something different, which unites the whole series of consecutive consciousnesses into one.

What is this something which binds together my fundamental and individual ego, which is not composed of my body and of a series of consciousnesses which take place in it, but that fundamental ego on which, as on a wire, are strung, one after another, the various temporally consecutive consciousnesses? The question seems very profound and wise, and yet there is not a child that does not know an answer to it and does not utter this answer twenty times a day. "*I* love this, and *I* do not love that." These words are very simple, and yet in them lies the solution of the question as to what this special ego is which binds together all the consciousnesses. It is that ego which loves this and does not love that. Why a man loves this and does not love that, no one knows, and yet it is that which forms the basis of the life of each man; it is that which binds together all the temporally variant conditions of consciousness of each individual man. The external world acts on all men alike, but the impressions of men who are placed even under identical conditions are endlessly varied, both as to the number of impressions received and capable of infinite division, and as to their strength. Of these impressions the series of

consecutive consciousnesses of each man is composed. But all these consecutive consciousnesses are bound together for the same reason that in the present some impressions act, and others do not act, on his consciousness. Now certain impressions act upon a man, or do not act upon him, because he loves this more or less, and does not love that.

Only in consequence of this greater or lesser degree of love there is formed in man a certain series of such or such impressions. Thus, it is nothing but the property of loving this more or less, and of not loving that, that is this special and fundamental ego of man, in which are collected all the scattered and interrupted consciousnesses. Though this property is developed during our life, it is brought by us into this life from some invisible and uncognizable past.

This special property of man to love one thing in a greater or lesser degree, and not to love another, is generally called character. By this word is frequently understood the peculiarity of the properties of every individual man, formed in consequence of certain conditions of time and place. But that is not correct. The fundamental property of man to love one thing more or less, and not to love another thing, is not due to spatial and temporal conditions, but, on the contrary, spatial and temporal conditions act upon a man, or do not act upon him, because a man, upon entering into the world, has already a very definite property of loving one thing and not loving another. This is the only reason why men who are born and brought up under precisely the same spatial and temporal conditions frequently present sharp contrasts as to their inner ego.

What unites all the scattered consciousnesses, which in their turn unite into one in our body, is something quite definite, though independent of spatial and temporal conditions, and is my real and actual ego. Myself I under-

stand as this fundamental property; if I know any other men, I know them only as some special relations to the world. When we enter into serious spiritual communion with men, we are certainly not guided by their external signs, but try to penetrate into their essence, that is, to understand what their relation is to the world, what they love and to what extent, and what they do not love.

Every separate animal, a horse, a dog, a cow, if I know it and have a serious spiritual communion with it, is known to me not by external signs but by its special relation which it bears to the world, — that is, what, and to what extent, each of them loves, and what it does not love. If I know especial different breeds of animals, I know them, strictly speaking, not so much by external signs as by this, that each of them — a lion, a fish, a spider — represents a common special relation to the world. All lions in general like one thing, all fishes something else, and all spiders still something else; even because they all like something else they present themselves to my consciousness as different living beings.

The fact that I do not yet distinguish in each of these beings its special relation to the world does not prove that it does not exist, but only that this special relation to the world, which forms the life of one individual spider, is removed from that relation to the world in which I am, and that, therefore, I have not yet come to understand it, as Silvio Pellico understood his individual spider.

The foundation of everything which I know of myself and of the whole world is this special relation to the world in which I am and in consequence of which I see the other beings, which are in their special relation to the world. But my special relation to the world was not established in this life and did not begin with my body or with a series of temporally consecutive consciousnesses.

And so my body, which is united into one by my temporal consciousness, may be destroyed, and my temporal

consciousness itself may be destroyed; but what cannot be destroyed is this special relation to the world which forms my special ego, from which everything which is was built up. It cannot be destroyed, because it is that which alone is. If it did not exist, I should not know the series of my consecutive consciousnesses, nor my body, nor my life, nor any other life. And so the destruction of the body and of consciousness cannot serve as a sign of the destruction of my special relation to the world, which did not have a beginning or origin in this life.

XXIX.

THE TERROR OF DEATH IS DUE TO THIS, THAT MEN REGARD AS THEIR LIFE ONE SMALL PART OF IT, WHICH IS LIMITED BY THEIR OWN FALSE CONCEPTION OF IT

We are afraid that with our carnal death we lose our special ego, which unites into one both the body and the series of consciousnesses as manifested in time; but this special ego did not begin with my birth, and so the interruption of a certain temporal consciousness cannot destroy that which unites into one all the temporal consciousnesses.

The carnal death, indeed, destroys what holds the body together, — the consciousness of the temporal life. But this takes place with us all the time, every day, whenever we fall asleep. The question is as to whether the carnal death destroys what unites all the consecutive consciousnesses into one, that is, my special relation to the world. In order that we may affirm this, we must first prove that this special relation to the world, which unites into one all the consecutive consciousnesses, was born with my carnal existence, and so will die with it. But this is not true.

Judging on the basis of my consciousness, I see that that which has united all my consciousnesses into one, — a certain susceptibility for one thing and coldness for another, in consequence of which one thing remains in me and another disappears, the degree of my love of the good and hatred of the evil, — that this my special relation to the world, which forms me, my individual me, is

not the product of some external cause, but the fundamental cause of all the remaining phenomena of my life.

But judging on the basis of observation, it appears to me at first that the causes of the peculiarity of my ego lie in the peculiarities of my parents and of the conditions which have acted upon me and upon them; but, continuing to reason on this path, I cannot help but see that if my special ego lies in the peculiarity of my parents and of the conditions which have acted upon them, it lies also in the peculiarity of all my ancestors and in the conditions of their existence — *ad infinitum*, that is, they are outside time and space, so that my special ego originated outside of space and outside of time, that is, precisely what I am conscious of.

In this, and only in this extra-temporal and extra-spatial basis of my special relation to the world, which unites all my remembered consciousnesses and the consciousnesses which preceded my remembered life (as Plato says and as we all feel), — in this, in this basis, in my special relation to the world, lies this special ego which we are afraid will be destroyed with the carnal death.

But we need only understand that what unites all the consciousnesses into one, what is man's special ego, is outside of time and has always been, and that what can be interrupted is only a series of consciousnesses of a certain time, in order that it may be clear that the destruction of the consciousness last in time, at the carnal death, can as little interrupt the true human ego as the daily sleep. Not one man is afraid of falling asleep, though in sleep the same takes place as at death, namely, consciousness in time is interrupted. Man is not afraid of falling asleep, though the destruction of consciousness is precisely the same as at death, not because he has come to the conclusion that he has fallen asleep and awakened again before, and so will waken even now (this reflection is not correct: he may have wakened a thousand times,

and not waken the thousand and first time), — no one ever makes this reflection, and it would not calm him; but man knows that his true ego lives outside of time, and that, therefore, the interruption of his consciousness, as manifested in time, cannot impair his life.

If a man fell asleep, as in the fairy tales, for a thousand years, he would fall asleep just as calmly as when he falls asleep for two hours. For the consciousness of the non-temporal, true life a million years of interruption or eight hours are the same, for time does not exist for such a life.

When the body is destroyed, the consciousness of the present day will be destroyed.

It is time that man became accustomed to the transformation of his body and the exchange of one series of temporal consciousnesses for another. These changes began as far back as man can remember himself, and they have taken place without cessation. Man is not afraid of the changes of his body, and not only is not terrified, but very frequently desires an acceleration of these changes, — desires to grow, to arrive at man's estate, to be cured. Man was a red piece of flesh, and all his consciousness consisted in the demands of his stomach: now he is a bearded, sensible man, or a woman who loves grown-up children. There is nothing in the body or in the consciousness like what it was, and man is not frightened at these changes which have brought him to the present condition, but hails them with joy. Where, then, is the terror in the imminent change? The destruction? But that on which all these changes take place, — the special relation to the world, — that in which the consciousness of the true life consists, did not begin with the birth of the body, but outside of the body and outside of time. How, then, can any temporal and spatial change destroy what is outside of it? Man arrests his attention on a small, tiny part of his life, does not

want to see the whole of it, and trembles lest this tiny and beloved particle disappear from view. This reminds me of the anecdote of that madman who imagined that he was made of glass and when he was dropped said, "Crash!" and immediately died. In order that man may have life, he must take all of it, and not a small part of it as manifested in time and space. To him who takes the whole of life, it shall be given, but from him who takes part of it, even that which he has will be taken from him.

XXX.

LIFE IS A RELATION TO THE WORLD. THE MOTION OF LIFE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW, HIGHER RELATION, AND SO DEATH IS THE ENTRANCE INTO A NEW RELATION

Life we cannot understand otherwise than as a certain relation to the world: thus we understand life in ourselves and thus we understand it also in other beings.

But in ourselves we understand life not only as a once established relation to the world, but also as the establishment of a new relation to the world through a greater and ever greater subjection of the animal personality to reason, and as a manifestation of a greater degree of love. That inevitable destruction of the carnal existence which we see in ourselves, shows us that the relation in which we are toward the world is not constant, and that we are obliged to establish another relation. The establishment of this new relation, that is, the motion of life, destroys the conception of death. Death appears only to him who, not having recognized his life as consisting in the establishment of a rational relation to the world and to its manifestation in a greater and ever greater love, has stopped at that relation, that is, at that degree of love for one and enmity toward another with which he entered into existence.

Life is an unceasing motion, but, by persisting in the same relation to the world, persisting in that degree of love with which he entered into the world, he feels its arrest, and death appears to him.

Death is visible and terrible only to such a man. The whole existence of such a man is one unceasing death. Death is visible and terrible to him, not only in the future, but also in the present, with all the manifestations of the diminution of the animal life, from childhood to old age, for the motion of existence from childhood to maturity only seems to be a temporary increase of forces, but is in reality just such an induration of the members, diminution of pliability and vitality, as do not cease from birth until death. Such a man continually sees death before him, and nothing can save him from it. With every day and hour the position of such a man becomes worse and worse, and nothing can improve it. His special relation to the world, his love for one and enmity toward another, presents itself to such a man as one of the conditions of his existence, and the one business of life, the establishment of a new relation to the world, the increase of love, presents itself to him as unnecessary. His whole life passes in the impossible, — in the attempt at liberating himself from the inevitable diminution of life, in its induration, weakening, aging, and death.

But not so for a man who understands life. Such a man knows that he has brought into his present life his special relation to the world, his love for one and enmity toward another from the past which is concealed from him. He knows that this his love for one and enmity toward another which is carried by him into his existence, is the very essence of his life; that it is not an accidental property of his life, but that this alone has the motion of life, — and he places his life in this motion alone, in the increase of love.

Looking at his past in this life, he sees, by the series of cognitions which is intelligible to him, that his relation to the world has changed, the subjection to the law of reason has increased and the power and sphere of love has increased all the time, without cessation, giving him an

ever increasing good independently of, and sometimes directly in inverse proportion to, the existence of personality.

Such a man, who accepts his life from the invisible past, and recognizes its constant uninterrupted growth, endures it and looks into the future, not only calmly, but even with joy.

They say that disease, old age, debility, dotage are the destruction of man's consciousness and life. For what man? I imagine John the Divine falling, according to the tradition, from old age into childhood. According to the tradition he says nothing but this: "Brethren, love one another!" The barely moving old man of one hundred years, with tearful eyes, lisps only these three words, "Love one another!" In such a man the animal existence is barely flickering, — it is all consumed by the new relation to the world, the new living being, which no longer finds its place in the existence of the carnal man.

For a man who understands life as it actually is to speak of the diminution of his life with diseases and old age, and to grieve about it, is the same as though a man on approaching the light should grieve about the diminution of his shadow, in proportion as he walks up to the light. To believe in the destruction of one's life, because the body is destroyed, is the same as believing that the destruction of the shadow of an object, when this object has entered into the full light, is a sure sign that the object itself is annihilated. Such a conclusion could be made only by a man who has looked for so long a time into the shadow that at last he comes to imagine that the shadow is the object itself.

But to a man who knows himself, not from the reflection in his spatial and temporal existence, but from his increased love relation to the world, the destruction of the shadow of his spatial and temporal relations is only a

sign of a greater degree of light. For a man who understands his life as a certain special relation to the world, with which he entered into existence, and which grew in his life with the increase of love, to believe in his annihilation is the same as though a man who knows the external visible laws of the world should believe that his mother found him under a cabbage-leaf, and that his body will suddenly fly away somewhere, so that nothing will be left.

XXXI.

THE LIFE OF DEAD PEOPLE DOES NOT CEASE IN THIS WORLD

And still more, I shall not say on the other hand, but according to the very essence of life, as we cognize it, does the superstition of death become clear to us. My friend, my brother lived just as I do, and now he has stopped living like me. His life was his consciousness and took place under the conditions of his bodily existence; consequently, there is no place and no time for the manifestation of his consciousness, and there is none for me. My brother was, I was in communion with him, and now he is not, and I shall never find out where he is.

"Between him and us all ties are broken. He does not exist for us and we similarly will not exist for those who will be left. What, then, is this, if not death?" Thus speak people who do not understand life.

These people see in the cessation of the external communion an unquestionable proof of actual death, whereas by nothing is the phantasmal conception of death more clearly and more obviously dispersed than by the cessation of the carnal existence of our friends. My brother has died, what has happened? Namely this, that the manifestation of his relation to the world, accessible to my observation in time and space, has disappeared from my eyes, and nothing is left.

"Nothing is left," so would a chrysalis say which has not yet unfolded itself as a butterfly, as it observes that

the cocoon which is lying near it is empty. But the chrysalis would say so if it could think and speak, because, having lost its neighbour, it would indeed feel the neighbour as being nothing. Not so with man. My brother has died: his cocoon, it is true, is empty, — I do not see him in the form in which I saw him heretofore, but his disappearance from my sight has not destroyed my relation to him. With me is left, as we say, his memory.

His memory is left, — not the remembrance of his face, his eyes, but the remembrance of his spiritual picture.

What is this memory, — such a simply and apparently intelligible word? The forms of crystals, of animals disappear, and there is no memory left among crystals and animals. But I preserve the memory of my friend and brother. And this memory is the more vivid the more the life of my friend and brother harmonized with the law of reason, the more it was manifested in love. This memory is not merely a notion, but something which acts upon me in precisely the same way as my brother's life acted upon me during his earthly existence. This memory is the same invisible, immaterial atmosphere which surrounded his life and acted upon me and upon others during his carnal existence, even as it acts upon me after his death. This memory demands of me after his death the same that it demanded of me during his lifetime. More than this: this memory becomes for me more obligatory after his death than it was during his life. That life force which was in my brother has not only not disappeared, or been diminished, but has not even remained the same, for it has increased, and acts more powerfully upon me than before.

His life force after his carnal death acts as much or even more strongly than before his death, and it acts like everything which is truly alive. On what ground, then, feeling upon myself this life force just as it was during

the carnal existence of my brother, that is, as his relation to the world, which elucidated to me my relation to the world, can I affirm that my dead brother has no longer any life? I can say that he has gone out of that lower relation to the world, in which he was as an animal, and in which I still abide, — that is all; I can say that I do not see that centre of the new relation to the world in which he now is: but I cannot deny his life, because I feel its force upon myself. I have been looking at a reflecting surface to see how a man was holding me; the reflecting surface has grown dim. I no longer see how he is holding me, but I feel with my whole being that he is holding me as much as before, and so exists.

But, moreover, this invisible life of my dead brother not only acts upon me, but enters into me. His special living ego, his relation to the world, becomes my relation to the world. It is as though in the establishment of the relation to the world he raised me to that level to which he himself rose, and to me, to my especial living ego, is made clearer that next step to which he raised himself, disappearing from my vision, but drawing me after him. Thus I cognize the life of my brother who sleeps in carnal death, and so I cannot doubt it; but, as I observe the actions of this life, which has vanished from my vision upon the world, I become still more indubitably convinced of the actuality of this life which has vanished from my vision. The man is dead, but his relation to the world continues to act upon people, not as in his lifetime, but with an enormously greater force, and this action increases in accordance with its reasonableness and lovableness, and grows like everything which lives, never ceasing and knowing no interruptions.

Christ has been dead a very long time, and his carnal existence was short, and we have no clear conception of his carnal personality, but the force of his rational and lovable life, his relation to the world — nobody else's —

acts even now upon millions of people, who receive in themselves his relation to the world and live by it. What is it, then, that acts? What is this which before was connected with the carnal existence of Christ and now forms the continuation and ramification of that his life? We say that it is not Christ's life, but its consequences. When we utter such absolutely meaningless words we imagine that we have said something more definite and clear than that this force is the living Christ itself. The same might be said by ants who dug around an acorn, which sprouted and grew to be an oak; the acorn gave way to the oak, which now tears up the ground with its roots, drops leaves, branches, and new acorns, wards off the light and the rain, and changes everything which lived round about it. "This is not the life of the acorn," the ants say, "but the consequences of its life, which came to an end when we dragged that acorn down and threw it into the hole."

My brother died yesterday or a thousand years ago, and that same force of his life which acted during his carnal existence continues to act more powerfully in me and in hundreds, thousands, millions of men, in spite of the fact that the visible centre of this force of his temporal carnal existence has disappeared from my sight. What does this mean? I saw before me the light of the burning grass. The grass has burned out, but the light is only stronger: I do not see the cause of this light, I do not know that anything is burning, but I can conclude that the same fire which burned the grass is now burning the distant forest, or something else that I cannot see. The light is such that I not only see it now, but it alone guides me and gives me life. I live by this light. How can I deny it? I may think that the force of this life has now a different centre, which is invisible to me; but I cannot deny it, because I feel it, am moved and live by it. I cannot know what this centre is, what this life is in itself, — I can guess, if I am fond of guessing and am

not afraid of blundering. But if I seek a rational comprehension of life, I shall be satisfied only with what is clear and indubitable, and will not spoil that which is clear and indubitable by adding to it obscure and arbitrary guesses. It is enough for me to know that everything I live by is composed of the lives of those who have lived before me and have now been long dead, and that, therefore, every man who has fulfilled the law of life and has subjected his animal personality to reason and has manifested the power of love, has lived and still lives in others after the disappearance of his carnal existence, in order that the insipid and terrible superstition of death should no longer trouble me.

In the men who have left after them the force which continues to be active we may observe also this, why they, who subjected their personality to reason and abandoned themselves to a life of love, never could have had any doubts about the possibility of the destruction of life.

In the lives of such men we can find the foundation of their faith in the uninterruptedness of life; and then, comprehending our own life, we may find these foundations in ourselves as well. Christ said that he would live after the disappearance of the phantasm of life. He said this, because even then, during his carnal existence, he entered into the true life, which cannot cease. Even during his carnal existence he lived in the beams of the light from that other centre of life, toward which he was walking, and saw in his lifetime that the beams of that light were illuminating the people round about him. The same is seen by every man who renounces his personality and lives a rational life of love.

No matter how narrow the circle of a man's activity may be, — whether he is Christ, or Socrates, or a good, inglorious, self-sacrificing old man, or youth, or woman, — if he lives, renouncing his personality for the good of others, he enters even here, in this life, into that new relation to the

world, for which there is no death, and the establishment of which is for all men the work of this life.

A man who places his life in the subjection to the law of reason and in the manifestation of love sees even in this life, on the one hand, the beams of light of that new centre of life toward which he is walking, and, on the other, that action which this light, passing through it, produces on those who surround him. And this gives him an indubitable faith in the undiminishableness, undyingness, and eternal intensification of life. We cannot accept the belief of immortality from others, — we cannot convince ourselves of immortality. In order that there should be a belief in immortality, there has to be this immortality, and in order that it should be, we must understand our life as being immortal. Only he can believe in the future life, who has done his work of life, who has established in this life that new relation to the world, which is no longer contained in him.

XXXII.

THE SUPERSTITION OF DEATH IS DUE TO THIS, THAT MAN CONFUSES HIS DIFFERENT RELATIONS TO THE WORLD

Yes, if we look upon life in its real meaning, it becomes difficult even to understand on what the strange superstition of death is based.

Thus, if you make out what it is that in the darkness frightened you as a phantasm, you can no longer reconstruct that phantasmal terror.

The fear of losing what alone exists is due to this alone, that life presents itself to man, not only in the one, to him known, but invisible, special relation of his rational consciousness to the world, but also in two, to him unknown, but visible relations: his animal relation and the relation of his body to the world. Everything in existence presents itself to man: (1) as the relation of his rational consciousness to the world, (2) as the relation of his animal consciousness to the world, and (3) as the relation of the matter of his body to the world. Failing to understand that the relation of his rational consciousness to the world is his only life, man imagines his life also in the visible relation of his animal consciousness and matter to the world, and is afraid of losing his special relation of the rational consciousness to the world, when in his personality there is impaired the former relation of his animal personality and of the matter composing him to the world.

To such a man it appears that he originates from the motion of matter, passing to the level of personal animal

consciousness. It seems to him that this animal consciousness passes into a rational consciousness, and that later this rational consciousness weakens, again passes back into the animal, and at last the animal weakens and passes into dead matter, from which it came. But the relation of his rational consciousness to the world presents itself in this view as something accidental, unnecessary, and perishable. With this view it turns out that the relation of his animal consciousness to the world cannot be destroyed, — the animal continues itself in its species; the relation of matter to the world can in no way be destroyed, and is eternal; but the most precious, — his rational consciousness, — is not only not eternal, but is only the gleam of something unnecessary, something superfluous.

And man feels that that cannot be. And in this lies the terror of death. In order to save themselves from this fear, some people want to assure themselves that the animal consciousness is their rational consciousness, and that the undyingness of the animal man, that is, of his species, his descent, satisfies that demand for the immortality of the rational consciousness which they contain in themselves. Others want to assure themselves that the life, which has never existed before, having suddenly appeared in the carnal form and having vanished again from it, will again be raised in the flesh and live. But it is impossible for people who do not recognize life in the relation of the rational consciousness to the world to believe either the one or the other. It is evident to them that the continuation of the human race does not satisfy the unceasing demand for the eternity of their special ego; but the conception of a life beginning anew includes the concept of a cessation of life, and if life did not exist before, nor always, it cannot exist later.

For either of these the earthly life is a wave. Out of the dead matter rises the personality, out of the person-

ality the rational consciousness, — the crest of the wave; having risen to the crest, the wave, the rational consciousness and the personality, falls back to whence it came, and is destroyed. To either of these human life is the visible life. Man grows up, matures, and dies, and after death there can be nothing for him; what is left after him and of him, whether his posterity, or even his works, cannot satisfy him. He is sorry for *himself*, is afraid of the cessation of *his* life. He cannot believe that this life of his, which has begun here upon earth in his body and ends here, should rise again. He knows that if he did not exist before, and has appeared out of nothing and dies, his special ego will and can never exist again. Man is cognizant of this, that he will not die only when he will cognize that he was never born and has always existed and will always exist. Man will believe in his immortality only when he will understand that his life is not a wave, but that eternal motion which in this life is manifested only as a wave.

It seems to me that I shall die and my life will come to an end, and this thought torments and frightens me, for I am sorry for myself. What will die? What am I sorry for? What am I from the commonest point of view? First of all I am flesh. Well, am I afraid and sorry for it? It turns out that I am not: the body, matter, can never, nowhere perish, — not one particle of it. Consequently this part of me is safe, and there is no reason for having any fears for it. Everything will be intact. But no, they say, it is not this that one is sorry for. I am sorry for myself, Lev Nikoláevich, Iván Seménych. But a man is not what he was twenty years ago, and every day he is different. So for whom am I sorry? No, they say, it is not this that one is sorry for. What I am sorry for is the consciousness of myself, of my ego.

But this consciousness of yours was not always one, but there were different states of consciousness: there was one a year ago, and a quite different one before that; as

far as you remember, it has changed all the time. Have you taken such a special liking for your present consciousness that you are sorry to lose it? If it were always one with you, this would be intelligible; but it has been doing nothing but changing all the time. You do not see its beginning, and you cannot find it, and suddenly you want that there should be no end to it, that the consciousness which is in you should remain for ever. As far back as you can remember yourself, you have been going. You came into the world yourself not knowing how; but you know that you came as that special ego that you are; then you walked and walked, until you reached the middle, and suddenly you were both rejoiced and frightened, and you are stubborn, and will not move from the spot, to move on, because you do not see what is there. But you have not seen even the place from which you have come, and you certainly came; you came in by the entrance gate, and you do not want to go out by the exit.

Your whole life has been a walking through the carnal existence: you walked and were in a hurry to walk, and suddenly you feel sorry because that is taking place which you have been desiring all the time. What you are terrified by is the great change of your state at the carnal death; but such a great change took place at your birth, and that not only did not result in anything bad for you, but, on the contrary, it resulted in something good, for you do not wish to part from it.

What is it that can frighten you? You say that you are sorry for your ego, with your present sensations and thoughts, with your view of the world, with your present relation to the world.

You are afraid you will lose your relation to the world. What is this relation? What does it consist in?

If it consists in this, that you eat, drink, beget, build, dress yourself in a certain way, and assume a certain relation to men and animals, all that is the relation of

every man, as a reasoning animal, to life, and this relation can never pass away; there have been millions such, and there will be millions, and their species will as certainly be preserved as each particle of matter. The preservation of the species is implanted in all animals with such force, and, therefore, is so firmly grounded that there is no need of having any fears on that score. If you are an animal, you have no reason for fearing; but if you are matter, you are still better secured in your eternity.

But if you are afraid of losing what is not animal, you are afraid of losing your special rational relation to the world, — with which you have entered into this existence. But you know that it did not arise with your birth: it exists independently of your procreated animal, and so it cannot depend on its death.

XXXIII.

THE VISIBLE LIFE IS A PART OF THE INFINITE MOTION OF LIFE

My earthly life and the life of all other men presents itself to me like this:

I and every living man, — we find ourselves in this world in a certain definite relation to the world, with a certain degree of love. At first it seems to us that our life begins with this relation to the world, but observations over ourselves and over other men show us that this relation to the world, the degree of love of each one of us, did not begin with this life, but has been carried by us into life from the past, which is concealed from us by our carnal birth; besides, we see that the whole current of our life here is nothing but an unceasing increase and intensification of our love, which never ceases, but is only concealed from our view by our carnal death.

My visible life presents itself to me as a segment of a cone, the apex and base of which are hidden from my mental vision. The narrowest part of the cone is that relation of mine to the world with which I first become conscious of myself; the broadest part is that higher relation to life which I have now attained. The beginning of this cone, its apex, is hidden from me in time by my birth; the continuation is hidden from me in the future, which is equally unknown to me in my carnal existence and in my carnal death. I do not see the apex of the cone, nor its base, but from the part through which my visible, memorable life passes, I unquestionably know its properties.

At first it seems to me that this segment of the cone is my whole life, but in proportion as my true life advances, I see, on the one hand, that that which forms the foundation of my life is behind it, beyond its borders: in proportion with life I feel more clearly and more vividly my connection with my visible past; on the other hand, I see that this foundation leans against the future, which is unknown to me, and I feel more clearly and more vividly my connection with the future, and I conclude that my visible life, my earthly life, is only a small part of my whole life, which incontestably exists at both ends, — before birth and after death, — but which is hidden from my present consciousness. And so the cessation of the visibility of life after the carnal death, just like its invisibility before birth, does not deprive me of the undoubted knowledge of its existence before birth and after death.

I enter into life with certain ready properties of love to the world outside of me; my carnal existence — whether it be short or long — passes in the increase of this love which I brought with me into the world, and so I conclude indubitably that I lived before my birth and shall live, as after that moment of the present in which I, reflecting, now am, so also after any other moment of time before and after my carnal death. Looking outside of me at the carnal beginnings and ends of the existence of other men (even of beings in general), I see that one life seems to be longer, another shorter; one appears before, and is visible to me for a longer time; another appears later, and very quickly is again concealed from me; but in all of them I see the manifestation of one and the same law of every true life, — an increase of love, — so to speak, a broadening of the beams of life. Sooner or later the curtain will fall which conceals from me the temporal current of the life of men: the life of men is still a life exactly the same as any other, and it has no beginning and no end. The fact that a man has lived

a longer or shorter time in the visible conditions of this existence can present no distinctions in his true life. The fact that one man passed more slowly through the field of vision open to me, or that another man passed through it more quickly, can by no means compel me to ascribe more actual life to the one and less to the other. I know without a doubt that, if I saw a man walking past my window, — whether he walked fast or slowly, — this man existed before the time when I saw him, and will continue to exist, even though he is hidden from my view.

But why do some pass quickly, and others slowly? Why does a man live, who is old, dried up, morally ossified, and, in our opinion, incapable of performing the law of life, — of increasing love, — while a child, a youth, a girl, a man in the full vigour of his spiritual labour dies, passes out of the conditions of this carnal life, in which, according to our conception, he has only begun to establish in himself a regular relation to life?

We may understand the death of Pascal, of Goethe; but Chénier, Lérmontov, and thousands of other men, with whom the inner work, as we think, had just begun, whose work, as we think, might have been so well accomplished here?

But that only seems so to us. None of us knows anything about those principles of life which are brought into the world by others, about that motion of life which has taken place in it, about those obstacles against the motion of life, which are to be found in this existence, and, above all, about those other conditions of life, possible, but invisible to us, in the which the life of this or that man may be placed in the other existence.

It seems to us, as we look at the blacksmith's work, that the horseshoe is all made, — that he has to strike it but once or twice, — but he breaks it up and throws it into the fire, knowing that it has been overheated.

We cannot know whether the work of the true life

has been accomplished in man or not. We know this only of ourselves. It seems to us that a man dies when he does not need to, but this cannot be. A man dies only when death is needed for his good, just as a man grows up and reaches man's estate only when that is needed for his good.

Indeed, if by life we understand life, and not the semblance of it; if the true life is the foundation of everything, the foundation cannot depend on what it produces: the cause cannot result from the result, — the current of the true life cannot be impaired by its change, by its manifestation. The incepted and unfinished motion of man's life cannot cease in this world, because he gets a boil, or a bacterium flies into him, or somebody discharges a pistol at him.

A man dies only because in this world the good of his true life can no longer be increased, and not because his lungs hurt, or because he has a cancer, or because he was shot, or a bomb was thrown at him. It generally seems to us that it is natural to live a carnal life, and unnatural to perish by fire, water, cold, lightning, diseases, pistol-shots, or a bomb, — but we need only think seriously, looking at men's lives from the side, in order that we may see that, on the contrary, it is very unnatural for a man to live a carnal life among these destructive conditions, among these universally distributed and generally fatal bacteria. It is natural for him to perish. And so the carnal life among these disastrous conditions is, on the contrary, something very unnatural in the material sense. If we live, this is not due to the fact that we are taking care of ourselves, but because in us is taking place the work of life which subjects to itself all these conditions. We live, not because we take care of ourselves, but because we are doing the work of life. When the work of life is done, and nothing can arrest the unceasing destruction of the human animal life, this destruction takes

place, and one of the nearest causes of the carnal life, which always surround us, appears to us as its exclusive cause.

Our true life exists, — it alone we know, from it alone we know our animal life, — and so, if its semblance is subject to invariable laws, how can that which produces this semblance fail to be subject to laws?

But what troubles us is that we do not see the causes and actions of our true life in the same way as we see the causes and actions in external phenomena: we do not know why one enters into life with such properties of his ego, and another with other properties, — why one man's life is cut short, and another man's life is continued. We ask ourselves: what were the causes before my existence that I was born to be what I am? And what will be after my death as the result of my living in one way or another? And we regret that we do not receive any answers to these questions.

But to regret this, that I am unable to find out now what happened before my life and what will be after my death, is the same as regretting my inability to see what is beyond the limits of my vision. If I could see what is beyond the limits of my vision, I should not be able to see what is within these limits; but, for the good of my animal, I must above all else see what is around me.

The same is true of my reason, by means of which I cognize. If I could see what is beyond the limits of my reason, I should not see what is within its limits; but, for the good of true life, I must above all else know that to which I am obliged now and here to submit my animal personality, in order that I may obtain the good of life.

And reason reveals this to me: it reveals to me in this life that one path on which I do not see the cessation of my good.

It shows without a doubt that this life did not begin

with birth, but has always been, — it shows that the good of this life grows, increases here, reaching those limits which can no longer contain it, and only then passes out of those conditions which retard its growth, in order to pass into another existence.

Reason places man on that one path of life which, like a cone-shaped, widening tunnel, amidst the walls which surround it on all sides, opens to it in the distance the unquestionable endlessness of life and of its good.

XXXIV.

THE INEXPLICABILITY OF THE SUFFERINGS OF THE EARTHLY EXISTENCE PROVES MORE CONVINCINGLY THAN ANYTHING ELSE TO MAN THAT HIS LIFE IS NOT A LIFE OF THE PERSONALITY, WHICH BEGAN WITH BIRTH AND ENDS WITH DEATH

But even if man could get along without fearing death or thinking of it, the terrible, aimless sufferings, which cannot be justified and which can never be averted, the sufferings to which he is subject, would suffice to destroy every rational meaning which is ascribed to life.

I am occupied with a good, unquestionably useful work, and suddenly I am seized by a disease which cuts short my work and torments and pesters me without sense or purpose. A screw has rusted in the rails, and it must happen so that on the day when it comes out, a good woman, a mother, is travelling on that train, in that particular car, and her children are killed in her sight. An earthquake causes the particular spot on which Lisbon or Vyérny stands to cave in, and absolutely innocent people are buried alive in the ground and die in terrible suffering. What sense has this? Why, for what purpose are these and thousands of similar senseless, terrible accidents of sufferings which afflict people?

The explanations of reason explain nothing. The explanations of reason of all such phenomena always get around the very essence of the question and show more convincingly its insolubility. I have fallen sick, because some kinds of microbes have settled somewhere in me;

or the children were crushed to death by the train in their mother's sight, because the dampness affects the iron in such and such a way; or Vyérny caved in, because there exist certain geological laws. But the question is, why such or such people were subject to these terrible sufferings, and how I can free myself from these accidents of suffering?

There is no answer to this. Reflection, on the contrary, shows me that there is no law by which one man is subject to these casualties and another is not, and that there can be no such law; that there is an endless number of such casualties, and that, therefore, no matter what I may do, my life is every second subject to all the infinite accidents of most terrible suffering.

If men made only the deductions which inevitably follow from their world conception, these people, if they understand life as personal existence, would not remain alive a minute. Certainly not a labourer would work for a master who, hiring him, would reserve for himself the right every time when he pleased to roast the labourer over a slow fire, or to flay him alive, or to pull out his nerves, or do in general all those terrible things which, without any explanation or cause, he did with his labourers in full sight of him whom he was hiring. If men actually understood life fully as they say that they understand it, not one of them would, out of fear of all those painful and absolutely inexplicable sufferings, which he sees all around him, and to which he may be subject at any moment, remain alive in the world.

But although all people know different easy means for killing themselves and passing out of this life, which is so full of cruel and senseless sufferings, they continue to live: they complain of the sufferings and lament them, but continue to live.

It is impossible to say that this is due to the fact that there are more pleasures in life than sufferings, because,

in the first place, not only a simple reflection, but also a philosophic investigation of life shows that the whole earthly life is a series of sufferings, which are by no means redeemed by the pleasures; in the second place, we know from ourselves and from others that people in positions which offer them nothing but a series of increasing sufferings without the possibility of alleviating them until death, none the less do not kill themselves and hold on to life.

There is but one explanation to this strange contradiction: all men know in the depth of their hearts that all kinds of suffering are necessary for the good of their life, and so continue to live, foreseeing them or submitting to them. They are provoked at these sufferings, because with the false view of life, which demands the good only for its personality, the impairment of this good, which does not lead to any palpable good, must present itself to them as something inexplicable and so provoking.

Men are terrified at these sufferings and marvel at them as at something quite unexpected and unintelligible. And yet every man has grown up with sufferings and his whole life is a series of sufferings, experienced by him and imposed by him on other beings, and it would seem that it is time to get used to sufferings, not to be terrified by them, and not to ask oneself why and for what these sufferings exist. If a man will only stop to think, he will see that all his pleasures are bought with the sufferings of other beings; that all his sufferings are necessary for his enjoyment; that without sufferings there are no pleasures; that sufferings and pleasures are two opposite conditions which are evoked one by the other and are necessary one for the other. So what do the questions mean, "Why? For what are these sufferings?" which a rational man puts to himself? Why does a man who knows that suffering is united with

enjoyment ask himself why and for what there is suffering, and not why and for what there are pleasures?

The whole life of an animal and of man, as an animal, is an uninterrupted chain of sufferings. The whole activity of an animal and of a man, as an animal, is called forth only by suffering. Suffering is a morbid sensation which rouses an activity that abolishes this morbid sensation, and which evokes a state of enjoyment. And the life of an animal and of man, as an animal, is not only not impaired by suffering, but takes place only in consequence of suffering. Suffering is, therefore, what moves life, and so is what it ought to be; so what, then, does man mean by asking why and for what there is suffering?

An animal does not ask that.

When a hungry perch torments a minnow, or a spider a fly, a wolf a sheep, they know that they do what must be; and so, when a perch, a spider, a wolf, are subjected to similar torments by those who are stronger than they, they, in running away, defending themselves, and escaping, know that they are doing everything which ought to be done, and so there cannot be the slightest doubt in them that what is taking place with them is as it ought to be. But a man who is troubling himself only about having his legs healed over that were torn off on the field of battle, where he tore off the legs of other men; or who is thinking only of how he may, in the best way possible, pass his time in the solitary confinement of the prison after he has directly or indirectly incarcerated others there; or who is thinking only of how he may ward off and escape the wolves, which are tearing him to pieces, after he has himself cut up and devoured thousands of animals, — such a man cannot find that what is taking place with him is right. He cannot acknowledge that what is happening to him is right, because, when he was subject to these sufferings, he did not do everything which

he ought to have done. But, since he did not do everything which he ought to have done, it seems to him that what is happening to him is not right.

But what is it that a man who is being torn by wolves ought to do except to run away and defend himself? He ought to do what is proper for a rational being: to recognize the sin which has produced the suffering, by repenting it, and to recognize the truth.

The animal suffers only in the present, and so the activity which is evoked by its suffering and is directed upon itself in the present completely satisfies it. But man suffers not in the present alone, but also in the past and in the future, and so the activity which is evoked by his sufferings cannot satisfy him, if it is directed only upon the present of the human animal. Nothing but an activity which is directed upon the cause and the consequences of the suffering, upon the past and the future, satisfies a suffering man.

The animal is locked up and tries to get out of its cage, or its leg is broken and it licks the aching spot, or it is being devoured by another and tries to get away from it. The law of its life is impaired from without, and it directs its activity to its reëstablishment, and there takes place what ought to take place. But man — I myself or a near friend of mine — is sitting in prison; I have lost my leg in battle, or wolves are tearing me to pieces; the activity which is directed to the flight from prison, to the healing of the leg, to defending myself against the wolves, does not satisfy me, because the imprisonment, the pain in my leg, the lacerating of the wolves, form only a tiny part of my suffering. I see the causes of my suffering in the past, in my own errors and in those of others, and if my activity is not directed to the cause of suffering, to the error, and I do not try to free myself from it, I am not doing what I ought to do, and so the suffering presents itself to me as what ought

not to be, and it grows, not only in reality, but also in imagination, to terrible proportions, which exclude the possibility of life.

The cause of the suffering is for the animal, the violation of the law of the animal life: this violation is manifested in the consciousness of the pain, and the activity which is evoked by the violation of the law is directed to the removal of the pain; for the rational consciousness the cause of the suffering is the violation of the law of the life of the rational consciousness: this violation is manifested in the consciousness of error, of sin, and the activity which is evoked by the violation of the law is directed to the removal of the error, the sin. And as the suffering of the animal evokes an activity which is directed upon the pain, and this activity frees the suffering from its agony, so the sufferings of the rational being evoke an activity which is directed upon the error, and this activity frees the suffering from its agony.

The questions as to why and what for, which rise in a man's soul when he experiences or thinks of suffering, show only that he does not yet know the activity which ought to be evoked in him by the suffering, and which frees the suffering from its agony. Indeed, for a man who recognizes his life in the animal existence, there cannot be this activity which frees from suffering, and the less of it, the narrower the sense in which he understands his life.

When a man, who recognizes his personal existence as life, finds the causes of his personal suffering in his personal error, — when he understands that he grew ill because he ate something harmful, or that he was beaten because he himself went out to fight, or that he is hungry and naked because he did not want to work, — he knows that he is suffering because he has done what he ought not to do, and in order that he may not do so again in

the future; and, directing his activity upon the destruction of the error, he is not provoked at the suffering, and bears it lightly and often with joy. But when such a man is assailed by suffering which is beyond the limit of the visible connection of suffering and error, — as when he suffers from causes which have always been outside his personal activity, or when the consequences of his sufferings cannot be of any use either to his personality, or to any other, — it seems to him that he is assailed by what ought not to be, and he asks himself why? what for? and, finding no object on which to direct his activity, he is provoked against the suffering, and his suffering becomes a terrible torment. But the majority of the sufferings of man are such that their causes or consequences — at times both — are hidden from him in space and time: such are hereditary diseases, unfortunate accidents, failures of crops, wrecks, fires, earthquakes, and so forth, which end in death.

The explanations that this is necessary in order to teach a lesson to future men, how they should not abandon themselves to those passions which are reflected as diseases on their posterity, or how they should build better trains and be more cautious with fire, — all these explanations do not give me any answer. I cannot recognize any meaning of my life in the illustration of the neglects of other people: my life is my life, with my striving after the good, and not an illustration for other lives. These explanations are good enough for conversation, but do not alleviate that terror before the meaninglessness of the sufferings with which I am threatened, and by which the possibility of life is excluded.

But even if it were possible in some way to understand this, that, while I by my errors cause others to suffer, I with my errors also bear the errors of others; if it is possible even most distantly to understand that every suffering is an indication of an error, which must be

corrected by men in this life, there is still left an enormous series of sufferings which cannot be explained in any way. A man is all alone in the woods, where he is torn to pieces by wolves; or he is drowned, or frozen, or burned, or simply falls ill in solitude and dies, and no one ever finds out how he suffered, and thousands of similar cases. Of what use will this be to any one?

For a man who understands his life as animal existence there is no explanation, and there can be none, because for such a man the connection between the suffering and the error is only in phenomena which are visible to him, but this connection completely slips away from his mental vision at the time of his death agony.

A man has choice between two things: either, by not recognizing the connection between the sufferings which he experiences and his life, to continue to bear the majority of his sufferings as torments which have no meaning whatever, or to acknowledge that my errors and my acts, which are committed as the result of them, — my sins, no matter what they may be, are the cause of my sufferings, whatever they be, and that my sufferings are a liberation and redemption of my sins and of those of any other men.

Only these two relations to suffering are possible: one, that suffering is what it ought not to be, because I do not see its external meaning, and the other, that it is what it ought to be, because I know its internal meaning for my true life. The first results from acknowledging as the good the good of my separate personal life. The other results from recognizing as the good the good of my whole life of the past and the future in an uninterrupted union with the good of other men and beings. With the first view, the sufferings have no explanation whatever and evoke no other activity than a constantly growing and insoluble despair and infuriation; with the second, the sufferings evoke the same activity which forms the motion

of the true life, — the consciousness of the sin, the liberation from error, and the subjection to the law of reason.

If it is not man's reason, it is the agony of his suffering that involuntarily compels him to recognize that his life is not coextensive with his personality; that personality is only the visible part of his whole life; that the external nexus of cause and action, which is visible to him from his personality, does not coincide with that internal nexus of cause and action, which is always known to man from his rational consciousness.

The connection between error and suffering, which is visible to the animal only in spatial and temporal relations, is always clear to man outside these conditions in his consciousness. Suffering, whatever it be, is always cognized by man as a result of his sin, whatever it be, and the repentance of his sin — as a liberation from suffering and attainment of the good.

The whole of man's life from the first days of his childhood consists in nothing but this: in the consciousness of sin through suffering, and in the liberation of self from error. I know that I came into this life with a certain knowledge of the truth, and that, the more error there was in me, the more suffering there was both of my own and of other men; the more I free myself from error, the less suffering there was of my own and of other people, and the greater was the good which I attained. And so I know that the greater the knowledge of the truth is which I carry out of this world, and which is given to me by my suffering, even though it be the last, before death, the greater is the good that I attain.

The agony of suffering is experienced by him alone who, having segregated himself from the life of the world, and not seeing those sins of his, by means of which he brought suffering into the world, regards himself as innocent, and so is provoked at those sufferings which he endures for the sins of the world.

And, strange to say, the same that is clear to the reason, mentally, is confirmed in the one true activity of life, in love. Reason says that a man who recognizes the connection of his sins and sufferings with the sins and sufferings of the world, is freed from the agony of suffering; love proves this in fact.

One-half of the life of each man passes in sufferings which he not only does not recognize as agonizing and does not notice, but even considers his good, only because they are endured as the consequences of error and as a means for alleviating the sufferings of beloved persons. Thus, the less there is love, the more is man subject to the agony of suffering, and the more there is love, the less there is of the agony of suffering; but a completely rational life, the whole activity of which is manifested only in love, excludes the possibility of any suffering. The agony of suffering is only that pain which men experience in the attempts at severing that chain of love for their ancestors, their posterity, their contemporaries, which unites the life of man with the life of the world.

XXXV.

PHYSICAL SUFFERINGS FORM THE NECESSARY CONDITION OF THE LIFE AND GOOD OF MAN

"STILL it pains, it pains bodily. What is this pain for?" ask people.

"Because we not only need it, but also could not live if we did not experience pain," would reply he who caused us the pain, and made this pain as little as he could, and the good from this pain as great as he could.

Who does not know that the very first sensation of pain is our first and chief means for the preservation of our body and the continuation of our animal life, and that if this did not exist, we should, while we are children, have burned up and cut to pieces our whole body? Physical pain preserves the animal personality. And as long as pain acts as a preservative of the personality, as is the case in the child, this pain cannot be that terrifying torment as which we know pain at a time when we are in the full force of our rational consciousness and struggle against the pain, recognizing it as something which ought not to be. Pain in the animal and in the child is a very definite and insignificant quantity, which never rises to that agony, to which it rises in a being that is endowed with a rational consciousness. In the child we see that it sometimes cries as pitifully from the bite of a flea as from a pain that destroys its internal organs. The pain of an irrational being leaves no trace in the memory. Let a man try to recall his childish sufferings of pain, and he will see that he not only has no recollection of

them, but is not even able to reconstruct them in his imagination. Our impression at the sight of the sufferings of children and animals is more our own suffering than theirs. The external expression of the suffering of irrational beings is immeasurably greater than the suffering itself, and so to an immeasurably greater degree provokes our sympathy, as we may see in the case of the diseases of the brain, of fevers, of all kinds of agonies.

At a time when the rational consciousness is not yet awakened, and the pain serves only as a preservation of the personality, it is not agonizing; but at a time when there is in man the possibility of a rational consciousness, it is a means for subjecting the animal personality to reason, and in proportion as this consciousness is awakened, it becomes less and less agonizing.

In reality, only when we are in full possession of our rational consciousness can we speak of sufferings, because only with this state begins that life and those conditions which we call sufferings. In this state the sensation of pain may be expanded to the greatest and narrowed down to the most insignificant proportions. Indeed, who does not know, without studying physiology, that there is a limit to sensitiveness, that with the increase of pain to a certain limit sensitiveness stops, — there is syncope, dulness, delirium, — or death ensues. The increase of pain is, therefore, a very definite quantity, which cannot surpass its limits. But the sensation of pain may be increased from our relation to it to infinity, and even so may be reduced to an infinitely small amount.

We all know how a man, by submitting to pain and recognizing pain as something which ought to be, is able to reduce it to insensibility, even to the sensation of pleasure in enduring it. Not to speak of the martyrs, of Huss, who sang at the stake, simple people, from a desire of showing their bravery, endure without a cry, or jerking, operations which are considered extremely painful. There

is a limit to the increase of pain, but there is no limit to the diminution of its sensation.

The torments of pain are really terrible for those men who have placed their life in the carnal existence. How can they help being terrible, since the force of reason which is given man for the purpose of destroying the agony of suffering is directed only to increasing it?

In Plato there is a myth about God's having at first set the term of seventy years to man's life, but later, when he saw that men fared worse from it, he changed it to what it is now, that is, he made it so that people do not know the hour of their death. Just as correctly would the rationale of what exists be defined by a myth which would say that men were originally created without the sensation of pain, but that later it was created for their good.

If the gods had created men without the sensation of pain, men would soon have begun to ask for it; without child labour women would bring forth children under such conditions that only extremely few would be left alive; children and young people would ruin their bodies, and grown men would never know the errors of men who lived before them or who are living now, nor, above all, their own errors: they would not know what to do in this life, — they would have no rational aim in their activity, could never make their peace with the thought of their imminent death, and would have no love.

For a man who understands life as the subjection of his personality to the law of reason, pain is not only no evil, but even a necessary condition, both of his animal and his rational life. If there were no pain, the animal personality would have no indication of the departures from this law; if the rational consciousness did not experience any suffering, man would not know the truth, — he would not know his law.

"But you are speaking," some will say to this, "of your own sufferings: how can you deny the sufferings of

others? The sight of these sufferings is the most agonizing suffering," these people will say, not quite sincerely.

The suffering of others? But the sufferings of others, what you call sufferings, have never stopped. The whole world of men and animals suffer and have always suffered. Have we really just learned this? Wounds, mutilations, hunger, cold, diseases, all kinds of unfortunate accidents, and, above all, childbirth, without which none of us has ever come into the world, — all these are necessary conditions of existence. It is precisely this — the diminution of it, the aid offered to it — that forms the contents of the true life of men, and to it the true activity of life is directed. The comprehension of the sufferings of personalities and of the causes of human errors, and the activity for their reduction are precisely that which forms the business of the human life. This is precisely why I am a man, a personality, — that I may understand the sufferings of other people; and for this I am a rational consciousness, that in the suffering of each separate personality I may see the common cause of suffering, — of error, — and may be able to destroy it in myself and in others. How, then, can the material of his labour be the cause of the labourer's suffering? It is the same as though a ploughman should say that the unploughed land is his suffering. The unploughed land can be a source of suffering only to him who wants to see the land ploughed, but does not consider it the business of his life to do the ploughing.

The activity which is directed upon the immediate service of love to the sufferers and upon the destruction of the common causes of suffering — of errors — is that only joyful work which is incumbent on man and gives him that inalienable good in which his life consists.

There is but one suffering for man, and it is that which compels man against his will to abandon himself to the life in which alone his good lies.

This suffering is the consciousness of the contradiction between his sinfulness and that of the whole world on the one hand, and, on the other, the necessity, and not only the possibility, of realizing, through me, and not through any one else, the whole truth in my life and in that of the whole world. It is impossible to allay this suffering by not seeing one's own sin, while participating in the sin of the world, and still less, by ceasing to believe in the possibility, as well as in the necessity, of realizing, through myself, and not through any one else, the whole truth in my life and in that of the whole world. The first only increases my sufferings; the second deprives me of the forces of life. What allays this suffering is nothing but the consciousness and activity of the true life, which destroy the incommensurableness of the personal life with the aim, as cognized by man. Man must involuntarily admit that his life is not limited to his personality from birth until death, and that the aim which he recognizes is accessible, and that in striving after it, — in the recognition of his greater and still greater sinfulness and of the greater and ever greater realization of the whole truth in his life and in the life of the world has always consisted, and always will consist, the work of his life, which is inseparable from the life of the whole world.

If it is not the rational consciousness, it is the suffering, which results from the error in respect to the meaning of man's life, that against his will pushes him on the one true path of life, on which there are no obstacles, no evil, but only the inviolable, ungenerated, undying, ever-increasing good.

CONCLUSION

Man's life is a striving after the good, and what he strives after is given to him.

The evil in the shape of death and of sufferings is visible to man only when he takes the law of his carnal animal existence to be the law of his life.

Only when, being man, he descends to the level of an animal, does he see death and sufferings. Death and sufferings, like scarecrows, frighten him on all sides, and drive him back to the one open road of human life, which is subject to his law of reason and finds its expression in love. Death and sufferings are only man's transgressions of his law of life. For a man who lives according to his law there is no death and no suffering.

Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls, for my yoke is easy, and my burden is light (Matt. xi. 28–30).

Man's life is a striving after the good; what he is striving after is given to him, namely, life, which cannot be death, and the good, which cannot be evil.

APPENDIX I.

It is generally said that we study life not from the consciousness of our life, but in general from without. But this is the same as saying that we observe objects not with our eyes, but in general from without.

We see objects outside ourselves because we see them in our eyes, and we know life outside ourselves because we know it within ourselves. We see objects only as we see them in our eyes, and we define life outside ourselves only as we know it in ourselves. But we know life in ourselves as a striving after the good: and so, if we do not define life as a striving after the good, we not only are unable to observe, but even to see, life.

The first and chief act of our cognition of living beings is this, that we include many different objects in the concept of one living being, and exclude this living being from everything else. Both we do only on the basis of the definition of life, cognized alike by all of us, as a striving after the good, and of self, as a being distinct from the whole world.

We recognize that a man on a horse is not a multiplicity of beings and not one being, not because we observe all the parts which form a man and a horse, but because neither in the heads, nor in the legs, nor in any other parts of the man and the horse do we see such a separate striving after the good as we know in ourselves. And we know that the man on the horse is not one, but two beings, because we know in them two distinct strivings after the good, whereas in ourselves we know but one such.

Only thus do we know that there is life in the combination of the rider and horse, and in a herd of horses, and in birds, in insects, in trees, in the grass. If we did not know that the horse wishes its own good and a man his own, that the same is desired by every individual horse in the herd, that the individual good is desired by each bird, bug, tree, weed, we should not see the individuality of beings, and, not seeing the individuality, we should never be able to comprehend anything living: a regiment of cavalry, a herd, and the birds, and the insects, and the plants, — everything would be like waves on the ocean, and the whole world would blend for us into one undistinguishable motion, in which we should entirely fail to find life.

If I know that the horse, and the dog, and the tick that is sticking to it, are living beings, and am able to observe them, this is so because the horse, the dog, and the tick have their individual aims, each for its own good. But this I know, because I know myself as such a being which is striving after the good.

In this striving after the good consists the foundation of all knowledge of life. Without recognizing the fact that the striving after the good, which each man feels in himself, is the life and symptom of all life, no study of life, no observation of life, is possible. And so observation begins when life is already known, and no observation on the phenomena of life can (as the false science assumes) determine life itself.

Men do not acknowledge the definition of life as a striving after the good which they find in their consciousness, but they recognize the possibility of the knowledge of this striving in the tick, and on the basis of this assumed, unfounded knowledge of the good after which the tick strives, they make observations and conclusions as to the essence of life itself.

Every conception of mine about the external life is

based on the consciousness of my striving after the good; and so, only by having come to understand wherein my good and my life consist, shall I be able to know what the good and the life of other beings are. But, if I do not understand my own good, I shall never be able to understand that good and the life of other beings.

Observations on other beings, which strive after their own aims, that are unknown to me, and that form a semblance to that good the striving after which I know in myself, not only are unable to explain anything to me, but certainly can conceal from me my true knowledge of life.

To study the life of other beings, without having a definition of my own, is the same as describing a circle without having a centre. Only by establishing one invariable point as the centre, are we able to describe a circle. No matter what figures we draw, they will not be circles, if they have no centre.

APPENDIX II.

The false science, in studying the phenomena which accompany life, and purporting to study life itself, by this very intention corrupts the concept of life; and so, the longer it studies the phenomenon of what it calls life, the more it departs from the concept of life, which it wants to study.

At first they study the mammals, then other animals, the vertebrates, fishes, plants, corals, cells, microscopic organisms, and finally reach a point where we lose the distinction between animate and inanimate, between the limits of the organism and the non-organism, between the limits of one organism and another. They reach a point where that which cannot be observed presents itself as the most important subject of investigation and observation. The mystery of life and the explanation is sought in commas and twinkles invisible but assumed, discovered to-day, forgotten to-morrow. The explanation of everything is sought in those beings which are contained in the microscopic beings, and in those that are in them, and so forth, *ad infinitum*, as though the infinite divisibility of what is small were not the same kind of an infinity as the infinitely great. The mystery will be revealed when the whole infinity of the small shall be fully investigated, that is, never. And men do not see that the assumption that the question finds its solution in the infinitely small is an undoubted proof of this, that the question is incorrectly put. And this last stage of madness, which clearly shows the complete loss of sense in

the investigations, is regarded as the triumph of science: the highest degree of blindness is considered as the highest degree of vision. Men have gone into a blind alley and so show the lie of the road on which they have been travelling. There is no end to their raptures: "We will make the microscopes just a little more powerful, and we shall understand the transition from the inorganic to the organic, and from the organic to the psychical, and the whole mystery of life will be revealed to us."

While studying the shadows instead of the objects, men have entirely forgotten that object the shadow of which they have been investigating, and busying themselves more and more with the shadow, they have come to complete darkness, and are happy to find the shadow so compact.

The meaning of life is revealed in the consciousness of man as a striving after the good. The elucidation of this good, a more and more exact definition of it, forms the chief aim and work of the life of all humanity, and now, because this work is difficult, that is, not play, but work, people decide that the definition of this good cannot be found where it is put down, that is, in the rational consciousness of man, and that, therefore, it has to be sought everywhere, except where it is shown.

This is something like what a man would do, who would throw away a note, on which precise directions are given to him, because he cannot read it, and would keep asking all the men whom he meets to tell him what it is he wants. The definition of life, which is sketched in man's soul with indelible letters, namely, in his striving after the good, is sought by men everywhere except in man's consciousness itself. This is the more strange since all humanity, in the persons of its wisest representatives, beginning with the Greek utterance, which was, "Know thyself," has always said the very opposite. All the religious teachings are nothing but definitions of life as a striving after the real, infallible good which is accessible to man.

APPENDIX III.

More and more clearly does man hear the voice of reason; more and more often does man listen to this voice, and the time is coming and is already at hand when this voice shall be stronger than the voice which calls to the personal good and to the deceptive duty. On the one hand it becomes more and more clear that the life of personality with its enticements cannot give the good, and, on the other, that the payment of any debt, as prescribed by men, is only a deception, which deprives man of the possibility of paying the one debt of man to that rational and good principle from which he has come. That ancient deception, which demands a faith in what has no rational explanation, is worn out, and we can no longer return to it.

Formerly they used to say: do not reflect, but believe in the duty alone which we prescribe. Reason will deceive you. Faith only will reveal the true good of your life to you. And man tried to believe, and believed; but his relations with other men showed him that other men believed in something quite different and asserted that that something else gave a greater good to man. It became inevitable to solve the question which of the many faiths was the more correct one; but this can be decided only by reason.

Man always cognizes everything through his reason, and not through faith. It was possible to deceive him, by asserting that he cognizes through faith, and not through reason; but the moment a man knows two faiths and sees

men who profess another faith just as he professes his own, he is placed in the inevitable necessity of deciding the matter by means of his reason. A Buddhist who has become acquainted with Mohammedanism and yet remains a Buddhist will be such no longer by faith, but by reason. The moment there arises before him another faith and the question as to whether he should reject his own or the one which is proposed to him, the question will inevitably be decided by reason. And if he, having become acquainted with Mohammedanism, remains a Buddhist, his former blind faith in Buddha will now inevitably be based on rational foundations.

The attempts which are made in our day to pour the spiritual contents into a man through faith, despite his reason, — are the same as attempting to feed a man in any other way than through his mouth.

The communion of people among themselves has shown them that common foundation of cognition, and they can no longer return to their former errors, — and the time is coming and is already at hand when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and, having heard it, shall come to life.

It is impossible to drown this voice, because it is not the voice of just one person, but of the whole rational consciousness of humanity, which finds its expression in every separate man, and in the best men of humanity, and now even in the majority of men.

THOUGHTS ON GOD

From Tolstóy's diaries, private letters, memorandum-books, drafts of unfinished writings, and similar unpublished private papers

1885 – 1900

THOUGHTS ON GOD

God is for me that after which I strive, that the striving after which forms my life, and who, therefore, *is* for for me; but he is necessarily such that I cannot comprehend or name him. If I comprehended him, I would reach him, and there would be nothing to strive after, and no life. But, though it seems a contradiction, I cannot comprehend or name him, and yet I know him, — know the direction toward him, and of all my knowledge this is the most reliable.

I do not know him, and yet I always feel terribly when I am without him, and only then do I not feel terribly when I am with him. What is stranger still is this, that in my present life I do not need to know him better and more than I know him now. I can approach him, and I want to, and in this does my life consist, but my approach in no way increases or can increase my knowledge.

Every attempt of the imagination at cognizing him (for example, that he is a creator, or merciful, or something like it) removes me from him and cuts off my approach to him.

Stranger still is this, that I can love him alone as is proper, that is, more than myself and more than anything; in this love alone is there no cessation, no diminution (on the contrary, a constant increase), no sensuality, no terror, no self-satisfaction. Everything good you love

through this love, so that it turns out that you love, and so live, through him and by him.

So this is the way I think, or, rather, feel. All I have to add is, that the pronoun *he* somewhat impairs God for me. "He" seems to minimize him.

To the definition of God for me it is necessary to add M. Arnold's definition, which I have always conceived as one, the chief, side from which God presents himself to us. (M. Arnold deduces his definition from the prophets of the Old Testament, and, indeed, before Christ it is sufficiently full.) God is that endless, eternal principle, which is outside us, leading us, demanding righteousness of us. We may say: the law of human life is God's will in relation to that part of human life which is in the power of men. I say that this definition was sufficient before Christ, but Christ has revealed to us that the fulfilment of this law, besides its external obligatoriness for human reason, has also another, simpler, internal impulse, which embraces the whole being of man, — namely, love, — not of woman, child, country, and so forth, but love of God (God is love), the love of love, — that very feeling of goodness, meekness of spirit, joy of life, which is the blessed, true, deathless life, characteristic of man.

You know God not so much by means of reason, not even by means of your heart, as by the complete dependence felt in relation to him, something like the feeling which a suckling babe experiences in the arms of its mother. It does not know who holds it, who warms and feeds it; but it knows that there is somebody who does this, and, moreover, loves this person.

I had formerly seen the phenomena of life, without thinking whence they came, or why I saw them.

Later I understood that everything which I see comes

from the light which is the comprehension; and I was so glad of having reduced everything to one principle that I was fully satisfied with the recognition of comprehension alone as the beginning of everything.

Later, however, I saw that the comprehension is the light which reaches me through a hazy glass. I see the light, but I do not know what it is that gives the light: I know only that it exists.

This something which is the source of the light that illumines me, and which I do not know, but of the existence of which I know, is God.

It is remarkable how I could have lived before without seeing the unquestionable truth that beyond this world and our life in it there is some one, something for which this world exists, and we bubble up in it, burst and disappear, like bubbles in boiling water.

You say: "It is impossible to understand how God sat, — sat somewhere in eternity, and suddenly resolved, 'Well, I will create the world,' and began to create, saying all the time, 'It is well.'"

It is true, you and I cannot understand it, when we ask nothing, and are suddenly told so.

But tell me, can we understand that everything which is, has been, and had no beginning? Impossible!

And you say that there is a beginning to everything, and, ascending from beginning to beginning, you have gone very far and by guesses have ascended not seven thousand years, but much farther. And there you see not only the formation of the earth and of everything living upon it, but also the formation of the sun, and much farther — But, no matter how far you have gone, you acknowledge that the beginning of all beginnings is as far off and as inaccessible as ever. And still you continue seeking the beginning of beginnings; to this your

vision is turned, and from this, you say, everything was originated.

Well, this very thing, not the part, but the beginning of beginnings, I call God.

Consequently, when I say God, you cannot misunderstand and condemn me. We both of us know him, because we believe alike, and no one can demand of us that we should understand God as such as he is in the Book of Genesis.

We must renounce that by means of which we understand, our reason, that we may understand him as such. Even so no one can demand of Moses that he should understand the heavens, the sun, and the stars better than the earth. The answer of Moses to the question whence we come is the same which you gave: "From the beginning of beginnings, from God."

"But," you will say, "this beginning of beginnings is far from being that which is understood by the word *God.* By this word they understand a being which cares for men. They say that he wrote the law with his finger, appeared in the burning bush, sent his son, and so forth; all that does not exist in a rational comprehension of the beginning."

I agree with such words. In the beginning of beginnings there is not that God.

But as inexplicable as a living, pitying, loving, and angry God is to you, so incomprehensible is to the human mind what he himself is, what his life is.

Tell me what life is, and I will tell you what the living God is.

You say, "Life is a false consciousness of its freedom, of the gratification of its needs, and of the choice between them."

But whence did this life come?

You say, "It was evolved out of the lower organisms."

But the lower organisms already bore in themselves

this consciousness, — and whence did the lower organisms come?

You say, "From the infinite beginning." This I call God.

I say: "The consciousness of my life, the consciousness of freedom is God; but this is not all of God."

In addition to this, that I am, that I live, strive after the gratification of my needs, recognize the freedom of my choice, I have also reason, which guides me in my choice.

Whence is reason? This reason seeks the beginning, struggles with man himself, vanquishes him, subdues his appetites, enacts laws for him. Tell me: Whence comes this reason of man, which enacts laws that are contrary to the impulses of the flesh?

You say: "These laws are from man."

But whence comes man's reason?

"From the evolution of the living?"

And the living from what is not living? But even in the non-living there were these germs. In the detached parts of the rotating sun, there were already the germs of reason. And in the sun and those stars, from which the sun broke loose?

If there is reason, and it is due to evolution, its beginning is just as much concealed in infinity.

Now this beginning of the beginnings of reason is also God.

Both with you and with me there exist the same conceptions of the beginning, which are, that the beginning of life and the beginning of reason merge into one.

You point only to the train of your thought, and I call everything God; the reason I call it so is this, that I must give some name to what you only indicate, and what with you breaks up into three paths of thought.

I frequently meet men who recognize no God except the one which we recognize within ourselves. And I

wonder. God is in me. But God is an infinite beginning; how, then, and for what purpose did he turn up in me? You cannot help asking yourself about this, and the moment you ask, you must acknowledge an external cause. Why are people not in need of an answer to this question? Because the answer to this question is for them in the reality of the existing world. It is the same according to Moses, or according to Darwin. And so, in order to understand about the external God, we must understand that what is actually real is only the impression of our feelings, that is, ourselves, our spiritual ego.

What is God? What is God for?

God is all that unlimited which I know as limited in myself; I am a limited body, God is an unlimited body; I am a being that has lived for sixty-three years, God is a being that lives eternally; I am a being that thinks within the limits of my understanding, God is a being that thinks without limitation; I am a being that sometimes loves a little, God is a being that loves always infinitely. I am a part, he is everything. I cannot remember myself otherwise than as a part of him.

When an unsolved question troubles you, you feel yourself a sick member of some kind of a healthy body, — you feel yourself an ailing tooth of a sound body, and you ask the whole body to help the one member.

The whole body is God; I am the member.

One of the superstitions which most puzzles our metaphysical concepts is this: that the world was created, that it came out of nothing, and that there is a creating God.

In reality, we have no ground for assuming a creating God, and there is no need for it the (Chinese and Hindoos do not know this conception); at the same time

God the creator and the provider are not compatible with the Christian God the Father, God the Spirit, God, a particle of whom lives in me and forms my life, and the manifestation and evocation of whom forms the meaning of my life, — God the love.

God the creator is indifferent and admits suffering. God the spirit releases from suffering and is always the perfect good. There is no God the creator. There is I who by means of the implements of the sensations given to me cognize the world, and know inwardly my God the Father. He is the beginning of my spiritual ego, but the external world is only my limit.

Frequently people, who are struck down with grief by the death of a beloved being, speak of the evil which God causes to men. When people speak and think thus, they imagine that they believe in God and pray to him.

God does evil. If God does evil, he is not good, — he is not love; and if he is not good, he does not exist.

This is due to the fact that people are so convinced that what they do badly is not only good, but even excellent (as they assure us that to love [excessively] their children is beautiful), that, when they experience that evil which is only the result of their own mistakes, — their sins, they do not accuse themselves, but God. And so they in the depth of their souls recognize God as bad, that is, they deny him, and so receive no consolation from him.

We ought to do what the Dukhobors do, — bow to the ground before each man, remembering that God is in him. If we cannot do so with the body, we may with the spirit.

The consciousness, the sensation of God, who lives in me and acts through me, cannot always be perceived.

There are activities to which we must abandon ourselves completely, inseparably, without thinking of any-

thing but of this work. It is impossible therewith to think of God, — it distracts and is unnecessary.

We must live simply, without effort, abandoning ourselves to our preoccupation; but the moment there appears internal doubt, struggle, dejection, terror, ill-will, we must recognize in ourselves our spiritual being, recognizing our connection with God, at once transfer ourselves from the carnal sphere to that of the spirit, not in order that we may get away from the work of life, but in order, on the contrary, to gather strength for its accomplishment, in order to vanquish and overcome the obstacle. We must, like a bird, move along with the feet, having folded the wings; but the moment there is an obstacle, we must unfold our wings and fly away. And everything is easy, and every difficulty will disappear.

What comes of this, that man recognizes his ego not as a separate being, but as God who is living in him?

In the first place this, that, since he does not consciously wish any good for his separate being, such a man will not deprive others, or will deprive them with less intensity, of their good; in the second place, this, that by recognizing God, who wishes well to everything which exists, as his own ego, man will wish the same.

Prayer is addressed to the personal God, not because he is personal (indeed, I know for certain that he is not personal, because personality is limitation, while God is unlimited), but because I am a personal being. I have a green glass over my eye, and I see everything green; I cannot help but see the world green, though I know that it is not.

This is what has happened with me: I have begun to think more and more abstractly of the questions of life, — of what it consists in, what it tends to, what love is, and

I have departed more and more not only from the conception of the Old Testament God the creator, but also from the conception of the Father, of that comprehension of the good, the beginning of all life and of me; and the devil caught me: it began to occur to me that it was possible — an idea which is of especial importance for a union with the Chinese, the Confucianists, the Buddhists, and our infidels, the agnostics — entirely to obviate this conception. I thought that it was possible to be satisfied with the mere conception and recognition of that God who is in me, without recognizing the God in myself, that God who has put a particle of himself into me. And, strange to say, I suddenly began to feel weary, dejected, terrible. I did not know why it was so, but I felt that I had suddenly fallen terribly in spirit, was deprived of every spiritual joy and energy.

And it was only then that I guessed that it was so because I had departed from God. And I began to think, — strange to say, — began to divine whether there was a God, or not, and, as it were, found him anew, and I experienced such joy, and I had such firm confidence in him and in this, that I can and must commune with him, and that he hears me, that these last days I have been experiencing a feeling as though I were very happy, and I ask myself, Why am I so happy? Yes, there is a God, and I do not have to be troubled or fear anything, but can rejoice.

I am afraid that this feeling will pass and become dulled, but now I experience much joy. It is as though I had been within a hair's breadth of losing, and even thought that I had lost, a very dear being, and had really not lost it, but found out its inestimable value. I hope that though this, my most ecstatic mood, may pass, much of what I have newly acquired will remain.

Maybe it is that which some call the living God; if that is so, I am very guilty toward them, since I did not agree with them and disputed their opinions.

The main thing in this feeling is the consciousness of a complete security, the consciousness that he is, that he is good, that he knows me, and that I am on all sides surrounded by him, have come from him, form part of him, am his child; everything which seems bad seems so only because I believe myself, and not him, and out of this life, in which it is so easy to do his will, because this will is at the same time my will, I cannot fall anywhere except into him, and in him there is full joy and goodness.

Everything I may write now will not express what I felt. If I have some physical or moral pain, — a son dies, that which I love perishes, — and I myself can do nothing, and sufferings await me, — I suddenly think, And God? and everything becomes good and happy and clear. . . .

There is not one believer who is not assailed by moments of doubt, of doubt in the existence of God. These doubts are not harmful: on the contrary, they lead to the highest comprehension of God.

That God whom I knew became familiar to me, and I no longer believed in him. A man believes fully in God only when he is revealed anew to him, and he is revealed to man from a new side, when he is sought with a man's whole soul.

I have thought much about God, about the essence of my life, and, it seemed, I doubted both and verified my deductions; and then, lately, I simply just wanted to lean on my faith in God and in the indestructibleness of my soul, and, to my surprise, I experienced such a firm, calm confidence as I had never experienced before. Thus all the doubts and verifications apparently not only did not weaken, but even enormously strengthened faith.

One needs never go on purpose to God: "I will just go to God, I will live in godly fashion. I have lived in devilish fashion, and so now will live in a godly way,— I will try, maybe it is no misfortune." It is a misfortune, and a great one at that. To God, as in marrying, one must go only when one would like not to go, and would like not to marry, but cannot help oneself. . . . And so I will not say to everybody: "Go purposely into offences;" but to him who puts the question like this, Shall I not make a mistake if I go to God, instead of going to the devil? I will shout with might and main, "Go, go to the devil, by all means to the devil." It is a hundred times better to burn oneself on the devil than to stand on the crossway or hypocritically to go to God.

I have read Spencer's answer to Balfour: it is the confession of agnosticism, as they now call atheism.

I say agnósticism, though it wants to be something different from atheism in that it advances a certain impossibility of knowledge; but in reality it is the same as atheism, because the root of everything is the non-recognition of God.

So I read Spencer, who says: "It is not that I *wish* to reject the faith in God, but that I *must:* self-deception is the alternative. There is no pleasure," he says, "in the consciousness of being a small bubble on a globe that is in itself infinitesimal compared with the totality of things." (I should like to ask him what he means by totality of things.) "Those on whom the unpitying rush of changes inflicts sufferings which are often without remedy find no consolation in the thought that they are at the mercy of blind forces which cause, indifferently, now the destruction of a sun and now the death of an animalcule. Contemplation of a universe which is without conceivable beginning or end, and without intelligible purpose, yields no satisfaction. The desire to know what it all means is

no less strong in the agnostic than in others, and raises sympathy with them. Failing utterly to find any interpretation himself, he feels a regretful inability to accept the interpretation they offer."

Precisely the same thing N—— told me the other day: "There takes place a kind of circular motion, and amidst this motion, endless in time and space, I appear, and live, and disappear, — so much is certain. But everything else, that is, the conception of a rational being from whom I came, and for the attainment of whose purpose I exist, together with everything which exists, — such a conception is self-deception."

These two variant and opposite world conceptions must be represented as follows:

Some, the agnostics, say: "I see myself, a being born of my parents, such as all the living beings which surround me and which live in certain conditions that are subject to my investigation and study, and I study myself and the other beings, both the animate and the inanimate, and those conditions in which they live; and I arrange my life in conformity with this study. Questions of origin I investigate in the same manner, and by observation and experience attain greater and greater knowledge. But the question as to whence all this world came, why it exists, and I in it, I leave unanswered, as I see no possibility of answering it as definitely, clearly, and convincingly as I answer the questions in regard to everything which exists in the universe. And so I do not recognize the answer to this question, which is, that there exists a rational being, God, from whom I originate" (Generally they say "from whom the universe has its beginning," meaning by this origin the creation of the universe, which the Christian teaching does not assert), "and who has determined the law of my life for certain purposes of his own, — this answer to the question I do not recognize, since it has not that clearness and conclusiveness which

the scientific answers have in respect to questions of causes and conditions of various vital phenomena." Thus speaks the agnostic, and, by not admitting the possibility of any other knowledge than the one which is obtained by means of observation and of reflection on these observations, he is, though not right, at least logically quite consistent.

But a Christian, a man who recognizes God, says: "I recognize myself as living only because I recognize myself as a rational being; since I recognize myself as rational, I cannot help but acknowledge that my life and that of everything in existence must be just as rational. In order to be rational, it must have a purpose. Now, the purpose of this life must be outside me, in that being for whom I and everything in existence serve as a tool for the accomplishment of his purpose. This being exists, and I must in life fulfil his law (will). But the questions as to what this being is that demands of me the fulfilment of its law, and when this rational life in me had its beginning, and how it originates in other beings in time and space, that is, what God is, whether personal or impersonal, how he created, and whether he created the world, and when the soul arose in me, and at what age, and how it originates in others, and whence it comes and whither it goes, and in what part of the body it lives, — all these questions I must leave unanswered because I know in advance that in the sphere of observation and reasoning concerning them I shall never arrive at a final answer, since everything will be concealed in time and space. For this reason I do not admit the answers given by science as to how the world, the suns, the earth began, how the soul begins, and in what part of the cerebral brain it is to be found."

In the first case, the agnostic, by acknowledging himself to be only an animal being, and so recognizing only this, that he is subject to external sensations, does not recognize the spiritual principle and is reconciled to the

stupidity of his existence, which violates the demands of reason. In the second case, the Christian, by recognizing himself only as a rational being, and so recognizing only that which corresponds to the demands of reason, does not acknowledge the actuality of the data of external experimentation, and so regards these data as fantastical and erroneous.

Both are equally right. But the difference, the material difference, between them is this, that according to the first world conception everything in the world is strictly scientific, logical, and rational, with the exception of the life of man himself and of the whole universe, which has no meaning; and so, in spite of all attempts to the contrary, there result from such a world conception many interesting and amusing reflections, but nothing needful for guidance in life; while according to the second world conception the life of man and of the whole universe receives a definite and rational meaning, and a very direct, simple, and accessible application to life, whereby the possibility of scientific investigations is not excluded, except that these investigations occupy their appropriate place.

Nothing proves better the existence of God than the attempts of the evolutionists at recognizing morality and deducing it from the struggle.

It is evident that it cannot result from struggle; and yet they feel that they cannot get along without it, and so try to deduce it from their propositions, although to deduce it from the theory of evolution is as strange or even stranger and more illogical than to deduce it from the precepts given by the Jewish God on Sinai. Their error, which consists in this, that they deny the consciousness of their spiritual ego as the production of God, of a particle of him, without whom there can be no rational world conception, compels them to admit the unjustified and

even contradictory mystery, that is, in respect to morality, of that very God whom they have excluded from their world conception.

The other day a Frenchman asked me whether morality would not be sufficiently well based on goodness and beauty, that is, again on God, whom they, by dint of the spiritual disease which assails them, are afraid to name.

They say: "God must be understood as a personality."

There is here a great misconception: personality is limitation. Man feels himself as a personality, only because he is in contact with other personalities. If man were alone, he would not be a personality. The two conceptions, the outer world, — other beings, — and personality, define one another. If there did not exist a world of other beings, man would not feel himself (would not be conscious of) as a personality, — he would not recognize the existence of other beings. Thus man in the world cannot be thought of otherwise than as a personality. But how can we say of God that he is a personality, that God is personal? In this lies the root of anthropomorphism. Of God we can say only what Moses and Mohammed said, — that he is one; not one in the sense that there is no other God, — in relation to God there cannot be the concept of number, and so we cannot say that he is one (one in the sense of a number), — but in this sense, that he is unicentric, that he is not a concept, but a being, — what the Orthodox call a living God, in contradistinction to the pantheistic God, that is, a higher spiritual being which lives in everything. He is one in this sense, that, as a being, he exists, and may be turned to, that is, not exactly by praying, — which is a relation between me, a limited being, a personality, and incomprehensible, but existing God. The chief incomprehensibility of God consists even in this, that we know him as one being, — we cannot know him otherwise, — and yet we cannot

understand one being as filling everything. If God is not one, he melts away, he does not exist. If he is one, we involuntarily imagine him in the form of personality, and then he is no longer a higher being, no longer everything. And yet, in order that we may know God and lean on him, we must understand him as filling all and at the same time as one.

The world is such as we see it, only if there do not exist any other beings, besides ourselves, who are differently organized and endowed by different sensations. But if we see, not only the possibility, but also the necessity, of the existence of other beings, who are endowed with other sensations than are ours, then the world is in no case only such as we see it.

Our conception of the world shows only our relation to the world, just as a visual picture, which we form for ourselves because we see as far as the horizon, in no way represents the actual definition of visible objects. The other sensations, those of hearing, smell, and chiefly touch, by verifying our visual impressions, give us a more definite conception of the visible objects; but the fact that we know the visible objects as broad, thick, hard, or soft, and how they sound and smell, does not prove that we know these objects well, and that a new sense (in addition to the five), if it were given to us, would not reveal to us that our conception of things, as formed by the five senses, is as deceptive as that conception of flatness and diminution of objects in the perspective, which vision alone gave us.

I see a man in the mirror, hear his voice, and am fully convinced that this is a real man; but I come nearer, want to take his hand, and touch the glass of the mirror, and see my deception. The same must take place with a dying man: a new feeling is born, which reveals to him (both through the new feeling and the new knowledge

given to him) the deception of the consciousness of his body and of all that which by means of the senses of this body was recognized by him as existing.

Thus the world is certainly not such as we know it: there will be other instruments of perception, and there will be another world. But no matter how that which we call the world — our relation to the world — may change, one thing is indubitably such as we perceive it, and always unchangeable, — it is that which perceives. And it perceives not only in me, but in everything which perceives. This perceiving one is everywhere and in everything and in itself. It is God and that for some reason limited particle of God, which forms our actual ego.

But what is this God, that is, the eternal, infinite, all-powerful, which has become mortal, limited, feeble? Why has God divided in himself? I do not know, but I know that it is, that in this is life. Everything which we know is nothing but just such a division of God. Everything which we cognize as the world is the cognition of these divisions. Our cognition of the world (what we call matter in space and time) is a contiguity of the limits of our divinity with its other divisions. Birth and death are transitions from one division into another.

The severest and most consistent agnostic recognizes God, whether he wants to or not. He cannot help but recognize that, in the first place, in his own existence and in that of the whole world, there is a certain meaning which is inaccessible to him; in the second place, that there is a law of his life, — a law to which he can submit, or from which he can depart. Now, this very acknowledgment of a higher meaning of life, which is inaccessible to man, but inevitably exists, and of the law of his life, is God and his will.

Such a recognition of God is much firmer than the recognition of God as creator, Trinity, redeemer, provider,

and so forth. To believe in this manner is like digging a foundation down to the rock, to the bottom rock, and then building a house on it.

Men know two Gods: one, whom they wish to make subservient to themselves, by demanding of him through prayers the execution of their wishes, and another, such as we ought to serve, to the fulfilment of whose will all our wishes must be directed.

Everything I know I know, because there is a God, and I know him. On this alone can we rear a firm foundation, in relation to men and to ourselves, and to the extra-terrestrial and extra-temporal life. I not only fail to find this mystical, but, on the contrary, find that the opposite view is mysticism, while this is a most intelligible and accessible reality.

Nature, they say, is economical with its forces: with the least effort it obtains the greatest results. Even so is God. In order to establish in the world the kingdom of God, unity, and the service of one another, and to destroy enmity, God does not need to do so himself. He has imparted to man his reason, which frees love in man, and everything he wishes will be done by man. God does his work through us. There is not time for God, or it is infinite. Having implanted rational love in man, he has done everything.

Why did he do so, through man, and not in himself? A foolish question, such as would never have occurred to us, if we were not all spoiled by the insipid superstitions of the creation of the world by God.

There is no doubt that something is being done in this world, and that it is done by all living beings, and by me, by my life. Otherwise, why should there be this sun,

these springs and winters, and, above all, this three-year-old girl, wanton from a superabundance of life, and this doting old woman, and this madman. These separate beings, who evidently have no meaning for me, and yet live so energetically and preserve their life so well, in whom life is screwed in so firmly, — these beings convince me more than anything that they are needed for some rational, good work, which is not comprehensible to me.

Once, while praying to God, it became clear to me that God was indeed a real being, love, — that he was all that which I embrace with a small edge and feel in the form of love. And it is not a sensation, an abstraction, but a real being: I felt him.

To love means to wish what a beloved object wishes. The objects of love wish the love of the other side, and so we can love what wishes one and the same. God wishes one and the same.

The love of God means to love what God wishes; but he wishes well to everything.

"Brothers, let us love one another! He who loves is born of God and knows God, because (it says, God is love, but we ought to say) love is God." However, God is also love, that is, we know God only in the form of love, and love is God, that is, if we love, we are not gods, but God.

Yes, love is God. Love, love him who has done you harm, whom you have condemned, and have not loved, and everything which concealed his soul from you will disappear, and you will see, as through clear water, the divine essence of his love at the bottom, and you will not have to forgive him, and will not be able to do so: you will have only to forgive yourself for not having loved

God in him in whom he was, and for not having seen him in your wanting love.

Love is the manifestation (consciousness) of God in oneself, and so the striving to get out of oneself, be freed, live a divine life. This striving evokes God, that is, love to others.

My chief thought is that love evokes love in others; God, awakened in you, causes an awakening of the same God in others.

I went on horseback from Túla, and thought about my being a part of him, which in a certain way is separated from the other parts. He is all, the Father. And I felt love for him. Now, especially now, I am unable to reproduce, and even recall, that feeling. I felt so happy that I said to myself: I thought that I should not find out anything new, and now I have learned a remarkable, blissful, new sensation, yes, a sensation.

Lying in bed to-day, I thought of love to God . . . (I wanted to say love of God, that is, divine love) — that the first and chief commandment is divine love, and the second, similar to it, and resulting from it, — yes, resulting from it, — is love of our neighbour.

The desire of good is not God, but only one of his manifestations, — one of the sides from which we see God. God manifests himself in me as a desire for good.

God, who is contained in man, at first strives to free himself, in order to widen and increase the being in whom he is; then, noticing the unforeseen limits of this being, he strives to free himself, in order that he may go out of this being and embrace other beings.

A rational being is not contained in the life of a personality, and since it is rational, it strives to come out of it.

The Christian teaching reveals to man that the essence of his life is not his separate being, but God, who is contained in this being. But this God is cognized by man as reason and love.

The desire for good for oneself, love of oneself, could have existed in man only so long as reason did not wake up in him. The moment reason woke in him, it became clear to man that the desire for good for himself, a separate being, is vain, because the good is not realizable for a separate and mortal being. As soon as reason appeared, only one desire for good became possible, — the desire for good for everything, because with the desire for good for everything there is no struggle, but union; not death, but transmission of life.

God is not love, but in the living irrational beings he manifests himself as love for themselves, in the living rational beings as love for everything existing.

Why are you so dispirited? You are expecting something great. You are waiting, it seems to me, for God in thunders and in storm, and not in stillness. The best is that there is "no place in which to give," as you say. In this the hand of God is most visible and perceptible.

You say that it looks as though I did not acknowledge God. There is some misunderstanding here. I acknowledge nothing but God.

I think I have written to you and told you my definition of God, which I would now give as an answer to the question as to what God is. God is all that infinite something of which I am conscious of being a part. And so everything in me borders on God, and I feel him in everything. This is not an empty phrase, but that by which I live.

I agree with you, no, I think like you in what you say about the comprehension and about God. I do not say I agree, because, speaking of these subjects, it is hard to express them precisely, and words may say too much or too little, and so it is impossible ever to recognize a given formulation as completely corresponding to one's comprehension. All I feel is that we think and feel in the same direction, and this gives me much pleasure. It is impossible not to think of these subjects, but each involuntarily thinks in his own way; it is not only useless, but it may be dangerous, to formulate them in such a way as they did in the symbols of faith. What we can and must formulate are the conclusions, as applied to life, as Moses did, Thou shalt not kill, and Christ, Resist not evil. But I repeat that I think in the same direction and fully agree with you that the measure of the comprehension is given according to purity, humility, and love.

We shall try to say what we know, what is necessary, joyful, and indubitable to us, and God (the same that you think we ought to obviate) will help us. In naming him, I acknowledge my insufficiency, and try — I his weak, partial vessel — to disclose myself, that part of myself which receives him, in order that he may enter me, so far as I can receive him and am worthy to. But the chief thing is, I need him in order that I may express whither I am going, and to whom I am going. In this uniform earthly life I may not feel him and get along without this form of thought and expression, but in passing over from the former life into this, and from this into another, I cannot help but call that whence I come and whither I go God, because this is the manner of expression which is nearest to the real meaning of the matter: from God to God, — from the extra-temporal and extra-spatial into the same.

What am I here, who am cast amidst this world? To whom shall I turn? From whom shall I expect an answer?

From men? They do not know; they laugh and do not wish to know, saying: "These are trifles. Do not think of them. Here is the world with its joys, — live!"

But they will not deceive me. I know that they do not believe in what they say. They are tormented like myself, and suffer terror before death, before themselves, and before thee, O Lord, whom they will not name.

And I, too, did not name thee for a long time, and for a long time did the same as they do. I know this deception, and how it oppresses the heart, and how terrible the fire of despair is, which is concealed in the heart of him who does not name thee. No matter how much you may flood him, he will burn your inside, even as he burned me.

But, O Lord, I have named thee, and my suffering has come to an end. My despair has passed.

I curse my weaknesses, I seek thy way; but I do not despair, — I feel thy nearness, thy aid, when I walk thy ways, and forgiveness, when I depart from them.

Thy way is clear and simple. Thy yoke is good and thy burden light, but I wandered for a long time off thy ways: in the abomination of my youth I, in my pride, threw off every burden, unhitched myself from every yoke, and taught myself not to walk in thy ways. Thy yoke and thy burden are hard for me, though I know that they are good and light.

O Lord, forgive me the errors of my youth and help me to bear thy yoke as joyfully as I receive it.

Awhile ago, as I was left alone after my occupations, I asked myself what I should do, and I had no personal wish (except the bodily needs, which rise only when I

want to eat or drink); I felt so clearly the joy of the consciousness of God's will that I needed nothing and wanted nothing except to do what he wishes.

This feeling arose in consequence of the question which I proposed to myself when I was left alone in the stillness: Who am I? Why am I? And so clearly the answer came of itself: Whoever and whatever I may be, I am sent by some one to do something. Well, let me do that. And it gave me such joy and pleasure to feel my uniting with God's will.

This is my second living feeling of God. Before I just felt love for God. Now I cannot recall how it was; all I remember is that it was a joyous sensation.

Oh, what happiness solitude is! To-day I am so happy to feel God.

ON THE MEANING OF LIFE

From Tolstóy's diaries, private letters, memorandum-books, drafts of unfinished writings, and similar unpublished papers

1885 – 1900

ON THE MEANING OF LIFE

It will give me pleasure to try to answer your question, for I see that it is put with full sincerity. The question is of prime importance and yet such as the majority of men do not put to themselves, assuming that there is no answer to it, or that it was given long ago, or that it is impossible; but it is a simple and necessary question, without which, it seems, it is impossible to live. You ask: What is the aim of human life? Why does man live, or, in different words, why do I live?

You are right when you say that it is only religion that answers this question. Religion, true religion, is nothing but an answer to this question; and the religion which I profess, the Christian teaching in its true sense, gives to this question an answer which is as simple and as clear as the question itself, if in the place of the word *aim* we put the word *meaning*.

The aim, the finite aim of human life in the world, which is infinite in space and time, is obviously not accessible to man in his limitation; but the meaning of human life, that is, why he lives and what he ought to do, must by all means be comprehensible to man, just as comprehensible as is to a workman his duty in a large factory.

The meaning of human life, as intelligible to man, consists in establishing the kingdom of God upon earth, that is, in coöperating with the substitution for the selfish,

hateful, aggressive, irrational structure of life of another, which is amicable, fraternal, free, and rational.

The means for attaining this, that is, the answer to the question as to what a man must do, consists in what, according to the Gospel, forms the whole law and the prophets: to act toward others, as thou wouldst that they should act toward thee.

The answer, as you see, is very simple, but seems very obscure to us, because our animal nature, and our education, and the false religious teaching, accustom us to the belief that the meaning of life does not consist in serving God and our neighbour, but lies in our personal happiness. Having become accustomed to live for ourselves and our personal happiness alone, it seems hard to us to transfer the aim of our life to the service of God. But, no matter how hard it is, it is possible, and the more we accustom ourselves to it, the more natural it becomes, the more so since, by executing God's will, we by that very act attain the highest personal good, which before we regarded as the aim of our life, as it says in the Gospel, Seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and the rest shall be added unto you. Living a personal life, we seek the rest only, that is, the personal happiness, and we do not attain it, and do not contribute to the establishment of the kingdom of God, but, on the contrary, work against it. But seeking the kingdom of God and his righteousness, we receive the rest, that is, happiness, if only by happiness we understand, not some external benefits for which we hanker, but spiritual ones, — peace, freedom, and joy.

I write to you, not what I have arrived at through reasoning, but what I have attained through experience: it is possible to live for the execution of God's will. If a man cannot live so at all times, he can do so in some of his best moments. If he shall find in it the meaning of life, he will live so ever more frequently. And the oftener he will live so, the more he will experience

the reasonableness and joy of such a life and will be naturally drawn toward such a life.

The aim of life? There is no such aim, and there cannot be, and no knowledge can discover it. The law of direction, the path of life? Yes. To this, religion — wisdom, if you wish — gives an answer. Its answer consists in this, that it shows the falseness of all those paths which do not coincide with the one true way. By the rejection of the false directions it indicates and illuminates the one true direction. On this path a few little things can be seen. There are nearer aims which science points out, but it can in no way indicate the path.

In my weakness, in my incomplete subjection of my whole life to reason, I have put this question to myself, and have tried to answer it. If I were completely welded with the life of reason and lived in harmony with the law of the world, I should not think of it. But, without ascribing any importance to them, I must say that these are dreams that involuntarily pass through my head.

This is what has presented itself to me: the law of organic life is a struggle; the law of the rational, conscious life is union, love. On the organic life, the life of struggle, the rational life is born, and is connected with it. The aim is obvious: to destroy the struggle and introduce union where there was dissension: at first among men, then between men and animals, and then between animals and plants.

Such an aim has been put long ago. The Hebrew Messiah is nothing else: to forge spears into ploughshares, and let the lamb lie with the lions.

Now, it is an aim like this that flashes through my mind, but I ascribe no importance to it: I know that it is far from exhausting everything. What is dear to me is only the correctness of the direction of the path. The

first condition for the correctness of the path, I know, is to walk on it with all my being.

The support and multiplication of life cannot be the aim of life, — so much is certain. But here there turn up two different points of view: one is this, that the knowledge in man — science in humanity — guides life, and that, therefore, the aim of life, as guided by knowledge, must be known to this knowledge; and the other, that man is a tool of reason for the accomplishment of the work of reason, which is not fully known to man, and that the aim of reason cannot be known, but what is known to man is only the path, the direction, in which reason living in man takes him. (Christ has said all this, and I never stop wondering at the logicalness and precision of his philosophic definitions.)

Indeed, can there be an aim for the life of the world and for the life of men (when they weld their life with the life of the world?) The concept of aim is a concept of the limitation of human reason, like the concept of reward and punishment, and so it is not applicable to the life of the world. If there is an aim, it must be attained, and then there is an end. For the world in general there can only be life: for the participants in the life of the world there is and can be only a direction, a path.

Besides: with the first point of view it is assumed that man's whole activity consists, or, at least, is guided by knowledge, and that for the attainment of the aim a mental activity is needed in the main (some think, exclusively). With the second point of view, a man, who knows the direction only, walks in this direction with all his nerves, and muscles, and nails, that is, he completely submits to the direction, which alone he knows, and with every step he sees new sign-posts on the road, but never the aim, which he can never see.

And only under this condition can man believe implic-

itly in the direction in which he is walking, and fulfil what reason demands of him. Only by placing himself under conditions of a support and a multiplication of life, which are in accord with reason, and only by having from the start chosen the one true direction of the path, — the path, — with all his being, can he with absolute certainty proceed and recognize himself in accord and union with reason; the nearer these conditions are, the safer; the farther, the more they are doubtful.

Not to see the promised land into which you have led others, or, at least, have been in some way instrumental in leading others, is the invariable law of your true life. The more actual the work of the true life is, the more remote are its consequences, and the consequences of a true life are not only remote, but at infinity, and so you cannot see them. You see farther than what your term of life is. You will see the house when it is built, and you will live to receive the rank of general; but you will not live to see the liberation, not only from the slavery of state, not even from the slavery of land tenure.

The most obvious proof that life is not in the attainment of the aim, but in the fulfilment of the message.

I have come to understand with a special, new force that my life and that of all is only a ministration, and has not purpose in itself.

Every life is meaningless, except the one which has for its aim the service of God, the service of the accomplishment of the work of God, which is incomprehensible to us.

It is a very common error to assume the aim of life to be in serving men, and not in serving God. Only by serving God, that is, doing what he wants us to do, can

we be assured that we are not doing anything worthless, and it is not impossible to choose whom to serve.

God has given us his spirit, love, reason, that we may serve him; but we use this spirit in order to serve ourselves: we use the axe to whittle a handle with it.

The meaning of our life, the only, rational, and joyful meaning, consists in serving and feeling ourselves as serving the work of God, the establishment of his kingdom. At times it happens that you do not feel this service: it seems as though you had slipped off the collar, or the traces had given way; but at times it only seems so, because you got used to the collar and to the work, and no longer feel it. In any case, even if you do not externally feel your service, as long as you know in the depth of your soul that you have not refused to serve and have not slipped off your collar, you may be sure that you are serving: apparently you are having down-hill work, or the master wants to give you a breathing-spell.

The meaning of life now for me lies exclusively in serving God, saving man from sin and suffering.

But what is terrible is that I want to guess the road on which God wants to do it, and I may err and be overhasty, and so, instead of coöperating, may interfere and retard.

There is one means for avoiding errors, and that is, not to undertake anything, but wait for God's call, — which is a situation when a man cannot help acting this way or that, for God, or against him; in these cases all the forces are to be strained so as to do the first.

Man uses his reason for asking, What for? and Why? applying his questions to his own life and to that of the world; but reason shows him that there are no answers.

With these questions one gets something like nausea and dizziness. The Hindoos say in reply to the question, Why? "Maya enticed Brahma, who existed in himself, to create the world;" but to the question, What for? they do not even invent such a stupid answer. No religion has invented, nor any human mind can invent, answers to these questions.

What does this mean? Namely, this, that human reason is not given for the purpose of answering these questions, — that the very putting of these questions indicates an aberration of reason. Reason solves only the fundamental question, How? And, in order to know how, it solves the questions, Why? and What for? within the limits of finality.

What how? How to live. How live? Blessedly.

That is necessary for everything living and for me. This possibility is given to everything living and to me, and this solution excludes the questions, Why? and What for?

But why and for what is blessedness not dissolved at once? Again an error of reasoning. Blessedness is the *doing* of blessedness: there is no other.

A live man is he who walks ahead toward where there is the light of a moving lantern, and who never reaches the end of the illuminated place, for the illuminated place is ahead of him. This is life, — there is no other; and only with such life is there no death, for the lantern illuminates *thither*, and thither you follow it as calmly as during the whole period of life.

But if man shields the lantern or begins to shed light around him or behind him, and not in front of him, and stops walking, there will be an arrest of life.

But if there is no meaning in my life, there is also none in the life of man and in that of humanity. Thus

speak the ancient Buddhists and the modern pessimists. The same says the Gospel, but with this difference, that the Buddhists and pessimists say it as the last deduction, from which follows the negation of life; but Christianity says this as an indication of the false comprehension of life as held by the Gentiles, and of the necessity for another comprehension, the Christian, and of the confirmation of life.

Life has no aim which is comprehensible to man, so also says Christianity. But, though it has no comprehensible aim, it still has one, and man's vocation consists in serving this incomprehensible aim. An aim which is comprehensible to man would be a finite aim; but the aim which is now set before man is infinite, and the meaning of man's life consists in approaching it. The aim which is comprehensible only in infinity, as set before man, is incomprehensible to him, but the direction toward its goal is comprehensible.

"How can one live without knowing what will be, without knowing in what forms one will live?"

The real life begins only when you do not know what will be. Only then you create life and fulfil God's will. *He* knows. Only such an activity serves as a testimony of a belief in God and his law. Only then there is freedom and life.

We must be in relation to God's will, like a good thoroughbred little mare that I used to drive: she did not want to run away, or to stop serving me, but only wanted to guess what work I wished her to do. She tried now one leg, now another, now a third, now to the right, now to the left, now raising her head, and now dropping it.

Even so we must do.

For me Christ's teaching became most comprehensible

and most fully took possession of me, when I saw clearly that my life was not mine, but his who gave it to me, and that the aim of life was not in me, but in his will, and that it was necessary to find it and to do it. This transformed me.

If God would only free us from the evil one, from the devil, who is the ego in me and you. If only I shall not forget that my life is not for to-morrow, not for the ensuing year, not in Yásnaya Polyána, not in Moscow, not with X—— nor without her, but in serving the Father everywhere, always, and with all men, and all is well. . . .

This is what we ought to be like, as Lao-tse says, — like water. If there are no obstacles, it flows; if there is a dam, it stops; if the dam breaks through, it flows again; in a square vessel it is square; in a round vessel it is round. For this reason it is most needful and strong.

The force with which we are convinced of something is full, complete, imperturbable, not when the proofs are logically incontrovertible, nor when the feeling coincides with the demands of reason, but only when man has become convinced through experience, having tried the opposite, that there is but one path.

Such conviction is given us as to life's being but this: the following of God's will.

Imagine that a beloved woman has promised you a rendezvous in the evening. How are you going to pass the day? How will you prepare yourself for this meeting? How afraid you will be that you will die, that the world will come to an end before the meeting! If only the meeting takes place! After that let come what may.

This is what desiring means. It is in this way that I should like to wish to do God's will, and just as passionately to wish for this alone, — its fulfilment. Is this possible?

Is this possible? Yes, it is. All that is needed for this is to know just as clearly what it is about and to be conscious of one's labour, and that there has to be a sacrifice.

God aid you to rejoice without cessation that nobody can anywhere or at any time interfere with you, — to rejoice at the fulfilment of his will, so long as you fulfil it in purity, humility, and love.

You ask: "Why live, how live, and what shall I do, in order to have a right to live?" First of all we must transpose the questions, and answer the question as to how we must live, and then only we shall try to comprehend why. We must live. We have lived before all reflection: every day we sleep, eat several times, move, think. We are all like a horse in a treadmill, the wheel of which is moving below us, compelling us to move. We cannot help but live, and so the first and chief question, in my opinion the only rational question, is as to how we shall live. We all, and you, too, know the first answer: in the best manner possible. Thus all men have lived, that is, while striving after it; thus they live and will live.

The second question: What means are best? In what way best? The answer is clear for a man who knows himself only: as many enjoyments as possible. But as soon as a man understands that he is not alone and feels the sufferings of others, the first answer no longer satisfies him, — there appears a contradiction between the personal striving after enjoyments and his conscience. You are in precisely this contradiction. In order to solve it, you

must abandon yourself to one of these two forces, — to the striving after the personal good, or to your conscience, — and abandon yourself without any provision, exception, or compromise.

To abandon yourself to the striving after personal happiness or to your conscience does not mean that you are to drown the voice of your conscience or of your personal happiness, but that in your consciousness you recognize only one of the two as life, as the true life. Sufferings, doubts, are due to the indecision of the question in the consciousness. If it were so that your demands of truth are not the demands of your conscience, but something impressed upon you externally, you would, by renouncing conscience, calm yourself and live and enjoy life, as long as you could. (Of course, it will end in suffering, I know. But you cannot take this on trust, if the demands of conscience have not yet wakened in you. But they will awaken, because the movement of all humanity is from the striving after the personal good to the demands of conscience. All this I say only as a very improbable possibility.) But if conscience is awakened in you, you must recognize once and for all that life consists only in the gratification of the demands of this conscience, and you will again be calm, and life will receive a meaning for you. For what is conscience? Conscience is that highest law of everything living, which every man recognizes in himself not only by the admission of the rights of everything living, but also by the love for it. The demands of conscience are what in Christian language is called God's will, and so the meaning of life and the answer to the two questions, "Why must we live and how must we act in order that we may have a right to live?" consists in doing God's will, which is cognized in our consciousness. To what will this bring you? I do not know; but I know that the clear consciousness of this will change your whole external life and will give

your life a constant, more and more clear, joyful, and rational meaning. But if it is not clear to you what conscience demands, you will find an answer for it in the Gospel.

In order that I may answer your question, "What shall we live for?" you must first of all renounce all worldly considerations, all questions as to what studies are to be taken, or as to what may be agreeable or disagreeable for you or my parents, and vividly present to yourself the situation of a lonely, separate human being, which has lately, twenty or thirty years ago, appeared from somewhere, and to-day or to-morrow, in ten, twenty, or thirty years, must disappear somewhere.

Why should it be necessary for such a being to live, and for millions and billions of such beings, who are all in precisely the same condition? Obviously all this is not made for these beings, even as all the screws, wheels, and pegs of a large engine are not made for them, but in order to serve the common purpose of the engine.

The same is true of us: we are the instruments of that highest will, which through us does its necessary work. The only difference is that we recognize ourselves as living, and are able, if we do not admit that we are the tools of the highest will, to suffer from our situation, or, by recognizing ourselves as the necessary tools of life, to feel the joy of the participation in an infinitely great work, which is accomplished by the life of the world.

But you will ask wherein this work consists? To this I will reply that we cannot know all of it, but may always know when we coöperate with it, or when we work counter to it. Love relations to everything living, — first of all, of course, toward men, toward the nearest of them, — the sensation of love and the rousing of the same sentiment in others is a sign of the participation in the general work; the rousing of enmity and hatred in oneself and in others is a sign of counteraction to the general work.

Your letter has not only interested me, — it has drawn me toward you.

I think that you are seeking what every young man ought to seek, and what men cannot live without, although the whole life among the higher, well-to-do classes has formed itself in such a way as to make it possible for men to live without it. What you seek and toward what you are drawn, earlier than is the case with other men, by your nature, which is more serious than that of the majority of men, is the clearly cognized meaning of your life: What do I live for? Certainly not in order to procreate, send into the world, and educate just such people as I am, who do not know what they live for; and certainly not in order to make archæological investigations, which are of very doubtful utility to men.

We can live without anything, except an answer to this question. In the meantime it is considered in our quasi-cultured world not only as a sign of a certain mental superiority not to know this, but even to assert that it is impossible to know this.

It is only religion which will give an answer to this question. If that religion in which you believed is destroyed by your critical relation toward it, immediately look for another, that is, for another answer to the question as to what you live for. Just as you cannot be for a moment without a king, as they say, *Le roi est mort, vive le roi*, so one can much less be for a moment without this king in the head and the heart. Nothing but religion, that is, an answer to the question, What do I live for? will give you that which will make it possible for you to forget yourself, your insignificant, perishable, satiated, and intolerably exacting personality.

I have written of nothing but this in my books which are prohibited in Russia. If you read them, you will find in them the answer which I have found for myself. But if you have not read my books or, having read them,

have not found that answer, I can tell it to you in three words:

I live in order to do the will of him who sent me into life. But the will of God is this, that I should carry my soul to the highest degree of perfection in love, and that in this way I should coöperate in the unification of all men and of all beings in the world.

Everybody decides this in his own way, and the truth about the sword and division remains none the less a truth for all, no matter how you may decide it. I want to tell you this much, — what I have learned by experience, — what you are to be guided by in similar circumstances, — in the crush of life, when one gets into it and feels that there is one, only one path, and that it will be bad if one does not get on that path. This is what I think:

It is not given to us to know the will of the Father, what it consists in, what he wants, why he has been doing all this (if I may express myself so from old habit and for the sake of illustration), what the aim of your life and of mine is; and when we imagine that we know the aim of the Father, we get entangled in a most cruel manner. We cannot know his purpose, if for no other reason than because it is infinite.

But we know, and we can always know, whether we are doing his will, — what we live for, what he wants of us. He holds us as by reins, and we, as a horse, do not know whither we shall come and why; but we know by the pain, when we are not going where we ought to, and by the freedom and absence of restraint that we are going right. And so we know by experience and with our whole being that the first, chief, and only (the rest being embraced by it) sign of the fulfilment of God's will is this, that we feel at ease and not pained, and even joyous. He, loving us, wanted that of us, and we know that it is necessary.

The second sign, but in dependence on the first, is this, that others should have no pain, that my activity may not call forth a groan of suffering. Now, here is the problem: one, as it were, excludes the other. But "as it were"! When this seems so, it is a sign that life takes place in the crush, that there is not much of a path and it is of indifferent breadth, that the true path is narrow, as narrow as the point of a knife, but it exists. Feeling the sufferings of others as one's own, as you do, one can and must find that path which makes one feel at ease. That will be when I have done everything which depends on me in order to alleviate the sufferings of others. There exists, there exists that path, dear friend. You must pray, that is, commune with God, and this path will be found. The harder this search is, the more joyful it is. Yes, man must be free and almighty, and there is that one direction along which he is free and almighty, and it can be found.

But there is also a third sign, which I have found for myself. This is not a diminution, but an increase of the soul. This sign is dear to me in that it verifies the choice. If an act, a manner of life, a path, takes away or diminishes the soul, it is not the right one. I cannot say that this sign can be taken as a guide, — God forfend, — but to use all my forces in the search of a path between the sufferings of others caused by me and the oppression which I experience, and to lay out this path for myself, it is possible to verify its correctness by means of this sign.

The true food of life consists in doing the will of him who has sent us hither and in completing his work. But the will of him who sent us and his work is this, that, in the first place, we should pay the tribute for the life given to us with good deeds; and good deeds are those which increase love in men; and his work is to increase the talent, to add to the talent, our soul, which is given

to us. And the one cannot be done without the other. It is impossible to do good deeds, which increase love, without increasing the talent, one's soul, without increasing love in it; and it is impossible to increase one's talent, to increase the love in one's soul, without doing good to people, by increasing love in them. Thus, one depends on the other, and one verifies the other. If you do a deed which you consider good, but do not feel an increase of love in your soul, if there is no joy at this in your soul, know that the deed which you do is not good. And if you do something for your soul, and the good is therewith not increased in men, know that what you are doing for your soul is useless.

Seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and the rest shall be added unto you. Seek to be the doers of God's will, and nothing, nothing more. There will be everything: righteousness, and joy, and life, not to speak of bread and raiment, which are not needed. All that is needed is the daily bread, the food of life, of which Christ has spoken.

The fulfilment of God's will is the work of life; but wherein does the will of God consist? Shall we do this or that act, in order that we may do God's will? Shall we place ourselves in such or such conditions: give up the property, leave the family, arraign people? Shall we go to Nineveh or to Jerusalem? and so forth. And there is no answer.

Neither the one, nor the other, nor the third is necessary, and no condition or act corresponds to the fulfilment of God's will; it not only does not correspond, but it even interferes, because every action according to one's own will, every change of situation, is an insubmission to the will of God. But the fulfilment of God's will, like his kingdom, is within us: the fulfilment is not in acts,

but in submission, in a meek and humble relation to the demands of the life, in which one happens to be.

You say: the demands are contrary to conscience, or there are several contradictory demands, or none at all.

All you have to do is to bear yourself meekly and humbly in respect to the demands, if they are contrary to your conscience, that is, to refuse to fulfil them, without boasting or fury, but with humility and meekness; or, bear yourself with meekness and humility in respect to the demands which seem to be contradictory, turning away from your will, in the presence of God alone, and the contradiction will be removed. But it is impossible that there should be no demands. Even the mere needs of the body are demands, and it is possible to eat and sleep and cover oneself with meekness and humility.

Yes, the will of God is not in this, what to do (what to do life shows), but how to do. *How* is that which creates the true spiritual life.

I lately thought of this, that it is the business of a Christian to do the will of the Father; but wherein is the will of the Father? How are we to find out, so as not to make a mistake? Or I might begin to think that it is the will of the Father that I should preach, or live this way or that way, — live with the family, or without it. And if you begin to question yourself in this manner, you will never find out wherein is the will of the Father, and you will arrive at doubt and dejection: why are we commanded to do the will of the Father, and not shown in what it consists?

And this is the way I think about it: that the will of the Father is clearly shown to us, but that we do not seek it where it is shown to us. We think all the time that the will of the Father can be in external works, like Abraham's going into a strange land, and so forth; but the will of the Father is only in this, that we should be

meek and humble in the yoke into which we are hitched, and that, without asking whither, why, what we are hauling, we should pull as long as we have strength, and stop when we are told to, and should pull again when we are told to, and turn whither we are told to, and not ask why and whither. "Take my yoke upon yourselves and learn of me, because I am meek and humble."

Be meek and humble, be satisfied with everything and prepared for every situation, and you will do the will of the Father. Thus, to fulfil the will of the Father, it is necessary to find out, not what to do, but how to do what we are called to do.

Life is in the doing of the will of God. In what does this will of God consist?

Everything which we may set as our aim, as the will of God, — everything is insufficient, incomplete, — everything is only a sign, but not the will itself of God, just as an individual labourer cannot understand the whole work of the contractor. (However miserable and petty this comparison of the will of God is, that is, the comparison of everything, with the will of the contractor, it by its very inadequacy shows how impossible it is for man to understand the will of God.) We, too, have a sign that we are doing the will of God, but the will of God we never know. By all these signs we can tell that we are doing his will; but that wherein his will consists will always remain a mystery to us.

And so it must be. There could be no life, no eternal life, if the aim toward which we strive were intelligible to us, — consequently, finite.

But there are given to us the most incontestable signs that we are living according to his will, and not contrary to it, as the reins permit a horse to go in one direction only.

The very first, chief, incontestable sign, which we are

so prone to neglect, is the absence of a sensation of spiritual suffering (as with the horse the absence of the sensation of pain from the bit). If you experience full liberty, which is not impaired by anything, you are living according to God's will.

Another sign, which verifies the first, is the unimpaired love for men. If you feel no hostility toward any one, and know that people do not feel evil toward you, you are in the will of God.

A third sign, which again verifies the first and is verified by it, is spiritual growth. If you feel that you are becoming more spiritual, if you conquer the animal, you are in the will of God.

We know, we know for certain, when we are living according to the will of God; but we do not know God's will itself, and we must remember, must know, that we do not know and cannot know it, and must not put forth external aims, identifying them with the will of God, no matter how high these aims may appear, as, for example, the instruction of men in the truths of religion, the actual establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth, the indication of an example of a godly life, and many other things.

The mare knows for certain that she is walking according to the will of her master when the reins do not jerk her, but she does not know the master's will, and woe to her if she imagines that she does know this will. The master turns the bespattered mare from the highway into the mud and compels her to enter into a dirty yard, which is crowded with other horses. It seems clear to the mare that it is the master's will that she should pull a load along the highway, and she pulls the load; but the turning into the dirt of the yard and the keeping company with other horses, — that, according to the mare's judgment, is not what the master must want, and she is stubborn, and complains, and suffers. She does not know

that the master turned her into the yard in order to put the load on other horses and to feed the mare, for he is compassionate with her, expecting a colt from her.

Even so I have often been stubborn, complaining of my fate and of the reins which led whither they led me, and I suffered. It was all due to this, that I imagined a certain realization in the world of God's will. There, I have given up my property, have renounced all luxury, and live, showing by my example how one can and must live according to God's will. . . . Suddenly I am turned to one side, into the mud, where it is crowded. I think that God's work is retarded and impaired by this; whereas it is really being accomplished by it, so long as the signs are in evidence that I am living according to God's will.

I am seeking for the nearest consequences, and am grieved because I do not see them, and I do not know those consequences which are a million times greater and are obtained in this roundabout way.

We must live for the purpose of doing the will of him who has sent us into the world, and we must live in such a way that this will can be fulfilled. The fulfilment of this will gives us the right to live, or, to express myself more exactly, gives us the assurance that our life not only has a meaning, but is also necessary and needful for him who has sent us into the world.

But you will ask: "In what does this will consist, and how are we to know when we do it, and when not?" This will demands two things of us: a constant self-perfection and a constant coöperation with the establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth, that is, of an order of things, in which all men would recognize themselves as equal brothers and would love one another. In order that you may know with each piece of work whether you are doing the will of him who has sent you, or not, you

must ask yourself whether this work contributes at the same time to your perfection (but perfection consists in the increase of love) and to the establishment of the kingdom of God, that is, the increase of love in men. If the work satisfies only one thing, your perfection, but does not serve men by increasing the love in them; if it serves men, but does not evoke love in thee, increasing it, — it is not God's work, not the fulfilment of his will.

Briefly expressed, the meaning of life is this, that every live man is God's tool, a tool through which the higher power does its work. And so the meaning of life consists in doing in the best manner possible the work which this higher power demands of you. And you can always know whether you are doing this work, or not: conscience is an indicator of it. All you have to do is to listen to it and to try to make it more and more sensitive.

One has frequently occasion to hear and read controversies and discussions as to what should be the aim of human life, — internal moral perfection or the service of humanity, the establishment of the kingdom of God. This controversy can never be settled, because both sides are right: both aims are set before man and humanity, and one aim not only does not exclude the other, but, on the contrary, both coincide, and one conditions the other.

What aim must a mason set to himself in taking part in the work of rearing a structure, — the greatest perfection of the work of his day, or the building of the structure? The mason will reach the highest perfection of the work of his day only when he will have as an aim the building of the structure, and he can contribute to the building of the structure only when he will strive after performing the work of his day in the best manner possible.

Only by setting as an external aim the establishment of the kingdom of God, does man reach the highest per-

fection of life which is accessible to him; and only by striving after this highest perfection of life and obtaining it, does he coöperate with the establishment of the kingdom of God.

Both he who strives after the perfection of human life, after the establishment of the kingdom of God, without establishing it in himself, and he who strives after a personal self-perfection which has not for its aim the establishment of the kingdom of God outside himself, are equally in error and do not fulfil their vocations.

Man is placed in such circumstances that the only possible, true, rational good for him consists in the striving after personal self-perfection; but the personal self-perfection is such that it is attained only when man recognizes himself as a tool of God for the establishment of his kingdom.

"The kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you."

In proportion as a man attains internal perfection, he establishes the kingdom of God, and only in establishing the kingdom of God does he move toward internal perfection. Without the consciousness of this, that my effort coöperates with the establishment of the kingdom of God by the approach to the perfection of the Father, there would be no life. And so each of us lives only in proportion as he establishes the kingdom of God within himself and perfects himself inwardly.

The assertion that man may slight his moral obligations with the view of attaining general ends is like what a man would do if he asked: "What must the aim of a stoker, or water-carrier, or smith be in a manufacturing plant, — to look after the fires, haul water, forge a hook, or to care for the business of the whole establishment?"

Neither the one nor the other aim taken separately satisfies the demands of human life, because both aims are set at the same time before man and humanity, and one aim not only does not exclude the other, but on the contrary, both coincide, and one conditions the other.

In order to do God's will it is necessary to do his work; in order to do his work two things are needed, not separately, but both together: what is needed is reason and love, and truth and good; it is necessary for reason to be love-bearing, that is, for its activity to have love for its aim, or for love to be rational, that is, for love not to be contrary to reason.

An example of the first is the scientific activity of the mind: the investigation of the milky way, the finesses of metaphysics, the natural sciences, art for art's sake; an example of the second is the love for one woman, for one's children, for one's nation, a love which has for its aim, not the spiritual, but the animal good.

The fruit of the activity of reason is truth; the fruit of the activity of love is goodness. But in order that there may be fruit it is necessary for both activities to coincide. Goodness will come only from a rational love which is verified by truth, and truth will result only from a love-bearing activity which has for its aim the good of reason.

All this is not my invention, but I have seen it.

We all think that our duty, our calling, is to do various things: to educate the children, acquire a fortune, write books, discover a scientific law; but we need only one thing, and that is, that our life may be unimpaired, good, and rational, — not before men, leaving behind us the memory of a good life, but before God: to offer ourselves to him, our soul, better than it was, nearer to him, more in harmony with him. It is very hard to think so, still more to feel so. One gets so easily off the track in the

direction of human glory, but this can and must be. Help me, God! I feel it at times, and even now.

I have been thinking of what one ought to remember in moments of dejection of spirit, of grief, fear, annoyance, or anger at people:

Remember that your life is only in doing the will of God upon earth; but it is impossible to do the will of God: you can only increase your spiritual essence; and you can increase your spiritual essence by the observance of purity in your animal, of humility in your human (worldly), and of love in your divine life. But for the observance of purity you need privations, for humility — ill fame and humiliations, for love — the enmity of men toward you ("If ye love them that love you, what reward," etc.). And so, what you call sufferings, what you complain about, what causes you worry, what you are sorry for, what you fear, — all this is nothing but privations and pains, or ill fame, offences, humiliations, or enmity of men toward you; but all these are necessary for you, in order that you may preserve purity, humility, love, — that you may increase your spiritual essence, that you may serve the kingdom of God, — for life. And so I must not be grieved, but rejoice at privations, and humiliations, and enmity.

Indeed, could God have placed man in such a terrible position, where he would bear privations, humiliations, and enmity, without receiving his rewards for it? This is not possible, and it does not exist. It is impossible to answer whether there is any reward in the other world, or not. The question is incorrectly put. First it is necessary to change the false view, which ought not to be, from which such a question can arise. It is as though lazy people, starving as the result of their laziness, should ask whether they will receive a reward in the next world, because they are obliged to work in order to feed themselves. There

will be no reward; but we must understand that the work which gives bread is a necessary condition of animal life. Even so we must understand that the endurance of privations, humiliations, and enmity is a necessary condition of the spiritual life.

The chief delusion of human life is this, that it appears to each one individually that the striving after enjoyment and the disgust at suffering form the guide of his life. And man, all alone, without any guidance, entrusts himself to this guide, seeks enjoyments, and avoids sufferings, and assumes that the aim and meaning of life lies in this. But man can never live by enjoying himself, and cannot avoid sufferings. Consequently the aim of life cannot lie in this. And if it did, how absurd! The aim is enjoyments, and they do not exist and cannot exist. And if they existed, the end of life is death, which is always connected with sufferings. If a sailor decided that it is his aim to avoid the rise of the waves, whither would he sail? The aim of life is outside of enjoyments and sufferings. It is attained by passing through them. Enjoyments, sufferings, — they are the breath of life: the inhalation and the exhalation, the food and its discharge. To place one's aim in enjoyments and in the avoidance of sufferings means to lose the path which cuts through them. The aim of life is general or spiritual.

"Repent ye, come to your senses." You must understand the insipidity of the meaning which you ascribe to life. Look at yourself, and understand who you are, what you are, and what you live for. The personal good of the individual man, or even of the family or of the state, cannot be the aim of your life. He did not teach them anything new, but only opened their eyes to what they themselves cannot help but see, to this, that the meaning of human life does not consist in each man's acquiring his

personal, frail, deceptive, and short-lived good at the expense of another. The meaning of your life, he said to them, can be only in the fulfilment of that will which, for the attainment of its ends, has sent you into this life. But this will, which consists in the establishment of the kingdom of God, that is, in the union and love of all creatures among themselves, coincides with that fundamental striving after the good which lies in your soul. You must understand that your life is not yours, not your property, but his who produced it for his own purposes, and that the highest possible good is given you only under the condition of doing his will. Seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and the rest shall be added unto you.

Be always ready for that hour. Be ready for it, like a master watching his house, like the virgins with the lamps, meeting the bridegroom. And not only be prepared to meet this hour, but work with all your might that it may be near, as the servants had to work, when the master going away entrusted them with various amounts of talents, according to their strength (Matt. xxiv., xxv.).

One side of Christ's teaching, which is connected with everything else and is even fundamental, was completely obscured, and even concealed from us by his deification, namely, his teaching of the embassy. Remember how often and from how many sides he says that he is doing the will of him who sent him; that he is nothing himself, but that he is an ambassador and unites his life with him who has sent him; that his whole life, its whole meaning, is the fulfilment of the embassy. Only our recognizing him as a special being, and not as a man, such as we are, could have concealed from us this foundation of his teaching.

I have now arrived at it, and understand it with my whole being. Endless doubts and obscurities in life in

the fulfilment of Christ's teaching had always tormented me. I solved them the best I knew how, but I always felt my lack of clearness and firmness. And only now has it become clear to me that the solution of all doubts and difficulties in the execution of the teaching consists in this, that we do not recognize in life that one meaning which it has, and which Christ has pointed out to us, — the service of truth (that higher truth which you comprehend) and its implanting not only in men, but also in the whole world.

Life is given you with your reason for this very purpose, that you may introduce this reason into the world, and so the whole of life is nothing but this rational activity as manifested in me. Christ understood himself as an ambassador, and so taught us. Every one of us is a power which is conscious of itself, which is conscious of its common aim, and so joyfully tends toward this aim, — a flying stone that knows whither it is flying, and that it is itself nothing, a stone, and that all its significance is in this flight.

We need only make this view of life our own (namely, the force of Christ's teaching) and all terrors and doubts disappear. My chief work does not consist merely in keeping the five commandments, in not having any property, in not sinning, — all those are not works, but conditions under which I can be sure that I am fulfilling my calling, and forms of my interaction with others, — but my work is to live, by introducing the rational principle into the world, using for that purpose all the means at my command.

I can fall, sin, err, — the work of my life will not change in consequence of this, nor will my happiness and the peace of my life. But with this view the idle commiserations, and the wishes, and the terror of death, are annihilated, and the whole of life is transformed into the present.

If my whole life consists in shedding upon others the light which is within me, that is, if my life is in the light, my death not only fails to be terrible, but is joyous, because each of us with his personality dims the light which he bears. Physical death frequently contributes to that light in which life is centred.

The practical application is this, that each of us must place all the interests of his life in carrying the truth through life and implanting it in others, and then there will be no doubts and no sufferings and no idleness for him. Each of us is always surrounded by men, and so can always do his work of life.

How we must always remember our dignity of God's ambassador, to whom God's work has been entrusted! If I were the Tsar's ambassador in Turkey, how I would take care of myself! But now I am God's ambassador in the world, and so everything must give way to that. The Tsar may not find out something, but here it is impossible to conceal anything.

Man is an ambassador, as Christ has said, — that's it, an ambassador, to whom all that is important is to carry out what has been entrusted to him, and who does not care what they think of him. Let them think ill: sometimes that is necessary, provided the embassy has been accomplished.

We are sent to walk over that inclined path, carrying through it that light which has been entrusted to us. And all we can do is to aid one another on the path to carry this light, but we detain and push one another, and put out our light and that of others.

If we do not look upon our life as upon an embassy, there is no life, but only a hell. I must remember, not

only that I am an ambassador, entrusted with some work, but also that I am an ambassador who must guard, and uplift, and increase himself. Both are the same: one can uplift himself only by doing his work, and by uplifting and increasing oneself, one can do his work.

To live in godly fashion means to wish what God wishes; but God wishes the good of the world; but the good of the world is obtained by increasing love in it.

To live in godly fashion means to live for the good of self as not separated from other beings.

Does not to live in godly fashion mean to give life to others, to rouse in others the spiritual, true life?

One can live badly only with lusts, and well — with this alone: with goodness, with the desire, the effort to be good, better.

My life is not mine, — cannot have my good for its aim, — but his who sent me, and its aim is the fulfilment of his work. Only by fulfilling his work can I obtain the good.

You know that; but for me it is so important, such a joy, that I rejoice at every opportunity to repeat it.

The aim of life is the good. The good is only in serving God. Serving God is in the increase of love in the world. The increase of love in the world is obtained only through the increase and manifestation of love in oneself. But love in oneself gives us that greater good after which we strive.

The aim of life is as little the reproduction of ones like, the continuation of the species, as the service of men, — just as little the service of God.

To reproduce one's like, — what for? To serve men? And what are those to do whom we shall serve? To serve God? Can he not do without us what he wants? But he can want nothing.

If he commands us to serve him, he does so for our own good. Life can have no other aim than the good, than joy. Only this aim, joy, is fully worthy of life.

Renunciation, the cross, to give up life, — all this is for joy's sake.

The joy is and can be impaired by nothing, and is constant.

Death is a transition to new, unexplored, entirely new, different, greater joy.

There are springs of joy which never run dry: the beauty of Nature, of animals, of men, are never absent. In prison, — the beauty of the beam, the fly, the sounds. The chief spring is love, — mine for people, and the people's for me.

Beauty, joy, only as joy, independently of the good, is disgusting. I made this clear, and gave it up. The good without beauty is tormenting. Only the union of the two, no, not the union, but beauty as the crown of the good.

Mill says that humanity will get a greater share of happiness when every man will pursue his own happiness, under the condition of observing the rules and conditions demanded for the good of others, than when man will set for himself as his only aim the good of all others.

That is true, only that by the good of each individual we must understand his spiritual good, that is, his agreement with the will of God, or, more simply, the gratification of the demands of his conscience (reason and love).

Let each man seek the kingdom of God and his right-

eousness, let him put his life into this, and there will result the greatest happiness for all. But then it will turn out that the happiness of man will consist in observing those rules and conditions which secure the greatest good to all men, that is, we shall get precisely what Mill denies.

We are all labourers in life, charged to attend to the work of the salvation of our souls, — we may compare it with the watching of the fire given from heaven and kindled on the hearth of my body. My business is only to watch and kindle this fire within me (not to waste the material of this fire on anything but the burning), without thinking of what will burn from this fire or how.

It is not hard to thresh with several flails, but that things should go well, and the threshers should not get mixed (not merely threshing, but interfering with one another), one has only to think of oneself, one's measure of the beat on which to strike. But the moment you think of others and look at them, you get mixed. Even so it is in life. Think only of yourself, your work, and the work is this: to love, to increase this love in yourself, and not to think of others, of the consequences of your labour, — and the work of life proceeds fruitfully and joyfully. The moment you think of what you are producing, of the results of your labour, and begin to measure it with these results, the work gets mixed up and comes to a stop, and there is the consciousness of the vanity of life.

The master of life has given us work, to each one individually, so that the accomplishment of this work is very fruitful. He himself will utilize and direct this work, and will give it a place and significance. But the moment I want to find and determine a place for it and in conformity with it to modify it, I get mixed, see the vanity of the work, and am in despair. My business is to work, and he knows what it is wanted for, and how to use it. Man walks, God leads.

One work is, — to increase love in myself. I am a self-moving force, or a living spade, and its life consists in keeping the edges clean and sharp, and then it will work, and the work will be needed. Keep it sharp, and sharpen it all the time, — make yourself better and better.

What seemed irrefutable from the social point of view appears meaningless from the Christian point of view. This change is due to the change of aim which is placed before man. The Christian teaching puts a different aim in the place of the one set by the social teaching.

The aim which Christianity sets to people is not the good of this or that totality of men, attained by the fulfilment of the will and of the laws of this totality, but the highest good of all men and of the whole world, which is attainable by doing the will and keeping the law of God.

It is possible to think that we can live for God, coöperate with the establishment of the kingdom of God, mainly by persuading people to be good, to refrain from offences, — by establishing the lives of other men.

This is a delusion: we can live for God only by loving men, by manifesting love, infecting others with love, making them believe in love.

I must know this now by all means, and I decide that it is not necessary to arrange anything or to admonish people, but only to treat them with love and kindness. This is the strongest means for establishing the kingdom of God.

No proposition has so obviously been verified by me through experience as that the meaning of life is in the increase of love. As long as I remembered this and lived by it, I was unceasingly happy.

Our life, the life both of an old and a young man, is subject to the possibility of an instantaneous cessation, and so we must not put off the fulfilment of our life's work, — serving God and men, — but we must live and serve God and men at once, every minute of our life. But serving God and men consists in the increase of love in ourselves and in others, and this we can always do under any conditions.

It is man's task to fulfil in this life that for which he has been sent into it by God, from whom he has proceeded and to whom he goes. What God wants of man is that he should expend his life, his body, in order to serve the good of the world and the good of all men and of all beings. This a man can do by renouncing his animal personality and evoking in himself love for men and for all beings.

In man there is a spiritual, immortal, divine essence and his animal personality. If man thinks that his life is in his body, he will serve the body, will ruin his soul, and will not accomplish his task; but if he recognizes as himself his divine, spiritual essence and lives for it in godly fashion, and wishes for it what God wishes, that is, not his good, but the good of all beings, he will fulfil his task and will receive the true good.

If you have any power of activity, let it be one of love; if you have not, and you are weak, let your weakness be that of love.

As an athlete attends to the increase of his muscles, so you must attend to the increase of love or, at least, to the diminution of malice and lying, and there will be a full, joyous life.

I just thought that I must remember that the time for the fulfilment of the work set for me in this world is

on the decline, and that it is a sin to waste it unproductively, that is, not in the service of God's work.

No matter how much I have reflected on the question of the relation of God's work to the internal perfection of love, I cannot get away from that proposition that the problem of life — the execution of the divine work of the destruction of disunion — is equal to an increase of love, and that this work can be accomplished only through works in which there takes place an inner perfection in love.

I write and I think as follows.

The aim of life is the permeation of all its phenomena by love, — a slow, gradual transformation of an evil life into one that is good, — the creation of the true life (for the true life is only a life of love), — the birth of the true life, that is, of the life of love.

"What is the essence of that work which ought to proceed in parallel lines with a strictly regulated life?" you ask.

The work which you are called to do in life is of a twofold nature, though it is attained by one and the same action: the external work consists in this, that with our life we should coöperate in the establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth, that is, the substitution of concord, mutual aid, and union for enmity, struggle, and disunion, — a condition when all the spears should be forged into ploughshares, etc. We can contribute to this by truthfulness in words and deeds. The internal work consists in perfection, in the approach to God: "Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect." But in order that we may constantly improve, it is necessary to increase love in ourselves, that is, widen the circle of love in ourselves, to love, not because it is agreeable to us, but as God loves his creatures, in order to wish and offer them the good. But in order to increase love in ourselves,

we must not interfere with its manifestation and growth. It always strives of itself after increase. What interferes with the manifestation of love is the offences. Now, the offences consist in regarding as the good and as the aim of one's life the good of the animal personality, and not the increase of love. The increase of love is that action by means of which both aims are attained: the coöperation in the establishment of the kingdom of God, and the attainment of the highest perfection. . . . Such a life has a greater probability even of an earthly happiness than a worldly life, which has for its aim the good of the animal personality. Such a life does not exclude all the most accessible joys, which are furnished by Nature, and by merriment, and singing, and friendship, and communion with men and animals.

Life for oneself is torment, for one wants to live for an illusion, for what is not, and this not only fails to be happy, but cannot be at all. It is the same as clothing and feeding a shadow. Life is only outside ourselves, in the service of others, and not in the service of relatives and beloved persons, — this is again for self, — but in the service of those you do not love, — better still in the service of your enemies.

The whole life which I lead is only a *tâtonnement;* but life ought to be built firmly on this: to seek, desire, do nothing but good to people, — to love and increase love in them, to diminish enmity in them. The good of men? What is the good? This, — love. I know this in myself, and so wish men nothing but this, and work for nothing else. To live boldly by this, and not by groping, means to forget that you are a Russian, a lord, a peasant, married, a father, and so forth, and only to remember this: before you is a live man; as long as you live, you can do what will give him and you the

good, and do the will of God, of him who sent you into the world, — you can unite yourself with him in love.

I have experienced the joyous feeling of transferring the meaning of life to a desire to serve God by means of serving men, — a desire for the good for all men with whom I meet.

Such a life is possible and joyous.

Ask yourself well which of the two you want: that you be glorified at once, that you may see the fruits of your works, but that doubt in your work be possible? or, that you should be misunderstood and scorned to the end, but that your work should certainly be the work of God?

How terrible it is to forget God! But this is done imperceptibly. Works for God give way to works for men, for glory, and then for oneself, for one's bad self. And when you rub against this badness, you want to raise yourself again.

Frequently one wastes his spiritual powers for nothing. That is a sin. These powers are given for serving. They ought to be spent on nothing else; but, as it is, out of decency, out of ambition, out of apathy, you waste yourself in such a way that no strength and no time is left for serving.

Whether you have done what you ought to receives an enormous importance, because the only meaning of your life is in this, whether in the short period of life given to you you are doing what is wanted of you by him or it that sent you into life.

Are you doing the right thing?

The pagan conception tells you that your life is your carnal possession; Christianity tells you that your life is that vineyard which was given to the husbandmen with all the trees and the well and fruit, only that the husbandmen, making use of the vineyard, might give its fruits to the owner.

We are given but a short time to stay here. Now, now, we shall all be taken back there, all at once or singly, — some are being already taken away in our sight, — and we have the choice: to pass this short, indefinite period in a joyful manner, abandoning ourselves to our innate feeling of compassion and love for one another, or to quarrel, contend, fight, and with all cruelties to establish an order of things which, we know, will not last even a few years, and which we do not approve of; to pass the moment given to us, loving one another and practising mutual love and kindness, or to use all our strength for the purpose of tormenting and infuriating one another as much as possible during this short space of time, and with malice, reproaches, and curses to be taken back whence they let us out.

In the comprehension of truth, that is, of what is wanted of you by him who does his work through you, only in this does your life consist.

Seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and the rest shall be added unto you.

In caring for worldly matters, for what to you seems to be necessary for securing your carnal personality and the lives of other people who are bound with you, you will obtain, neither the good of this personality, nor the good of the other people, though you put it before you as your aim; but in caring for the truth of the kingdom of God, which is obtained by recognizing and fulfilling that degree of truth which is revealed to you, you attain both your own good and that of the other people, and fulfil what has

been implanted in your reason and your heart. How can you help doing this ?

Men have assured themselves that this is not important, that something else is important. But there is nothing more important in the world than performing the truth, which is revealed to man.

Nothing but this one thing is needed, namely, what we neglect, — the fulfilment in little deeds of the truth which we know. The fulfilment of the truth by every individual man is the most important work.

Man's life of suffering, which is liable to be severed at any second, not to be a coarse sneer, must have such a meaning that the significance of life is not impaired by its long or short duration.

If a man knew for certain that his life comes to an end with this life, what would he do in the decline of his years, in which I am ? All the present affairs have already passed into other, younger hands, so what is he to do ?

Only when you believe that life does not end here, there is left an always most important and always interesting and necessary work over one's soul, which does not perish, but will be necessary there.

Of late I have frequently thought of one long known consideration, which with especial vividness passes now through my brain and braces me up ; it is this : to express in the simplest and clearest form the meaning, essence, and aim of life, I should say, as it is said in John vi. 38, and especially 39 : to increase in me, to bring to the highest possible divineness that spark, that comprehension, which is given and entrusted to me, as a child is given to a nurse. This definition of the meaning of life is broader than any other, — it includes all the others.

Now, what is needed, in order to fulfil this, to raise up this child? Not luxury, but work, struggle, privations, sufferings, humiliations, persecutions, precisely what is many times said in the Gospel. And it is this which we need that is sent to us in the most varied forms, both in small and in large proportions. If only we know how to accept it all in the proper manner, as necessary, and so joyous work, and not as something annoying which impairs our so well-arranged life.

Generally the following mistake is made. They say: "Here are circumstances which impair or threaten to impair our good life; we must as quickly as possible obviate and overcome these circumstances, in order that we may be able to continue our good life." In reality we ought to look upon the matter in a directly opposite way: "Here was a life which we established with great internal struggle and labours, and this life satisfied our moral demands; but now there appear new circumstances, which put forth new moral demands: come now, let us in the best manner possible respond to these demands." These circumstances are not an accident which can be removed, but the demands of new forms of life, in which I must try myself and for which I must prepare myself, as I prepared myself for the preceding form of life.

God, according to my conception, needs no sacrifices. All that God needs is that we should keep and increase that talent, that divine essence which is given to us, which is entrusted to us, as the child is to the nurse, understanding by this talent not some mental increase or culture, but only the increase of our love for God and his creation, so that a man who fulfils this work of God will always inevitably fulfil everything else, and will, without knowing it, be in many ways useful to all men.

Life is given me only under the condition of doing works of love. Life is given me as a talent, for its increase; but life cannot be increased otherwise than by works of love. My true life is only the one which is increased by me. Thus, by not keeping this life, but expending it, I acquire the true, the eternal life.

The main thing is to understand what is said (Matt. xxv.), that our life is not given us for our enjoyment or pleasure, but that we are slaves, tools, organs of God, predetermined to do his work (but an apparently unnoticed work, which you will do, may be a thousand times more important than loud works, which are known to us), and if we do this work, we are happy, no matter where or in what circumstances we may be, whether well or ill, old or young. But his work is this: to increase the talent, the divine spark, entrusted to me; now, it cannot be increased otherwise than by loving our neighbours and serving them, as indeed it says at the end of that chapter.

To be firm and not lose courage it is necessary, above all, to understand clearly and not to forget the one rational and joyous meaning of our life, which is, not only that we should carry through this life, without putting it out, that spark of divine love, which is implanted in us and forms our soul, but also that we should fan it with all our might, in order that it may be carried into the other life, not as a spark, but as a flame.

Nobody can fail to recognize that we have all come from and are dependent on one and the same principle, which Christ calls the Father, and that the meaning of our life consists in doing his will, the will of this principle, and in using our life for the very work for which it is given to us. But this work, we all know indubitably, consists in this, that we should with every day and hour

of this life become better, that is, more self-sacrificing and loving, and participate in making the world at least a grain better than what it was when we entered into life. We must ourselves become better and make the world better; I believe all agree that in this lies the problem of man's life. Everything else, if this be agreed upon, may be yielded, or, at least, we may ask permission not to express any opinion about the Trinity, or about revolution, or about the Pope, or about Marx, and so forth. "I do not ask of you any belief in anything," we may say, "except that we must try to become better and make the world better."

That the aim of life is self-perfection, the perfection of the immortal soul, that this is the only aim of man's life, is just, if for no other reason than because every other aim is senseless in view of death.

These last days, especially yesterday, I have been feeling and applying to life the consciousness of this, that the aim of life is nothing but being perfect as the Father, doing the same that he does, that he wishes us to do, that is, to love; that love should guide us in minutes of the most energetic activity, and that we should breathe it in a moment of the greatest weakness. The moment something is hard and painful, we need only remember this, and everything hard and painful disappears, and nothing but what is joyful is left.

To a man who seriously, sincerely makes use of his intellect it is evident that all aims are closed to him; only one is rational: to live for the gratification of the demands of God, of one's conscience, one's higher nature (it is all one and the same). To express it in time, — to live in such a manner as to prepare one's soul for the transition into a better world; to express it precisely outside of time, — to unite one's life with its

extra-temporal principle, with the good, with love, with God.

I am afraid of one thing, — lest this for me so powerful and beneficently acting consciousness of the one rationality and liberty, of the joyousness of life in God, be dulled and lose its liberating action, which elevates me above the petty cares of life. Oh, that it were so for all! And always so! Last night I reflected in this light on various phenomena of life, and I felt such joy and happiness. I will wait for the examination, — I will prepare myself for it.

Last night I thought in a dream that the shortest expression of the meaning of life is this: the world moves, is being perfected; it is man's task to contribute to this motion and to submit to and coöperate with it.

To serve God and men, but how? With what? Perhaps there is not this possibility? It is not true, — this possibility is always given to you, — to become better.

There is but one meaning of life: self-perfection, — to improve one's soul. Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect.

When you are oppressed, when something torments you, remember that in life you alone are the life, and immediately you will feel easier and happier. As a rich man rejoices collecting his wealth, so you rejoice, if only you have placed your life in this alone. In order to attain this there are no obstacles. Everything which appears as grief, as an obstacle in life, is a broad step which places itself of its own accord under your feet in order that you may rise.

Each of us is a light, a divine essence, love, the son of God, enclosed in the body, in barriers, in a coloured lan-

tern, which we have still farther coloured with our passions and our habits, so that everything which we see we see only through this lantern. We cannot rise to look above it; above there is just such a glass, also painted by us, through which we see God. There is one thing we can do, and that is, not to look through the glass, but to concentrate ourselves upon ourselves, to recognize our light, and to make it flame up. This is the one salvation from the deceptions of life, from sufferings, from temptations. And this is a joy, and always possible.

I imagined vividly what a joyous, calm, and absolutely free life it would be, if we gave it entirely to God, that is, if in all circumstances of life we sought but this: to do what he wants, — to do it in disease, in insult, in humiliation, in suffering, in all offences, and in death, which then is only a change of destination.

And weakness, and non-fulfilment of what God wants? What then? Nothing: a return to the consciousness of this, that life is only in this fulfilment. Minutes of weakness are the intervals between the letters of life, not life.

The main thing is, that we are labourers, from whom the result of the labour is hidden, who are not permitted to make use of the work. One thing is possible: the participation in the work, the uniting of our interests with those of the master.

It is remarkable how this last deduction at which one arrives was definitely and in this precise form expressed by Christ. It is not even a comparison, but a fact. The whole life of men is work: work for the master (factory hands and others), the work of ploughing and sowing, of the harvest and again of sowing, the improvement of the soil, of the breeds, of the buildings, intellectual inventions, — all that is not for oneself, but for the use of all, and in all that there is a good in the work itself. Such is the

whole of life. We are permitted only to enjoy the good of the work itself. We are also permitted to transfer our interest to the interest of others, outside ourselves, to the interest of the master or the work; and this transference of the interest, this liberation of self from the interest of the perishing self, is possible only through work.

So it is in the labours of life. And just so it is in all life, if we look upon our whole temporal, carnal life, upon the direction of our will in this life (and we cannot look in any other way upon it), as upon labour for the work of God, or, more briefly, for God. Only if we pass our whole life with the purpose of fulfilling the will of God and of establishing the kingdom of truth, wherever we see it, and in the observance of the truth, in humility and love, even where we do not see it, — can we, in the work for God, renounce our own interest, in order to find an interest in the work for God. To say that you will make use of this work in the future is risky and inexact: it is impossible to say the rest. And why should it be? The participation in the work gives enough of the good. The moment you begin to take part in it, you feel the good; what, then, will happen if you give yourself entirely over to this work, and make a habit of it? Then the true good will be so great that it will not be necessary to imagine any other in the future.

Yes, this is a prayer which I will write down on my finger-nail: Remember that you are a labourer in God's work.

I have been thinking all the time of the harm of selecting an external aim for life. "Seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and the rest shall be added unto you." Sailor, be guided by the compass which is on thy ship, — a tiny needle which is a thousand times smaller than the ship, — and not by any visible object, not even

by the stars: everything is deceptive but what is within you. Do not trouble yourself about writing an important work, nor about this, that men may learn the truth, nor that you may remain pure in the eyes of men; trouble yourself only about doing the will of him who sent you. But the will of him who sent you is that nothing should perish of what he gave you, but that, on the contrary, everything possible should be resuscitated, brought back to life, expanded, purified.

It is true that thy work and thy power have been entrusted to me. Now, thy work consists in manifesting thyself in me and in the world. In this alone does my life consist.

It is true that in me is thy power, given to me for the purpose of fulfilling thy work. But thy work consists for me in increasing thy power in me and in the world.

I throw a chip into the whirlpool of the brook, and watch it circling around. A steamer is only a little bigger, but still such a chip; the earth is a mote, a thousand years are a minute. Everything is nothing, everything material is nothing; the one real, indubitable thing is the law by which everything is accomplished, both great and small, — the will of God.

A compositor who does not know the language sets type better in that he does not guess at the meaning in his own way. Even so we must live, without guessing at the meaning of what we are doing, — not guessing at the work which we suppose God needs, but doing one thing after another according to what God commands, — setting letter after letter. Not I, but he, has given a meaning to the whole.

In order to know the will of the Father, we must know his true, fundamental will. The son's will always coincides with the Father's.

There will always be left one mystery for man, only one: What do I live for? There is but one rational answer: Because God wants it. Why does he want it? This is a secret, and this secret is covered only by the belief in God, by the belief that he, who is good, has done this for my good.

I have thought vividly and with joy of this, that my life and, so I conclude, the life of everything is the power of God, the whole power of life, which passes through me, through a (limited and organic) part of all, and I can allow this power to pass through me, or I may try to check it. My whole rôle in life is this: I cannot check it, but I can try to do so.

The life of the world presents itself to me like this: a liquid, or gas, or light, is streaming in through numberless tubes of various form. This light is the whole power of life, God. These tubes are we, all the beings. Some tubes are entirely immovable, others move a little, others again more, and, finally, we are very mobile tubes. We can let the light through completely, or we may bar it for a time.

What we call our life, our personal life, is the ability to cross the light, — not to let it through; but the true life is the ability to stand in such a way as to let the light through completely, without barring it. But when a man takes up this position, the motion of his life comes to an end. It ends when a man begins to take up this position. The motion of life ends, and then a man feels that he has done everything which he ought to do, only when he has removed himself as though he did not exist. When a man recognizes this negation of his personal exist-

ence, he transfers his life into what passes through him, into God.

I wanted to express more clearly in words, what is true, that there is in me God's power, which does the work of God; then I convinced myself that this is unnecessary. It is enough that I am not I, but the power of God acting in me. And so it says in John v. 19: "Then answered Jesus and said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise."

What to us appears as the motion of our personal life is the motion of our form of life when we stand at an angle to the direction of God's will. But if we stand in the direction of God's will, it passes through us, no longer moving us, and then the illusion disappears, and we recognize that we, our life, is nothing but the power of God. Then there presents itself the necessity of transferring our consciousness from the integument of the form into the force of its direction. However, this difficulty is overcome of itself, and the question of immortality and of the future life is set aside. The consciousness of life is transferred from the moving form into the source of power, into the eternal, infinite will of God itself. From the consciousness of form I have passed to the consciousness of life itself. So how can I doubt that what alone exists, has been and will be, — that it will not die?

I am conscious of myself as of the power of life, which passes through me: the motion of my life is the wavering of this form, which stood at an angle to the direction of the power and which slowly took up a position in its direction. The axis of the direction is established, the motion stops, the carnal, personal life comes to an end, I pass into the power which goes through me.

But what is this infinite whole power? An eternal

secret, and we need not know any further. All I know is that death is not terrible to me with it. "Into thy hands I commend my spirit." The individualization, which was presented as the form through which I passed, comes to an end, and I unite with the *all*. I began lately to feel that when I die I shall not die at all, but shall live in everything else.

THE END.

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